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ABSTRACT 
The bargaining power of the Republic of Cyprus accommodation providers in 
contractual and non-contractual negotiations with large European tour operators 
Savvina Karyopouli 
This study examined the bargaining power of the accommodation providers (APs) of 
the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) when undertaking contractual and non-contractual 
negotiations with large European tour operators (TOs). Within a tourism and 
hospitality context there was an insufficient understanding regarding bargaining 
power, its antecedents, influencing factors and the implications for negotiation in 
business-to-business (B2B) buyer-supplier relationships. Bargaining power is 
embedded in B2B buyer-supplier exchanges, where parties engage in negotiations to 
exchange resources in order to achieve their organisational objectives and survive.  
A qualitative inductive approach was followed and an epistemological interpretivist 
Grounded Theory methodology and design adopted, combining elements from two 
versions of Grounded Theory: evolved and classic. Qualitative primary data were 
collected in two stages: an exploratory stage and a main stage. The exploratory stage 
was undertaken to better understand the contextual characteristics of the tourism and 
hospitality industry in the ROC and the actors involved and guide the main stage of 
primary data collection.  Sixteen semi-structured interviews, using a purposive 
convenience sampling technique, were conducted in the exploratory stage. The main 
primary data collection stage used purposive snowballing sampling and forty-five 
semi-structured interviews were conducted. Grounded Theory’s techniques were 
employed to analyse the data.  
This study has made contributions to knowledge, theory and practice. First, in terms 
of contributions to knowledge this study has extended the bargaining power concept 
within a tourism and hospitality context. As a result, it has advanced current 
knowledge of power relations between B2B buyers and suppliers. In addition, 
extending the resource-dependence perspective in the tourism and hospitality 
context assisted in determining dependence patterns that can influence various 
aspects of B2B buyer-supplier relationship, including negotiations. This study has 
also contributed to knowledge by advancing understanding regarding the role of 
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emotions in B2B buyer-supplier negotiations. Further, it has contributed to B2B 
pricing management knowledge by identifying that B2B pricing in tourism buyer-
supplier negotiations is also influenced by culture, relative bargaining power and 
relational factors (emotions) and relationship constructs, and not solely by 
rationality and market characteristics as frequently accepted by economic models. 
Second, a contribution was made to theory through the development of a substantive 
theory combining three core categories, resources, relational factors and market 
characteristics, in order to fully explain the bargaining power interactions in 
negotiations between tourism buyers and suppliers, from the weaker party’s 
perspective. Third, the practical contribution was made in terms of the explanation 
of bargaining power interactions and the implications for the contractual and non-
contractual negotiations of the APs with the TOs. This knowledge can aid perceived 
weaker parties such as APs to take more informed decisions in negotiations as well 
as to better manage their relationship with the large perceived powerful TOs. These 
were developed into recommendations for APs, TOs and Government. 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION  
1.1. INTRODUCTION  
The buyer-supplier relationship, within a business-to-business (B2B) context 
entails a process of resource exchange (Ramsay 1994). The efficient and effective 
management of these inter-organisational relationships is important for an 
organisation’s competitive success (Laing and Lian 2005; Crook and Combs 2007; 
Herbst et al. 2011; Meehan and Wright 2012). This is not suprising given the often 
substantial resource investments needed in many B2B buyer-supplier relationships. 
Hence succesful management of the relationship and the resource exchanges is 
critical for the organisation’s competitiveness (Laing and Lian 2005; Crook and 
Combs 2007; Herbst et al. 2011; Meehan and Wright 2012).  
In a B2B buyer-supplier relationship, that involves the exchange of 
resources, negotiation is an important aspect because during negotiations the parties 
negotiate the value appropriation (profit) for each party, shared distribution of 
responsibilities, anticipated benefits and costs (Dwyer et al. 1987; Ramsay 1994). In 
this process the parties  negotiate the terms of jointly acceptable resource exchange 
and the distribution of  consequent costs (profit) (Ramsay 1994). Thus achieving the 
best possible outcome during negotiations (whether contractual or not) is critical for 
both buyers and suppliers, particularly in the current dynamic and complex markets 
where organisations are under pressure to enhance their overall performance (Herbst 
et al. 2011). 
However, stronger parties, those with a higher bargaining power, have the 
ability to gain a better outcome in negotiations than the weaker party (Wolfe and 
McGinn 2005). This is because in negotiations a party’s ability to achieve the best 
possible outcome rests on the relative power that each party has in relation to the 
other (Dwyer and Walker 1981; Yan and Gray 1994; Kim et al. 2005; Crook and 
Combs 2007). This ability can be termed as the bargaining power of each party, 
which can be considered as the ability (or potential) of one party to influence the 
outcome of a negotiation process in their favour (Yan and Gray 1994; Benton and 
Maloni 2005; Crook and Combs 2007).  
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The power of one organisation over the other is determined by the level of 
dependence that each organiation has on the resources of the other in order to 
achieve their organisational objectives (Emerson 1962; Cook 1977; Pfeffer and 
Salancik 2003; Bacharach and Lawler 1981). That is to say, the higher the 
dependence of party A on party B’s resources to achieve its organisational aims, the 
higher the power of party B in relation to party A. Within a buyer-supplier context 
power can be considered as (a) the relative attractiveness of the resources; and (b) 
the availability of those resources that the supplier and buyer have to provide to one 
another (Ramsay 1994). The party with the ability to control valuable resources that 
the other party needs has more power than the other. Therefore, a better 
understanding of the resource dependence patterns that exist between two parties, 
such as a buyer and supplier, can help the parties to understand their bargaining 
power in relation to each other during negotiations. Within the B2B marketing, 
supply chain and strategic management literature this power-dependence perspective 
denotes the structural sources of power between buyers and suppliers (Brass and 
Burkhardt 1993; Buvik and Reve 2002; Cendon and Jarvenpaa 2001; Kähkönen and 
Virolainen 2011; Aminoff and Taskanen 2013).  
However, to fully understand the power relationship in B2B buyer-supplier 
context it is also important to understand how this power is exercised by the parties 
(the behavioural perspective) in order to achieve their desired outcomes. That is to 
say, the influence strategies used by the parties. Influence strategies refer to the 
method by which power is used and communicated by actors to influence the other 
party (Frazier and Rody 1991; Gelderman et al. 2008). These strategies can be 
employed by a party to merely coordinate with the other party or for more 
significant matters such as to comply with inter-firm agreements (Payan and 
MacFarland 2005). Both aspects need to be considered in order to fully understand 
the power and bargaining power interactions between the buyer and supplier in 
negotiations. 
Within this study negotiation is considered as a process and denotes any type 
of discussion where buyers and suppliers converse with the aim of reaching an 
agreement on a certain issue of mutual interest, whether contractual or not. This is 
because negotiations in a buyer-supplier relationship do not solely occur during 
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formal contractual agreements but can also be non-contractual. This is due to the 
fact that throughout the buyer-supplier relationship, environmental contingencies or 
complexities may appear that can lead the parties to re-negotiate the formal contract, 
make modifications, or negotiate to solve a conflict (Iyer and Villas-Boas 1992; 
Ganesan 1993; Lumineau and Malhotra 2011; Mouzas and Blois 2013).  
It is of great importance for organisations to understand and identify their 
bargaining power in relation to the other parties that they negotiate with. It is also 
critical to understand how this bargaining power can be utilised to aid them to 
achieve their desired outcomes as well as manage bargaining power asymmetries in 
their relationship. However, despite the importance of power and negotiations, 
research is still insufficient in B2B buyer-supplier literature (Herbst et al. 2011; 
Olsen 2011; Mouzas and Blois 2013; Olsen et al. 2014; Lacoste and Johnsen 2015). 
This is particularly relevant within a tourism and hospitality context where research 
on the B2B buyer-supplier relationship, its management, and power is still lacking 
(Zhang et al. 2009; Song 2012; Guo and He 2012; Ford et al. 2012; Gjerald and 
Lyngstad 2015).  
Within the tourism field a buyer-supplier relationship that is often 
characterised by power asymmetry is the B2B relationship between the large 
European Tour Operators (TOs) acting as buyers and their suppliers such as 
Accommodation Providers (APs). Specifically, the large European TOs are more 
powerful than their suppliers such as the APs (Buhalis 2000; Bastakis et al. 2004; 
Medina-Muñoz et al. 2003; Alegre and Sard 2015). The power asymmetry evident 
often allows the TOs to dominate the relationship, and particularly negotiations, 
restricting the profitability of the APs and reducing their competitiveness (Falzon 
2012; Bastakis et al. 2004). However, although various academics have identified 
the strong position of the large TOs in relation to their suppliers (Buhalis 2000; 
Bastakis et al. 2004; Aguiló et al. 2003; Karamustafa 2000; Medina-Muñoz and 
García-Falcón 2000; Medina-Muñoz et al. 2003; Falzon 2012; Alegre and Sard 
2015), research is still needed to fully understand power interactions in the 
negotiations between tourism buyers and suppliers and the management of these 
B2B relationships.  
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This research explores the contractual and non-contractual B2B negotiations 
between the APs and large European TOs in the Republic of Cyprus (ROC), from 
the APs perspective: a relationship characterised by bargaining power asymmetry. 
This was done in order to contribute to the current buyer-supplier knowledge by 
providing an in-depth understanding and explanation of the bargaining power 
relationship in negotiations between businesses within a tourism context by 
explaining the way bargaining power and its interactions may influence the 
negotiations and outcomes between buyers and suppliers. This should aid weaker 
parties, such as APs, to improve their bargaining position and better manage their 
relationship with more powerful parties.  
This chapter discusses the rationales for the study, specifically, the personal, 
academic and the study’s relevance to practice. The research location is then 
introduced and the aim and objectives of the study are outlined. Subsequently, the 
methodology and research design is presented. The structure of the thesis is then set 
out, followed by the conclusion. 
1.2. RATIONALES FOR THE STUDY  
1.2.1. Introduction 
The choice of this topic was based on personal and academic rationales as 
well as its relevance to practice. Firstly, the researcher had a personal interest and 
motivation to investigate the relative negotiating power of APs and large TOs due to 
her experience of working within the tourism and hospitality industry in the ROC 
and knowledge of the strong position of the TOs in relation to their suppliers, 
including the APs. Secondly, from an academic perspective, the theoretical 
limitations of the current B2B buyer-supplier literature, specifically within a tourism 
and hospitality context, are evident. Thirdly, this study could be of relevance to 
practice by offering important information to businesses on how to improve their 
bargaining position and better manage bargaining power interactions in their buyer-
supplier relationships. Accordingly, the subsections below discuss in detail the 
personal rationale, the academic rational and the relevance of the study to practice.  
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1.2.2. Personal rationale 
Within a tourism context, the distribution channel intermediaries, specifically 
the large TOs, are more powerful than their counterparts in other markets given that 
they are the main link between supply and demand (Ujma 2001; Song et al. 2013). 
The strong power that the TOs have in relation to their suppliers enables them to 
impose their demands in terms of, for instance, operational decisions, and product 
and pricing agreements (Buhalis 2000; Bastakis et al. 2004; Medina-Muñoz et al. 
2003; Alegre and Sard 2015). In turn, the profitability and competitiveness of the 
less powerful suppliers is often constrained (Buhalis 2000; Bastakis et al. 2004; 
Falzon 2012).  
The researcher’s knowledge of the unequal power of TOs and APs has arisen 
in three ways. Firstly, through her involvement in the accommodation unit owned 
and operated by her family in the ROC. Secondly, through her professional 
experience of working in accommodation units over a period of two years in the 
ROC. Thirdly, the researcher’s higher education focused on the hospitality and 
tourism industry, which enhanced her knowledge regarding the relationship of 
tourism suppliers and buyers. As such she was aware of the dominant position of the 
large European TOs in relation to their suppliers, such as APs, and that the TOs 
often control many aspects of their relationship (such as operational and promotional 
activities). In turn suppliers, such as APs, face many challenges in their relationship 
with the TOs.  
Her personal knowledge and experiences motivated the researcher to study 
this topic further to achieve a better understanding of the power interactions that 
occur between buyers and suppliers in the tourism industry and the way they can be 
managed. This understanding could aid the researcher to offer practical insights to 
the less powerful tourism and hospitality suppliers on two aspects. Firstly, how 
tourism and hospitality suppliers, who are perceived to have lower bargaining 
power, may increase their bargaining position in their relationship with large TOs. 
Secondly, how these suppliers can better manage the challenges that they face with 
the powerful TOs. As the researcher delved into these issues further the review of 
the B2B buyer-supplier literature indicated that this topic was in need of further 
investigation, accordingly the academic rationale is discussed below.  
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1.2.3. Academic rationale  
The relationship between the buyer and supplier has been the focus of much 
interest from various academics over the years within a variety of fields, such as 
business-to-business (B2B) marketing and management, supply chain and strategic 
management (Dwyer et al. 1987; Anderson et al. 1994; Dyer and Singh 1998; Cox et 
al. 2001; Cox 2004; Johnsen and Ford 2008; Terpend et al. 2008; Herbst et al. 2011; 
Aminoff and Tanskanen 2013; Lacoste and Johnsen 2015). This interest is justified 
given that relationships between organisations are perceived as a means for the 
organisations to attain benefits, accomplish their goals and survive (Wilson 1995; 
Hadjikhani and La Placa 2013).  
However, as indicated earlier, the buyer-supplier relationship is not 
necessarily an equal one and power imbalance is often evident (Meehan and Wright 
2012; Habib et al. 2015). Power refers to a party’s ability (or potential) to alter the 
behaviour or actions of another party to achieve the desired goals of the organisation 
(Weber 1978; Emerson 1962). The power of each party influences the formation, 
development and maintenance of the buyer-supplier relationship as well as the 
relationship exchange processes, the behaviour of the parties and negotiations 
(Mysen et al. 2012; Kähkönen and Lintukangas 2010; Nyaga et al. 2013).  
The academic rationale in terms of exploring and explaining bargaining 
power in the B2B buyer-supplier relationship of large TOs and APs within 
negotiations in the ROC was to fill the gaps in knowledge regarding the 
understandings of these relationships. This gap was evident in the lack of recent 
empirical studies that have focused on power and its implications in business 
relationships particularly within a buyer-supplier context, in the B2B marketing and 
supply chain and strategic management field (Caniëls and Gelderman 2007; Olsen 
2011; Olsen et al. 2014; Lacoste and Johnsen 2015; Chicksand 2015).  
In addition in the tourism and hospitality field research on power and buyer-
supplier exchanges was still limited (Zhang et al. 2009; Ford et al. 2012; Song et al. 
2013; Gjerald and Lyngstad 2015).  Only a few studies existed at the outset of this 
research that explicitly focused on investigating the bargaining power of large TOs 
and APs. Two examples of research that had been conducted are the studies by 
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Ivanov et al. (2015), which examined the influence of the bargaining power of APs 
and intermediaries (travel agencies and TOs) on the conflict resolution strategies 
used by each of the parties and Guo and He (2012), which from an economic and 
game theory perspectives investigated the effect of bargaining power on the revenue 
distribution between hotels and TOs.  
Other researchers have examined the challenges of conflict, control and 
cooperation that tourism service providers, such as APs, must tackle while 
considering the power asymmetry in their relationship with the TOs (Buhalis 2000a; 
Aguiló et al. 2003; Bastakis et al. 2004; Karamustafa 2000; Medina-Muñoz and 
García-Falcón 2000; Medina-Muñoz and Medina-Muñoz 2002, 2004; Medina-
Muñoz et al. 2003; Andreu et al. 2010; Lee et al. 2013). For instance, Bastakis et al. 
(2004) investigated the impact that the large TOs power had on small and medium 
hotels in Greece highlighting the importance of improving the bargaining position of 
these hotels in relation to the TOs. The above mentioned studies provide insights 
regarding the impact of power on the relationship between buyers and suppliers in a 
tourism context, and the APs and TOs in particular.  
However, the interactions that occur between the parties, and the challenges 
that the weaker tourism and hospitality suppliers face (such as APs), depend on the 
bargaining power, and thus the ability of each party to influence the other. The 
above mentioned studies did not explicitly explore the bargaining power concept in 
terms of its antecedents, how this bargaining power is exercised in the relationship, 
its implications on the negotiation process and outcomes to aid tourism and 
hospitality suppliers to manage these relationships. Furthermore, as noted in section 
1.1, both contractual and non-contractual negotiations occur between suppliers and 
buyers. This is because the parties may need to renegotiate the formal contract 
and/or make changes or negotiate to resolve a disagreement that may have arisen 
due to environmental contingencies (Iyer and Villas-Boas 1992; Ganesan 1993; 
Lumineau and Malhotra 2011; Mouzas and Blois 2013). In the tourism literature 
limited research exists regarding the contractual relationships and activities between 
tourism suppliers and buyers and the management of those relationships (Zhang et 
al. 2009; Song 2012; Guo and He 2012; Gjerald and Lyngstad 2015) but reviewing 
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the literature did not reveal research into non-contractual negotiations between TOs 
and APs. 
The above discussion indicates gaps in knowledge that restrict the full 
understanding by academics of the power relations and negotiations between buyers 
and suppliers in the service sector such as tourism and hospitality. Moreover, so far 
research into B2B buyer-supplier negotiations have been mainly focused on the 
relationship-specific factors that influence the negotiation process and outcomes 
(Herbst et al. 2011). There was a perceived gap therefore of a need to research the 
interplay of various factors, such as external structure and firm-specific, influencing 
the negotiations between the APs and TOs and their bargaining power, extending 
current understandings of B2B tourism buyer-supplier relationships.   
1.2.4. Relevance to practice 
An in-depth understanding of the power-dependence structure and exercise 
of power evident between buyers and suppliers was identified as being needed to 
advance knowledge in buyer-supplier research. This was particularly true within a 
tourism and hospitality context, which was the focus of this research. Power 
asymmetry is a common occurrence in tourism and frequently results in the uneven 
sharing of benefits between tourism parties (Song et al. 2013). However, as also 
stated in the above subsection, examination of the literature indicated that research 
on power, buyer-supplier exchanges, and the management of these relationships 
within a tourism context, was scarce and lacked the clear focus necessary (Zhang et 
al. 2009; Ford et al. 2012; Song et al. 2013; Gjerald and Lyngstad 2015) in order to 
entirely understand its antecedents and the implications for the relationship. Ford et 
al. (2012), adopted a sociological perspective of power, when discussing the 
asymmetric power–dependence relationship between tourism channel members. 
They noted that power asymmetries in the tourism distribution network might lead 
the weaker party having to consent to a lower share of the value for a service or 
product. They continued by stating that the critical importance of examining power 
asymmetric relationships in tourism, to gain a better understanding of its influence 
on the weaker organisation, that could then aid the weaker organisation in better 
managing these relationships.Through conducting this study in the ROC the 
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researcher hoped that the findings would increase understanding in three ways and, 
as a result, improve the bargaining power of the APs. 
First, by providing the parties with perceived lower power (the APs) with the 
findings of this research the APs will be in a better position to improve their 
bargaining power during negotiations and could utilise this increased bargaining 
power to achieve more favourable negotiation outcomes. This study’s findings will 
also assist APs to better manage their relationship with the large TOs.  
Second, although the research was focused on the buyer-supplier relationship 
in the tourism and hospitality industry in the ROC, it could provide practical insights 
for other tourism and hospitality suppliers in mature sun-and-sea Mediterranean 
destinations facing power relationships characterised by perceived asymmetry.  
Third, a better understanding of the power asymmetry that exists, and the 
implications in the relationship of tourism buyers and suppliers, could also help in 
enhancing the knowledge of tourism policy-makers regarding the challenges that 
destination suppliers face. Consequently, policy-makers can take more informed 
decisions when considering future tourism plans.  
1.3. RESEARCH LOCATION: THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS 
(ROC)  
The research was undertaken in the Republic of Cyprus (ROC), an 
economically developed island-state in the Mediterranean with a service-based 
economy. The island is divided, de facto, into the Greek-Cypriot controlled part in 
the south, the ROC, and the Turkish-Cypriot controlled part in the north, the 
“Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.” The ROC is an internationally recognised 
state, while the Turkish- Republic of Northern Cyprus is recognised only by Turkey 
(U.S. Department of State 2015). This research was carried out in the Republic of 
Cyprus and therefore only relates to the ROC. For economy of space throughout the 
research the words ROC, island and destination denote the Republic of Cyprus.  
The ROC is an established mature mass sun-and-sea destination focusing on 
the packaged tourism product. However, the destination faces many challenges that 
restrict its competitiveness such as dependence on the sun-and-sea tourism product, 
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reliance on a small number of source markets, high substitutability in relation to 
other destinations, tired accommodation infrastructure, seasonality and oversupply 
of accommodation units (Boukas and Ziakas 2013; Tsangari 2012; Farmaki 2012; 
Karyopouli and Koutra 2012; Sharpley 2007). These challenges also contribute to its 
dependence on the large European TOs for its tourism industry. Consequently, this 
gives the European TOs a powerful position in relation to the suppliers based in the 
ROC, in particular the APs. The research focuses on the coastal areas of Limassol, 
Paphos, Larnaka, Ammochostos (which includes the areas of Ayia Napa and 
Protaras). This is because these areas receive the highest number of tourist arrivals 
and thus the majority of accommodation units are established there and all the major 
TOs operate in those areas. The section below outlines the research aim and 
objectives.  
1.4. RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES  
The aim of the research was: 
To provide an understanding of the influences on, and the 
implications of, the bargaining power of the Republic Of Cyprus 
(ROC) accommodation providers (APs) when undertaking 
contractual and non-contractual negotiations with large European 
tour operators (TOs).  
Three objectives were developed to address this aim:   
1. To discover the sources of power of both the accommodation providers 
and the tour operators, from the accommodation providers’ perspective, 
in order to determine their bargaining power within the contractual and 
non-contractual negotiations; 
2. To investigate how bargaining power is employed within the 
relationship, from the accommodation providers’ perspective, in order to 
establish the influence strategies adopted by both parties during their 
contractual and non-contractual negotiations; 
3. To examine how bargaining power is exercised within the relationship, 
from the accommodation providers’ perspective, in order to ascertain the 
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consequences on the contractual and non-contractual negotiation 
outcomes. 
Meeting the above aim and objectives has enabled the researcher to generate rich 
insights that help in understanding and explaining the bargaining power relationship 
and interactions that the APs experience in their contractual and non-contractual 
negotiations with the large TOs.  
1.5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
This study followed a Grounded Theory methodology and design which was 
qualitative and discovery oriented by nature. More specifically, a Grounded Theory 
methodology and research design (combining elements of classic and evolved 
Grounded Theory) was followed in order to achieve the aim and objectives of the 
study (Chapter 5 section 5.3.1). This was because both evolved and classic 
Grounded Theory versions provided the researcher with important insights and 
useful guidelines on the research process.  First, evolved Grounded theory and its 
epistemological interpretivist lens, offered insights on the role of the researcher. It 
allowed the researcher to exploit her own knowledge and understandings to 
elucidate the phenomena under investigation, while at the same time acknowledging 
bias, and seeking to capture the participants’ meanings. Second, evolved Grounded 
Theory offered clarifications to aid the researcher understand the process of 
developing a theory, through more detailed guidelines during data collection and 
analysis process. Third, classic Grounded Theory emphasised the importance of 
allowing the data to speak for themselves. Thus, it assisted the researcher to 
understand the need to be flexible and open during the research process, particularly 
in relation to data analysis in respect of coding in a flexible and spontaneous way to 
focusing on what the participants were saying about the phenomena (bargaining 
power and negotiations).  
Both primary and secondary data were collected to achieve the data needs of 
the study. More specifically, primary data were collected at two stages; an 
exploratory stage and a main stage were undertaken. Using a purposive convenience 
sampling technique the exploratory primary data collection and analysis stage 
firstly, enabled the researcher to identify and establish the roles and links of actors in 
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the tourism and hospitality and to better understand the ROC context. Secondly, this 
exploratory stage assisted the researcher to refine the research’s focus based on the 
concerns of the participants. As a result this guided her in the main stage of primary 
data collection in terms of raising questions to further explore the concepts from the 
exploratory analysis and in terms of the choice of the types of participants. In the 
main primary data collection stage a purposive snowballing was the sampling 
technique employed to identify information-rich participants to further explore the 
concepts. Semi-structured interviews were utilised so as to collect rich and in-depth 
data on the specific issues (bargaining power and negotiations) while also offering 
the flexibility to uncover new issues based on the interests of each participant. 
Finally, the evolved Grounded Theory coding strategies (open, axial and selective) 
were utilised for data analysis to generate insights and explain the bargaining power 
relationship and interactions in negotiations of the APs with the large TOs.  
1.6. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS  
Chapter 1 introduces the current study to the reader. First, the personal, 
academic and practical rationales are discussed in order to explain the focus of the 
research and what it might offer in terms of contribution to knowledge. Second, the 
research location, namely the ROC, is presented. Third, the research aim and 
objectives are provided, Finally, the main elements of the research approach are 
explained.  
Chapter 2 reviews current scholarly work regarding the bargaining power 
concept and the buyer-supplier exchange and relationships, in order to offer a clearer 
understanding of the key phenomena under investigation. The chapter is divided into 
three key sections. The first section reviews the literature on the B2B buyer-supplier 
exchange focusing on negotiations, in order to define and clarify the characteristics 
and interactions of the buyer-supplier negotiations. In the second section the focus 
turns to the concept of power, particularly, the nature of power and its sources in 
order to offer a comprehensive understanding of power and its antecedents within a 
B2B buyer-supplier context. In the third section, the bargaining power concept is 
examined emphasising the sources of power and the exercise of bargaining power 
within a buyer-supplier context.  
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Chapter 3 discusses the tourism industry in order to aid the reader’s  
understanding of the industry context of the study. Specifically, a detailed 
examination of the tourism industry is presented regarding its characteristics and 
their possible implications for the bargaining power of the tourism buyers (TOs) and 
suppliers (APs). The chapter also discusses the characteristics of the relationship 
between the APs and TOs to offer a more detailed understanding of the contextual 
influences on the negotiations. 
Chapter 4 disucusses, in detail, the location of the research, the ROC, in 
order to provide a clearer understanding of the setting that surrounds the phenomena 
under study. Firstly, an overview of the economic, political and socio-cultural 
aspects of the Republic is presented. This is followed by a discussion regarding 
tourism development and the tourism product highlighting the challenges the ROC, 
tourism on the island generally and hospitality suppliers specifically face and how 
these factors contribute to the power of the large TOs. The characteristics of the 
accommodation sector in the ROC are also discussed. 
Chapter 5 discusses and explains decisions taken regarding the research 
methodology and design. The chapter explains the methodology and design adopted 
that combined elements of two Grounded Theory versions, evolved and classic. The 
data collection process and sampling design utilised, as well as the rationale for the 
semi-structured interview questions’ guide, are examined. Further, the chapter 
examines in detail the data analysis process followed. This is followed by the 
evaluation of the study, the ethical considerations and lastly limitations.  
Chapter 6 analyses and critically discusses the key findings induced from the 
coding strategies of Grounded Theory. Specifically, there is a critical discussion of 
the six propositions developed under the three categories from the open and axial 
coding. The propositions together provide a detailed understanding and explanation 
of the bargaining power relationship of the APs with the TOs in contractual and non-
contractual negotiations. In this chapter additional literature to that already reviewed 
in Chapter 2, 3 and 4 is utilised in order to better support the findings and to 
critically examine the issues. This is because the exploratory and inductive nature of 
Grounded Theory can lead to the identification of new themes that were not taken 
into account before data collection, thus directing the researcher to developing 
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theory. Lastly, the storyline is presented that narrates all the key relationships and 
phenomena identified in the analysis process, leading to the theory developed. This 
study developed a substantive theory since it offers an explanation of a situation 
within a certain area; specifically, it fully explains the bargaining power relationship 
and interactions of B2B buyers and suppliers in contractual and non-contractual 
negotiations within a tourism and hospitality context.  
In Chapter 7 the conclusion and implications of the major research findings 
are discussed. The study’s contributions to current knowledge and implications for 
practice are discussed. In turn, recommendations for tourism and hospitality practice 
are offered. Finally, avenues for future research are set out and final remarks are 
made.  
1.7. CONCLUSION  
This thesis explores the bargaining power relationship of the APs with the 
European large TOs in contractual and non-contractual negotiations, from the APs 
perspective, in one destination: the ROC. The following chapter reviews existing 
literature to critically examine the B2B buyer-supplier exchange relationship, 
particularly negotiations and the bargaining power concept in order to aid the 
researcher to address the aim and objectives of the study.  
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CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. INTRODUCTION  
The study of business-to-business (B2B) buyer-supplier relationships has 
received considerable attention from a number of scholars (Ford 1984; Dwyer et al. 
1987; Anderson et al. 1994; Dyer and Singh 1998; Cox et al. 2001; Cox 2004; 
Johnsen and Ford 2008; Terpend et al. 2008; Herbst et al. 2011; Lacoste and 
Johnsen 2015). This is due to the increased importance of issues of efficiency in 
organisational processes, value creation, and the significant investments needed in 
many buyer-supplier relationships that render the successful management of inter-
organisational relationships critical to an organisation’s competitiveness (Liang and 
Lian 2005; Crook and Combs 2007; Herbst et al. 2011; Meehan and Wright 2012). 
Hence, buyer-supplier research is highly fragmented because it is a topic of shared 
interest in B2B marketing and management, purchasing, supply chain and strategic 
management literature (Olsen and Ellram 1997; Ross et al. 2009; Kähkönen and 
Virolainen 2011; Aminoff and Tanskanen 2013). Research from the above 
mentioned academic fields is utilised, since they offer important insights which help 
us to understand the complex bargaining power dynamics evident in the buyer-
supplier exchange under investigation.   
This chapter reviews existing literature regarding the concept of power, 
bargaining power and negotiations within the buyer-supplier context. This literature 
was consulted prior to the primary data collection stage and utilised as a guide to 
address the aim and objectives. This was because, according to Grounded Theory 
strategy, a brief literature review can enhance the researcher’s theoretical sensitivity1 
and can stimulate questions during the first stages of data collection (Corbin and 
Strauss 2008) (Chapter 5, section 5.3.1). Further, for novice researchers, it is 
important to understand what is already known to avoid generating existing 
knowledge (Heath 2006). Therefore, this literature review helped the researcher in 
three ways. First, to better understand the concepts being studied. Second, to 
                                                
1 Theoretical sensitivity refers to the researcher being sensitive to the data in order to understand the 
subtle nuances of meaning in the data and grasp the relationships between concepts (Strauss and 
Corbin 1998; Kelle 2007). 
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establish what was already known. Third, to increase the researcher’s theoretical 
sensitivity and to establish the theoretical basis to guide the initial data collection 
stages, without preventing the data from telling its own story. However, due to the 
inductive nature of Grounded Theory new themes often arise that are not taken into 
account before the data collection. Consequently, additional literature is reviewed 
and utilised in Chapter 6 to analyse and explain the primary findings.  
With the above in mind, the study aimed to provide an understanding of the 
influences on, and the implications of, the bargaining power of the Republic Of 
Cyprus (ROC) accommodation providers (APs), acting as the suppliers, when 
undertaking contractual and non-contractual negotiations with large European tour 
operators (TOs), acting as buyers. This was important to understand, since parties 
which are perceived to be powerful often achieve the best possible outcome in 
negotiations and frequently ignore the interests of the perceived lower power parties 
(Wolfe and McGinn 2005). Hence, an in-depth understanding of the bargaining 
power dynamics and negotiations occurring between buyers and suppliers can 
advance current knowledge of the power interactions that arise. Further, it can aid 
the parties that are perceived to be less powerful, such as APs, and increase their 
bargaining position in relation to perceived powerful parties, such as TOs.  
Since bargaining power was investigated within a negotiation context, 
literature on the buyer-supplier exchange is examined in section 2.2. This is done to 
define and explain the negotiation process where the bargaining power interactions 
occur. This sets out the context of bargaining power dynamics and helps to address 
the aim and three objectives of the study (Chapter 5, section 5.2). Objective 1 seeks 
to discover the sources of power of the accommodation providers and the tour 
operators in order to determine their bargaining power within the contractual and 
non-contractual negotiations. Objective 2 investigates the way bargaining power is 
employed within the relationship, from the APs perspective, in order to establish the 
influence strategies adopted by both parties during their contractual and non-
contractual negotiations. Objective 3 examines the way the bargaining power is 
exercised within the relationship, from the APs perspective, in order to ascertain the 
consequences on the contractual and non-contractual negotiation outcomes. 
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However, to examine the bargaining power of the parties and address the 
study’s aim and objectives, it is important to firstly understand the concept of power. 
Therefore, section 2.3 reviews the power relations literature within a buyer-supplier 
context to better understand its influence of power in the buyer-supplier exchange. 
This discussion also sets the scene for examining the concept of power, focusing on 
its antecedents, definition and aspects to be considered when investigating 
bargaining power and its interactions between the APs and TOs. As such, the 
literature indicates the importance of exploring both the structural and behavioural 
(use of) perspectives of power in order to fully understand bargaining power 
interactions and their implications for negotiations.  
In section 2.4 the concept of bargaining power within a buyer-supplier 
context adopted in this thesis is defined, and the theoretical perspectives taken to 
investigate the structural sources and behavioural aspects of bargaining power are 
discussed. The resource-dependence and power-dependence perspectives are 
explained, highlighting the various sources of power identified within the buyer-
supplier literature. This aids determination of the relative bargaining power of the 
parties, thus directly addressing Objective 12, which sets out to identify the sources 
of power of the APs and TOs. Section 2.4 also discusses the behavioural aspect. 
This discussion focuses on the theoretical perspective taken into account to examine 
the exercise of bargaining power within a buyer-supplier context. As such, it 
addresses Objective 23, which investigates the exercise of bargaining power in order 
to identify the influence strategies adopted by the APs and TOs.  
All the literature reviewed in this chapter also makes it possible to tackle 
Objective 34, which focuses on investigating how the use of bargaining power 
influences negotiation outcomes. As noted earlier, when using Grounded Theory, 
                                                
2 Due to the Grounded Theory strategy, in Chapter 6 additional literature is utilised to better support 
the findings. Hence, to address Objective 1, literature on exchange partner selection within the 
business-to-business (B2B) marketing, supply chain and strategic management field is also utilised. 
3 Taking into account the Grounded Theory approach taken in this study, to fully address Objective 2, 
supplementary literature is utilised in Chapter 6. Specifically, additional literature on B2B 
relationship marketing management, supply chain management, contract theory, influence strategies 
in B2B marketing management, and emotions literature drawing from organisational behaviour, 
negotiations and B2B marketing management is utilised. 
4 Bearing in mind the Grounded Theory strategy adopted, in Chapter 6, the additional literature 
employed to critically analyse the findings and fully address Objective 3 considers pricing research in 
B2B marketing management and strategic management within a buyer-supplier context. 
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researchers can perform a brief literature review to guide initial primary data 
collection and enhance their theoretical sensitivity. The author deemed that 
developing a prior understanding of the bargaining power concept and buyer-
supplier negotiations helped in two ways. First, it enabled her to raise questions for 
initial data collection. Second, it increased her theoretical sensitivity, allowing her to 
understand the relevance and pertinence of the participant’s statements, and of 
incidents observed in theoretical terms in order to fully explain the phenomena 
investigated, whilst also allowing her the freedom to follow the data and avoid 
forcing preconceived ideas on the data. This enabled her to explore the implications 
of bargaining power dynamics on the negotiation outcomes between the APs and 
TOs with an open mind.  
Furthermore, the literature reviewed helped to ascertain gaps in the literature. 
It was found that research is needed to fully understand the buyer-supplier 
negotiations in terms of the challenges the parties face, strategies utilised and how 
the contracts are expressed and enforced (Herbst et al. 2011; Mouzas and Blois 
2013; Thomas et al. 2013). It was also observed that insufficient recent empirical 
studies existed that explicitly investigated power and the implications of power 
asymmetry within a buyer-supplier context (Levina and Orlikowski 2009; Caniëls 
and Gelderman 2007; Olsen 2011; Lacoste and Johnsen 2015). These gaps should be 
addressed to gain new insights into the implications of asymmetric bargaining power 
in buyer-supplier negotiations, and as a result expand current knowledge.  
2.2. THE BUYER-SUPPLIER EXCHANGE: NEGOTIATIONS  
A relationship between a buyer and supplier centres around a process of 
resource exchange, where organisations possess or control resources but also have 
external needs (Ramsay 1994). Organisations enter relationships with supply chain 
partners with the goals of gaining access to the external resources needed, mitigating 
transactional costs and increasing their performance (Wang and Xiang 2007; 
Mandják et al. 2012; Nyaga et al. 2013). Therefore, exchange relationships between 
organisations are considered to be a means for organisations to obtain benefits, 
achieve their goals and survive (Wilson 1995; Hadjikhani and La Placa 2013).  
An exchange between two organisations is evident when “[…] resources are 
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transferred from one party to the other in return for resources controlled by the other 
party” (Blois 2002, p.524). Using a purchasing lens, Ramsay (1994) explained that 
the process of resource exchange indicates the beginning of the buyer-supplier 
relationship. He continued to explain the exchange process as follows: suppliers 
need to gain money through sales revenue, while buyers need to attain products that 
they cannot currently provide themselves. In turn the buyer organisation converts its 
needs into purchase specifications that are employed in order to assess the product 
offered by the supplier.  
Once a satisfactory pairing is found between the buyer’s specifications and 
the supplier’s product offering then the supplier’s external resource need (money) 
becomes a desire to sell to that specific buyer (buyer selection) and the buyer’s 
external resource need (product) becomes a desire to buy from the specific supplier 
(supplier selection). In order to satisfy their shared desires a bargaining process 
occurs between the buyer and supplier where the parties negotiate the conditions of 
mutually agreeable exchanges of resources and the allocation of subsequent costs 
(profit) (Ramsay 1994). Therefore, suppliers and buyers engage in negotiations in 
order to satisfy their external resource needs and gain benefits through establishing a 
contractual relationship. 
Negotiations between buyers and suppliers is a major concern given that they 
determine the level of value appropriation (profit) for each party, and influence the 
costs incurred by the organisation and the expected benefits from the relationship 
(Cox 2001; Ramsay 2004; Srivastava and Chakravarti 2009). This is particularly 
important in the current complex environment where organisations are under 
extreme pressure to gain the best possible outcomes in each of their buyer-supplier 
exchanges (negotiation) (Herbst et al. 2011). 
Inter-organisational negotiations have been defined by various scholars (for 
example Zartman 1974; Ramsay 1994; Rinehart and Closs 1991; Gulbro and Herbig 
1995; Mintu-Wimsatt and Calantone 1996; Herbst et al. 2011; Thomas et al. 2013). 
Table 1 below provides definitions that have been developed by scholars to define 
negotiations in a business context. The first column gives the name of the author and 
year of publication and the second column the definition.  
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Author(s)/Year Definition 
Zartman (1974) 
“[…] negotiation may be called the process of 
combining divergent view-points to reach a 
common agreement.” (p.386) 
Thompson (1990) 
“[N]egotiation is the process whereby 
individuals attempt to settle what each shall 
give and take or perform and receive in a 
transaction between them.” (p.516) 
Rinehart and Closs (1991)  
 “[…] the process leading to a mutually 
acceptable agreement between two or more 
parties on some course of action.” (p.123) 
Gulbro and Herbig (1995)  
“[N]egotiation is the process by which at least 
two parties try to reach an agreement on matters 
of mutual interest.” (p.19) 
Mintu-Wimsatt and Calantone (1996)  
A process where buyers and suppliers 
endeavour to merge conflicting interests and 
reach an agreement. 
Ramsay (2004) 
 “[N]egotiation is an information processing 
activity involving the manipulation of data from 
a variety of different sources.” (p.223) 
Herbst et al. (2011) 
[Business] negotiations are “[…] single 
interaction episodes” where the conditions for 
the exchange are negotiated between the 
partners (p.967).  
Thomas et al. (2013) 
Negotiation “[…] a single interaction between 
parties where exchange conditions are 
determined.” (p.97). 
Powell Thomas (2013) 
“[A] buyer-supplier negotiation is defined as a 
process by which two or more parties 
representing different organisations interact to 
make a joint decision on some course of 
action.” (p.33).  
Table 1: Definitions of negotiations. (developed by the author).  
Three common aspects arise from the definitions reviewed in the Table 1, 
namely: (a), negotiation is a process that occurs between two or more parties (such 
as buyer and supplier); (b), the parties engaged in negotiations have divergent views; 
and (c) the negotiations between the buyers and suppliers do not solely refer to 
reaching an agreement in terms of the formal contract. In other words, buyers and 
suppliers enter the process of negotiation with each other because they are interested 
in cooperating with, and accessing the resources of, the other party (Ramsay 1994). 
However, more often than not, buyers and suppliers have conflicting interests, given 
that each party must endeavour to satisfy the demands and expectations of their 
respective organisations (Clopton 1984; Powell Thomas 2013). Hence, during 
negotiations the diverse views of the parties must converge to reach a mutually 
acceptable agreement. 
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Further, negotiations between the buyers and suppliers can occur for various 
reasons and throughout their relationship and not only to establish a formal contract 
(Powell-Thomas 2013). For instance, due to environmental contingencies or 
difficulties that may arise, parties may renegotiate the contract, make adjustments, or 
negotiate to resolve conflict (Iyer and Villas-Boas 2003; Ganesan 1993; Lumineau 
and Malhotra 2011; Mouzas and Blois 2013). Within this thesis this type of 
negotiation is termed a non-contractual negotiation. This is because these 
negotiations are informal and occur outside the formal contractual negotiations that 
take place to establish the contract. Non-contractual exchanges and interactions are 
also important to understand given that relationship behaviour and outcomes do not 
only occur via actions described in the contracts (Aminoff and Tanskanen 2013). 
Hence, contractual (formal) and non-contractual (informal) forms of negotiation are 
inevitably evident between suppliers and buyers. Consequently, negotiation within 
this study refers to:  
a process where buyers and suppliers converse to combine their differing views, 
with the aim of reaching an agreement on a certain issue of mutual interest, whether 
contractual or not. 
The negotiation process that occurs leads to a negotiation outcome which refers to a 
certain point in the negotiation process where the supplier and buyer reach some 
form of agreement regarding the issue(s) discussed (Rinehart and Page 1992). The 
agreement is  “[…] the product” of the negotiation process (Thompson 1990, p.516). 
This outcome could, for instance, denote an agreement or a disagreement regarding 
the purchasing contract, the mutual decision on price, the volume of sales, the 
delivery date, the discounts and guarantees or the decision on a future joint action 
(Cox 2001; Atkin and Rinehart 2006; Herbst et al. 2011; Powell-Thomas 2013). The 
issues discussed and agreed upon during the contractual and non-contractual 
negotiations between the buyers and suppliers determine the value distribution 
(profit), expected benefits, and costs of the exchange relationship (Cox 2001; Crook 
and Combs 2007; Srivastava and Chakravarti 2009).  
Further, negotiation interactions between buyers and suppliers can have an 
impact in terms of the future of the relationship (Ganesan 1993; Powell-Thomas 
2013; Thomas et al. 2013). For instance, Thomas et al. (2013) identified that when 
suppliers and buyers adopt a more competitive negotiation approach (winning at the 
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expense of the other party), the communication quality and intention to share 
knowledge is reduced, particularly in highly interdependent relationships. This is 
because, in relationships where the parties are equally dependent on each other and 
expect mutual benefits, a competitive approach can be perceived as damaging to the 
expectation that these benefits will be achieved, thus restricting the intention to 
share knowledge (Thomas et al. 2013). Hence, buyer-supplier negotiations can 
influence a relationship beyond the economic outcome of price and volume of sales, 
increasing their importance for buyers and suppliers.  
Despite the importance of contractual and non-contractual negotiations, and 
the interactions between buyers and suppliers, empirical research exploring these 
phenomena is still needed within a buyer-supplier context (Ford et al. 2010; Herbst 
et al. 2011; Mouzas and Blois 2013; Thomas et al. 2013). More specifically, Herbst 
et al. (2011) reviewed 45 years’ worth of marketing studies that addressed buyer-
supplier negotiations and concluded that research was still needed to identify the 
challenges that parties face and to examine the strategies and tactics used within the 
negotiation process. Furthermore, an examination of the nature of the contractual 
and non-contractual relationship between parties may offer new insights into the 
manifestations of formal agreements (Mouzas and Blois 2013). This could lead to an 
understanding of the factors that may influence contractual decisions, and how 
contracts are expressed and enforced in power asymmetric relationships, expanding 
current knowledge on buyer-supplier negotiations. The section below discusses in 
detail the antecedents of the concept of power within the buyer-supplier relationship.  
2.3. POWER IN A BUYER-SUPPLIER CONTEXT  
2.3.1. Importance of power in a buyer-supplier context  
A critical factor that influences B2B relationships, and the outcomes of 
various transactions, is the relative power of the parties involved (Cox 2001, 2007). 
Power is central to understanding distribution channel and supply chain relationships 
in general and the buyer-supplier relationship in particular (El-Ansary and Stern 
1972; Dwyer and Walker 1981; Hingley 2005; Mysen et al. 2012; Lacoste and 
Johnsen 2015). This is because the power that each party has will impact on the 
formation, development, and preservation of relationships between suppliers and 
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buyers (Kähkönen and Lintukangas 2010). For instance, the power of each party 
influences the supplier’s and buyer’s willingness to collaborate, the level of 
commitment to the relationship, satisfaction of the parties, conflict, and relationship 
exchange processes and behaviour (Wilkinson 1981; Zhao et al. 2008; Benton and 
Maloni 2005; Kähkönen and Lintukangas 2010; Nyaga et al. 2013). Specifically in a 
negotiation process an important aspect of gaining the best possible outcome is an 
organisation’s (or party’s) relative power in terms of the other party (Dwyer and 
Walker 1981; Yan and Gray 1994; Wolfe and McGinn 2005; Kim et al. 2005; Crook 
and Combs 2007). 
Notwithstanding the significance of power, and its implications in B2B 
relationships, the study of power in buyer-supplier relationships has been mainly 
addressed as a side issue in the recent B2B marketing, purchasing and supply chain, 
and strategic management literature (Hingley 2005; Levina and Orlikowski 2009; 
Caniëls and Gelderman 2007; Olsen 2011; Lacoste and Johnsen 2015). This could 
be attributed to the misconception that power and power asymmetry is associated 
with negative implications for inter-organisational relationships, for example 
preventing the building of close relationships and causing conflict (Hingley 2005; 
Olsen et al. 2014; Nyaga et al. 2013). As a result the study of power has been 
diminished in favour of other relationship aspects at play such as trust and 
commitment (Olsen et al. 2014).  
Hence, recent empirical studies that explicitly examined the concept of 
power and its implications in a B2B relationship (buyer-supplier for example) are 
inadequate (Caniëls and Gelderman 2007; Olsen 2011; Olsen et al. 2014; Lacoste 
and Johnsen 2015). As Hingley (2005, p.562) argued “[P]ower is ever present” and 
exists side-by-side with other relationship aspects such as trust and commitment. 
Therefore, power is a major influencing factor within a buyer-supplier relationship 
and its investigation is worthwhile to enhance scholarly knowledge of buyer-
supplier exchanges. This is even more important in relationships where the power 
asymmetry that exists may leave the weaker party at a disadvantage in its exchanges 
with the stronger party. As such it is critical to understand the nature and 
implications of the power structure between buyers and suppliers (Nyaga et al. 
2013).  
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To fully understand the bargaining power interactions that occur in buyer-
supplier negotiations it is important to understand what is meant by power and its 
antecedents. Hence, the section below discusses the debates that exist regarding the 
nature of power to elucidate the phenomena. Due to the importance of power as a 
construct its literature is vast and dispersed across various fields, therefore, the aim 
is not to give a full overview5 of the perceptions of power, but rather to examine the 
key ideas relevant to this study.  
2.3.2. Defining power 
The notion of power has been contested by many researchers over the years 
(Wrong 1979; Pfeffer 1981; Dahl 1957; Emerson 1962; Lukes 2005). Power has, for 
example, been perceived as a property or attribute possessed by persons, groups or 
bigger social structures, or as a guide in explaining an active or inter-active action or 
relation between individual people or groups (Wrong 2009; Dahl 1957; Weber 1978; 
Haugaard 2002; Clegg 1979; Lukes 2005). Consequently, due to the various 
opinions regarding the utility of power as a concept, and its antecedents, there is no 
universally accepted definition of power in the literature (Wrong 1979; Gaski 1984; 
Mitchell et al. 1997; Meehan and Wright 2012). Authors such as Minogue (1959), 
James (1964) and Partridge (1963, p.107), therefore agree that power, as a concept 
or phenomenon “[…] is too amorphous, sprawling or chameleon-like ever to be 
amenable to exact identification”.  
However, Hawley (1963) highlighted that all relationships and moments of 
interaction that take place between actors can be explained through the concept of 
power and the use of power. This is because in all social relationships or 
interactions, control and influence over each other’s behaviour is reciprocal (Hawley 
1963). Thus, regardless of the discipline of a researcher, power will probably be 
taken into account in any systematic investigation which endeavours to examine the 
dynamics of social reality such as the relationship between a buyer and a supplier 
(Rogers 1974; Stannack 1996). 
                                                
5 Full overviews of the issues and interpretations of power as a concept have been produced by a 
number of authors, see for example Haugaard (2002) or Wrong (1979). 
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A major debate regarding the nature of power centres upon whether power is 
possessed or exercised (Avelino 2011; Brass and Burkhardt 1993). For instance, 
Foucault (1982, p.788) argued that power “[…] is a way in which certain actions 
modify others”, thus, “[…] power exists only when it is put into action”; or in other 
words, power can only be real when it is exercised on others. Other scholars view 
power as a possession. Parsons (1967), for instance, claimed that power is possessed 
by one person or group, and hence perceives power as a capacity to secure and direct 
others towards collective ends. Similarly, Hobbes (2010) perceived power as an 
individual’s means of creating some future good.  
However, as Avelino (2011, p.57) pointed out, regardless of whether an 
individual believes that power is exercised or possessed, the question that lingers is 
“[…] what is exercised”. In particular, is power an ability ‘to’ act to accomplish an 
aim or is power a social relationship where one actor exercises power ‘over’ another 
actor? Wrong (1979, p.1) claimed that in the English dictionary the word ‘power’ is 
synonymous with “[…] capacity, skill, or talent”. Such usage denotes the “[…] 
capacity to engage” in specific types of performance, in other words the ability to 
create an effect on the outside world “[…] the power to act itself” (Wrong 1979, 
p.1).  
This view has been criticized for neglecting the relational aspect of power, or 
the hierarchical attribute of power, in that power is “[…] exercised over someone” 
(Giddens 1968, p.264; Emerson 1962). Moreover, Dahl (1957, p.203), highlighting 
the relational aspect, argued that simply stating that one actor has power over 
another is not precise or revealing. Using as an example the President and Congress, 
he maintained that stating that the “[…] President has (some) power over the 
Congress” may be more accurate but is not helpful. He continued by asserting that 
“[…] the source, domain or base of the President’s power over Congress” will offer 
a more comprehensive view. This is because, the source of the power is inactive or 
inert, and therefore, it has to be used in some way in order to change the behaviour 
of others. Such a view reveals another contested issue regarding the nature of power: 
that is, whether power only exists when it is exercised, or whether it is possible for 
an individual to be thought of as powerful before that power is actually exercised.  
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Some scholars have argued that the capacity to complete acts of control and 
the actual completion of these acts are different (Wrong 1979; Bacharach and 
Lawler 1981; Rogers 1974). Power is, more often than not, believed to be the ability 
of an actor to influence others. However, Rogers (1974) stated that having an ability 
to influence implies that an individual might, or might not, use this power to 
influence the other party. Therefore, having an ability to influence does not signify 
social action. Still, the capacity of an actor to alter the behaviour of others is an 
important social occurrence. As Wrong (1979) argued, when power is considered as 
a capacity or ability it refers to the actual capacity (possession) that is dormant in the 
actor himself, even when it is not exercised to create an actual change in the 
behaviour of other actors. This is because individuals may, and often will, assess 
each other’s capacities in order to orientate their behaviour based on those 
assessments (Rogers 1974). In particular, the perceived capacity of an actor to 
influence can influence behaviour, even though the exercise of power is not evident. 
Therefore, based on the above arguments, the possession of power and the exercise 
of power could be distinct notions, since the capacity or possession of power by an 
individual could alter the behaviour of others. 
Emerson (1972, p.391), however, maintained that “[…] to have a power 
advantage is to use it”, thus making no distinction within the two. This is in support 
of Barnes (1988), who claimed that power should be thought of as both, a potential 
or capacity which may be utilised or not, and as ‘possessed’ by an actor. He 
continued, stating that power exists in the social setting (context) and external to its 
possessor (Barnes 1988). Additionally, to perceive power only as a possession is to 
run the risk of over emphasising the power of the power-holder and to ignore the 
fact that power is first and foremost a relation between actors (Wrong 1979). The 
possession of power as well as the exercise of power are inherent within a social 
context and are only evident within a relationship (Avelino 2011). Therefore, ‘power 
to’ act and ‘power over’ others can both be viewed as capacities possessed and 
exercised within the boundaries of a relationship.  
Hence, like Weber (1978, p.53), this thesis perceives power (“Macht”) as: 
“[T]he probability that one actor in a social relationship will be in a 
position to carry out his will despite resistance, regardless of the 
basis on which this probability rests.” 
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In other words, power is the potential or ability of an actor to achieve his/her desired 
outcomes, despite resistance by the other actor, and regardless of the basis of power. 
Weber’s definition of power has been extremely influential and a number of 
concepts are founded on his perspective (Emerson 1962; Ramsay 1994; Stannack 
1996; Belaya and Hanf 2009). Emerson (1962) utilised Weber’s definition of power 
and highlighted that power is the potential or ability of one party to influence the 
other party’s behaviour to achieve his/her desired outcomes. Therefore, power is 
considered to be the ability (or capacity or potential) to alter the behaviour of 
someone, that is relationally constituted (Emerson 1962).  
According to Haugaard (2002, p.21), power is a “[…] family resemblance 
concept”. That is to say, the meaning of power changes depending on its context and 
there is not one definition of power that can sum up all its usage. Therefore, the 
meaning changes depending on the local interpretation that pertains to each context 
(Haugaard 2010). In particular, each researcher produces or adopts local usage that 
reflects his/her specific aim or traditions.  
Within the B2B marketing channel literature, El-Ansary and Stern (1972, 
p.47) defined power as “[…] the ability to control and influence the decision 
variables […] of another channel member”, while Hunt and Nevin (1974, p.186) 
referred to power as “[…] the ability of one individual or group to control or 
influence the behavior of another.” Gaski (1984, p.10) defined power as “[…] the 
ability to cause someone to do something he/she would not have done otherwise.” It 
is evident from the above that power is thought to be the ability to influence the 
actions of another to achieve one’s objectives (El-Ansary and Stern 1972). The 
definition by El-Ansary and Stern (1972) is the most commonly adopted in studies 
within the B2B marketing channel literature (Dwyer and Walker 1981; Gaski 1984; 
Belaya and Hanf 2009; Hopkinson and Blois 2014). As Gaski (1984, p.12) stated, 
the study by El-Ansary and Stern (1972) was “[…] the genesis of channel power 
theory”. Although most of the studies above focused on channel relationships, for 
instance the manufacturer/distributors/customer channel, due to the fact that power 
is evident in all social relationships, such studies may be applicable to other types of 
business relationship, such as that between supplier and buyer (Gaski and Nevin 
1985; Lacoste and Johnsen 2015).  
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Consequently, and in accordance with the literature so far discussed, the 
current study defines power as:  
the ability (or potential or capacity) of a party to alter the actions and/or 
behaviour of another party to achieve its desired goals. 
As Meehan and Wright (2012) argued, power as the potential to influence is 
embedded in all buyer-supplier relationships. Having defined the concept of power, 
attention now turns to another main debate in power theory ‒ the source of power.  
2.3.3. The agency and structure debate 
Another key debate in the study of power is the distinction between agency 
and structure, or what is termed in the inter-organisational literature as the 
distinction between the behavioural sources of power and the structural sources of 
power (Brass and Burkhardt 1993; Cendon and Jarvenpaa 2001). The question here 
is whether power mainly falls on the agent side or on the structure side (Avelino 
2011). In particular, the agent side is seen as enabling individuals to make a change 
and the structure side is seen as predetermining and constraining the choices of 
individuals. Haugaard (2002) has highlighted that, within this discussion, power and 
structural constraint are conceived as two conflicting points placed on a continuous 
spectrum. Haugaard (2002, p.38) noted:  
“[…] at one end of the spectrum social relations are contingent […] 
whereas at the other they are determined […] at the contingent end 
there is power (A could have acted differently) and, at the determined 
end, there is structure (A had no possibility of acting differently).” 
That is to say, at one end social relations are dependent on the choices that the actor 
makes whereas at the other end of the spectrum social relations are predetermined by 
the social structure that exists. Thus, if power is determined by the agent one can 
achieve objectives that might not have occurred otherwise. For instance, Dowding 
(1996) claimed that power should be viewed as the ability of a single agent to 
achieve changes that fulfil his/her own interests. On the other hand, Foucault (1980, 
p.98) perceived power as a non-subjective phenomenon that is exercised by the 
existent structures and through individuals, highlighting that actors are the “[…] 
vehicles of power”.   
Specifically, Foucault (1995,p.200) using a prison cell as an example, argued 
that individuals are “[…] the object[s] of information, never a subject in 
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communication”, since the individual is seen but is being prevented from 
communicating with the other individuals. Therefore, Foucault (1995, p.202) 
claimed that critical mechanisms “automitise” and “disindividualise” power, and a 
material structure can be employed to manifest a power relation regardless of the 
individual who exercises it. Hence, any person can be thought of as being in a 
powerful position, since as per Foucault, structure can be thought of as constraining 
the options of an individual. 
Giddens (1984) contested this view within his theory of structuration. In that 
theory he claimed that both agency and structure are factors that trigger social 
relations, and power is a critical factor. In particular, the structure is what enables 
interaction between actors, but also it constrains it through its rules, laws, resources 
and social norms; and at the same time agency (actor) also reproduces the social 
structure, through his/her knowledge of social life. Thus both structure and agency 
are enabling and constraining factors of power. As such Giddens (1984) views 
power as the ability of human agent(s) to use these structures to accomplish their 
aims. Cendon and Jarvenpaa (2001) argued that Gidden’s structuration theory 
enables the integration of social structure and human action. Therefore, power is 
exercised both through an individual’s behaviour and actions and also through 
resources, which are perceived as structural components.  
Conversely, Clegg (1993), perceived power as a circular process that flows 
through three specific circuits. Specifically, he developed his multi-level framework 
of circuits of power, where power is presented as a highly complex interaction of 
episodic power, dispositional power and systemic power. Episodic power denotes 
the exercise of power in relation to agency which can shift through circuits; that is, 
understanding the event. Dispositional power refers to the rules of the game at the 
organisational level, such as rules of practice and shared meaning. Lastly, systemic 
power refers to the structures of domination at the societal level, where changes and 
new organisational forms can be developed. He argued that real events of power are 
understood in the first episodic circuit, since agency owns resources which can be 
used through various means to create the desired outcome. Understanding the 
situation where this event has taken place with its constraints and advantages occurs 
in the second (dispositional power) and third circuits (systemic power). Clegg (1993, 
p.211) noted that the dispositional and systemic level circuits are the “field of force” 
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in which the episodic agency notion of power is understood. With this framework, 
Clegg (1993), like other scholars (Pfeffer 1981; Astley and Sachdeva 1984; 
Haugaard 2002; Avelino 2011) stressed the importance of context in the theory of 
power.  
Therefore, perceiving power as a family-resemblance concept, that is 
context-specific, the notion that only a single correct use exists is disregarded 
(Haugaard 2010). From the above discussion the current study accepts this context 
specific factor to power. That is to say that, although events of power are enabled by 
the individual’s choices, the rules of the game and the systemic structure that 
surround the event are critical to understanding the power interactions between 
actors. Here the word actors does not denote individuals per se, but also 
organisations.  
Within the B2B marketing, supply chain and strategic management literature 
the agency and structure debate has been distinguished through the examination of 
structural (or macro) and the individual’s behaviour (micro) perspectives (Brass and 
Burkhardt 1993; Buvik and Reve 2002; Cendon and Jarvenpaa 2001; Kähkönen and 
Virolainen 2011; Aminoff and Taskanen 2013). Structural sources of power refer to 
the characteristics of a social system instead of the specific attributes of behaviour of 
an individual (Brass and Burkhardt 1993). Within a supplier-buyer context structural 
sources of power derive from organisational structures, including resources, 
interconnections among actors and organisational positions within the industry, 
denoting the relative power between actors (Cendon and Jarvenpaa 2001; Kähkönen 
and Virolainen 2011; Cuevas et al. 2015). From a micro-perspective, power is 
expected to derive from the actions of people and the exercise of power in terms of 
influence strategies and tactics (Cendon and Jarvenpaa 2001; Kähkönen and 
Virolainen 2011). Influence strategies denote the means by which power is used by 
individuals to influence the other party (Frazier and Rody 1991; Gelderman et al. 
2008).  
Brass and Burkhardt (1993, p.443) argued that the structural and behavioural 
perspectives of power must not be viewed as two distinct approaches but as “[…] 
simultaneously complementary processes” to fully explain the power interactions 
between parties. This is because, while a person’s choices and characteristics enable 
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him/her to gain power, the structure (rules of the game, institutional norms, policies 
and resources) constrains an individual’s exercise of power (ability to influence the 
behaviour of others). Therefore, both the behavioural and structural levels must be 
taken into account in order to fully understand the relative bargaining power and 
interactions between the buyer and supplier. The following section focuses on the 
bargaining power concept.  
2.4. BARGAINING POWER WITHIN A BUYER-SUPPLIER 
CONTEXT  
2.4.1. Defining bargaining power  
As stated in sections 2.2 and 2.3.1, research is still needed to understand 
power interactions that occur between buyers and suppliers during their 
negotiations. Following the examination of power debates, establishing its definition 
and sources of power, attention now turns to the bargaining power construct which 
is the focus of this thesis. Negotiations between organisations arise because 
communication is possible in a situation where the parties have an interest in 
cooperating in order to reach a commonly beneficial arrangement or agreement 
(Dwyer and Walker 1981). Within these negotiations, the parties engage in a 
bargaining process which they pursue to gain favourable outcomes and improve the 
terms and conditions of their transaction, namely, reorganising their shared 
distribution of responsibilities, benefits and costs (Dwyer et al. 1987; Benton and 
Maloni 2005; Crook and Combs 2007). The negotiation process is an area of great 
importance where one organisation must deal with another organisation’s power 
(Dwyer and Walker 1981). The power that one party has in relation to the other is 
critical to the ability of a party to achieve the best possible outcome during 
negotiations (Dwyer and Walker 1981; Yan and Gray 1994; Wolfe and McGinn 
2005; Kim et al. 2005; Crook and Combs 2007). In this thesis this power (ability) is 
termed ‘bargaining power’.  
Buvik and Reve (2002, p.263) argued that within a buyer-supplier 
relationship bargaining power can be defined as the ability of a party “[…] to 
influence the terms and conditions of contracts.” Similarly, Argyres and Porter-
Liebeskind (1999, p.55) noted that bargaining power in a buyer-supplier relationship 
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is the ability of one party “[…] to influence the terms and conditions of that contract 
or subsequent contracts in its own favour.” From a purchasing and supply 
management perspective Stannack (1996, p.51) distinguished purchasing power as 
referring to “[…] the capacity to achieve a successful negotiated contractual 
outcome on behalf of an organisation.” The above definitions from buyer-supplier 
studies emphasises the importance of bargaining power in relation to the contractual 
agreement.  
However, as noted in section 2.2, the current study investigates both the 
contractual and non-contractual negotiations that occur between the buyer and 
supplier. This is because buyers and suppliers do not only negotiate to agree on a 
formal contract. Buyers and suppliers also negotiate to deal with environmental 
contingencies or difficulties that may arise leading to non-contractual negotiations 
that also influence the expected benefits and costs (financial or otherwise) of the 
parties involved. Thus, to fully understand the negotiation interactions that arise, 
both types of negotiations must be considered. Therefore, since the aim is to explore 
both contractual and non-contractual negotiations the emphasis of the above 
definitions on contractual negotiations restricts the researcher from examining non-
contractual negotiations.  
Hence, following on from the above examination of power, that was broadly 
defined as the ability/potential to influence someone to do something that he/she 
would not otherwise do to achieve his/her objectives (Emerson 1962; Pfeffer 1981; 
Lawler and Bacharach 1987), bargaining power can be thought of as the ability to 
influence the outcome of a negotiation process (Yan and Gray 1994; Benton and 
Maloni 2005; Crook and Combs 2007). The ability to influence the outcome of the 
negotiation process derives from the ability of one party to influence the other 
party’s decision in its favour. Accordingly, bargaining power is: 
the ability of a party to influence the outcome of a negotiation process in their 
favour, whether with regards to the contract or not. 
Other scholars have labelled this ‘bargaining strength’, ‘bargaining ability’, or 
‘negotiation power’ (Schelling 1956; Grennan 2014; Dobrijevic et al. 2011). The 
above conceptualisation of bargaining power enables the examination of both the 
contractual and non-contractual interactions between the parties.  
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Bargaining power also has a relational dimension, where power is explored 
based on the relative power that one party has over another to achieve its desired 
goals (Wolfe and McGinn 2005). The bargaining power concept encompasses all 
aspects of bargaining between parties and offers an integrative approach to 
considering the context, process and outcomes of the negotiation process (Bacharach 
and Lawler 1981; Yan and Gray 1994). It enables the investigation of the sources, or 
bases,6 of bargaining power for each party as well as understanding the internal and 
external context of the relationship. It allows also the examination of the way this 
bargaining power is exercised by the actors in the form of strategies to gain 
compliance and explicate the outcomes of the negotiation process.  
In the subsections that follow the discussion focuses on explaining the 
theoretical perspectives taken to examine the bargaining power interactions between 
the buyer and supplier under investigation. Firstly, existing literature regarding the 
structural aspect of bargaining power within a buyer-supplier context is reviewed to 
help determine the sources of power during negotiations. Secondly, attention turns 
to the behavioural perspective and how the parties may use their bargaining power to 
influence negotiation outcomes.  
2.4.2. The structural perspective  
The structural aspect of power focuses on examining the sources of power 
available to the parties based on the structure that surrounds their relationship 
(Cendon and Jarvenpaa 2001; Kähkönen and Virolainen 2011; Cuevas et al. 2015). 
The resources that each party has can be considered as the important sources of 
power (Ramsay 1994; Cendon and Jarvenpaa 2001; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003; 
Kähkönen and Virolainen 2011) that determine their bargaining power. Therefore, 
the resources a party owns are the foundations of its power.  
Bearing in mind that organisations can be perceived as a bundle of resources 
then organisations can possess various tangible and intangible resources (Wernerfelt 
1984; Barney 1991). Intangible resources include intellectual property rights, 
                                                
6 In the attempt to achieve a more operationalised focus on power, power ‘bases’ have also been 
labelled ‘kinds’ (Etzioni 1961), ‘types’ (Olsen 1978), and ‘sources’ (Bacharach and Lawler 1980; 
Pfeffer, 1981). 
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reputation, employees’ knowledge and organisational structure (Hall 1992; 
Villalonga 2004; Allee 2008). For instance, Meehan and Wright (2012) investigated 
the origins of power within a buyer-supplier relationship and identified that 
knowledge of individuals and reputation of the organisation are important sources of 
power that influence negotiation outcomes between the parties. Tangible resources 
are the physical and financial assets of the firm. Money, for example, is a major 
resource which is owned by the buyer, and is thus an important source of power 
(Ramsay 1994; Villalonga 2004; Allee 2008).  
The resources that organisations have aid them to “[…] produce efficiently 
and/or effectively a market offering that has value” for another organisation (Hunt 
and Morgan 1995, p.6). However, some of the resources that an organisation owns 
may be considered more valuable than others to other organisations in order to 
realise their organisational objectives. Therefore, the power of one organisation is 
determined by the value the other attaches to the resources that it commands, 
whatever they may be (Emerson 1962). The organisation that controls desirable, 
valued, unique resources has a higher power base and thus bargaining power 
(Kähkönen and Virolainen 2011). Understanding the resources that increase and 
reduce the relative bargaining power of buyers and suppliers within the particular 
exchange can enable the parties to better interpret the context (Cox 2001) and 
regulate their behaviour accordingly to improve their bargaining power.  
Resource-dependence theory is perceived as a structural theory of power 
(Bacharach and Lawler 1981; Brass and Burkhardt 1993; Cendon and Jarvenpaa 
2001), and dependence is directly linked with power (Emerson 1962; Bacharach and 
Lawler 1981; El-Ansery and Stern 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). According to 
power-dependence theory, the ability a party has to influence another stems from its 
power, or to put it another way, from the dependencies that one party has on the 
resources of another (Emerson 1962; Cook 1977).  
Gaski (1984) argued that channel member dependence and sources of power 
in distribution channels are conceptually inextricable. This is because, in line with 
resource-dependence theory, organisations consist of external and internal coalitions 
of exchange relationships within an uncertain environment and depend on other 
organisations for their survival (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). Thus, cooperative 
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agreements between organisations can be seen as safeguarding the organisation in a 
volatile environment (Crook and Combs 2007).  
The fact that power is perceived as the control of resources and dependence, 
places attention on the factors that lead to the power of an organisation (Kirkbride 
and Durcan 1987; Belaya and Hanf 2009). For these reasons, it is particularly 
helpful to examine buyer-supplier relationships because it enables the researcher to 
identify the resources and motivations of each party within the relationship and the 
value that they attach to the exchange.  
The seminal work of Emerson (1962) on power-dependence has been 
influential in operationalising power within the B2B marketing management and 
supply chain management literature (Dwyer and Walker 1981; Ramsay 1994; 1996; 
Hingley 2005; Payan and McFarland 2005; Meehan and Wright 2012; Lacoste and 
Johnsen 2015). Emerson (1962, p.32) referred to power in terms of the dependence 
that each party has on the other’s resources, or in a broader sense, the “[…] things 
that [each party] values”. Emerson specified two dimensions of dependence, 
motivational investment and availability of alternatives. Specifically, he noted the 
dependence of party A on party B is determined by: (a) party A’s motivational 
investment in objectives arbitrated by party B; and (b) by the availability of 
alternatives in achieving these objectives of party A externally to a relationship with 
party B. Therefore, the level of dependence between the two parties is determined by 
the criticality of the resources, or the stakes in the relationship, and alternatives for 
accessing those resources needed to achieve their organisational objectives (Pfeffer 
and Salancik 2003).  
Ramsay (1994, p.129) utilised Emerson’s dependence dimensions in a buyer-
supplier situation. He argued that dependence is: (a) the “[…] relative attractiveness 
of the resources”; and (b) the “[…] availability of the resources that the buyer and 
supplier have to offer each other” in order to achieve their organisational objectives. 
In other words, anything that raises a buyer’s need to buy from a certain supplier or 
that decreases the buyer’s supplier freedom (alternatives) intensifies the buyer’s 
dependence on the supplier and vice versa, consequently increasing the bargaining 
power of the supplier and decreasing the bargaining power of the buyer and vice 
versa (Ramsay 1994). For instance, the attractiveness of the resources can be 
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influenced by the volume of sales and purchases that the parties represent for each 
other (Ramsay 1994; Kähkönen and Virolainen 2011). That is to say, the higher the 
volume of purchases for which a buyer is responsible from the total sales of the 
supplier, the higher the dependence of the buyer on that supplier. Thus, the volume 
of sales and purchases is an important source of power. Availability refers to the 
alternative options that each party has for accessing those resources from other 
sources (Ramsay 1994). For example, the dependence of a buyer on a supplier 
increases when there is a small number of suppliers from which to access critical 
resources.  
The dependence between the parties may vary in degree for each exchange 
relationship given that asymmetric dependence may exist. This asymmetric 
dependence creates an imbalance in the relationship where the less dependent party 
has a structural power advantage (Molm et al. 1999). This asymmetric dependence 
denotes the relative power of each party. Relative power refers to the dependence of 
party A compared to the dependence of party B on the relationship. That is, if A is 
dependent on B more than B is dependent on A, then B has power over A 
(Bacharach and Lawler 1981). Relative power indicates the imbalance in power 
between the two parties and can be perceived as the dissimilarity in value that 
buyers and suppliers assign to the exchange (Caniëls and Gelderman 2005). This 
relative power determines the bargaining power or power advantage of one party 
over the other (Anderson and Narus 1990; Mysen et al. 2012). As a result, relative 
power governs the degree to which an organisation has influence over its exchange 
partner, or, it can be influenced by its exchange partner. Hence, the current study 
focuses on the relative power between the parties, examining how the relative 
bargaining power of each party influences the contractual and non-contractual 
negotiations.  
Within a buyer-supplier context, various sources of bargaining power have 
been identified as well as structural factors that can influence the relative 
dependence, and thus relative power, between the parties (Porter 1980; Buvik and 
Reve 2002; Caniëls and Geldermand 2007; Kähkönen and Virolainen 2011; Meehan 
and Wright 2012). For instance, a firm’s market power is considered to be an 
important source of power that increases the bargaining power of a party (Kähkönen 
and Virolainen 2011; Meehan and Wright 2012). In his seminal work, Porter (1980) 
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examined competitive forces within an industry and identified five forces that can 
influence an organisation’s competitive advantage, namely: (a) the current condition 
of competitive market rivalry; (b) the scope for new market entrants; (c) the threat of 
substitutes; (d) the buyer’s bargaining power; and (e) the supplier’s bargaining 
power. These factors are believed to be important influences in enhancing or 
restricting the bargaining power of buyers and suppliers (Cox 2001).  
Porter (1980) argued that when an industry is highly concentrated or 
dominated by one or a small number of organisations then the relative power of 
those firms increases and it is relatively stable enabling those organisations to force 
discipline on to their partners. For example, in a highly concentrated market 
characterised by an oligopoly, where only a small number of buyers exist, each with 
a large share of the market, buyers have high bargaining power given that the 
suppliers have a small number of alternative buyers to whom to sell their product or 
services (Ferrer 2013; Ramsay 1994). Further, if the threat of new entrants in the 
supplier’s market is low the bargaining power of the supplier increases and the cost 
of substituting the supplier also rises, strengthening the dependence of the buyer on 
the supplier (Buvik and Reve 2002). Therefore, structural conditions, such as the 
competitive forces (Meehan and Wright 2012) that surround the relationship 
between the supplier and buyer, play an important part in constraining or enabling 
their bargaining power during negotiations. 
From a transaction cost economics approach, the costs associated with 
switching partners are a critical source of power (Heide and John 1992). Heide and 
John (1992) integrated power-dependence theory and transaction cost economics 
theory and argued that dependence between the exchange partners develops from 
investments in specific assets that the partners make in the relationship. Transaction 
specific investments often occur between the parties with the purpose of adding 
value or to economise (Buvik and Reve 2002). For instance, the buyer may adapt its 
production processes based on the needs of a specific supplier which can lead to 
high dependence of the buyer on the specific supplier. Accordingly, Buvik and Reve 
(2002) referred to the dependence of a buyer on a supplier as determined by the 
difficulties and costs entailed in replacing the specific supplier; and the supplier’s 
dependence is defined as the costs and difficulties entailed in replacing the specific 
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buyer. Porter (1980) also identified the impact of the costs incurred by a partner in 
switching as influencing the bargaining power of suppliers and buyers. 
The characteristics of the product offered by the supplier also play an 
important role in power dynamics and can be seen as an important source of power 
(Porter 1980; Caniëls and Geldermand 2007; Lacoste and Johnsen 2015). For 
instance, if a supplier has a differentiated7 product then the supplier’s bargaining 
power increases in relation to the buyer, since there are limited alternatives for the 
buyer to access this product, thus the supplier is protected against competition 
(Porter 1980). Further, Caniëls and Geldermand (2007) investigated the power 
dynamics between a manufacturer and distributor based on the type of product that 
is exchanged in the relationship. They observed that strategic products leave the 
supplier in a position of power. Often strategic products can only be accessed from 
one supplier and can thus be considered a high supply risk for the buyer.  
The power of an organisation has also been examined in terms of the size of 
the organisation (assessed in terms of the number of employees or turnover) (Bates 
and Slack 1998; Kähkönen and Virolainen 2011). Bates and Slack (1998) argued 
that the balance of power changes from the buyer to the supplier, first, when the 
buyer is of a smaller size than the supplier, and second, when the financial gains 
constitute only a small share of its turnover but a large share of the buyer’s costs. 
Therefore, the size of an organisation can be a vital factor given that a large 
organisation (in terms of number of employees and turnover) can have very high 
turnover in comparison to a smaller one. Thus the smaller organisation can be highly 
dependent on the economic resources of the larger organisation (Kähkönen and 
Virolainen 2011; Meehan and Wright 2012). This being the case, the larger 
organisation can have a higher bargaining power in comparison to the smaller 
organisation.  
Further, other structural aspects such as government regulations can 
influence the power dynamics between the buyer and supplier and offer power 
                                                
7 A product can be perceived as differentiated if any noteworthy element exists that separates the 
product of one seller from another and the result favours one variety of the product over the other 
(Becerra et al. 2013). 
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advantage to a firm (Cox 2001). Sanderson (2001) argued that government can play 
an important role in the power dynamics between a buyer and supplier and can result 
in creating or sustaining the power advantage of one party over another. He stated 
that an organisation may be the sole buyer of a good or service in a specific 
geographical market due to the fact that it has been granted exclusivity rights in a 
specific sector that necessitates a specialised product. Hence, government can also 
restrict or augment the power advantage of the buyer and supplier.  
The above discussion has examined the structural perspective of bargaining 
power. Specifically, it has highlighted the importance of relative dependence 
between the parties and reviewed the various sources of power of organisations that 
establish their relative bargaining power. These factors can constrain or enable 
bargaining power both in contractual and non-contractual agreements. However, to 
fully understand how bargaining power influences negotiations, one must also 
investigate the behavioural aspect (how this power is used and communicated). The 
section below addresses this point.  
2.4.3. The behavioural perspective  
The behavioural perspective examines an individual’s behaviour. In the 
distribution channels literature the behavioural perspective and the use of power has 
been extensively examined through power-base theory (the exercise of bases of 
power) (French and Raven 1959) and influence strategies (Frazier and Summers 
1984). The social psychologists French and Raven (1959) focused on interpersonal 
power; that is, on the bases that permit an individual (the power source) to acquire 
power over another (the power target). As French and Raven (1959, p.151) claimed 
“[…] our theory [...] is limited to the influence on the person P produced by a social 
agent O”. Although French and Raven (1959) acknowledged that many possible 
bases of power may exist, they defined five bases of power which they deem to be 
especially common and important, namely: reward, coercive, expert, referent and 
legitimacy. Reward refers to the capacity of the source to arbitrate dividends 
whereas coercion refers to punishment, for instance demanding cost reductions. 
Referent denotes the perception that an organisation holds, while expertise 
highlights the knowledge or information that is important to another organisation. 
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Lastly, legitimate power, that entails both the intrinsic and legal forms, supposes that 
the target of this power deems that the source has a right to influence him or her.  
These power bases were later applied to the inter-organisational context of 
distribution channels and have been central to the distribution channels literature 
ever since (Meehan and Wright 2012; Hopkinson and Blois 2014). Later, a 
dichotomization of the different power sources was attempted, such as mediated 
(coercion, legitimacy and reward) and non-mediated (expert and referent) and 
coercive (coercion) and non-coercive (legitimacy, expert, referent, reward) (Hunt 
and Nevin 1974; Brown et al. 1995; Maloni and Benton 2000; Handley and Benton 
2012).  
Frazier and Summers’ (1984) typology on the other hand identifies six 
influence strategies: information exchange, recommendations, requests, promises, 
threats, and legalistic pleas (these influence strategies are discussed below). 
Influence strategies are the “[…] means of communication available to a firm’s 
personnel” in their efforts to influence other channel members (Frazier and Rody 
1991, p.52). Influence strategies denote the method by which power is used and 
communicated by individuals to influence the other party (Frazier and Rody 1991; 
Gelderman et al. 2008; Belaya and Hanf 2009). These strategies can also be 
distinguished as coercive or non-coercive (Frazier and Rody 1991; Payan and 
McFarland 2005; Gelderman et al. 2008).  
Hence, both typologies acknowledge the use of coercive and non-coercive 
means for a party A to influence a party B. Belaya and Hanf (2009) reviewed the 
power literature within the supply chain and distribution channels domain and 
concluded that there is some similarity in the way power base theory and influence 
strategies have been conceptualised in the literature. Hopkinson and Blois (2014) 
argued that the two streams of research have integrated over the years which can be 
partly ascribed to overlapping vocabulary. For instance, Leonidou (2005) adopted 
vocabulary from the power base typology and influence strategy research to examine 
industrial buyers’ influence strategies during buying situations. He labelled 
influence strategies as reward influence strategies, informational influence 
strategies, coercive influence strategies, legalistic influence strategies, and referent 
influence strategies.  
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Similarly, Gaski (1984), and Gaski and Nevin (1985), made no distinction 
between the influence strategies typology and the bases (or sources) of power noting 
that they are not conceptually distinct but merely an issue of vocabulary. Benton and 
Maloni (2005, p.4) also used the power bases theory as set out by French and Raven, 
noting that they “[…] involve influence strategies that the source (buyer) 
specifically administers to the target (seller)”, thus making no distinction between 
the two. Other scholars who made no distinction between these two approaches are 
Hunt and Nevin (1974), Brown et al. (1995), Maloni and Benton (2000), and 
Handley and Benton (2012). 
In contrast, other scholars make a distinction between the two typologies (for 
instance Kale 1986; Frazier and Summers 1986; Boyle et al. 1992; Farrell and 
Schroder 1999; Sahadev 2005; Chang and Lin 2008). Venkatesh et al. (1995) and 
Farrell and Schroder (1999) argued that bases of power refer to the characteristics of 
a person, such as expertise and referent, that give an individual the ability to 
influence others and based on those characteristics influence strategies are chosen. 
Equally, Belaya and Hanf (2009) maintained that influence strategies represent the 
‘means’ or ‘instruments’ of an individual to influence another, whereas the bases of 
power represent where power is derived from. For instance, an individual may be 
perceived as having coercive power and use this power to threaten or make legalistic 
pleas in order to influence the other party. Therefore, the bases of power typology is 
“[…] attributional in nature rather than behavioural” (Meehan and Wright 2012, 
p.671). That is to say that it indicates information regarding the reasons why 
individuals (or subordinates) comply and not necessarily how the individuals behave 
or act. Nevertheless, a rational connection exists between the two streams, the 
sources and strategies of power use, which can be considered as complementary 
(Hopkinson and Blois 2014).  
This study acknowledges the complementarity between the two approaches 
and the fact that the bases of power typology has been applied to examine influence 
strategies between firms. However, the current study emphasises how the parties use 
and exercise their bargaining power thus seeking to examine the behaviour and 
actions of the parties to achieve their organisational objectives. Consequently, the 
influence strategies typology is more suited to examining the use of bargaining 
power in a buyer-supplier context. Furthermore, the relevance and suitability of the 
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influence strategy typology in explaining the exercise of bargaining power was also 
evident in the primary data collected. Specifically, the above discussed issues were 
considered prior to the primary data collection. This is because, as noted in section 
2.1, taking into account the Grounded Theory approach, a brief literature review was 
conducted to help the researcher to understand the phenomena under investigation 
and increase her theoretical sensitivity. This sensitised the researcher to the data 
enabling her to better understand the relevance and significance of the participant’s 
statements (codes) in explaining the phenomena under study (Chapter 5, sections 
5.3.1.5). During the analysis process the data further guided the researcher towards 
the influence strategies typology, revealing its pertinence to explain the behavioural 
aspect (exercise) of bargaining power.  
As noted above, influence strategies8 refer to the communication of the 
bargaining power of party A to party B in an effort to sway and alter the behaviour 
of party B based on the interests of party A (Wilkinson and Kipnis 1978; Frazier and 
Summers 1984; Gaski and Nevin 1985). These strategies can be utilised by a party 
A to merely coordinate with a party B or for more important issues such as 
compliance with inter-organisational initiatives (Payan and McFarland 2005). In an 
attempt to identify and categorise examples of behavioural tactics employed to 
exercise power between organisations, Kipnis and Wilkinson (1978) specified a 
comprehensive typology identifying twenty influencing strategies. They 
distinguished between (a) weak strategies, such as use of reputation, (b) request 
compliance, be cooperative/act nice, and offer benefits, and (c) strong strategies for 
instance demand compliance such as dictating terms, applying group pressure, and 
deceit. However, a more parsimonious and well accepted typology of verbal use of 
power is offered by Frazier and Summers (1984) (Frazier and Rody 1991; Boyle et 
al. 1992; Hopkinson and Blois 2014). 
Frazier and Summers (1984) argued that two influence approaches can be 
adopted by a party (source) in their attempt to modify the behaviour of another party 
                                                
8 It must be noted that the literature regarding influence strategies was consulted in more detail after 
the data collection, as stipulated by Grounded Theory (Chapter 5, section 5.3.1). However, in section 
2.4.2 that examines the structural aspect (sources of power) a more detailed discussion is offered 
regarding the various sources of power identified in the literature. Therefore, for issues of consistency 
this section offers more details on the influence strategies typology.  
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(target) in distribution channel relationships. First, by changing “[…] the perceptions 
of the target in terms of the inherent desirability of the intended behaviour” (Frazier 
and Summers 1984, p.44). In other words, the source attempts to indirectly modify 
the perception of the target to view the intended behaviour as in its own best interest. 
For instance, a recommendation strategy refers to the source highlighting the 
specific action needed for the target to attain the desired outcomes (Frazier and 
Summers 1984). That is to say, if the target follows the source’s recommendations 
then the target may avoid negative consequences or attain positive outcomes such as 
increased profitability (Frazier and Summers 1984). Information exchange refers to 
the strategy where the source firm (influencer) supplies information to the target on 
general issues and procedures without requesting or stating any specific action to the 
target firm. The source attempts to alter the general perception of the target to 
achieve the desirable outcome.  
Second, influence strategies may seek direct influence without altering the 
behaviour of the target. For instance, a situation may arise where the source needs to 
attain quick or immediate compliance from the target, or a source may be required to 
act in a way that is not intrinsically linked to the target’s best interest, thus direct 
influence strategies may be adopted to achieve compliance. For example, threats are 
the source informing the target that failing to comply will result in negative 
sanctions (Frazier and Summers 1984) while requests are where the source simply 
states the required action from the target without indicating or explicitly implying 
any particular consequences for the target’s compliance or non-compliance (Frazier 
and Summers 1984). Promises, as an influence strategy, involve the source 
promising to provide a particular reward contingent on the target’s compliance with 
a suggested action; thus the consequences of compliance are directly stated to the 
target (Frazier and Summers 1984). Legalistic pleas on the other hand refer to 
strategies where the source invokes the formal contract between the parties and 
requires the target to take certain action (Frazier and Summers 1984). The source 
may, for example, impose a penalty for not following the agreement. 
These strategies can also be coercive (for example, threats) or non-coercive 
(recommendations) (Frazier and Rody 1991; Payan and McFarland 2005; 
Gelderman et al. 2008). Non-coercive strategies seek to alter the perception of the 
target, whereas coercive influence strategies seek immediate and direct modification 
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of the behaviour based on source-controlled rewards and punishments which can be 
either explicitly or implicitly implied by the source (Payan and McFarland 2005; 
Brown et al. 2009). The dependence structure between the parties, the bargaining 
power symmetry, and level of cooperation are considered to be important 
antecedents to the type of influence strategy adopted and its effectiveness, namely 
the compliance of the target (Frazier and Rody 1991; Payan and McFarland 2005). 
Frazier and Rody (1991) investigated the use of influence strategies between 
suppliers and distributors and found that the weaker party avoided adopting coercive 
strategies towards a stronger party, in order to sustain their relationship and reduce 
the potential for retaliation.  
Therefore, bargaining power patterns between the parties influence the type 
of influence strategy adopted. Furthermore, the context of a buyer-supplier 
relationship plays a critical role in the contractual and non-contractual negotiations 
between two parties (Meehan and Wright 2012). Thus perhaps not all influence 
strategies apply or other influence strategies may be evident. The discussion above 
aimed to provide the reader with a better understanding of how power may be 
exercised within a supplier-buyer context rather than adopting a rigid framework for 
the study.  
2.5. CONCLUSION   
This chapter has examined current literature regarding the key phenomena 
under investigation, namely the buyer-supplier exchange and negotiations and the 
bargaining power construct to aid in addressing the study’s aim and objectives. This 
literature was reviewed before the data collection stage, as advocated by the 
Grounded Theory approach (Chapter 5, section 5.3.1) and its purpose was threefold. 
First, to help the researcher better grasp the phenomena under investigation in terms 
of issues that needed to be considered in the exploration. Second, to determine what 
was already known, thus preventing the researcher from developing already existing 
knowledge. Third, to ascertain the theoretical perspectives that could be used firstly 
as a guide in the early stages of the primary data collection and secondly to enhance 
the researcher’s theoretical sensitivity to the data. This should provide a better basis 
for understanding the relevance of the data in explaining the phenomena under 
study. Further, Grounded Theory frequently leads to new themes that were not 
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considered before data collection. Hence, additional literature is employed in 
Chapter 6 to analyse and support the primary findings.  
Current literature on the buyer-supplier exchange, and particularly 
negotiations, has been discussed to define and explain the content that surrounds the 
bargaining power interactions that occur between APs and TOs. Thus this review 
has contributed to the achievement of the aim and objectives of the study as follows.  
First, Objective 1 seeks to discover the sources of power of the APs 
(suppliers) and the TOs (buyers), from the APs perspective, in order to determine 
their bargaining power within the contractual and non-contractual negotiations. 
Objective 2 investigates the way bargaining power is employed within the 
relationship, from the APs perspective, in order to establish the influence strategies 
adopted by both parties during their contractual and non-contractual negotiations. 
Finally, Objective 3 relates to the way bargaining power is exercised within the 
relationship, from the APs perspective, in order to ascertain the consequences on the 
contractual and non-contractual negotiation outcomes. 
To investigate the bargaining power dynamics between the buyers and 
suppliers it was vital to understand the concept of power. Hence, power was defined 
within a buyer-supplier context, emphasising its antecedents and dimensions to take 
into account to aid in investigating the bargaining power. This review highlighted 
that both the structural and behavioural (use of power) perspectives of power must 
be considered to understand and explore the bargaining power interactions and 
outcomes of negotiations, thus helping to address the study’s aim and three 
objectives.  
This was followed by a discussion on the concept of bargaining power within 
a buyer-supplier context, focusing upon its definition and the theoretical 
perspectives adopted to examine its structural and behavioural aspects. Resource-
dependence and power-dependence were discussed and various sources of buyer-
supplier power were examined in order to better explain the structural aspect of 
power. This helped in meeting Objective 1. The behavioural aspect of bargaining 
power was also explained, highlighting issues to be borne in mind when looking at 
the exercise of bargaining power between APs and TOs. This helped to address 
Objective 2.  
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The literature reviewed also helped to address Objective 3. This was because 
understanding the concept of bargaining power and buyer-supplier negotiations 
helped to stimulate questions for initial data collection. Further, the researcher’s 
theoretical sensitivity also increased, enabling her to grasp the relevance of the 
primary data, whilst at the same time freeing her to follow the data and allow it to 
tell its own story. Moreover, it was observed that there is insufficient research to 
help understand negotiations between buyers and suppliers and that empirical 
studies which explicitly examine power and its influence in a buyer-supplier 
relationship are still needed. These gaps should be filled to generate new insights 
and expand current knowledge regarding the bargaining power and implications of 
asymmetric bargaining power in negotiations between buyers and suppliers.  
The next chapter examines the tourism industry, the study’s industrial 
context. This is done to provide a clearer understanding of the industrial context that 
envelops the relationship of the APs and TOs and could impact their bargaining 
power interactions and contractual and non-contractual negotiations.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
61 
CHAPTER 3 - THE TOURISM CONTEXT 
3.1. INTRODUCTION  
Tourism is a multifaceted service industry incorporating various activities, 
services and industries as well as generating regions (consumer origin countries) and 
destinations (host regions), that focus on serving the travellers’ needs and wants and 
ultimately produce the tourism product and provide a travel experience (Goeldner 
and Ritchie 2009; McCabe 2009; Cooper 2005). Due to its complexity, tourism 
entails numerous goods and services that are offered by the hospitality industry 
(such as accommodation and restaurants) as well as the travel industry (such as 
transportation) (Pizam 2009). The tourism industry includes various actors such as 
transportation providers, accommodation providers (APs), entertainment providers 
and intermediaries such as tour operators (TOs) (Buhalis 2000; McCabe 2009). 
Through the tourism distribution channel, which is a system linking various 
organisations, these tourism providers are able to sell, deliver or confirm travel 
arrangements to the buyer (Goeldner and Ritchie 2009).  
The channel actors (such as transportation providers, APs and TOs) are 
highly dependent on each other in the delivery of the tourism product to the 
travellers and in attaining their business objectives (Yilmaz and Bititci 2006). They 
engage in numerous types of relationship to provide the tourism product, including 
ad hoc informal relationships, and short-term or long-term formal contractual 
agreements (Buhalis 2000; Zhang et al. 2009; Franco and Pereira 2013). Taking into 
account the significance of efficiency in organisational processes and value creation, 
and the often substantial investment needed in buyer-supplier relationships, 
managing these relationships is vital to an organisation’s competitive advantage 
(Herbst et al. 2011; Meehan and Wright 2012). However, the literature reviewed 
indicated that research in tourism regarding the contractual relationships and 
activities between buyers and suppliers and the management of these relationships is 
insufficient (Zhang et al. 2009; Song 2012; Guo and He 2012; Gjerald and Lyngstad 
2015). The lack of in-depth understanding of the buyer-supplier relationships, and 
their management, within a tourism context is important because power asymmetry 
is a common occurrence in tourism and can lead to the unequal distribution of 
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benefits between tourism actors (Song et al. 2013; Ford et al. 2012). The current 
study focused on exploring and providing an understanding of the influences on, and 
the implications of, the bargaining power of the APs (suppliers) when undertaking 
contractual and non-contractual negotiations with large European TOs (buyers). 
Hence, the study will advance current knowledge regarding power relations and 
negotiations between these buyers and suppliers in the tourism and hospitality 
industry. 
To achieve the above, current tourism, hospitality and travel literature was 
reviewed in order to clarify the context in which APs and TOs operate. As with 
Chapter 2, this literature was reviewed before the primary data collection stage for 
three reasons. First, to gain a clearer understanding of the tourism industry and how 
its buyer-supplier relationships may influence bargaining power interactions and 
negotiations. Second, as stipulated by Grounded Theory (Chapter 5, section 5.3.1), 
the literature was utilised to enhance the theoretical sensitivity of the researcher and 
to raise questions for use in initial data collection, while also allowing the data to tell 
its own story. Third, to establish the existing knowledge regarding the buyer-
supplier negotiations and bargaining power dynamics. The exploratory and inductive 
nature of Grounded Theory (Chapter 5, section 5.3.1) often results in the emergence 
of themes that had not been considered prior to data collection. Hence, in Chapter 6 
additional literature is employed to analyse and fully explain the primary findings. 
In this chapter, section 3.2 defines the tourism industry, offering a clear 
understanding of this multifaceted industry. This helps to address the aim of the 
study and its three objectives (Chapter 5, section 5.2). Objective 1 sets out to 
discover the sources of power of both APs and TOs, from the APs perspective in 
order to determine their bargaining power within the contractual and non-contractual 
negotiations. Objective 2 investigates how bargaining power is employed within the 
relationship, from the APs perspective, in order to establish the influence strategies 
adopted by both parties during their contractual and non-contractual negotiation. 
Objective 3 examines how bargaining power is exercised within the relationship, 
from the accommodation providers’ perspective, in order to ascertain the 
consequences on the contractual and non-contractual negotiation outcomes. 
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Section 3.3 explains the tourism distribution channel, highlighting its 
attributes, links, and the roles of the various providers of the tourism product. This is 
important since buyer-supplier relationships and interactions can be influenced by 
the external structure that surrounds their relationship (Romero and Tajeda 2011; 
Song et al. 2013). It helps to fulfil Objective 1,9 which investigates the sources of 
bargaining power of the APs and TOs, to determine their bargaining power. 
Subsequently, section 3.4 examines how the power concept has been studied within 
a tourism and hospitality context, focusing on the buyer-supplier relationship and 
specifically the APs and TOs. This is done to further enhance the researcher’s 
knowledge regarding the implications of power, and to ascertain gaps in the 
literature.  
Section 3.5 discusses the bargaining power dynamics between tourism 
suppliers and buyers, emphasising the role of the large TOs as a powerful actor and 
their relationship with the APs. This helps to address all three objectives of the study 
as it sets the scene for the bargaining power interactions that occur between the APs 
and TOs during negotiations. In order to better understand relationship-specific 
issues and the negotiation context of the parties, the section also discusses the AP 
and TO negotiations and the challenges that may arise and lead to the exercise of 
bargaining power. This helps to tackle Objectives 210 and 311, which both investigate 
the use of bargaining power, determining the influence strategies adopted by the 
parties in negotiations, and how bargaining power can influence negotiation 
outcomes. Section 3.6 concludes the chapter.  
                                                
9 Due to the Grounded Theory approach additional literature is utilised in Chapter 6 to support the 
findings. To address Objective 1 supplementary literature relating to tourism policy, destination 
management and competitiveness as well as literature on buyer-supplier contracts and exchange 
partner selection in the tourism and hospitality field is employed. 
10 Due to the use of Grounded Theory strategy, additional literature is cited in Chapter 6 to help 
address Objective 2. More specifically, this literature deals with buyer-supplier relationship 
management and emotions literature in the B2B tourism and hospitality field.  
11 Due to the use of Grounded Theory strategy, in Chapter 6 supplementary literature is employed to 
support the findings and address Objective 3. In particular, this literature deals with pricing in B2B 
marketing management and strategic management, within a tourism and hospitality context, and with 
revenue management. 
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3.2. DEFINING THE TOURISM INDUSTRY  
Goeldner and Ritchie (2009, p.6) noted that tourism refers to the “[…] 
processes, activities, and outcomes” resulting from the relationships and interactions 
among travellers, tourism suppliers (principals), destination governments, 
destination communities and the surrounding environments that play a part in “[…] 
attracting and hosting” visitors. Therefore, tourism is a highly complex industry and 
encompasses an amalgamation of activities, services, industries and host regions 
(destinations) that aim to serve the needs and wants of travellers and ultimately 
create the tourism product and deliver a travel experience (Goeldner and Ritchie 
2009; Cooper 2005). 
 
Figure 1: The relationship between tourism, hospitality and travel industries. (amended from 
Pizam 2009, p.183). 
 Pizam (2009) highlighted that the complexity of the tourism industry may be 
confusing for researchers who need to distinguish between the travel, tourism and 
hospitality industries. He argued that the industries are interconnected but also 
distinct. Figure 1, below illustrates the interrelationships between the three. Tourism 
encompasses various goods and services that are provided by hospitality businesses, 
but these businesses also serve non-tourists (such as locals) (Pizam 2009). Equally, 
whilst the travel industry transports tourists, its services can also be used by non-
tourists, thus it is partly used for tourism purposes.  
 Thus, the tourism industry is broad, emphasising the notion of a tourism 
system. This system encompasses generating regions (consumers’ country of 
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origin), destinations, elements of the tourism service sector (principals/suppliers) 
such as transportation services, accommodation providers, visitor attractions, and 
entertainment facilities, as well as intermediaries such as TOs (wholesalers) who 
package and combine these elements to offer an organised itinerary (Buhalis 2000; 
McCabe 2009). In other words, the term tourism industry incorporates all providers 
of traveller and traveller related services.  
Due to the complex nature of tourism a debate exists whether tourism should 
be perceived as one large industry, or whether it should be referred to as multiple 
tourism industries (Leiper 2008; Song 2012). Leiper (2008) claimed that the use of 
the generic term ‘tourism industry’ is misleading, and that various small and large 
tourism industries exist (such as airlines, travel agencies and hotels), intersecting in 
many areas and with different organisations that directly but only partially support 
tourism. Hence, for this reason these components should not be regarded as part of 
one industry. Although the researcher acknowledges that various industries 
contribute to the tourism product the study uses the term tourism industry, as it is 
commonly adopted by both researchers and practitioners within the tourism field 
(Higgins-Desbiolles 2006; Zhang et al. 2009; Song 2012). 
For these reasons, the multifaceted nature of the tourism industry and the 
tourism product buyer-supplier relationships are obscure (Ujma 2001). The section 
below examines the tourism distribution channel in terms of its characteristics and 
dynamics in order to better understand the context of the buyer-supplier relationship, 
given that this influences the interactions of the parties.  
3.3. THE TOURISM DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL 
A tourism distribution channel is an operating structure, a system of 
numerous mixtures of organisations, through which a provider of tourism products 
sells, delivers or confirms travel arrangments to the buyer (Goeldner and Ritchie 
2009). The main function of the channel is information and travel arrangements, 
essentially bringing together consumers and suppliers rather than a physical product 
(Buhalis 2000; Goeldner and Ritchie 2009). The tourism distribution channel can 
include various channel members such as suppliers (for example accommodation 
and transportation providers), intermediaries (for example travel agents and TOs) 
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and destination management organisations who can offer information to tourists 
(Buhalis 2000). As can be seen in Figure 2, various organisations or structures of 
distribution channel exist. Consumers can purchase numerous elements, either 
directly from the tourism providers linked by online search engines, or through 
intermediaries such as TOs, travel agents or ‘speciality channelers’ (such as 
meetings and conventions planners or hotel representatives) (Ujma 2001). There are 
boundless alternatives of the tourism distribution channel based on the specific 
industry structure and external environment (Buhalis 2000).  
 
Figure 2: The tourism distribution channel. (Goeldner and Ritchie 2009, p.183). 
  In addition, the impact of information technology and the arrival of the 
world wide web has had a tremendous impact on the structure of the channel, 
offering countless choices for the consumer and resulting in a highly complex 
industry structure (Buhalis and Law 2008; Kracht and Wang 2010). The advent of 
the world wide web has intensified competition amongst channel members to win 
the customer, leading them to compete, merge or form cooperative agreements 
(partnerships) in order to survive (Kracht and Wang 2010).  
Hence, in the tourism industry the various channel actors are highly 
dependent on each other in order to provide the tourism product that consumers seek 
and achieve their organisational objectives (Yilmaz and Bititci 2006). This can be 
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attributed to the intangibility and perishability of the tourism product, which 
distinguishes the tourism industry from the manufacturing sector (Yilmaz and Bititci 
2006; Bull 2006; Zhang et al. 2009). The tourism product is intangible, that is to say 
it cannot be physically seen or touched before an individual purchases it, and it is 
considered to be a service that is perishable, thus it cannot be stored. Therefore, the 
tourism industry is also information-intensive, meaning it is highly dependent on the 
presentation and understanding of the products offered (Ujma 2001; Zhang et al. 
2009).  
Song (2012) identified three more distinguishing attributes of the tourism 
industry: it is a coordination-intensive industry; it has high demand uncertainty; and 
it has complex dynamics. Tourism is a coordination-intensive industry given that 
various products and services are bundled together to create the final product. 
Furthermore, high demand uncertainty is frequent which can be influenced by 
economic factors (low or high disposable income), seasonality, advertising and crisis 
events (Andriotis 2005; Wang 2009; Song 2012; Chen and Yeh 2012). Therefore, 
tourism is a dynamic industry and the strong competition between service providers 
further intensifies its complexity. Hence, in order to offer a tourism product which 
will reach the end consumer, channel members (such as tourism suppliers and 
intermediaries) enter into relationships to meet particular demand or offer services 
needed by consumers (Buhalis 2000). These can take the form of ad hoc informal 
relationships to satisfy specific demands, partial integration of business processes, 
short-term formal contractual agreements, or long-term formal contractual 
agreements with joint risks and rewards (Buhalis 2000; Zhang et al. 2009; Franco 
and Pereira 2013).  
These industry-specific characteristics influence the buyer-supplier 
relationships in general and negotiations in particular. For instance, Romero and 
Tajeda (2011) found that in Spain, due to high demand uncertainty, TOs (buyers) 
and APs (suppliers) often needed to renegotiate the conditions agreed in the formal 
contract such as price. The perishability and demand uncertainty of the product 
makes it difficult for tourism actors to balance supply and demand (Zhang et al. 
2009), and as such often leads to non-contractual negotiations between suppliers and 
buyers. 
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Although various studies have examined the relationships between tourism 
channel members, buyer-supplier research within a tourism context is insufficient 
and lacks a clear focus (Zhang et al. 2009; Guo and He 2012). This is mainly due to 
the fact that the majority of tourism research focuses on the exchange between 
business and consumer, rather than B2B (Jensen 2009; Hung et al. 2010; Guo et al. 
2013; Ling et al. 2014; Gjerald and Lyngstad 2015). Specifically, the investigation 
of the contractual relationships and cooperation activities between tourism providers 
is considered to be an under-researched area within a tourism context and the 
management of these relationships is a topic in need of further exploration (Zhang et 
al. 2009; Song 2012; Guo and He 2012; Gjerald and Lyngstad 2015). Considering 
the importance of successfully managing inter-organisational relationships for the 
competitive success of an organisation the examination of the buyer-supplier 
relationship in a tourism context is important. This is because power asymmetry 
between tourism actors is a usual phenomenon and can result in uneven sharing of 
benefits between the tourism actors during negotiations (Song et al. 2013; Ford et al. 
2012). The section below reviews the concept of power as currently studied by 
tourism and hospitality scholars. 
3.4. RESEARCH ON POWER WITHIN A TOURISM CONTEXT  
Although within the manufacturing sector the impacts of buyer-supplier 
power interactions and relationships have received attention from scholars, within a 
tourism context this is still considered a peripheral matter in need of further 
exploration (Zhang et al. 2009; Christodoulidou et al. 2010; Hall 2010; Beritelli and 
Laesser 2011; Ford et al. 2012; Berne et al. 2012). The study of power within the 
tourism literature focuses extensively on the destination level, in particular, the 
power relations among various tourism stakeholders and their impact on policy-
making and community planning (for example Reed 1997; Hall 2003; Nyaupane and 
Timothy 2010; Bramwell and Meyer 2007; Marzano and Scott 2009; Wearing et al. 
2010; Beritelli and Laesser 2011; Hazra et al. 2014).  
However, research on power within the tourism distribution channel, and 
buyer-supplier exchanges in particular, is still insufficient to fully understand its 
influence on relationship interactions (Ford et al. 2012; Song et al. 2013), although 
exceptions do exist (see Guo and He 2012; Berne et al. 2012; Ivanov et al. 2015). 
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Berne et al. (2012), for example, investigated how information and communication 
technology influences the power balance between the members in a tourism 
distribution channel. They identified that both market structure and channel structure 
play a critical role in determining the power balance between the parties, with 
market structure acting as an antecedent of power relations. From an economic 
perspective market power and competitive forces and their impact on tourism 
providers’ operations is examined by other authors (Aguiló et al. 2003; 
Papatheodorou 2006; Koutoulas 2006).  
Moreover, Ford et al. (2012) adopting a sociological perspective, discussed 
the asymmetric power–dependence relationship between tourism channel members. 
They noted that the weaker power party is at a disadvantage in terms of the share of 
value that it receives from the tourism network and recommended strategies 
(criticality and value of the firm-specific resources) to weaker organisations to better 
manage their asymmetric power relationships and increase value appropriation from 
the relationship. They highlighted the importance of examining power asymmetries 
within a tourism context to offer recommendations regarding strategies that weaker 
actors can adopt in order to manage these asymmetries.  
Within the tourism literature the market power of the large TOs has been 
identified by a number of researchers over the years (Buhalis 2000; Medina-Muñoz 
et al. 2003; Ioannides and Daughtrey Petridou 2006; Karyopouli and Koutra 2012; 
Falzon 2012; Alegre and Sard 2015). However, there are only a few studies that 
have explicitly examine the issues of power and bargaining power between buyers 
and suppliers within a tourism context in general and between TOs and APs in 
particular. Ivanov et al. (2015), for instance, investigated conflict between 
accommodation providers and intermediaries (travel agencies and TOs) in Bulgaria 
focusing on the influence of the bargaining power of each party in conflict 
resolution strategies. Guo and He (2012) used game theory to examine the 
cooperative relationship between hotels and TOs and identified the impact of 
bargaining power in determining the revenue gained by each party.  
Furthermore, other studies have focused on conflict, control, cooperation and 
the challenges that tourism providers, such as APs, face due to power asymmetries 
in their relationship with the TOs (Buhalis 2000; Aguiló et al. 2003; Bastakis et al. 
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2004; Karamustafa 2000; Medina-Muñoz and García-Falcón 2000; Medina-Muñoz 
and Medina-Muñoz 2002, 2004; Medina-Muñoz et al. 2003; Andreu et al. 2010; Lee 
et al. 2013). For instance, Medina-Muñoz et al. (2003) investigated the control large 
German and UK TOs exerted in their relationship with APs in sun-and-sea 
destinations focusing on the degree of control, mechanisms used, aspects of control 
and the ways in which control was exerted. They found that while some TOs 
exercised low control others excercised strong control particulalry over contract 
issues, through both indirect non-coercive strategies and direct coercive strategies. 
Lee et al. (2013), using one study case, explored the relationship between online 
travel agents and hotels and noted that the stronger bargaining power of the online 
travel agents in relation to the hotels decreased their ability to gain more favourable 
contracts. 
Bastakis et al. (2004) examined the impact of large TOs on small and 
medium tourism enterprises in Greece, identifying the advantages and challenges of 
the TOs power. Aguiló et al. (2003) found that the market power of large TOs 
enables them to obtain low prices from APs in the Balearic Islands. Although the 
above studies offer insights into the impact of power on the relationship between 
tourism buyers and suppliers they do not explicitly focus on the bargaining power 
interactions between the parties and the influence of bargaining power on the 
negotiation processes and outcomes. Therefore, given the importance of better 
understanding bargaining power interactions between buyers and suppliers and the 
management of these asymmetric relationships, the section below discusses 
bargaining power dynamics that are evident within a buyer-supplier context.  
3.5. BARGAINING POWER DYNAMICS BETWEEN TOURISM 
BUYERS AND SUPPLIERS: THE ROLE OF THE LARGE 
TOUR OPERATORS (TOS) 
In the tourism distribution channel, intermediaries are the key link between 
the customer and supplier (Buhalis 2000; Ujma 2001). As a result, the 
intermediaries, namely the TOs, have more power to influence, control and arrange 
demand levels, than their equivalents in other markets (Buhalis 2000; Ujma 2001; 
Song et al. 2013). The main function of the TOs is to combine various travel 
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services into a single product (package) and sell this at a single price thus operating 
as wholesalers (Fyall and Wanhill 2008; Čavlek 2006). In contrast, the majority of 
travel agents operate as retailers and as a result do not bear the risk of unsold 
capacity (Fyall and Wanhill 2008). The travel services that the TO combines 
typically include transportation such as airline seats, and accommodation such as 
hotels, however other services may also be included, such as guided tours and 
leisure activities (Fyall and Wanhill 2008).  
Although traditionally the TOs marketed and sold their product through the 
travel agents, currently the TOs act both as wholesalers and travel agents marketing 
their aggregated product directly to the consumer under their own brand names; for 
example, Thomas Cook (Fyall and Wanhill 2008). Therefore, TOs distribute their 
packaged product either to the consumer directly (direct sale or the Internet) or 
through a middleman, the travel agent, who sells the package for an agreed 
commission (Chand and Katou 2012). The TO industry encompasses a number of 
TOs which vary in size and market specialisation given that not all products can be 
standardised; some TOs, for instance, specialise in nature tourism (Grosspietsch 
2006; Vanhove 2011). However, the current study focuses on the large European 
TOs. These TOs focus on mass market, achieving economies of scale, offer a 
standardised product, large volumes, and attain maximum return of investment 
(Falzon 2012; Alegre and Sard 2015).  
These large TOs have enormous market power within the European tourism 
market in general and the Mediterranean area in particular. Their market power 
primarily stems from the oligopolistic nature of the European TO market. 
Specifically, since the 1990s a consolidation trend has been observed in the TO 
industry with a number of TOs adopting an aggressive merger and acquisition 
strategy establishing transnational conglomerates (Koutoulas 2006; Papatheodorou 
2006). For instance, in 2007, two TOs, TUI and First Choice, merged to create TUI 
Travel (Nelson 2007). At the same time key European TOs, such as TUI Travel, 
vertically integrated and now operate other tourism services such as travel agencies, 
airlines and accommodation units (Theuvsen 2004; Koutoulas 2006).  
Vertical integration can provide economies of scale, enable control of the 
product and increase profitability (Bottomley Renshaw 1994; Bastakis et al. 2004). 
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Hence, this vertical integration enabled the TOs to attain market share and maximise 
their profit (Bastakis et al. 2004). These actions created an oligopolistic European 
TO market with a small number of sellers controlling the largest market share 
(Davies and Downward 2007; Alegre and Sard 2015). TUI and Thomas Cook are 
the two principal TOs in Europe and they have a combined market share of more 
than 50% in key markets such as the UK, Scandinavia and Germany (FVW 2014). 
This oligopolistic structure has created a competitive and aggressive market, 
where the TOs have become the dominant organization within the tourism 
distribution system. Therefore, a number of researchers have identified the 
dominance and powerful position of the large TOs in relation to their suppliers 
(Aguiló et al. 2003; Medina-Muñoz et al. 2003; Buhalis 2000; Bastakis et al. 2004; 
Karyopouli and Koutra 2012; Tveteraas et al. 2014). Budeanu (2009) and Sigala 
(2008) have stated that the large European TOs are vital in promoting sustainable 
supply chain management within the tourism channel. These authors claimed that 
despite the lack of regulation on sustainable practices the powerful position of the 
large TOs (deriving from market power) enables them to influence attitudes and 
practices of various suppliers across the tourism chain. Consequently, the large TOs 
have the necessary power to influence their various suppliers on numerous aspects 
of their relationship.  
The TOs cooperate with various suppliers, such as transportation companies 
and leisure providers, in order to create their tourism packages, however a critical 
element of the TO’s package is the accommodation. The accommodation is believed 
to be a strategic product for the TOs, and is also their largest supplier group 
(Medina-Muñoz and Medina-Muñoz 2002; Budeanu 2009). This is because it is a 
product of considerable value to the TO’s success since it can influence consumer 
satisfaction levels and can define the cost of the total package offered (Medina-
Muñoz and Medina-Muñoz 2002; Yang et al. 2009).  
The term ‘accommodation sector’ refers to all the establishments that 
provide tourists with accommodation (or lodgings) (Barron 2005). However, some 
types of accommodation also offer food and beverages (hotels, bed & breakfast 
establishments, guesthouses, hotel apartments, and tourist villages), while others 
offer self-catering accommodation (tourist apartments and cottages) (Barron 2005). 
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Regardless of its type, the accommodation is a key product for the TOs success and 
for this reason the TOs seek to influence and control the APs to achieve their 
organisational objectives. Hence, contractual and non-contractual negotiations are 
ever present. A major reason why TOs exercise their power over APs is to maintain 
their competitiveness by reducing their prices and the APs profit margins, and 
seeking profit and market share maximisation for themselves (Medina-Muñoz et al. 
2003; Falzon 2012; Alegre and Sard 2015). This is because consumers have a 
particular budget allocated for their holidays and channel members are in direct 
competition with their partners to achieve a larger share (Buhalis 2000). On the 
other hand, APs attempt to balance the volume of tourists they receive with the 
average room rates to achieve a satisfactory return on investment (Buhalis 2000; 
Medina-Muñoz and Medina-Muñoz 2000; Medina-Muñoz et al. 2003). Against this 
background the APs and TOs interact and negotiate contractual and non-contractual 
issues that may arise.  
3.5.1. Challenges in the relationship between the TOs and APs  
Although various issues and conflicts may arise between the APs and TOs, 
contracted price and release periods are typical challenges during contractual 
negotiations (Buhalis 2000; Bastakis et al. 2004; Ivanov et al. 2015). On the other 
hand, issues such as the provision of booking details, fulfilment of contracted room 
allocation and overbookings can lead to non-contractual negotiations between the 
parties. Such issues cause the parties to use their bargaining power in order to attain 
their objectives.   
Within the tourism industry, pricing plays a critical role in adjusting the 
supply of the product to demand (tourists) and expected demand plays a critical role 
in the marketed price for services (Cirer-Costa 2013). Tourism organisations must 
combine both long-term and short-term pricing strategies (Narangajavana et al. 
2014; Alegre and Sard 2015). Long-term pricing strategies are based on the 
anticipated production and demand conditions, while short-term pricing is related to 
issues regarding segmentation, promotional offers and demand fluctuation 
(Narangajavana et al. 2014; Alegre and Sard 2015). Therefore, a fluctuation in prices 
is observed for APs and TOs based on the season (high or low) and booking levels 
(Cirer-Costa 2013).  
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Consequently, it is not suprising that a key concern for APs and TOs is the 
issue of price (Buhalis 2000; Myung et al. 2009; Alegre and Sard 2015). Bastakis et 
al. (2004) investigated the relationship between large TOs and small-and-medium 
APs and identify that, due to the oligopolistic TO market and the limited alternative 
distribution options for the APs, the TOs have a high bargaining power. Bastakis et 
al. continued to note that the high bargaining power of the TOs enables them to put 
pressure on the APs and negotiate more favourable prices. This is particularly 
relevant in sun-and-sea destinations where APs are highly reliant on TOs for the 
distribution of their product (Karamustafa 2000; Andriotis 2003).  
The agreed release period is another challenge to the relationship between 
APs and TOs (Bastakis et al. 2004). The release period regulates when the TOs 
should unblock or release to the APs any rooms from their room allocation that are 
left unsold. APs and TOs have contrasting interests in this situation due to the fact 
that a longer release period for the APs permits them more time to sell these rooms 
through other distribution channels, such as online (Ivanov et al. 2015). In contrast, 
the TOs favour shorter release periods in order to capitalise on the longer time 
period and generate sales. The higher bargaining power of the TOs and the 
competition between the APs may result in short release periods at the AP’s expense 
(Ivanov et al. 2015).  
Closely related to the release period is the coverage of the contract, that is the 
difference between the actual bookings that the APs receive in comparison to the 
room allocation agreed during contractual negotiations (Buhalis 2000; Andriotis 
2003; Ivanov et al. 2015). Andriotis (2003) examined the challenges that APs face in 
their relationship with TOs in Crete, Greece. He noted that, despite the TOs 
contracting a certain number of rooms during formal contractual agreements, they 
did not fulfil this allocation resulting in a number of rooms left empty. Since the 
accommodation product, similar to other tourism products, is intangible and 
perishable, an empty room is lost revenue for the APs (Cirrer-Costa 2013). In order 
to avoid loss of revenue APs sign agmeements for a higher total number of rooms 
than their available capacity which, if managed incorrectly, can lead to overbookings 
(Ivanov et al. 2015).  
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Overbookings are another challenge that arises between the APs and TOs 
(Buhalis 2000). Overbooking is commonly adopted within the accommodation 
sector to protect the unit from lost revenue (Hung et al. 2010; Todorov and Zhechev 
2010; Ivanov and Zhechev 2012). It is founded on the supposition that guests who 
have a reservation will not arrive at the accommodation unit (also referred to as ‘no 
show’), while other guests may cancel or alter their booking at the last minute and 
some may leave earlier than expected (Ivanov and Zhechev 2012). If this is managed 
correctly then the overbooked rooms should be equivalent to the number of 
cancelled bookings or no shows, otherwise the APs must book their guests into 
another accommodation unit. Todorov and Zhechev (2010) examined the impact of 
overbookings of accommodation units, particularly in hotels, and found that 
incorrect management can have negative impacts, such as lost revenue and 
decreased customer loyalty.  
Numerous issues may lead to negotiations between the APs and TOs and the 
above section has examined the common issues and interactions that occur in their 
relationship. This provides the reader with a better understanding of the dyadic 
relationship under investigation. These issues and interactions typically stimulate the 
exercise of bargaining power between the two parties in their effort to achieve their 
organisational objectives.  
3.6. CONCLUSION  
Existing literature regarding the tourism industry has been reviewed to offer 
a better understanding of the industry context that surrounds the AP and TO 
relationship that can influence their bargaining power and interactions during 
negotiations. As advocated by Grounded Theory, the literature was examined prior 
to data collection to stimulate questions for the data collection stage, whilst also 
conferring the freedom to follow the data. Additionally, the literature helped to 
augment the researcher’s theoretical sensitivity enabling her to grasp the relevance 
and suitability of the data in theoretical terms to explain the phenomena under study. 
Further, this literature enabled the researcher to ascertain current knowledge 
regarding bargaining power and negotiations of APs and TOs within a tourism, 
travel and hospitality context. However, as noted earlier (section 3.1)  due to the 
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inductive nature of Grounded Theory, in Chapter 6 additional literature is used to 
analyse and discuss the study’s primary findings.  
In this chapter the tourism industry has been defined and its structure and 
attributes have been explained in order to set out the context of the buyer-supplier 
relationship under investigation, namely that of APs and TOs. The tourism industry 
is a service industry characterised by an intangible and perishable product since the 
tourism product (the travel experience) cannot be seen or touched prior to purchase 
and cannot be stored. It is also an information and coordination intensive industry 
given that various actors must coordinate to deliver the travel experience. Further, 
high demand uncertainty is ever present since demand can be influenced by 
economic factors (for instance disposable income), crisis events and seasonality. 
Due to the complexity of the industry and its characteristics, the actors in the 
tourism distribution channel (such as APs, transportation providers and TOs) and 
specifically buyers and suppliers, are highly dependent on each other to provide the 
tourism product to the consumer and fulfil their organisational aims.  
Tourism is a highly dynamic, multifaceted and competitive industry and its 
characteristics can influence the interactions between the tourism providers. For 
instance, high demand uncertainty often leads to price renegotiations between the 
tourism buyers and suppliers. Understanding the tourism industry, and the tourism 
distribution channel, and the characteristics, links and roles of the various providers 
helped the researcher to address the aim and all three objectives. More specifically, 
Objective 1 seeks to discover the sources of power of both the APs and TOs in order 
to determine the bargaining power within the contractual and non-contractual 
negotiations. Objective 2 investigates how bargaining power is employed within the 
relationship, from the APs perspective, in order to establish the influence strategies 
adopted by both parties during their contractual and non-contractual negotiations. 
Objective 3 examines how bargaining power is exercised to ascertain the 
consequences on the on the contractual and non-contractual negotiation outcomes.  
Furthermore, tourism, travel and hospitality literature on buyer-supplier 
power and bargaining power was reviewed in this chapter to increase the 
researcher’s understanding of the implications of power and ascertain the current 
state of research on these phenomena within a tourism context. It is evident that 
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buyer-supplier research in tourism is perceived as being insufficient and in need of 
further exploration, particularly in terms of investigations on bargaining power and 
negotiations. Additionally, the bargaining power and the role of the large TOs in 
their relationship with the APs was discussed. This was done to identify the context-
specific factors that may influence the contractual and non-contractual negotiations 
of the parties and to set the scene by explaining the bargaining power interactions 
arising in the negotiations between APs and TOs. Lastly, the AP and TO 
relationship was examined regarding the challenges that may arise and may result in 
the use of bargaining power and negotiations, whether contractual or not. This 
knowledge provides a clearer understanding on the relationship context that may 
stimulate the use of bargaining power and negotiations. Thus, this examination helps 
in addressing Objectives 2 and 3. Having provided an understanding of the tourism 
industry context and how it may influence the bargaining power and negotiations of 
the APs with the TOs, the chapter below examines the tourism context of the 
Republic of Cyprus (ROC) to aid the enhance the reader’s understanding of the 
relationship of the APs and TOs in the ROC.  
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CHAPTER 4 – TOURISM IN THE REPUBLIC OF 
CYPRUS  
4.1. INTRODUCTION  
In this chapter the research location is discussed to enable the reader to better 
understand the context of the relationships between the accommodation providers 
(APs) and the tour operators (TOs) in the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) as well as the 
factors that may influence their bargaining power interactions. Cyprus is divided 
into two parts: the southern-part, controlled by the Greek-Cypriots and the northern-
part, controlled by the Turkish-Cypriots (U.S. Department of State 2015). This 
chapter only refers to the southern-part of Cyprus which was the research location. 
The southern-part is internationally recognised as the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) 
(U.S. Department of State 2015; European Commission 2016; United Nations 
2015). 
The ROC is an economically developed mature sun-and-sea destination and 
tourism plays a significant role in its economic growth (European Commission 
2015a; Boukas and Ziakas 2013). Utilising its beaches and favourable climate it has 
experienced tremendous tourism growth becoming a popular mass packaged sun-
and-sea destination (European Commission 2015b; Ioannides 2001). However, the 
emphasis on promoting the mass packaged sun-and-sea product, the reliance on a 
small number of source markets and the issues of flight accessibility have resulted in 
a destination dependent on large TOs for its survival (CTO 2011; Karyopouli and 
Koutra 2012; Farmaki 2012; Boukas and Ziakas 2013). Hence, the TOs play a 
dominant role in the tourism and hospitality industry and are powerful in relation to 
destination suppliers, namely APs.  
The accommodation sector is characterised by medium-and-large size units 
with the vast majority located in the coastal areas of Larnaka, Limassol, Paphos, 
Ayia Napa and Protaras (Ransley 2012; Tsangari 2012; CTO 2014b). This 
concentration is due to the destination’s focus on promoting the sun-and-sea 
product. The sector is perceived to be relatively successful, playing an important 
role in the destination’s economy (Ransley 2012; Tsangari 2012; European 
Commission 2016). Despite this success, however, APs (owner/managers) 
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experience many challenges, such as oversupply of units and tired accommodation, 
which reduces their competitiveness in the tourism market (Tsangari 2012; Farmaki 
2012; Sharpley 2007). Additionally, the powerful role of the TOs more often than 
not allows them to govern the relationship with the APs (Sharpley 2007). This 
makes it difficult for APs to manage the relationship with TOs, specifically during 
negotiations. Therefore, the ROC provides rich data for examining the contractual 
and non-contractual negotiations characterised by asymmetric bargaining power 
between the large TOs and APs. 
Accordingly, an account of the ROC is presented below discussing the 
economic, political and sociocultural aspects to gain a better understanding of the 
research location. This is followed by a discussion highlighting the development of 
the ROC as an important sun-and-sea destination, as well as the challenges that it 
faces in the competitive tourism market and the potential influence on the power 
relations of the APs and large TOs. This is because these issues influence the 
tourism and hospitality industry in the ROC as well as the actions of the actors 
involved. Subsequently, a discussion on the accommodation sector and its 
characteristics is presented in order to elucidate specific factors that may influence 
the relationship between APs and TOs. 
4.2. AN ACCOUNT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS 
Cyprus as a whole is the third largest island in the Mediterranean basin, but 
ROC is only the southern-part. As indicated in Figure 3 below, it is situated in the 
eastern Mediterranean, at the crossroads of three continents, Europe, Asia and 
Africa.  
Cyprus has been divided de facto, between the Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-
Cypriots, since 1974. In 1960 the island, as a whole, gained independence from 
Britain12 under treaties guaranteed by Greece, Turkey and Britain (Mallinson 2005). 
Despite its newly acquired independent status, political unrest was evident and 
tensions between the two communities were high (Bryant and Papadakis 2012). This 
                                                
12 The term Britain is used to refer to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) 
Government, as it is officially recognised. This is because this is the term adopted by the authors 
cited (Mallinson 2005; Bryant and Papadakis 2012).   
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was partly because, while the minority Turkish-speaking Cypriots was seeking the 
partition of Cyprus, the majority Greek-speaking Cypriots sought the union of 
Cyprus with Greece (Bryant and Papadakis 2012).13  
 
Figure 3: Map of the Mediterranean basin. (amended from Geographic Guide 2015). 
In 1974, there was a coup against the President by Greek-Cypriot right-wing 
extremists, supported by Greece’s military dictatorship which also sought the union 
of Cyprus with Greece14 (Bryant and Papadakis 2012; Mallinson 2005). This coup 
gave Turkey’s military forces an opportunity to invade, claiming it was within their 
rights to protect Turkish-Cypriots (Bryant and Papadakis 2012; Mallinson 2005). 
This resulted in the partition between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, as 
illustrated in Figure 4 below (following page) which shows that the southern two-
thirds of the island (in white) are controlled by Greek-Cypriots, namely the Republic 
of Cyprus, whilst the northern one-third (in yellow) is occupied and controlled by 
the Turkish-Cypriot administration, namely the “Turkish Republic of Northern 
                                                
13 Britain also played a role in increasing tensions between the communities because it encouraged 
the Cypriot President’s decision to modify the unworkable constitution initially agreed between the 
communities and the guarantor powers (Mallinson 2005).	
14 Although the Greek-Cypriot leadership moved away from seeking union with Greece, a small 
group of Greek-Cypriot right wing extremists continued to demand this (Bryant and Papadakis 2012).  
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Cyprus”15. However, this self-declared “state” is internationally recognised only by 
Turkey (U.S. Department of State 2015). 
 
Figure 4: Map of Cyprus. (Nations Online Project 2016). 
The ROC is an independent microstate and has been a member of the 
European Union (EU) since 2004, and of the Commonwealth since 1961. It has a 
Presidential government structure, with the President being elected by popular vote 
for a five-year term. Greek and Turkish are the two official languages of the ROC 
but English is also widely spoken.  
The ROC is often characterised as “[…] a Mediterranean island with a 
European mentality” (Ransley 2012, p.28; Broome 2004). This could be partly 
because it was a British colony, thus Britain has to a great extent formed the current 
public administration and processes (Dimitratos et al. 2011; Broome 2004). Further, 
the ROC receives over two million tourists annually, the vast majority from 
European countries (such as UK and Germany) (Broome 2004). These factors 
intensify the influence of a Westernised lifestyle and way of thinking (Broome 
                                                
15 The quotation marks are used to denote the fact that this administration is not internationally 
recognised by any country except Turkey.	
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2004).  
The ROC is an economically developed state that has a small and dynamic 
service-based economy (financial, banking, tourism and education) (Republic of 
Cyprus 2012; Charalambous 2014). In 2014, the service sector constituted 87% of 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the secondary sector (manufacturing, 
construction, electricity) accounted for 11%, and the primary sector (agriculture) 2% 
of GDP (World Bank 2015). The key characteristics of the economy are its small 
internal market, small size of the majority of businesses and its “open nature” 
(Republic of Cyprus 2012, p.3). The Government’s main responsibility is to provide 
support to the private sector and moderate the markets in order to maintain economic 
stability and a promising business environment (Republic of Cyprus 2012).  
Since 1974, the political climate has been stable, and volatility is very low in 
comparison to the majority of other EU countries (Ioannides and Holcomb 2001; 
Charalambous 2014). Between 1974 and 2011, the ROC experienced steady 
economic growth contributing to job creation, enhancing residents’ standard of 
living, and leading to low unemployment rates, and low rates of social exclusion and 
poverty (Ioannides 2011; Charalambous 2014). In 2011, however, the global 
economic crisis hit the ROC and the economy began to underperform 
(Charalambous 2014). This was because it lost credibility with the credit-rating 
agencies, partly due to the financial exposure of the ROC banks to the Greek 
economy (Charalambous 2014). The Greek financial crisis was a result of inaccurate 
debt and deficit figures which downgraded Greece’s credit rating to the lowest in the 
Eurozone (Melvin 2015; Niculescu 2011). Nevertheless, the economy of the ROC is 
now stabilising (European Commission 2015a). In 2014, the real GDP decreased by 
2.4%, which is lower than the 5.4% contraction observed in 2013 (European 
Commission 2015a). As a result, the microeconomic forecast for the ROC also 
demonstrates signs of stabilisation (European Commission 2015a).  
The ROC is an independent island-state that significantly relies on the 
success of its service sector, such as tourism, in order to contribute to its economic 
stability. Having described the economic, sociocultural and political issues of the 
ROC, attention now turns on tourism and its development in the ROC. 
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4.3. TOURISM DEVELOPMENT  
The service sector, particularly tourism, is a key economic driver for the 
ROC (European Commission 2015a). In 2014, the latest data from the World Travel 
& Tourism Council (WTTC) showed that the total16 contribution of travel and 
tourism to the GDP of the ROC was 21.3% and was expected to increase by 5.5% in 
2015 (WTTC 2015). Tourism is also a major employment provider, contributing 
22.6% to total employment in 2014 (WTTC 2015). Furthermore, export profits from 
international tourists and tourism related merchandise are valued at 29.6% of total 
exports (WTTC 2015). In November 2015, the European Commission calculated the 
importance of international tourism to its member states, based on the ratio of travel 
receipts to GDP (European Commission 2015b). The ROC, Croatia and Malta were 
identified as the three countries whose international tourism contributed most to 
GDP, indicating the importance of tourism to the economy of the Republic 
(European Commission 2015b). 
Indeed, since its independence, tourism has played a major role in the growth 
of its economy because it was utilised as a key vehicle for economic rejuvenation 
and diversification (Farmaki et al. 2015; Boukas and Ziakas 2013; Tsangari 2012; 
Clerides and Pashourtidou 2007). Sharpley (2004) has stated that tourism in the 
ROC occurred in two stages. The first stage was from 1960-1974 (when it gained 
independence, until the de facto division) while the second stage was after the 
partition in 1974. During this first stage Cyprus as a whole was transformed, 
receiving 25,700 tourists in 1960, but more than 264,000 tourists in 1973, with an 
annual growth rate of 22% (Sharpley 2004). This was because of spatial 
restructuring, from the Troodos mountains (where most accommodation was 
located) to the coastal areas of Ammochostos and Kyrenia (Ioannides 2001). Due to 
affordable air travel, packaged-holiday offerings from the TOs, and the growing 
demand for the sun-and-sea product in the northern markets, Cyprus as a whole 
became an established mass sun-and-sea destination (Apostolopoulos and Gales 
2002; Ioannides 2001).  
                                                
16 The total contribution of travel and tourism entails direct, indirect and induced impacts on the 
economy; for example, investment activity (such as building a new hotel), government collective 
spending related to tourism activities, and the purchase of goods and services by the domestic market 
to service tourists (such as food purchased by hotels) (WTTC 2015).  
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In 1974, during the second stage following partition, tourism virtually 
collapsed since most tourist facilities and infrastructure, including the airport, were 
lost (Sharpley 2002). Nevertheless, the ROC managed to rebuild its infrastructure 
focusing on the south and on the coastal areas of Limassol, Larnaca, Paphos and the 
area around Ayia Napa and Protaras (Sharpley 2001; Ioannides 2001). These four 
areas were the only relatively large coastal resorts that remained after the invasion. 
The ROC then achieved impressive economic growth in the 1980s focusing on mass 
tourism, and the sector stabilised in the 1990s (Tsangari 2012; Adamou and Clerides 
2009; Clerides and Pashourtidou 2007).  
In the early 2000s the number of arrivals in the ROC decreased (Adamou 
and Clerides 2009), from 2,696,732 in 2001 to 2,172,998 in 2010 (CYSTAT 2015a). 
This reduction could be partly attributed to the September 11th terrorist attacks and 
the war in Iraq, as well as increased competition from new, cheaper destinations 
such as Croatia and Egypt (Clerides and Pashourtidou 2007). Since 2011, however, 
tourism has grown (Emergo Wealth 2013). In the period January to November 2015, 
latest statistics from the ROC statistical service record tourist arrivals at 2,581,057, 
indicating a growth of 8.2% on the same period in 2014 (CYSTAT 2015b). This 
increase may be due to the rise in tourist arrivals from Russia and Eastern Europe, 
and to events in nearby countries, such as the conflict in Egypt, and terrorists attacks 
that make the ROC a preferable destination for tourists (SigmaLive 2015a).  
Hence, since 2011 the tourism sector has grown and the WTTC has noted 
that the increased contribution of travel and tourism to the GDP of the ROC, has 
increased in significance to the economy (WTTC 2015). The WTTC expect that in 
2025 the total contribution of travel and tourism will reach 25.5% of GDP, in 
comparison with 21.3% in 2014 (WTTC 2015). This is based on the direct and 
indirect contributions and induced impacts of travel and tourism on the economy 
(WTTC 2015). Contributions include for example investment activity (such as 
building new hotels), Government spending associated with tourism activities, and 
the purchasing of goods and services by the domestic market to service tourists 
(such as purchases of food by hotels).  
This economic contribution is significant for the island and particularly the 
coastal areas given that the coastal areas receive most of the international tourist 
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arrivals. As noted earlier tourism in the ROC is mainly concentrated around the 
coastal areas of Limassol, Larnaka, Ammochostos (including Ayia Napa and 
Protaras) and Paphos, because these locations were the only large coastal areas 
available following the island’s partition. Table 2 below, presents the distribution of 
international tourist arrivals by location for 2013. It shows that the coastal resort of 
Paphos (including the area of Polis Chrysochou) has received the highest percentage 
of international tourists with 38.7% of yearly arrivals, while Lefkosia and the Hill 
resorts, located in the hinterland areas, have received the lowest percentage of 
international arrivals, 5% and 0.2% respectively. This distribution is not surprising 
since the coastal areas offer a variety of activities that fulfil the desires of most 
tourists on holiday, from relaxing on the beach to more active pursuits such as 
swimming and sports (Holloway 2006). Thus the core product of the coastal areas 
(sun, sand and sea) continues to be attractive to the largest segment of the market 
(Holloway 2006; Andriotis 2006).  
Areas Arrivals Share 
Lefkosia (Nicosia) 119,129 5.0% 
Ammochostos (includes 
Ayia Napa and Protaras) 733, 068 30.05% 
Limassol 281,284 11.7% 
Larnaka 222,127 9.2% 
Paphos (including Polis 
Chrysochou) 931,794 38.7% 
Hill Resorts 4,694 0.2% 
Other 47,743 2.0% 
Any 2 or more areas 65,551 2.7% 
Total 2, 405, 390 100% 
Table 2: Distribution of tourist arrivals by location. (amended from CTO 2014a). 
Whilst the ROC has focused on sun-and-sea to become a popular mass 
Mediterranean summer destination (European Commission 2015b) a number of 
fundamental problems exist with the tourism product that jeopardise its 
competitiveness (Boukas and Ziakas 2013; Tsangari 2012; Adamou and Clerides 
2009; Clerides and Pashourtidou 2007). One such challenge is its over-dependence 
on mass sun-and-sea product (Boukas and Ziakas 2013; Koutra and Karyopouli 
2013; Tsangari 2012). Although sun-and-sea were appropriate in the 1980s, when 
the ROC was a new destination, this one-dimensional product is no longer suitable. 
New destinations have emerged, such as Turkey and Egypt, offering similar 
products at a lower price resulting in the decreasing competitiveness of the ROC 
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(Tsangari 2012; CTO 2011; Clerides and Pashourtidou 2007). Furthermore, the 
focus on the mass sun-and-sea product has led to architectural pollution, coastal 
erosion, air, water and noise pollution, change in the natural landscape and strain on 
the destination’s natural resources (Tsangari 2012; Sharpley 2004). 
Additionally, traditional competitors, such as Spain, have enhanced their 
infrastructure and diversified their product (Boukas and Ziakas 2013; Farmaki 2012; 
Clerides and Pashourtidou 2007). The ROC urgently needs to upgrade its tourism 
infrastructure, and to enhance and diversify its narrow sun-and-sea product in order 
to remain competitive (Boukas and Ziakas 2013; Farmaki 2012; Adamou and 
Clerides 2009).  
Furthermore, dependence on sun-and-sea contributes to the strong reliance of 
the destination on the large European TOs for their international tourism flows 
(Tsangari 2012; Farsari et al. 2007). This may be attributed to the fact that the 
package TO market is highly concentrated, with a small number of TOs controlling 
the majority of the market. Hence, these TOs decide which destinations will receive 
most international tourists (Falzon 2012; Farsari et al. 2007; Medina-Muñoz and 
García-Falcón, 2000). In the ROC, large TOs control a large share of tourist arrivals. 
In 2013, for example, 58% of international tourists travelled on a packaged 
arrangement, while 42% of international tourists travelled on an individual basis 
(CYSTAT 2014). Accordingly, the destination’s dependence on the large TOs for 
tourist arrivals contributes to the dependence of the destination’s suppliers on the 
large TOs for tourist arrivals, thus giving the large TOs a powerful position in the 
destination.  
Another key problem is over-reliance on the UK, Scandinavian and German 
markets (Farmaki 2012; Saveriades 2000). In 2003, the Cyprus Tourism 
Organisation (CTO) identified that the UK, Germany and Russia were high priority 
markets and Scandinavian countries were secondary markets in its strategic plan 
(CTO 2003). In 2011, in the CTO’s strategic plan, the UK, German, Russian and 
Scandinavian markets were considered key sources (CTO 2011). Therefore, almost 
10 years later after the 2003 strategic plan the island was still dependent on the same 
four markets for international arrivals. The ROC is particularly dependent on the UK 
market, which accounted for 37% (891, 229) of tourists in 2013, while Russia 
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accounted for 25% of total tourist arrivals (608,576) (CYSTAT 2014). One reason 
for the higher UK market share could be the strong ties that the ROC has with 
Britain and the fact that English is widely spoken on the island, making it an 
attractive destination for British people (Koutra and Karyopouli 2013).  
This overdependence on a small number of European markets contributes to 
the dependence of the destination on the large TOs. This is because the European 
tourism market is dominated by two large TOs. These two, TUI and Thomas Cook, 
have a combined market share of more than 50% in generating markets such as the 
UK, Scandinavia and Germany (FVW 2014). Consequently, three of the key source 
markets are controlled by two large TOs, which contributes to their power in the 
industry and in turn in their relationship with the tourism suppliers.  
Furthermore, the sun-and-sea product is highly seasonal and as a result 
tourism is characterised by the one-peak seasonality17 form (Boukas and Ziakas 
2013; Karyopouli and Koutra 2012; Clerides and Pashourtidou 2007). Most tourists 
arrive during the months of April to October, 87% in 2013 (CYSTAT 2014), which 
is considered the high season, whilst November to the end of March is the low 
season (PwC Cyprus 2014). Seasonality is linked to low profitability during the low 
season, seasonal employment and over-use of natural and built resources during the 
high season (Karyopouli and Koutra 2012; Farsari et al. 2007). Boukas and Ziakas 
(2013), for instance, state that a number of accommodation units in the ROC close 
down during the winter season due to their inability to generate sufficient revenue to 
cover their high operational costs. Therefore, highly seasonal tourism negatively 
affects both destinations and tourism suppliers, reducing their competitiveness.  
Accessibility to the destination is another major challenge (CTO 2011; 
Farmaki 2012). As for most island destinations, due to its peripherality and isolation, 
the ROC depends on air carriers to transfer tourists (Sharpley 2001; Lim and Cooper 
2009; Hernández-Martín 2008). Hence, air carriers such as the TOs’ charter flights, 
independent charter flights, and national and low-cost carriers are critical for tourism 
                                                
17 Seasonality refers to the concentration of tourist arrivals in relatively short periods during the year 
that reoccurs at about the same periods but may change from year to year (Koening-Lewis and 
Bischoff 2005). 
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development (CTO 2011). This dependence enables the large TOs to influence 
tourist characteristics, tourism flows, and prices in the destination in general, and for 
tourism suppliers in particular (Sharpley 2001; Karyopouli and Kourtra 2012). 
Hence, accessibility restrictions increase the importance of large TOs in the tourism 
industry, contributing to the dependence of the ROC on the large TOs. 
The above discussion has shown that, although the ROC has managed to 
establish itself as a popular sun-and-sea destination, various challenges exist that 
threaten its competitiveness. These include, increased competition from new 
destinations, deteriorating infrastructure, restricted accessibility, dependence on the 
mass sun-and-sea product and reliance on a small number of source markets 
(Boukas and Ziakas 2013; Tsangari 2012; Adamou and Clerides 2009; Clerides and 
Pashourtidou 2007). The tourism product is a combination of activities, attractions, 
services and destination characteristics that create the tourism experience, thus the 
product is rooted in the specific destination (Meethan 2004). Being a less 
competitive destination can reduce the competitiveness of the tourism businesses 
that operate in the destination as well as push tourists and TOs to seek other 
alternatives (Meethan 2004; Kozak 1999). This could have detrimental effects on the 
economy of the ROC in general and on tourism suppliers in particular due to the 
importance of the tourism sector in the destination. Therefore, the challenges faced 
by the destination could also have implications for the contractual and non-
contractual relationships of the large TOs and APs. The section below discusses the 
accommodation sector in the ROC to further contextualise the relationship between 
the large TOs and APs 
4.4. ACCOMMODATION SECTOR  
In the ROC the accommodation product can be considered relatively 
successful and is dominated by medium-and-large size units (Ransley 2012; 
Tsangari 2012). It offers a variety of accommodation types that are relatively 
luxurious and provide specialised services (such as conference facilities). The 
accommodation sector is a major component of the tourism experience and a key 
sector for the economy (European Commission 2016). It represents approximately 
10% of the total number of tourism business, and employs more than 40% of the 
total workforce (European Commission 2009). Considering the significant 
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contribution of the sector to employment, it is important to investigate the ability of 
the APs to improve their bargaining position in relation to the large TOs in order for 
the sector to be successful and sustain its contribution to the economy. 
As mentioned in section 3.3, tourist arrivals are concentrated in the coastal 
areas of Paphos, Ammochostos (including Ayia Napa and Protaras), Limassol and 
Larnaka, hence, most tourism activities and accommodation units are located in 
those areas. Table 3 illustrates the destination’s accommodation capacity for 2013, 
based on the type of unit and the area (location).  
Areas Operational 
Units 
Star 
Hotels 
Hotel 
Apartments 
Tourist 
Villages 
Other 
Categories*  
Beds in 
Operation 
Lefkosia 
(Nicosia) 25 20 2 0 3 2,860 
Limassol 74 34 16 1 23 13,032 
Larnaka 100 23 17 0 60 5, 972 
Ammochostos 
(including Ayia 
Napa and 
Protaras) 
243 72 100 8 63 35,055 
Paphos 
(including Polis 
of Chrysochou) 
273 56 31 12 174 27,866 
Hill Resorts 85 20 0 0 65 2,317 
Total 800 225 166 21 388 87,102 
*Other categories include tourist villas, traditional buildings, tourist apartments, hotels without 
stars, guesthouses and campsites. 
 
Table 3: Cypriot accommodation capacity for 2013. (amended from CTO: Accommodation 
industry capacity 2014b). 
 
As can be seen from Table 3, Paphos has the highest number of operational 
units, followed by Ammochostos (including Ayia Napa and Protaras). Larnaka 
follows in third place and Limassol has the lowest number of operational units. This 
distribution may be because following partition, the Government significantly aided 
the private sector, particularly refugees, to reestablish tourism infrastructure in the 
coastal areas of Ammochostos and Paphos (Ioannides 1992; Sharpley 2000). This 
state aid was in the form of free government land and/or bank loans with low 
interest (Ioannides 1992). Additionally, in Paphos tourism infrastructure further 
increased due to the construction of the Paphos airport (Ioannides 1992).  
The explosive growth of tourism development that occurred during the 1980s 
has, however, resulted in the need to upgrade and modernise the current 
accommodation product (CTO 2011). The accommodation product significantly 
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contributes to tourist satisfaction as well as increasing competitiveness in the market 
(Albayrak and Caber 2015; Tavitiyaman et al. 2011). Clerides et al. (2007) have 
reported that tourists identify that the accommodation aspect of their holiday was not 
value for money, leading to poorer average rating of their overall holiday experience 
in the ROC. An accommodation unit with poor infrastructure may not be considered 
competitive by the TOs thus reducing the negotiating position of the APs. In 2010, 
the Government of the ROC assigned 500 million Euro to aid the local economy 
following the global economic crisis, and a share of this was assigned to the 
accommodation sector through planning incentives to enhance and enrich their 
infrastructure (Republic of Cyprus 2010).  
Although this incentive helped to improve the accommodation units, further 
upgrades and improvement to the infrastructure are needed (Tsangari 2012; Farmaki 
2012) to enhance the destination’s competitiveness. Improvements to the 
infrastructure of the destination, namely the accommodation sector, can also 
improve its attractiveness and competitiveness in the tourism market (Crouch 2011). 
As such this could contribute to the success of the tourism suppliers given that a 
more competitive destination leads to more competitive businesses (Meethan 2004).  
Furthermore, due to the explosive growth of tourism and unplanned 
accommodation development in the 1980s and 1990s, supply exceeded demand in 
the 2000s (Sharpley 2001). As a result TOs were able to negotiate high discount 
rates, leading to reduced profitability for the APs, loss of jobs and a decline in 
quality and competitiveness (Sharpley 2001). To address this, in 2006, the 
Government announced an incentive plan for the withdrawal of lower quality 
touristic beds in order to alter the composition of the current supply (CTO 2007). 
This incentive did reduce the number of beds by 764 (Emergo Wealth 2014). 
However, the sector is still characterised by oversupply of accommodation units 
(Sharpley 2007; Farmaki 2012). In turn, this enables the large TOs to negotiate, or 
even dictate high discounts with the majority of APs, leading to a downward 
pressure on the agreed prices (Sharpley 2007). This oversupply increases the power 
of the large TOs since they have various similar accommodation alternatives to 
choose from and can transfer the tourism flow they control, which allows them to 
demand their preferred price in negotiations.   
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The above discussion emphasises the characteristics of the ROC 
accommodation sector and elucidates the challenges that may reduce the 
competitiveness of the accommodation product in the tourism market. These 
challenges, such as poor infrastructure and oversupply of accommodation units, may 
also influence bargaining power and negotiations between APs and large TOs. 
4.5. CONCLUSION  
Literature on tourism in the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) has been examined in 
order to provide the context for the contractual and non-contractual relationships and 
negotiations that occur between its APs and large European TOs. The ROC is a 
popular mass packaged sun-and-sea destination, with its tourism development 
primarily concentrated in the coastal areas, Limassol, Paphos, Larnaca, 
Ammochostos (including Ayia Napa and Protaras).  
This chapter’s discussion indicated that the ROC is dependent on large 
European TOs for the growth of tourism, which contributes to the powerful position 
of TOs in relation to APs. The large TOs have more power and thus a dominant role 
in their relationship with the APs which often allows them to control various aspects 
of their interaction, such as their contractual and non-contractual negotiations. APs 
therefore face various challenges, when managing their relationships with the 
powerful TOs in general, and during contractual and non-contractual negotiations in 
particular. As a research area, the ROC is thus able to offer rich data for exploring 
contractual and non-contractual negotiations between tourism suppliers, namely the 
APs, experiencing power asymmetry in their relationship with their buyers, namely 
the TOs.  
A discussion on the ROC and its tourism industry was presented in order to 
provide a better understanding of the context (social setting) of the bargaining power 
interactions and negotiations between the APs and the TOs. Chapter 5 discusses the 
methodology and design, employed to address the aim and objectives of the study.  
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CHAPTER 5 - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the methodology and research design used to produce 
the empirical evidence required to explore the contractual and non-contractual 
negotiations and bargaining power interactions between the accommodation 
providers (APs) and European large tour operators (TOs) in the Republic of Cyprus 
(ROC), from the APs perspective. This was done in order to gain an in-depth 
understanding and explanation of the bargaining power interactions and negotiations 
that arise between the parties and thereby address current gaps in knowledge in the 
business-to-business (B2B) buyer-supplier negotiations (APs acting as suppliers and 
TOs acting as buyers) and bargaining power interactions within a tourism and 
hospitality context (Chapter 1, section 1.2.3 and Chapter 3).  
This chapter first reviews the research aim and objectives. Second, the 
research methodology and research design is explained. Third, there is a discussion 
of the methods of data collection utilised, the sampling design employed and the 
rationale for the interview guide. Fourth, the data analysis process is explained. 
Fifth, the chapter sets out an evaluation (credibility, transferability, dependability 
and reflexivity) of the research project. Sixth, the ethical considerations of the 
research are outlined. Finally, the limitations of the study are discussed.  
5.2. RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
The aim of the study was: 
To provide an understanding of the influences on, and the 
implications of, the bargaining power of the Republic Of Cyprus 
(ROC) accommodation providers (APs) when undertaking 
contractual and non-contractual negotiations with large European 
tour operators (TOs).  
The study’s aim was generated from the literature reviewed (Chapters 2 and 3) 
which indicated that there was insufficient research regarding power relations, 
business-to-business (B2B) buyer-supplier exchanges (such as negotiations) and the 
management of these relationships within a tourism and hospitality context (Zhang 
et al. 2009; Ford et al. 2012; Song et al. 2013; Gjerald and Lyngstad 2015). Hence, 
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there was a lack of in-depth academic understanding regarding power and its 
implication on B2B buyer-supplier relationships within a service sector such as 
tourism and hospitality. The powerful position of the TOs in relation to their 
suppliers has been identified in the tourism literature, especially from an economic 
perspective (market power of the TOs) (Chapter 3, section 3.4). Researchers have 
also investigated conflict, control, cooperation and the challenges that tourism 
suppliers, such as APs, face in their relationship with the TOs (Chapter 3, section 
3.4). These studies offered insights in to the impact of power on the buyer-supplier 
relationship. However, the interactions and challenges that the perceived weaker 
parties (such as APs) face rests on the relative bargaining power of the parties: that 
is each party’s ability to influence the other. The studies referred to above did not 
explicitly examine the bargaining power concept regarding its antecedents, exercise 
and implications on the negotiation process and outcomes. This could be attributed 
to the fact that research within a tourism context has primarily focused on the 
relationship between businesses and consumers (B2C) rather than B2B relationships 
(Jensen 2009; Hung et al. 2010; Guo et al. 2013; Ling et al. 2014; Gjerald and 
Lyngstand 2015).  
Negotiations between suppliers and buyers are critical for businesses due to 
the fact that they determine the level of value appropriation (profit) for each 
negotiating party. Conversely, negotiations between buyers and suppliers can arise 
due to reasons other than establishing a formal contract (Powell-Thomas 2013). 
Thus, as well as contractual negotiations, there are non-contractual negotiations 
evident between buyers and suppliers (Chapter 2, section 2.2). Contractual 
negotiations refer to negotiations during the establishment of a formal contract. Non-
contractual negotiations refer to negotiations that are informal in nature, for instance, 
parties may need to adjust the formal contract or resolve a conflict that may occur 
due to environmental changes. Both contractual and non-contractual negotiations are 
important to consider in order to fully explain the phenomena under study. This is 
because relationship behaviour and outcomes do not only occur via the actions 
described in the contracts (Aminoff and Tanskanen 2013). 
However, despite the importance of negotiations, and B2B power 
interactions, insufficient knowledge existed regarding the contractual relationship of 
tourism suppliers and buyers, their activities, the power structures that exist  and the 
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management of these relationships (Zhang et al. 2009; Christodoulidou et al. 2010; 
Guo and He 2012; Gjerald and Lyngstad 2015). To fill this gap this exploratory 
study explores the contractual and non-contractual relationship and negotiations 
between the APs and TOs under a new light (bargaining power) in order to generate 
insights to understand and explain the situation. APs are considered as a major 
supplier for the TOs since accommodation is a key part of any type of travel 
arrangement and a strategic product for the TOs (Buhalis 2000; Medina-Muñoz et 
al. 2003) and the parties frequently engage in negotiations.  
The APs (acting as suppliers) face many challenges in their relationship with 
large European TOs (acting as the buyers) as these TOs govern various aspects of 
the relationship, including negotiations, and often influence the APs profitability and 
competitiveness (Falzon 2012; Bastakis et al. 2004). As a result the researcher 
focused on exploring the negotiations and bargaining power interactions that occur, 
and the APs’ perceptions, opinions and meanings of the situation that they 
experienced. The researcher sought to find common patterns regarding the 
experiences of the APs involved and to offer new insights and a better understanding 
of the situation since limited research existed. Such patterns could generate insights 
that would offer a detailed understanding and explanation of the bargaining power 
relationship in negotiations and outcomes between the parties, from the perspective 
of the perceived weaker party, the APs. This knowledge could help the perceived 
weaker parties, specifically the APs, to enhance their bargaining position and the 
management of their relationship with the large TOs.  
Three objectives address the aim of the research. The first objective was: 
To discover the sources of power of the accommodation providers 
and the tour operators, from the APs perspective, in order to 
determine their bargaining power within the contractual and non-
contractual negotiations. 
Although existing tourism and hospitality literature identifies that power asymmetry 
exists between the parties (Bastakis et al. 2004; Falzon 2012) the antecedents and 
sources of that power are not explicitly and sufficiently addressed. The literature 
reviewed (Chapter 2) indicated that it was important to investigate the sources of 
power available to the parties by considering both the external structure that 
surrounds the relationship (structural aspect of power) as well as firm-specific 
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resources in order to fully understand the bargaining power relationship of the 
parties. Specifically, it was important to explore how these sources contribute to, 
and influence the bargaining power of the APs and TOs. The resources that each 
party has establishes the relative bargaining power of each party: that is each party’s 
ability to influence the contractual and non-contractual negotiation process and 
outcomes.  
The second objective was: 
To investigate the way bargaining power is employed within the 
relationship, from the APs perspective, in order to establish the 
influence strategies adopted by both parties during their contractual 
and non-contractual negotiations. 
Objective 2 dealt with the behavioural aspect of power, which was identified in the 
literature reviewed (Chapter 2) as an essential element to fully understand and 
explain the bargaining power interactions in the buyer and supplier relationship, that 
is the APs and TOs. Specifically, the exercise of power was examined by identifying 
the influence strategies utilised by the APs and TOs during negotiations. These 
strategies are the ways through which power is used and communicated by party A 
to influence the behaviour of party B in order to achieve party A’s organisational 
objectives (Frazier and Rody 1991; Gelderman et al. 2008).  
The third objective was: 
To examine the way that bargaining power is exercised within the 
relationship, from the APs perspective, in order to ascertain the 
consequences on the contractual and non-contractual negotiation 
outcomes. 
Objective 3 required the examination of the implications of the exercise of 
bargaining power between the APs and TOs on the contractual and non-contractual 
negotiation outcomes. In particular, by exploring the APs’ perceptions, the focus 
was on understanding the way the bargaining position of the APs and the exercise of 
their bargaining power enabled them to influence the outcome of contractual and 
non-contractual negotiations with the TOs. This knowledge helped the researcher to 
understand and explain the implications of bargaining power during negotiations 
between a perceived weaker supplier (APs), and a perceived stronger buyer (TOs).  
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Meeting the study’s objectives assisted the researcher to generate rich 
insights in to this under-researched area that explain the bargaining power 
interactions and negotiations that occur between the APs and TOs, from the APs 
perspective. These insights firstly advance existing buyer-supplier knowledge 
regarding bargaining power interactions and negotiations between tourism and 
hospitality buyers and suppliers. Secondly, through the insights, the perceived 
weaker parties (APs) may be able to fully understand their bargaining position in 
relation to powerful parties (TOs), the way to improve this position, and how to 
better manage their relationships with powerful parties. The section below discusses 
the methodology and research design of the study.  
5.3. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
5.3.1. Grounded Theory methodology and research design 
5.3.1.1		 Introduction	
According to Crotty (1998) research methodology describes the plan of 
action, process and research design that forms the choices that are made in the 
research process to achieve the desired outcomes. The research methodology and 
design has to be suitable to enable the researcher to answer the research question in 
the best way possible based on the researcher’s beliefs (Collis and Hussey 2003). In 
the sections below, first the choice of a qualitative approach is explained, secondly 
the choice of Grounded Theory rather than other types of qualitative methodology 
and design is discussed. Thirdly, an overview of Grounded Theory is offered and 
lastly the version of Grounded Theory adopted in this study combining elements 
from evolved Grounded Theory and classic Grounded Theory is explained.  
5.3.1.2.	 Why	a	qualitative	approach?	
A qualitative approach was more appropriate for exploring the experiences 
of the APs, and identifying the antecedents of bargaining power, the why and how 
bargaining power may influence the negotiations of the APs with the TOs, and as 
such to inductively generate in-depth insights to explain this under-researched area. 
There were three reasons for this. First, a qualitative approach was more appropriate 
because power, and bargaining power in particular, is a relational construct 
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embedded in social relationships and interactions influenced by the particular 
context that surrounds that relationship (Hawley 1963; Emerson 1962; Haugaard 
2002). Second, a quantitative approach would fail to consider the influence of the 
context (natural setting), and would assume that one ‘truth’ exists, and would 
focuses on seeking to generalise the findings to wider contexts (Creswell 1998; Flick 
2014). Third, it is in line with the critical turn evident in tourism literature. These are 
covered in more detail below. 
First, a qualitative approach is followed, when the researcher seeks to 
explore and understand the meanings individuals assign to social or human 
phenomena or problems, from an insider’s perspective (Creswell 2013; Hennick et 
al. 2011).  A qualitative approach enabled the researcher to explore the perceptions, 
experiences, motivations and meanings held by each participant in the study (in the 
case of this research APs, tourism professionals, Government officials and local 
academics) and to understand what is occurring, why and how, from their point of 
view. In the case of this research, taking into account that the study explores the 
phenomena from the APs perspective, the focus was particularly on understanding 
the APs (key participants) behaviour, the way they interpreted their relationship and 
interactions with the TOs and the reasons behind their actions in their negotiations 
with the TOs within the context of the tourism and hospitality industries in the ROC. 
The qualitative approach adopted enabled the researcher to attain a richer 
understanding and explanation of the bargaining power interactions within the 
negotiations of the APs with the TOs.  
Second, for this research, it was important to incorporate and consider the 
setting of the APs, the hospitality and tourism industries in the ROC, the restrictions 
of the everyday social setting as well as the norms and beliefs, and motivations of 
the APs and the way these issues can influence the bargaining power and 
negotiations with TOs. A qualitative approach assumes that social reality is a 
constantly changing and evolving property of each individual’s creation (Denzin and 
Lincoln 2005; Creswell 2007). This is because the subjective meanings held by 
individuals are shaped by their natural setting (formed through social, historical 
norms and their interactions with other individuals), thus emphasising the 
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importance of understanding the potential influence of the participants’ natural 
setting.  
In addition, the inductive qualitative logic followed offered flexibility to 
follow the data and allowed the researcher to explore the negotiations and 
bargaining power in a more detailed manner, and thereby to both understand the 
context/setting of the APs (the key sample) in depth and to explain their behaviour. 
Further, considering the importance of understanding the influence of the external 
structure on a party’s bargaining power (Chapter 2, section 2.4.2), achieving a 
detailed understanding of the tourism and hospitality industries in the ROC, where 
the APs operate, is critical to fully explain the relative bargaining power in 
negotiations between the APs with the TOs. 
Third, adopting a qualitative approach within a tourism context, is in accord 
with the shift identified in tourism studies; a shift that is moving away from the 
prevailing knowledge traditions that are mainly positivist and quantitative 
(Papageorgiou 2008; Bianchi 2009; Wilson et al. 2012; Junek and Killion 2012). 
This shift towards a qualitative approach welcomes the pluralisation of life worlds 
and embraces the differences in the social setting of the participants. This qualitative 
shift welcomes the reflexivity in knowledge generation and rejects the “[…] de-
humanising obedience” to the positivist and quantitative prevailing traditions 
(Bianchi 2009, p.486). This shift is a move away from positivist and quantitative 
perspectives (Bianchi 2009; Junek and Killion 2012; Flick 2014). The positivist 
tradition assumes that a fixed reality exists and that there is a “true state of affairs” 
consisting of facts that can be measured and tested (Guba and Lincoln 1998 p.204; 
Hennink et al. 2011). The positivist, quantitative tradition, seeks to quantify 
phenomena, to test a prior theory, measure and count the frequency of issues and 
factors (Hennink et al. 2011; Flick 2014). Moreover, the positivist and quantitative 
tradition fails to acknowledge the humanness and the influence of the social setting 
(context) on the lives of the participants (Hennink et al. 2011).  
Bearing the above discussion in mind a qualitative approach was considered 
more appropriate for this study rather than a quantitative.  
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5.3.1.3.	 Why	Grounded	Theory?		
Within qualitative research several research methodologies can be identified 
including, but not limited to, ethnography, narrative, case study, phenomenology 
and Grounded Theory (Creswell 2013; Crotty 1998). The current study adopted a 
Grounded Theory research methodology and design because it is discovery oriented, 
allowing the researcher to use limited literature at the beginning of the process 
(Wilson and Hutchinson 1991) so that the researcher stays open to new knowledge, 
in order to uncover the participant’s understanding of the phenomena during data 
collection, analysis and interpretation  (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 
1998). Explanations of the alternative approaches and why they were not adopted 
are given below. 
Yin (2013) has argued that in case study methodology the development of 
theory and theoretical propositions prior to the data collection are critical for the 
researcher as they are needed to direct the study. In contrast, Grounded Theory 
allows the researcher to utilise limited literature at the beginning of the process18 in 
order for the researcher to stay open to new knowledge and to uncover the 
participant’s understanding of the phenomena (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and 
Corbin 1998). Due to the limited and outdated literature on B2B bargaining power 
relations in negotiations within tourism, this research intended to explore and 
discover what was happening and to inductively generate new insights that would 
explain the phenomena. Therefore, considering the aim of the study a case study 
methodology that requires theoretical propositions at the outset would have 
constrained the ability of the researcher to stay open to the data and generate new 
insights. Hence, Grounded Theory was more appropriate to use given its discovery 
oriented nature that would allow the researcher to focus on the data thus generate 
insights and explain bargaining power interactions within negotiations of the APs 
with the TOs. 
Further, the current study did not seek to describe the life story of individuals 
regarding various life events, narrated by one person or a small group of people, as 
                                                
18	As noted in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 the researcher undertook a brief literature review in order to raise 
questions for initial data collection and increase her theoretical sensitivity.  
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one would in a narrative study (Creswell 2013). The aim of this study was to explore 
and explain the bargaining power in negotiations of a number of APs and TOs. This 
would take place by uncovering the APs shared meanings of these phenomena and 
from these generate a theory to offer an integrated and shared explanation. Grounded 
Theory assumes that common understanding exists between various actors given 
that individuals may experience (interpret) phenomena in a similar way and thus the 
researcher can identify these common meanings (Patton 2000).  
The study did not adopt a phenomenological approach because that would 
focus on understanding and describing the essence and significance of a single 
experience (phenomenon) (Creswell 2013). Phenomenology is not concerned with 
the factors and issues that influence these phenomena or the conditions that lead to 
the phenomena (experience) (Patton 2000; Lopez and Willis 2004). However, given 
the limited literature available on bargaining power interactions in negotiations 
within a tourism context, this study sought to understand and explain the bargaining 
power interactions that take place in negotiations. Grounded Theory emphasises 
social processes and interactions, and goes beyond merely describing and 
interpreting what is happening (Annells 1997; Wilson and Hutchinson 1991; Corbin 
and Strauss 2008). Specifically, Grounded Theory seeks to generate theory to offer a 
unified explanation of the phenomena (Corbin and Strauss 2008). Considering the 
above phenomenology, as it focuses on description of a single lived experience, 
would have been inappropriate for this study. In contrast, the explanatory power of 
Grounded Theory and the topic of this investigation (bargaining power interactions 
in negotiations) make Grounded Theory a more appropriate methodology to use for 
this study. 
Finally, the cultural lens of ethnographers, which focuses on understanding 
common meanings, beliefs and language of a specific cultural group who interact 
over time, locating participant’s stories within culture and specific cultural group 
(Creswell 2013), would have been inappropriate for the current study. In particular, 
the current study did not seek to rely on cultural factors to explain the bargaining 
power relations in negotiations of APs with the TOs, as one would in an 
ethnographic study. This is because, in order to fully understand bargaining power, 
both the firm-specific resources as well as the external (macro) environment 
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(tourism industry, government and culture) need to be taken in to account. As such 
the use of Grounded Theory was critical in facilitating the consideration of various 
conditions that could influence the bargaining power relations of APs with the TOs. 
This is because Grounded Theory requires that the researcher takes into account 
both microscopic (relationship-specific) and macroscopic conditions such as 
economic conditions, culture and government structure (Strauss and Corbin 1990). 
Therefore, the cultural lens of an ethnographic methodology was inappropriate for 
the current study because it would have restricted the ability of the researcher to 
discover and consider other micro and macro factors that were of relevance to the 
participants and could aid in explaining the bargaining power relations in 
negotiations of APs with the TOs. 
5.3.1.4.	 Grounded	Theory	–	an	overview		
In this subsection Grounded Theory methodology and design is discussed to 
offer a better understanding to the reader regarding the key tenets and characteristics 
of the methodology and design adopted in this study. 
Grounded Theory is committed to “[…] a qualitative, naturalistic, contextual, 
historic, intersubjective methodology to understand human responses and 
experiences” (Wilson and Hutchinson 1991, p. 272). That is to say, it seeks to 
understand human experiences and actions within their natural setting by uncovering 
the subjective meaning articulated through words. Grounded Theory is a set of 
systematically grounded concepts ordered around a core category that explains the 
situation under study (Glaser and Holton 2004). It focuses on the key concern(s) of 
the primary participants to generate a theory that explains the prevalent behaviour in 
a substantive area. Grounded theorists seek to gather data and then systematically 
generate the theory from the data collected, instead of developing a theory and then 
systematically pursuing proof to confirm it (Walker and Myrick 2006). 
Grounded Theory involves a rigorous yet flexible methodology and design to 
generate theory based on the data (Van der Merwe and de Villiers 2011; Jones and 
Alony 2011; Charmaz 2006, 2014; Corbin and Strauss 2008). First, consideration of 
social structural influences on the experiences of the participants (Annells (1997). 
Second, constant comparison, which entails the comparison of incidents (codes) 
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with incidents (codes), concepts with concepts and categories with categories in 
order to ascertain differences and similarities (Corbin and Strauss 2008; Glaser and 
Strauss 1967; Annells 1997; Charmaz 2014). Third, theoretical sensitivity, which 
refers to the researcher being sensitive to the data and meanings (Strauss and Corbin 
1998; Kelle 2007; Annells 1997). Fourth, memo writing, which refers to writing 
theoretical notes regarding the data and conceptual links between categories (Glaser 
and Holton 2004; Glaser and Strauss 1967; Annells 1997) in order to aid the 
researcher to be more analytical and reflective on the coding process (Jeon 2004). 
Fifth, data saturation which involves collecting data until no new data or related data 
arise and/or data are repeated (Corbin and Strauss 2008). Sixth, theoretical sampling, 
which refers to sampling participants according to the concepts and categories 
developed from the evolving theory and involves interplay between data collection 
and analysis (Goulding 2002; Annells 1997). 
Since its development Grounded Theory has evolved demonstrating subtle 
but diverse views of the Grounded Theory methodology. Firstly, the Glasserian or 
classic Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Glaser 1998) is the version that 
was created by Glaser and Strauss (Hallberg 2006; Matavire and Brown 2013). 
Secondly, the Straussian, or evolved Grounded Theory, offers an adaptation of 
classic Grounded Theory encompassing more systematic tools and techniques 
(Strauss and Corbin 1990, 1998). Finally there is third version of Grounded Theory, 
namely, Charmaz’s (2006, 2014) social constructivist Grounded Theory.  
Classic Grounded Theory assumes a positivist epistemological stance where 
the researcher is independent of the object being researched (Annells 1996, 1997; 
Hallberg 2006). In classic Grounded Theory interviewing is mainly a passive 
activity listening to the participants and categories emerge from the data (Hallberg 
2006). On the other hand evolved Grounded Theory is considered to have a more 
interpretivist epistemological stance where the subjectivity and influence of the 
researcher on the process is recognised (Annells 1996; Mills et al. 2006; Hallberg 
2006). As Strauss and Corbin (1990, p.59) argued “[…] doing analysis is, in fact, 
making interpretations.” However, evolved Grounded Theory also highlights the 
importance of acknowledging bias, maintaining objectivity and, through interpretive 
work, bringing out the voices of the participants (Strauss and Corbin 1994; Mills et 
  
103 
al. 2006). Finally, Charmaz (2006, 2014) introduced a constructivist Grounded 
Theory version and claimed that theories do not emerge but are constructed through 
the continuous communication between the inquirer and the participant in a specific 
situation. For example, the researcher’s actions, looks, behaviour during the 
interview process influences the participants perceptions and determines future 
interaction, thus both the participants and the researcher produce the data (Hallberg 
2006; Mills et al. 2006).  
Bearing in mind the epistemological differences between the versions of 
Grounded Theory it is not surprising that a debate exists among classic, evolved and 
constructivist grounded theorists regarding the role of the literature and the data 
analysis process. The first point of dispute is over the role and timing of the 
literature review (Walker and Myrick 2006). First, in evolved Grounded Theory the 
use of the prior knowledge of the researcher and the literature are initial influences 
and can be used to increase theoretical sensitivity and to raise questions and 
concepts to follow during data collection (Strauss and Corbin 1998; Heath and 
Cowley 2004). Thus in evolved grounded theory the literature sensitises the 
researcher to the incidents observed and facilitates the researcher in focusing the 
investigation. Second, in classic Grounded Theory an extensive review of the 
literature should be avoided prior to data collection, a more focused review of the 
literature ensues when the theory is adequately developed and the literature is then 
used as additional data (Glaser and Holton 2004; Heath and Cowley 2004). In this 
way, it prevents the researcher from forcing preconceived theoretical notions on the 
data and thereby inhibiting the emergence of concepts and categories (Glaser and 
Holton 2004).  However, this does not mean that the literature is ignored (Suddaby 
2006) because, as noted above, in classic Grounded Theory a more focused review 
of the literature ensues when the theory is adequately developed and the literature is 
then used as additional data (Heath and Cowley 2004). Third, in constructivist 
Grounded Theory the literature review is delayed until the researcher has developed 
categories and their relationships (Charmaz 2014). However, regardless of the 
differences on the literature review, Heath (2006) highlighted that a brief literature 
review is useful for a new researcher in order to identify what is already known and 
to avoid developing an already existing theory. Hence, the advice of evolved 
Grounded Theory to perform an initial literature review to identify already existing 
  
104 
knowledge and increase the researcher’s theoretical sensitivity was suitable for this 
study. 
The second point of division between the versions of Grounded theory is the 
data analysis process (Kendall 1999; Ng and Hase 2008; Cooney 2010). Evolved 
Grounded Theory provides three stages of coding – open, axial and selective – along 
with guidelines and techniques to build a theoretical explanation. More specifically, 
evolved Grounded Theory offers a coding paradigm consisting of conditions, 
actions/interactions and consequences in order to aid the researcher to find linkages 
between the data and to organise them in a structured manner (Strauss and Corbin 
1990). The coding paradigm of evolved Grounded Theory involves the construction 
of a theoretical framework by the researcher in order to develop grounded categories 
in a precise way (Kelle 2007). However Glaser (1992), in reference to evolved 
Grounded Theory, noted that the use of the coding paradigm and rigid analysis 
procedures stipulates a prescriptive model to follow and may lead researchers 
forcing the data, rather than focusing on what the data were saying, in order to 
understand the meaning of the participants. In classic Grounded Theory the focus is 
on what the data reveal about the substantive area, the interactions and behaviours 
that occur rather than forcing preconceived ideas (Heath and Cowley 2004; Kendall 
1999). Hence, in classic Grounded Theory coding is more flexible and spontaneous, 
focusing on the meanings of the participants and allowing the data to speak for 
themselves (Heath 2006). Constructivist Grounded Theory also stipulates a more 
open and flexible approach to coding and uses two stages of coding - initial line-by-
line and focused- where codes are constructed by the researcher based on the 
participant’s accounts (Charmaz 2014). Similarly, classic Grounded Theory notes 
two coding stages - substantive and selective- (Heath and Cowley 2004). The 
additional stage of coding – axial- stipulated by evolved Grounded Theory helps the 
researcher to integrate and identify interrelationships between concepts and 
categories to aid in developing the grounded theory (Heath and Cowley 2004; 
Strauss and Corbin 1998). As Matavire and Brown (2013) noted the guidelines 
stipulated by evolved Grounded Theory and the three types of coding - open, axial 
and selective - can be useful for novice researchers to understand and gain 
clarification on issues of the analysis process. Similarly, the researcher deemed that 
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the three stages of coding of evolved Grounded Theory offered useful guidelines to 
understand the coding process and were thus adopted in this study.  
Finally, all versions of Grounded Theory can generate two types of theory, 
substantive and formal, and can take the form of a narrative statement or 
propositions the indicate the relationships between concepts and/or categories 
developed (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Corbin and Strauss 2008). Glaser and Strauss 
(1967) stated that substantive theory is developed for a particular substantive area 
and provides a theoretical explanation for a particular situation within a certain area. 
Hence, a substantive theory does not have the explanatory power across a broader 
variety of disciplinary concerns and problems, that a formal theory would (Strauss 
and Corbin 1998). The current study developed a substantive theory because it 
provides an explanation for the specific situation of bargaining power interactions 
within the negotiations of APs with the large TOs in the ROC within the tourism and 
hospitality field (section 5.8.6). 
5.3.1.5.	 Grounded	Theory	as	implemented	in	this	study	
Denzin and Lincoln (2005, p.4) have noted that a qualitative researcher is a 
“bricoleur”, free to mix procedures or put together a new tool, in order to answer 
the research question. Jeon (2004, p.255) also highlighted that undertaking a 
Grounded Theory study must not be steered by selecting a “[…] cookbook of 
Grounded Theory methods to follow […] step-by-step.” This is because moving 
beyond of the boundaries of a specific version can increase the possible depth of 
understanding of a certain phenomenon (Johnson et al. 2001).  
On the other hand, Cutcliffe (2000) has argued that researchers should not 
combine diverse versions of Grounded Theory to prevent producing a messy 
research strategy. However, Annells (1997) has stated that researchers should be free 
to combine any version of Grounded Theory as long as they consider the study’s 
aims and objectives and philosophical assumptions. Annells (1997) proposed a 
combination of various versions of Grounded Theory approaches, one of which is a 
combination of classic and evolved Grounded Theory. This study has also combined 
both classic and evolved Grounded Theory. The reasoning behind this is discussed 
below along with an explanation of the elements adopted from each version.  
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Annells (1997) has highlighted that a Grounded Theory study must include 
the study of social process and interactions. This study focuses on understanding and 
explaining the contractual and non-contractual bargaining power relationship of the 
APs with the TOs in negotiations. Bargaining power is a concept embedded in all 
social relationships and interactions and moments of interaction can be explained 
through the bargaining power concept. This is because influence over each other’s 
behaviour is reciprocal (Chapter 2, section 2.3.2). Further, bargaining power 
relations are examined within negotiations, which is a process of resource exchange 
occurring between two parties (APs and TOs). With the above in mind the focus of 
the study was suitable for a Grounded Theory methodology and design.  
In terms of the philosophical assumptions of the researcher, evolved 
Grounded Theory has informed the researcher’s epistemological stance. The 
epistemological stance of the researcher refers to the relationship between the 
researcher and that being researched and what can be known (Creswell 1998; Guba 
and Lincoln 1998). In other words, it refers to the relationship of the researcher and 
that of the participants and how knowledge is generated. Evolved Grounded Theory, 
and its more interpretive epistemological stance, is more in line with the researcher’s 
own beliefs and offered the researcher significant insights on her role in the research 
process. More specifically, in evolved Grounded Theory the researcher is not 
separated from the research process and analysis involves interpretation in order to 
obtain shared understandings and to make sense of the phenomena under 
investigation. Furthermore, evolved Grounded Theory also holds that researchers 
can utilise their knowledge and experiences in the research process to elucidate the 
phenomena under study (Annells 1996). However, evolved Grounded Theory also 
stresses the significance of recognising bias and upholding objectivity in order to 
draw out the meanings and concerns of the participants (Strauss and Corbin 1994; 
Mills et al. 2006). Hence, the researcher must be self-reflective and should consider 
how his/her assumptions might have influenced the knowledge generated (Snape 
and Spencer 2003; Corbin and Strauss 2008) in order to capture the meaning of the 
actors. Hence, the more interpretivist stance of evolved Grounded Theory allowed 
the researcher to exploit her knowledge to interpret the experiences of the 
participants (APs, tourism professionals, Government officials and local academics) 
making the text more meaningful and achieving deeper insights on the APs’ 
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negotiations with the TOs. However, as noted above, the researcher must also be 
aware and knowledgeable regarding her influence on the process and findings. As 
such, throughout the research process, the researcher was aware of the need to 
reflect on the influence of her own beliefs, views and understandings of the process 
and be open to absorbing new knowledge, while also exploiting pre-existing 
understandings to provide insight in to the bargaining power interactions and 
negotiation experience of the APs with the TOs (sections 5.9.2 and 5.9.5). 
Bearing in mind the epistemological lens adopted, evolved Grounded Theory 
was considered appropriate for the study to adopt. However the current study was 
also informed by classic Grounded Theory. This is because, despite the fact that the 
classic Grounded Theory has positivist epistemological leanings, where the 
researcher is independent of the object being researched, in classic Grounded 
Theory, as advocated by Heath and Cowley (2004) and Kendall (1999), the 
‘emergence’ or discovery of categories and theory is a key process given that 
attention is on the data to speaking for themselves. Thus, classic Grounded Theory 
allows the data to tell their own story, and the researcher to bring out the key 
concerns of the participants as much as possible, as required by the epistemological 
lens of the study. In this thesis, although the researcher acknowledges her influence 
on the data, she also believes in the discovery of concepts and ideas from the data. 
Thus the current study takes a more distant and neutral stance throughout the 
research process in order to offer a tentative view of the participants’ reality. Hence, 
this study’s epistemological lens is in conflict with the epistemological stance of the 
constructivist Grounded Theory that assumes that both the participants and the 
researcher produce the data and reject the idea of discovery; thus it was not 
adopted.  
Therefore, as detailed above, the study combined elements from classic and 
evolved Grounded Theory in order to better address the aim and objectives of the 
study. Explanations of what this meant in practice are set out below. 
First, regarding when the literature review stage should be conducted, the 
study followed the advice of Corbin and Strauss (2008) which stipulated that a brief 
literature should be reviewed prior to data collection in order to increase the 
researcher’s theoretical sensitivity and facilitate raising questions to guide the initial 
data collection. Thus the literature review sensitised the researcher improving her 
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ability to grasp the meaning and to identify relevant codes that could explain the 
bargaining power interactions and negotiations of the APs with the TOs.  
Furthermore, the literature reviewed assisted the researcher to grasp what was 
already known and to avoid developing existing knowledge as well as developing a 
better understanding of the structures that exist in the tourism and hospitality 
industry of the ROC. In the later stages of the analysis additional literature was also 
utilised to compare and contrast the data collected and arrive at the theory generated 
(Chapter 6).  
Second, the researcher deemed that evolved Grounded Theory offered 
clarifications in understanding the steps needed for the analysis process, thus three 
stages of coding were utilised - open, axial and selective - (section 5.8). However the 
coding paradigm advised by evolved Grounded theory was not adopted in this study. 
This is because, following the advice of Glaser (1992) who is a proponent of classic 
Grounded Theory, the researcher considered that to adopt a specific coding 
paradigm during the analysis might not fit the data and as such might limit her 
ability to focus on what the data were saying in order to understand the meaning of 
the participants (section 5.8). Therefore, a more flexible and open approach to 
capturing the meaning in the data was used in a more spontaneous way, while also 
including the researcher’s own perspective through interpreting what the 
participant’s accounts signify about their experiences (section 5.8). 
Third, while the research utilised evolved Grounded Theory’s three stages of 
coding, open, axial and selective, the researcher thought it necessary to improvise an 
extra step in the open stage analysis process, thus adjusting the Grounded Theory 
analysis in order to fit the data collected (section 5.8). As Corbin and Strauss (2008, 
2015) highlighted researchers should use common sense and trust their instincts in 
analysing the data, thus, advocating flexibility for the researcher in conducting the 
research process. Specifically, the decision to add an extra step was taken because, 
following the completion of the three-step analysis [(a) codes, (b) concept and (c) 
categories] stipulated by Grounded Theory, further analysis was considered 
necessary in order to capture the meaning in more encompassing categories and to 
ascertain the core issues (section 5.8.4).  
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5.3.1.6.	 Conclusion	
As explained above, a Grounded Theory methodology and design was 
adopted, that combined elements of evolved and classic Grounded Theory, and this 
aided the researcher to provide a rich understanding and explanation of the 
contractual and non-contractual bargaining power relationship in negotiations of the 
APs with the TOs. Specifically, the interpretivist stance of evolved Grounded 
Theory informed the epistemological stance of the researcher. Hence, it allowed her 
to employ her knowledge and understandings to clarify and interpret the 
participant’s concerns, making the text more meaningful, while also acknowledging 
her influence and focusing on bringing out the voices of the participants and their 
concerns. Further, evolved Grounded Theory, and its more specific guidelines, aided 
the researcher to better understand the research process needed to generate insights 
and develop a grounded theory. Classic Grounded Theory also played a part based 
on the  emphasis that it places on permitting the data to tell their own story by 
adopting a more open approach to data. Hence, it helped the researcher comprehend 
the importance of being flexible and open in the research process, specifically during 
data analysis enabling the researcher to code in a more spontaneous manner based 
on the participants’ concerns. Having explained the research methodology and 
design adopted, the section below explains the choice of the research location.  
5.4. CHOICE OF RESEARCH LOCATION – THE REPUBLIC 
OF CYPRUS (ROC) 
The ROC was chosen as the location for the research due to its 
characteristics as a tourism destination. First, it is an economically developed, 
mature sun-and-sea tourism destination (Chapter 4). Although it could be considered 
as a successful destination many issues are evident that constrain it’s 
competitiveness. For instance, its over-reliance on the sun-an-sea tourism product, 
high substitutability in relation to its competitors, seasonality, dependence on a 
small number of source markets and tired accommodation (Chapter 4). Second, 
these issues all add to its dependence on the packaged tourism product that the TOs 
primarily sell and as a result to the destination’s dependence on the European large 
TOs for a substantial proportion of the tourists who visit the ROC.  Hence, the 
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tourism and hospitality professionals, and APs in particular, in the ROC, work 
closely with the TOs and have first-hand experience negotiating with them. These 
negotiations are often characterised by the TOs being in a dominant ‘buyer’ position 
as identified in the literature (Tsangari 2012; Sharpley 2007). As a result, tourism 
and hospitality professionals in the ROC, and the particularly the APs, had the 
necessary knowledge to provide rich data that could contribute to the understanding 
of the negotiations that occur between tourism and hospitality suppliers and the large 
external European TOs.  
5.5. THE RESEARCH  
5.5.1. Introduction 
This section sets out and explains the data collection carried out during the 
research in relation to the secondary data used and the primary research undertaken. 
The secondary data was data that was already available (Veal 2006). The primary 
research was the collection of original data by the researcher specifically for the 
study and consisted of the initial exploratory research and the main research. 
Subsequent sections provide more specific detail about the main survey in terms of 
sampling design, the interview guide and the data analysis. In this section, the 
subsections below firstly, discuss the secondary data and subsequently the primary 
data.  
5.5.2. Secondary data  
The secondary data available enhanced the researcher’s knowledge and 
provided a better understanding of the key areas of inquiry which Collis and Hussey 
(2003) have indicated should be the case. The secondary sources in tourism, 
hospitality, B2B marketing and management, purchasing, supply chain and strategic 
management areas helped in achieving a better understanding of the primary issues 
of the study. In particular, the understanding of the theoretical background on the 
bargaining power concept and negotiations within a buyer-supplier context as well 
as the industry context that is the tourism and hospitality industry. Further, these 
secondary data aided the researcher to understand the fieldwork process and the 
context of the ROC as a country and tourism destination. The university library, 
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online university databases, the library of the CTO in the ROC and the Internet were 
employed as the channels for secondary data sources. Therefore, books, journals, 
online databases, Government reports and promotional material were used. Hence, 
various sources were used to collect the relevant secondary data.  
Furthermore, the researcher obtained documents, original contracts and 
correspondence that occurred between an AP and a number of TOs during the years 
1998 to 200819. Access to these documents was possible due to the family 
relationship between the researcher and an individual who was involved in the 
accommodation sector until 2008. It must be noted that the researcher has not 
undertaken a content analysis of the contracts and correspondence, rather they were 
used to enhance her knowledge regarding the contractual and non-contractual 
negotiations between the APs and TOs. These documents helped to increase her 
understanding of the APs’ and TOs’ relationship context by uncovering elements of 
the written communication, such as email communication on contract changes.  
5.5.3. Primary research  
5.5.3.1.	 Introduction		
Following on from the qualitative research methodology and design adopted 
qualitative data were collected in order to generate in-depth and rich data. In 
particular, semi-structured interviews were chosen as the most suitable tool to 
collect the primary data. The primary data were collected in two stages. First, an 
initial exploratory data collection and analysis and then the main primary data 
collection and analysis. Each of these is discussed below.  
                                                
19 The researcher particularly focused on reviewing the most updated documents in the year of 2007-
2008. The credibility, that is the accuracy and the reliability of these documents, is assured as these 
are authentic original documents of an accommodation unit. Due to the sensitive nature of the area 
under investigation the researcher was not able to obtain more up-to-date contracts or correspondence 
from other participants. As such representativeness cannot be claimed (Flick 2014). However, 
interview data depicted that a similar written format of contractual agreements is still used by the 
TOs in their contractual agreements with the APs. 
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5.5.3.2.	 Initial	exploratory	primary	research		
In the initial stages of this research process the researcher deemed it 
necessary to collect exploratory primary data, before undertaking the main primary 
data collection. This was because the research process began with the aim of 
exploring the relationship between the APs and the large TOs and the challenges 
that the APs face in dealing with the more powerful large TOs who dominate the 
tourism industry in the ROC. However, the information available regarding the 
relationship of the tourism and hospitality suppliers and large TOs was inadequate 
since most literature in tourism and hospitality emphasises the exchange between 
businesses and consumers (Zhang et al. 2009; Song 2012; Guo and He 2012; Gjerald 
and Lyngstad 2015). Furthermore, research regarding the ROC was insufficient and 
out-dated particularly in terms of the tourism and hospitality industry (Krambia-
Kapardis and Zopiatis 2008; Tsangari 2012). Due to the insufficient information, 
and a methodological approach that required understanding of the context (social 
setting), it was deemed necessary to visit the ROC prior to the main data collection 
phase. The purpose of visiting the ROC was to explore and establish the 
relationships that existed between the large TOs, the tourism industry and the APs.  
The exploratory primary data collection stage in the ROC was undertaken 
during April and May of 2012. This was a critical stage, and a turning point for the 
research process, since it allowed the researcher to explore the initial concepts and 
ideas, namely power, decision-making processes and ethics identified in the 
literature. Moreover, the researcher discovered the relationships and roles of the 
players in the tourism and hospitality industry and their communication and 
operational structures and important issues for the actors from an insider’s 
perspective. Hence, it provided the researcher with important insights to fulfil the 
study’s aim and objectives (section 5.2).  
In order to collect the necessary data for the exploratory stage the sample 
consisted of tourism and hospitality professionals who were actively involved in the 
tourism industry in the ROC and had a direct relationship with the TOs. In 
particular, interviews in person were carried out with people from the 
accommodation and travel agent associations, the CTO (government sector), and the 
accommodation and travel agency sector. Before the data collection the interview-
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questions were piloted to ensure that the questions were understood and that the 
interview guide as a whole functioned well. The interview question guide was 
piloted on three individuals who had extensive knowledge regarding the tourism and 
hospitality industry in the ROC, namely two APs and one tourism professional 
(travel agent). As a result although the overall guide worked well two questions had 
to be rephrased so as to make the questions more easily understood by the 
participants. Following the changes made to the questions and ensuring that the 
interview guide functioned well the data collection stage began.  
A purposive convenience sampling technique (that is, informed individuals 
willing to participate) was adopted and sixteen formal interviews were achieved on 
one-to-one basis. A purposive convenience sampling technique was used for two 
reasons. First, the researcher sought to determine the roles and links of players in the 
tourism and hospitality industry and to gain a better understanding of the context in 
the ROC. Second, the researcher wanted to find out what the important issues for the 
APs in their relationship with the TOs were in order to guide the investigation and 
the main stage of primary data collection based on the participant’s concerns. In 
other words, what data to look for (concepts) and where to find them (participants). 
The number of the interviews was considered sufficient since data saturation point 
was achieved given that the data were repeating. 
Semi-structured interviews were employed as they offered flexibility and the 
use of probing questions when needed to ask participants to build on their answers 
and follow issues as they arose. One set of semi-structured interview questions was 
developed. Four themes were incorporated in the semi-structured interview guide: 
the nature of the relationship in terms of power between the TOs and the APs; the 
social setting; decision-making; and ethical considerations. The themes and 
questions arose from academic literature, Government reports and professional and 
academic knowledge of the researcher and were considered as the main and relevant 
issues and challenges for the APs in their relationship with the TOs. It must be noted 
that the order that the questions were asked was not fixed or structured, this was 
done to allow the participants to develop their thought process and not to confine 
them in any way.  Following such a strategy can enhance the data, since it offered 
the opportunity to uncover new topics that the researcher did not expect. 
  
114 
Grounded Theory coding strategies (open and axial) were used to analyse the 
primary data collected (Strauss and Corbin 1998). These coding strategies permitted 
the researcher to generate questions that were centered on the main concerns of the 
participants. Hence, it was considered as the most appropriate analysis process to aid 
the researcher to refine the focus of the study and delineate the research questions 
for the main primary data collection stage. During open coding the researcher 
inspected the data for words, phrases, sentences or paragraphs that signified 
experiences and attitudes of the participants, and actions that related to their 
interactions with the large TOs and could help in explaining the relationships of the 
large TOs with the APs in the ROC. Following the identification of codes, and 
concepts, three categories were produced, namely market trends, bargaining power 
and personal factors. These three categories represented the relationship between the 
TOs and the APs, and dealt with its early development through to issues of 
disentanglement.  
In turn, axial coding took place, where relationships between the categories 
and concepts were identified to rebuild the data into various patterns. Ten 
propositions were discovered altogether (Table 4). 
Categories Market trends Bargaining power Personal factors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Propositions 
 
 
 
 
Inadequate product and 
low goodwill are 
perceived as 
detrimental to the 
bargaining power of 
APs. 
Evidence of exploitation 
and pressure on price are 
recognised as barriers to a 
fair profitable negotiation 
outcome, as perceived by 
the APs.  
Good work ethos as a 
factor in the long-term 
success of the relationship.  
 
Insufficient 
cooperation between 
APs significantly 
impedes their 
bargaining power. 
Controlling and enforcing 
attitude of TOs are 
perceived as detrimental 
for increasing the APs 
bargaining power. 
Personal relations and their 
role in negotiations.   
Dependency of the 
destination on air travel 
companies is 
considered as 
constraining factor to 
the bargaining power 
of the APs. 
Country of origin of the 
TO and its effect on the 
bargaining ability of the 
APs. 
 
The oligopolistic tour 
operating market is 
perceived as a 
damaging factor to the 
bargaining power of 
APs. 
The antagonistic nature of 
the relationship between 
the TOs and APs is 
thought to be detrimental 
to creating a beneficial 
long-term relationship.  
 
Table 4: Propositions induced from the exploratory data stage. (developed by the author). 
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The propositions in Table 4 present three different dimensions of the 
relationship between the TOs and the APs and the factors that influence the 
bargaining power of the APs. First, there are industry specific factors as 
demonstrated by market trends. Second, influence strategies, cultural aspects and 
nature of past relationship are factors affecting the bargaining power of the APs. 
Third, personal relationships and work ethos were discovered as factors that 
influence the relationship. Selective coding was not undertaken for this data analysis 
since the aim of this exploratory data analysis was to develop propositions in order 
to refine the research focus. The analysis directed the researcher to firstly, discard 
the concept of ethics given that interview data indicated that this was not a primary 
concern for the participants and secondly, the analysis identified that the contractual 
and non-contractual relationship between the APs and TOs was a main concern for 
the APs in respect of their bargaining ability in relation with the TOs.  
The focus of the exploratory investigation was directed towards exploring 
the contractual and non-contractual relationship and bargaining power between the 
APs and TOs in order to aid the APs to take more informed decisions and better 
manage their negotiations with the TOs. Hence, the data directed the research 
towards a multidisciplinary approach considering the marketing, strategic, 
management and purchasing perspectives, where concepts, such as bargaining 
power, negotiations, market structure, relationship management and culture were 
evident. These concepts also allowed the researcher to generate themes for the 
interview questions used in the collection of the primary data in the second, main, 
stage of the research project, which is discussed below.  
5.5.3.3.	 Main	primary	research		
The main data collection process used semi-structured interviews. 
Interviewing is considered one of the most powerful methods through which 
researchers’ can understand fellow humans (Fontana and Frey 2005). Bloch (1996, 
p.323) stated that: 
“[…] in social research the language of conversation, including that 
of interview remains one of the most important tools of social 
analysis, a means whereby insights is gained into everyday life, as 
well as the social and cultural dimensions of our own and other 
societies.” 
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In other words, interviews offered the researcher insights into the participant’s 
perception, opinions and experiences and enabled the researcher to understand why 
these perspectives arose. The interviews also allowed the researcher to explore broad 
and complex phenomena in order to provide an understanding of the participant’s 
perspective on the contractual and non-contractual bargaining power relationship 
and interactions within the negotiations that occur between the APs and TOs. 
The interviews were one-to-one semi-structured interviews for two reasons. 
First, the researcher had key topics (arising from the exploratory primary stage, the 
literature and her knowledge) to discuss with each participant in order to elucidate 
the bargaining power interactions within negotiations of the APs with the TOs 
(section 5.7). Second, the flexibility this type of interview offered provided the 
opportunity to discuss more openly the concerns of the participants. As a result the 
interviewer could discover new issues and had the flexibility to adjust the questions 
in order to explore the set issues (Bryman and Bell 2011). In contrast, unstructured 
interviews, although they would have offered the flexibility to explore issues as they 
arose during the interview, often result in the data collected varying considerably for 
each participant (Patton 2002). Hence, semi-structured interviews were utilised since 
the researcher sought to offer a shared stimulus from which comparisons could be 
made and shared meanings identified, while also maintaining flexibility to explore 
topics that were of interest to each participant, from their point of view, in order to 
understand and explain the phenomena under investigation (section 5.7). Semi-
structured interviews are valuable in Grounded Theory studies to fully uncover and 
understand the participant’s meanings in social process (Parry 1998; Goulding 2002; 
Locke 2003; Duffy et al. 2004) such as bargaining power and negotiations as it is the 
case of this study. Isabella (1990) similarly adopted semi-structured interviews in 
her Grounded Theory study of how managers perceive organisational events of 
change.  
The exploratory stage (5.5.3.2) led the researcher to utilise four groupings of 
potentially information-rich participants who could assist in explaining the 
bargaining power interactions within negotiations (section 5.6.4) and fully address 
the aim and objectives. The four types of participant groups were: APs 
(owner/managers); tourism professionals; Government officials; and local 
academics (section 5.6.5).  
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Three different sets of semi-structured interview questions were developed. 
This was because participants had different roles within the tourism and hospitality 
industry and therefore different knowledge and information (section 5.6.5). 
Specifically, one set of semi-structured interview questions was directed to APs 
(owner/managers), the key participants in the study. A second set of semi-structured 
interview questions was intended for tourism professionals and Government 
officials. Finally, a third set of semi-structured interview questions was directed to 
local academics.  
Following the construction of the questions, the set of interviews were 
piloted (section 5.7). As Bryman and Bell (2011) noted this was needed to ensure 
that all questions were understood and functioned well, as well as the guide as a 
whole operated well. A pilot study was carried out on six individuals who had 
knowledge of the subject, namely, two APs, three tourism professionals and one 
local academic. As a result three questions needed to be rephrased in order for the 
participants to better understand the question. For instance, in the set of interview 
questions directed to APs (owner/managers) the initial question was: “What do you 
think about the large TOs in the ROC?” This question was asked because the 
researcher aimed to allow the participant to freely express his/her opinion on the 
aspect of the relationship important to them. For example, the participant could refer 
to the TO’s behaviour during operations, or negotiations, or their behaviour in the 
tourism industry as a whole. However, the pilot interviews highlighted that this 
question confused the participants who requested a clarification on which aspect did 
the researcher want to discuss. Therefore, the question was re-worded to be more 
explicit, namely “How would you describe the TOs behaviour in your relationship?” 
(section 5.7). Furthermore, a similar change occurred in the set of interview 
questions directed towards the tourism professionals and Government officials. 
Specifically, the question “What do you think about the large TOs in the ROC?” was 
rephrased to: “What is your opinion about the business activities of large TOs 
operating in the ROC?” (section 5.7).  
Moreover, another question that aimed to stimulate the participants to 
discuss the Republic’s tourism environment in terms of its competitiveness and its 
attractiveness was rephrased. The initial question was: “Do you think that the ROC 
as a destination is a fruitful environment for tourism and hospitality businesses to be 
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profitable? Yes/No. Why?” However, during the pilot interviews the participants 
seemed confused on how to answer the question and asked for clarifications from 
the researcher. The researcher believed that the word fruitful might have created the 
confusion and thus the question was phrased more simply, namely “How do you 
perceive the current tourism industry in the ROC in terms of success?” This question 
was changed in all the set of interview guide for the APs, tourism professionals and 
Government officials (section 5.7). Once the necessary changes to the questions 
were made then the data collection process ensued (section 5.7). 
Interviews were undertaken during the months of May to September 2013 in 
the ROC. The interviews were undertaken in person on a one-to-one basis. This was 
done firstly, due to convenience given that it was easier for only the participant and 
the researcher to arrange a suitable date for the interview and secondly, the 
researcher believed that the participants would feel more comfortable to share 
information regarding their perceptions and experiences giving them time for 
reflection. In addition, the focus of the investigation on contractual and non-
contractual negotiations and agreements required the participants to reveal sensitive 
business information thus it was expected that group interviews or focus groups 
would deter participants from expressing their thoughts in a public context.  
While the semi-structured interview guides had a set of questions focusing 
on specific topics that were prepared in advance no specific order was followed 
regarding the topics or the questions that needed to be covered. This was done to 
avoid restricting the participant’s thought process, to explore topics that were of 
relevance and interest to the participants, and it enabled the researcher to discover 
new issues and enrich the findings. More specifically, in conducting the interviews 
the researcher focused on establishing rapport with the participants to put them at 
ease regarding the interview process. In order to achieve rapport, the researcher was 
flexible and followed the verbal cues from the participants. For example, some 
participants firstly asked the researcher to offer details regarding the research topic, 
and whilst the researcher explained, the participants would begin discussing offering 
their opinion.  In contrast, other participants were more direct and asked the 
researcher to begin with a question. 
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In addition, the use of a semi structured interview guide allowed the 
researcher to explore topics listed in the guide and also have the flexibility to use 
probes, to adjust the questions in order to uncover new topics of interest for the 
participants (section 5.7). Further, in the data collection stage the researcher 
reflected on previous interviews, such as what the participant’s were saying, the 
topics of the conversation, seeking to enhance her knowledge and understanding of 
the nuances within the data. In other words, thereby increasing her theoretical 
sensitivity. Memos were used during this stage for the researcher to record ideas and 
reflections. These memos were not coded, rather they were a way for the researcher 
to enhance her understanding and theoretical sensitivity in the research process both 
during collection and analysis. In appendix 1 two examples of memos are presented. 
The first example relates to a memo during data collection and the second to a memo 
during the data analysis.  
All interviews took place at the offices of the participants enabling the 
researcher to observe and experience the participants in their daily setting, namely 
the office environment and the accommodation unit. Participants were also given the 
option to have the interview either in English or Greek (Greek is the native language 
of the ROC). This choice was provided in order to help the participants to feel more 
comfortable during the interview process. This also helped the participants to be 
more open to discuss further on the topics when necessary thus more precise and 
detailed answers were obtained. 
Eight interviews were undertaken in English and thirty-seven in Greek. The 
interviews in Greek were translated into English to facilitate the data analysis 
process (section 5.8.3). Each interview lasted between forty minutes and two hours. 
The duration of each interview was influenced by the time availability of the 
participant and also by the openness of the participant to discuss and expand on 
his/her answers. Following the verbal consent of the participants the interviews were 
tape recorded in order to ensure they were accurately collected and to enable the 
process of a detailed analysis. Notes were also used to facilitate the researcher in 
noting issues to probe the participants for further information without disrupting 
their thought process.  
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5.6. SAMPLING DESIGN AND SAMPLING METHODS  
5.6.1. Introduction  
Following the exploratory qualitative approach attention was placed on 
achieving in-depth data. Hence, a non-probability or purposive sampling design was 
adopted. Purposive sampling, which is often based on a small number of cases, 
allows the researcher to select information-rich cases to achieve an in-depth 
understanding of the phenomena (Patton 2002; Bryman and Bell 2011). This is in 
contrast to a probability sampling design, employed in quantitative studies and based 
on statistical representations, which is based on large random samples to enable the 
generalising of the findings to large populations (Jankowicz 2005; Bryman and Bell 
2011). Thus, the study adopted a purposive sampling technique, specifically 
snowballing, which helped the researcher to locate and strategically choose the most 
appropriate sample determined by the recommendations of participants already 
interviewed to generate rich and meaningful data (section 5.6.4). Forty-five 
participants were interviewed in total (APs, tourism professionals, Government 
officials and local academics) and the data saturation method (data begun repeating 
themselves) was adopted to determine the sample size (section 5.6.3). A detailed 
profile of the participants is also discussed (section 5.6.5). The sections below 
explain the sampling choices.  
5.6.2. Defining potential participants 
In tourism research, the term population can include all the potential 
participants in the study, such as tourists, employees and managers, or study units 
such as accommodation establishments, tourism attractions and transportation 
providers (Jennings 2001; Veal 2006). In this study the population included 
individuals who had knowledge and experience regarding the tourism and 
hospitality industry in the ROC. 
As noted, in sections 5.2 and 5.3.1.2, in order to fully understand bargaining 
power interactions in the negotiations of APs with TOs it was important to 
understand the influence of the external structure. Hence, bearing in mind the 
significance of both the external structure of the tourism and hospitality industry and 
the bargaining power within contractual and non-contractual negotiations, the 
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population could include individuals from (a) the accommodation sector, (b) tourism 
and hospitality associations (for example Cyprus Hotel Association (CHA) and 
Association of Cyprus Travel Agents (ACTA)), (c) governmental organisations 
(CTO), (d) the food and beverage sector, (e) the transportation sector, (f) travel 
agencies, (g) the recreation sector, (h) tour operators (TOs), and (i) local university 
academics. From within that population the participants were selected based on 
purposive snowballing sampling; that is from the recommendation of participants 
who had been interviewed (section 5.6.4). The individuals were all actively involved 
in the tourism and hospitality industries in the ROC with relevant experience and 
knowledge to elucidate the phenomena under investigation. While the study 
included other participant types the key participants were the AP participants as they 
directly engaged in contractual and non-contractual negotiations with the large 
European TOs. Section 5.6.5 offers information on the profile of all the participants 
in detail.   
5.6.3. Rationale for number of participants  
Patton (2002, p.228) stated that for qualitative studies “[…] no rule of thumb 
exists” regarding the sample size. The sample size depends on the (a) purpose of the 
research; (b) the interests of the participants and the researcher; (c) the resources and 
time available. Due to the qualitative approach the focus was on the depth of the 
data collected rather than on breadth. Time was devoted to understand the perception 
and views of all the participants (APs, tourism professionals, Government officials 
and local academics) choosing cases based on their relevance and importance to the 
research, so as to collect rich data regarding the APs negotiations and bargaining 
power interactions with the TOs.  
Within this study forty-five interviews were undertaken in total, twenty-four 
interviews with APs, twelve interviews with tourism professionals, seven interviews 
with Government officials and two with local academics. Data saturation was 
adopted to determine the sample size. Since the study intended to generate insights 
to explain the bargaining power in negotiations it was important to ensure that the 
phenomena were understood and no new information was offered by the 
participants. Thus, when the data were repeating themselves and no new data and 
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concepts were emerging the data were saturated. Therefore, the researcher deemed 
that a sample size of forty-five interviews was sufficient.  
5.6.4. Sampling technique- Purposive Snowballing   
A purposive snowballing sampling technique was used within this study. 
Purposive snowballing sampling is a technique that enables the researcher to locate 
and choose new participants based on the referral or suggestion of the participants 
that had already been interviewed (Jankowicz 2005). Given that Charmaz (2014) has 
indicated that theoretical sampling is not essential, but what is critical is utilising 
inductive data to develop abstract categories with analytic precision, this research 
adopted purposive snowballing sampling which was deemed more practical in the 
context of the topic and the location. Purposive snowballing sampling is often used 
in populations where informal or formal networks exist (Jennings 2001) such as the 
ROC. This technique was central for the researcher particularly at the beginning of 
the data collection process. This was because due to the family relationship that the 
researcher had with two tourism professionals they were able to direct and refer the 
researcher to relevant individuals. In turn, the researcher also requested participants 
to refer her to other participants within their business network. This occurred 
following the interview process and once the researcher had built rapport with the 
participants.    
Given the purposive snowballing sampling utilised the researcher was guided 
by the participants to knowledgeable individuals who would have relevant 
information in relation to the study. The participant making the recommendation 
was knowledgeable both about the study, as they had done the interview, and the 
person they recommended. This is also in accordance to Morse’s (1991, p.132) 
claim in terms of participant selection that “[…] informants must be knowledgeable 
about the topic” and considered experts by their engagement and association in the 
specific topic under investigation.  
A drawback of the snowballing technique is that the participants’ 
recommendations may only be a part of a specific network, which could result in a 
biased sample (Arber 2002). In order to avoid bias in the chosen participants the 
researcher endeavoured to gain more information regarding the relevance and 
knowledge of the participant referred. The researcher considered the referred 
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participants in terms of the aim of the study, their professional background and 
experience. This information was obtained both through the participants already 
interviewed and also through informal chats and discussions with individuals 
involved in the tourism and hospitality industry. The small geographical size of the 
ROC, and relatively small population, creates a tight-knit community and business 
networks where everybody knows one another. The researcher exploited this fact to 
gain information regarding the potential participant’s knowledge and experience and 
its relevance to the study. 
5.6.5. Profile of participants  
The experiences, background, culture and occupation were taken into 
account when considering the sample of the research since such factors can 
influence views and opinions regarding tourism and hospitality. As noted earlier 
(section 5.5.3.1) four groups were developed. 
The APs were the key participant group because they had first-hand 
experience of negotiations with TOs, thus although they are considered as tourism 
professionals they were distinguished from the group. However, the knowledge and 
experience of tourism professionals, Government officials and local academics was 
also central to the completion of this study, due to the knowledge and information 
they could offer regarding the influence of the external structure on the bargaining 
power of the APs and TOs (section 5.5.3.3). Each of the groups had different 
experiences and knowledge that contributed to an insightful view of the APs and 
TOs contractual and non-contractual relationship. Below a more detailed profile of 
each group is presented.  
5.6.5.1.	 Accommodation	Providers	(owner/managers)	
The participants from the accommodation providers (APs) consisted of 
owner/managers of accommodation units, that worked directly with large TOs and 
who conformed to the CTO’s categorisation20 for being a star hotel, a hotel with 
apartments, or a tourist village. Other categories, such as such as tourist villas, 
                                                
20 This was based on the CTO’s classification of the accommodation sector (appendix 2). The CTO’s 
categorisation of the accommodation sector is founded on architectural structural factors and service 
provided within a centralised space (CTO 2014a). 
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traditional buildings, furnished apartments, guesthouses, tourist apartments, hotels 
without stars and camping were excluded. For instance a hotel is considered as a 
unified functional organisation, while a hotel with apartments building needs to offer 
food preparation areas (kitchenette), whereas a tourist village is considered as a site 
of a number of small ground-floor or two-floor houses and needs also to provide 
services such as shops offering the customers food, athletic grounds and so on 
(Hotels and Tourist Establishments Law 1969). 
The decision to follow the CTO’s categorisation was taken based on 
reviewing existing literature regarding the accommodation sector. From the 
literature review it was apparent that no clear classification of the accommodation 
sector exists. In tourism definitional issues are frequent, to some extent due to the 
absence of coordination between public and private organisations and partly because 
of the experiential character of the tourism product (Morrison et al. 1996; Pender 
2005). Therefore, the CTO offered a valid category classification specific to the 
ROC and all registered accommodation establishments in the ROC must adhere to 
the CTO’s classification as regulated by law. As Aguiló et al. (2001) and Andriotis 
(2003) noted a country’s category classification is to a certain extent the best marker 
for quality, size and available resources that an establishment has. The choice to 
include star rated hotels, tourist villages and hotel apartments in the study was based 
on three reasons.  
First, to broaden earlier research on the accommodation sector since the 
literature reviewed indicated that current research on the accommodation sector 
mainly focused on star hotels (Baloglu and Peckan 2006; Orfila-Sintes and Mattsson 
2009; Espinet, et al. 2012; Bernini and Guizzardi 2012; Becerra et al. 2013; 
Dedeoğlu and Demirer 2015; Nieves and Segarra-Ciprés 2015). For instance, 
Smithson et al. (2011) investigated online visibility of small-and-medium tourism 
accommodation enterprises using star rated hotels as their sample. Also, Alegre et 
al. (2013) studied the impact that location characteristics of star rated hotels have on 
the TOs pricing. Therefore, the study was unique in terms of including these three 
types of categories to examine the phenomena.  
Second, the study’s aim was to offer an explanation of contractual and non-
contractual bargaining power interactions within negotiations experienced by the 
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APs in the ROC. Thus it was decided that concentrating on a single homogeneous 
accommodation category, for instance star rated hotels, would not cover the full 
breadth of those interactions. Also a heterogeneous sample, in terms of the quality of 
the hotel, accommodation category and size, enabled the researcher to gain 
information from participants with different perspectives, who may have diverse 
views on the contractual and non-contractual negotiations and interactions and attain 
central experiences, concerns. As a result the researcher was able to generate themes 
that were shared within the sector, achieving an overarching picture of the 
negotiation experience and interactions that arise facilitating theory generation.  
Thirdly, star hotels, tourist villas and hotel with apartments represented the 
largest number of total units in the ROC (CTO 2014b).  
The APs were based in the coastal areas of the ROC, namely Paphos, 
Limassol, Larnaka, and Ammochostos which includes the areas of Agia Napa and 
Protaras. These locations were chosen as they received the highest tourism flows 
and thus the highest number of accommodation units are established there (Chapter 
4, section 4.4). The concentration of tourist activities around the coastal area is a 
common characteristic of mature sun-and-sea Mediterranean destinations (Andriotis 
2006). This is because the majority of the people (residents and tourists) are 
attracted to the coastal areas, while the inland areas of the destination are perceived 
as complimentary to coastal tourism (Andriotis 2006). Exploratory findings also 
indicated that in Nicosia, and in peripheral areas (Hill/mountain resorts), 
accommodation establishments mainly operate with small niche TOs and/or receive 
bookings directly from the clients. For this reason these geographical areas were 
excluded from the study since individuals did not have the relevant knowledge for 
the phenomena under investigation. The ROC’s small geographical size enabled the 
researcher to collect data from all four key tourist areas. 
Accordingly, as illustrated in Table 5 below, twenty-four interviews were 
completed with APs given that saturation point was achieved (section 5.6.3). The 
highest number of interviews was completed with owner/managers of star hotels 
which can be attributed to the number of units that exist in the ROC. The number of 
units of star hotels is higher than other accommodation types (hotel apartments and 
tourist villages) (CTO 2014b). The highest number of interviews was achieved in 
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Paphos (nine interviews) in comparison to Ammochostos (six interviews), Limassol 
(four interviews) and Larnaka (two interviews). This was because Paphos has the 
highest number of operational units (CTO 2014b).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
 
Table 5: Profile of participants: accommodation providers. (developed by the author). 
All participants had similar educational and cultural backgrounds and all 
originated from the ROC. As indicated in Table 5 above, all the participants had 
managerial roles within their company, specifically three participants were 
Managing Directors of accommodation groups; nineteen participants were General 
Managers and two were Sales Managers within their respective accommodation 
units. All participants had vast and direct experience in negotiating with large TOs. 
The subsection below discusses the profile of tourism professionals. 
Type and size* of 
accommodation 
Number of 
participants 
Participant 
codes** Position Star rating 
Small-size star rated 
hotels 3 
SH:1 
SH:4 
SH:6 
General Manager 3 and 5 star 
Medium-size star 
rated hotels 4 
SH:2 
SH:3 
SH:8 
SH:9 
General Manager 4 and 5 star 
Large-size star  
rated hotels 6 
SH:5 
SH:7 
SH:10 
SH:11 
SH:12 
SH:13 
General Manager 
(5)  
and 
Sales Manager 
(1) 
4 and 5 star 
Hotels with 
apartments 
(small and large-
size) 
4 HA:1 to HA:4 
General Manager 
(3)  
and   
Sales Manager  
(1)  
Not star 
rated*** 
Tourist Villages 
(large-size) 4 TV:1 to TV:4 General Manager 
Not star 
rated*** 
Multi-types of 
accommodation 
(group of 
accommodation 
units) 
3 IG:1 to IG: 3 Managing Director 
Not star  
rated*** 
 
*According to the European Consumer’s Centre (ECC): small unit has a capacity of 
under 150 beds, medium unit is one with a capacity of more than 151 beds and a large 
size unit is one where APs manage more than 400 beds. 
**Star Hotel/ HA: Hotel Apartments/ TV: Tourist Villages/ IG: Interviewee Group. 
***According to the CTO classification, tourist villages and hotels with apartments do 
not have stars but are rated based on Class: De Luxe, A, B, C (appendix 2). 
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5.5.5.2.	 Tourism	Professionals		
Twelve interviews with tourism professionals21 were completed on a one-to-
one basis. The number interviewed was considered sufficient since saturation point 
was achieved for this group (section 5.6.3). Nine participants were from the ROC 
sharing the same cultural background and similar educational background while the 
three TO participants were not. The TOs were all British nationals sharing the same 
cultural background. The participants were based in all the coastal areas of the ROC 
which meant they could provide a more complete view of the structural issues 
present in each coastal area and reduce bias from focusing on only one area. The 
group of tourism professionals had diverse perspectives due to the varied sectors that 
the individuals work in which gave the opportunity to the researcher to compare and 
contrast the data.  
Three interviews with individuals within the tourism and hospitality 
associations were achieved. These participants held executive positions within their 
respective associations, namely CHA and ACTA. The individuals were based in 
Limassol, Larnaka and Nicosia. However the associations are national are thus their 
members are based in all areas of the ROC.   
Three participants from a large TO were interviewed, two participants from 
the large TO were Managers who had daily contact with the APs, and one member 
of operational staff. These participants offered important information regarding the 
policies and procedures of the large TO in their daily operations with regards to the 
APs. Despite the researcher’s best efforts she was able to obtain interviews from 
three individuals from one large TO through snowballing sampling (section 5.6.4). 
However, as stated at the beginning of this section interviews with the TOs were 
used to enhance the researcher’s knowledge and not to compare and contrast the 
perception of the APs and TOs, as this would have gone against the study’s aim and 
objectvies.  
Three local travel agents, based in Limassol and Paphos, were also 
interviewed. In the ROC a number of the travel agents operate with external TOs by 
                                                
21As noted earlier to address the first objective (section 5.2) it was critical to gain knowledge 
regarding the external structural environment, such as culture, Government and the tourism and 
hospitality industries in the ROC. 
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acting as their representatives in the Republic. They are often present at contractual 
negotiations with the APs and TOs mainly for legal reasons. Specifically, in order 
for a business licence to be granted it is required that the owner is a resident of the 
ROC or has an established formal business connection with a Republic’s resident 
(Republic of Cyprus 2015). Therefore various external TOs cooperate with local 
travel agents enabling them to gain insights on the relationship between APs and 
TOs. 
Finally, three interviews with local service providers were achieved, 
specifically one individual from the food and beverage sector, one individual from 
the recreation sector, one individual from the accommodation sector (managing 
tourist villas). These individuals were based in the Paphos, Limassol and Larnaka 
areas. The section below focuses on the profile of the Government officials.  
5.5.5.3.	 Government	officials		
Government officials provided valuable information on the external structure 
that impacts the negotiations, such as the influence of Government activities, culture 
and the tourism and hospitality industries of the destination, hence, fully addressing 
the first objective of the study (section 5.2). All Government officials originated 
from the ROC and therefore shared the same cultural background and a similar 
education. 
Seven Government officials were interviewed because the researcher 
believed that the saturation point was achieved and all information relevant to the 
study were collected. Six individuals held key positions within the CTO, which is 
the semi-governmental organisation solely responsible for tourism in the ROC. The 
participants worked in different departments within the CTO, namely Law, Strategy, 
Marketing and Quality Assurance. The rationale behind this choice was to enable the 
researcher to gain information on the operations of the CTO from various 
perspectives thus obtaining a more complete picture on the operations of the CTO 
within the tourism and hospitality and any possible influences on the bargaining 
power and negotiations of APs. One individual held a key position within CTO’s 
regional office based in Limassol thus providing information regarding the CTO’s 
activities from a regional perspective. For example, information in relation to the 
coordination between private sector and government at the regional level and the 
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challenges that regional offices may face in implementing strategic objectives. This 
aided the researcher in better understanding the impact that the destination as a 
whole may have on the bargaining power of the APs and TOs during their 
negotiations. The below section explains the profile of local academics. 
5.5.5.4.	 Local	academics	
The local academics were individuals employed by two universities22 in the 
ROC. Similar to the Government officials above, local academics were able to offer 
information regarding the external structure (Government, culture and industry) in 
order to enable the researcher to address the first objective (section 5.2). Two local 
academics were interviewed who had knowledge of tourism, and hospitality (one 
Professor and one studying for a doctoral degree). Interviews with the two 
academics were considered sufficient given that interviews with local academics 
were providing supporting data. These participants were chosen based on the vast 
professional experience they had working in the private tourism sector and 
knowledge deriving from their academic experience. However they were not directly 
involved in the tourism industry. Hence, they could express a less biased view on the 
tourism situation in the ROC, for example its tourism development, Government 
activities and the social and professional culture of the ROC’s professionals.   
5.7. RATIONALE FOR THE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW 
GUIDES 
5.7.1. Introduction  
Three semi-structured sets of interview questions were developed, since, 
participants had diverse roles within the tourism and hospitality industry and thus 
diverse knowledge and information was needed to address the study’s aim and 
objectives (sections 5.2 and 5.5.3). A set of interview questions was developed for 
the APs, the key group in the study in order to elicit information regarding their 
relationship with the large TOs. The second set of questions was directed to the 
                                                
22 Following the ethical considerations of the study the name of the University that the local 
academics were employed by is omitted, so as to uphold the anonymity and confidentiality of the 
participants.   
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tourism professionals and Government officials due to their knowledge regarding 
the external structure (Government, culture and tourism industry) as that can 
influence the relationship of the APs with TOs. A separate set of questions was 
designed for local academics because they were not directly involved in the industry 
but the researcher deemed that they had valuable knowledge and a broader 
perspective on the tourism and hospitality industry in the ROC.  
Both open-ended and closed-ended questions were utilised in the sets of 
semi-structured interview question guides developed for the participants. Semi-
structured open-ended questions were employed to encourage the participants to 
offer detailed descriptions and explanations using their own words and develop their 
thoughts regarding their views on the phenomena. However, some closed-ended 
questions were also used in order to elicit certain facts such as the participants’ job 
description, experience, the type of business and its operations. These introductory 
closed-ended questions also aided in building rapport with the participants and put 
them at ease for the interview process. Further, when deemed necessary the 
researcher used follow-up questions and probes during the interview to gain more 
detailed data from the participants. This is an advantage of the semi-structured type 
of interview as it offers flexibility to adjust the questions to further explore issues of 
concern to the participants and to uncover new topics of interest for the participants 
(section 5.5.3.3). Hence, questions were added and adjusted to further explore the 
concerns of each participant.  
The discussion below examines the rationale and design for the interview 
guide for the APs, in turn for the tourism professionals and Government officials 
and lastly for the local academics.  
5.7.2. Accommodation providers’ (APs) interview guide 
The questions for the semi-structured set of interview guide developed for 
APs were formed and categorised according to the study’s aim and objectives 
(section 5.2). However, it must be noted that the researcher was flexible regarding 
the order that these questions were addressed. This was done in order to avoid 
restricting the participants’ thought process while answering the questions and, in 
turn, to aid the researcher to probe for further details when needed (section 5.5.3.3). 
Hence, the researcher explored each topic as it arose during the interview. Figure 5, 
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6, 7, 8, 9 (below) illustrate the set of interview questions for the APs and the 
rationale behind each question.  
The guide for the APs was divided into five sections with one section 
consisting of introductory questions, the other three sections reflecting the objectives 
of the study and the final section entailing a concluding question (Figures 5, 6, 7, 8, 
9). Following the division of the APs’ interview guide in five sections, to facilitate 
this discussion the interview guide is divided in five figures (Figures 5, 6, 7, 8, 9) 
that explain the purpose of each question. 
 It must be noted that Objective 1 of the study (section 5.2. and Figure 6 and 
8) sought to identify the bargaining power of the APs and TOs during negotiations, 
which is influenced by both the external structure and the firm-specific resources. 
For issues of clarity these two aspects were dealt separately in the interview guide, 
first the firm-specific resources were addressed and second the influence of the 
external structure. (More details on which questions correspond to each aspect are 
given below Figure 6 and 8). Objectives 2 and 3 of the study (section 5.2 and Figure 
7) were closely related and interconnected since the aim was to elicit information 
regarding the behaviour and interactions that occur during the negotiations between 
the APs and TOs. For this reason the second and third objective were dealt with 
together during the interview process.  
Interview Questions for Star Hotels/Tourist Villages/Hotel Apartments 
Questions Purpose 
Section 1 
Introductory Questions  
1. Could you tell me about your job role?  
2. How long have you been working in 
this role? 
3. What are the main markets of the unit 
in terms of country? 
4. Which is your main customer markets?  
These questions were developed in order to 
firstly, elicit specific information regarding the 
participant’s background, education and 
experience in the tourism industry in general 
and within the accommodation unit in particular 
and secondly, to gain more information 
regarding the operations of the unit. 
Figure 5: Section 1- Accommodation providers’ interview guide (star hotels, hotel apartments 
and tourist villages. (developed by the author). 
As seen in Figure 5 above, questions 1 to 4 were introductory and were 
developed for two reasons. Firstly, to elicit information in relation to the 
participant’s experience in, and knowledge of, the tourism industry and the 
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accommodation sector. Secondly, these questions sought to enhance the researchers 
knowledge regarding the operations of the specific unit. 
 Interview Questions for Star Hotels/Tourist Villages/Hotel Apartments 
Questions Purpose 
Section 2  
Objective 1: To discover the sources of power of the accommodation providers and the tour 
operators, from the APs perspective, in order to determine their bargaining power within the 
contractual and non-contractual negotiations. 
5. Do you work with a number of tour 
operators? Yes/No. If so, which ones?  
This question was used to identify the number 
of TOs the unit cooperates with in order to 
ascertain the level of dependence of the unit on 
TOs to achieve its organisational objectives.  
6. Do you have a contract with the TOs? 
Yes/No. Why? 
The purpose of this question was to identify 
whether the unit has a contractual relationship 
with the TO and the reasons behind this choice. 
7. What type of contract do you have 
with the tour operators?  
 
Follow-up question that aimed to discover the 
relative dependence that exists between the 
parties.  
8. Could you tell me why you have 
agreed to this type of contract? 
 
The purpose of this question was to examine 
the benefits of each type of contract that the 
APs expect to receive. This question again 
pursued to identify resources that the APs seek 
in their relationship with the TOs.  
9. Why do you choose to work with the 
particular tour operator(s) instead of 
others? 
 
This question aimed at identifying the resources 
that the APs pursue from their relationship with 
the TOs, in order to determine the TOs 
bargaining power.   
10. Why do you think the tour operators 
choose to work with your unit? 
This question aimed at identifying the resources 
that the TOs seek from their relationship with 
the APs in order to determine the APs 
bargaining power.  
Figure 6: Section 2-Accommodation providers’ interview guide (star hotels, hotel apartments 
and tourist villages. (developed by the author). 
As seen in Figure 6 above, questions 5 to 10 directly addressed Objective 1. 
First, these questions (5 to 10) allowed the researcher to explore the dyadic 
relationship by discovering the specific and valuable resources that the APs and TOs 
seek to access in their relationship, from the APs perspective. Second, these 
questions (5 to 10) elucidated the benefits that the APs and TOs expect to receive 
from their relationship in order to determine the relative dependence that exists in 
the relationship and thus the bargaining power of each party.  
   Interview Questions for Star Hotels/Tourist Villages/Hotel Apartments 
Questions Purpose 
Section 3 
Objective 2: To investigate how bargaining power is employed within the relationship, from the 
APs perspective, in order to establish the influence strategies adopted by both parties during their 
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contractual and non-contractual negotiations. 
Objective 3: To examine, from the APs perspective, how bargaining power is exercised within the 
relationship in order to ascertain the consequences on the negotiation outcomes. 
11. Could you talk me through a 
contractual negotiation process with 
the tour operators?  
The aim of this question was to explore the 
contractual negotiation interactions that occur 
between the APs and TOs. By adopting this open-
ended question the researcher encouraged the 
participants to discuss and elaborate on the 
negotiation processes. By asking follow up 
questions and using probes this question elicited 
information on the APs and TOs influencing 
strategies, key concerns and offered insights on 
the ability to negotiate pricing and volume of 
sales.  
12. Are there any disagreements during 
the contractual agreements?  
Yes/No, why? 
This was a follow-up question that aimed at 
encouraging the APs to discuss their influencing 
strategies on how they would resolve their 
disagreements.  
13. Following a negotiation with the 
tour operators what is your opinion 
about the outcome? Why?  
This question intended to offer the APs a moment 
to reflect on their behaviour, actions and evaluate 
the outcome of the negotiation process 
encouraging them to discuss about their choice 
and offering a deeper understanding on the 
negotiation processes.   
14. Do any changes occur in the 
agreements you make with the tour 
operators? (Probe: If so what and 
why do you think this happens?)  
 
This question aimed at encouraging the APs to 
convey information regarding the non-contractual 
negotiations between the APs and TOs, which also 
revealed information on pricing and volume of 
sales outcomes. 
15. What actions would you take to 
address such changes? 
This was a follow-up question aiming to explore 
the behaviour of the APs in addressing requests 
from the TOs, namely their influencing strategies. 
16. Do you believe that you receive 
sufficient information from the tour 
operators to enable you to plan your 
business activities accordingly? 
Yes/No. Why?  
 
 
This question aimed at obtaining information on 
the context of the relationship the level of 
communication between the APs and TOs in order 
to ascertain the closeness of their relationship as 
well as identify deviant practices. Evidence of 
deviant practices were identified during the 
exploratory primary investigation stage which also 
influences the pricing and volume of sales 
outcomes. Thus this question elicited information 
addressing both the second and third objective. 
17. How would you describe the tour 
operators’ behaviour in your 
relationship?  
The literature review and exploratory findings 
indicated that competition may exist between 
suppliers and buyers which influences the 
behaviour between the parties. Therefore, the 
intention of this question was to discover how the 
APs perceive the TOs to ascertain whether a 
cooperative behaviour or a competitive behaviour 
is evident between the parties that can impact the 
influencing strategies and negotiation outcomes.  
Figure 7: Section 3 - Accommodation providers’ interview guide (star hotels, hotel apartments 
and tourist villages. (developed by the author). 
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Figure 7 (above) indicates questions 11 to 17 that directly addressed 
Objective 2 and 3 by exploring the interactions that occur between the APs and TOs 
during contractual and non-contractual negotiations. First, the questions explored 
how the bargaining power is used in the form of influence strategies and tactics 
adopted during negotiations. Second, the questions covered the major concerns of 
the APs and the issues that occur during their negotiations, whether contractual or 
not. Third the questions examined the context of the relationship. Finally the 
questions sought to identify the impact of bargaining power on the outcome of these 
negotiations.  
Interview Questions for Star Hotels/Tourist Villages/Hotel Apartments 
Questions Purpose 
Section 4 (also see p.46) 
Objective 1: To discover the sources of power of the accommodation providers and the tour 
operators, from the APs perspective, in order to determine their bargaining power within the 
contractual and non-contractual negotiations. 
18. Do you believe that it is possible to 
stop working with the tour operators 
in the current tourism environment 
in the ROC? Yes/No, why? 
This question aimed at examining the level of 
dependence that the APs perceive to have on the 
TOs. Also this question revealed information on 
how the current tourism environment may 
constraint or enable the APs ability to negotiate.  
19. What is your opinion of other 
accommodation providers in the 
ROC? Why? 
 
The purpose of this question was to obtain the 
APs view regarding other APs to explore the level 
of competition that exists in the tourism industry. 
Exploratory findings also indicated that the level 
of cooperation between the APs influences their 
bargaining power. Thus, this question elicited 
information on the factors influencing the APs 
bargaining power.  
20. Do you think the tourism and 
hospitality association’s work well 
together? Yes/No, why?  
This question was used in order to explore the 
level of cooperation that exists between the actors 
in tourism industry thus assessing and if, how this 
can influence the destination-specific resources of 
the APs. Further, as noted above exploratory data 
highlighted that the level of cooperation between 
APs influences their bargaining power thus this 
question further enriched understandings on the 
level of cooperation between APs.  
21. Do you believe that the Government 
sufficiently supports the 
accommodation sector? Yes/No, 
why? 
The purpose of this question was to obtain 
information regarding the Government’s activities 
and policies in aiding the APs to improve their 
resources. Hence, gaining information on how the 
structure can enable or constrain the APs 
bargaining power.  
22. How do you perceive the current 
tourism industry in the ROC in 
terms of success? 
 
This question offered information on the influence 
of the external structure namely, the ROC as a 
destination its competitiveness. In particular, it 
revealed perceptions regarding the tourism 
product, destination attractiveness and its 
challenges, thus enabling the researcher to 
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ascertain its influence on the APs bargaining 
power.  
Figure 8: Section 4 - Accommodation providers’ interview guide (star hotels, hotel apartments 
and tourist villages. (developed by the author). 
As seen in Figure 8 (above) questions 18 to 22 addressed the first objective 
of the study and were intended to investigate the external structure (culture, 
Government and tourism and hospitality industry) and its influence on the 
bargaining power of the APs with the TOs and their negotiations.  
   Interview Questions for Star Hotels/Tourist Villages/Hotel Apartments 
Questions Purpose 
Section 5  
Concluding Question 
23. Is there something else you would 
like to add in terms of your 
relationship with the tour operators 
that we have not discussed?  
This question was used in order to give the 
participant time to reflect on the interview and 
offer an opportunity to the researcher to identify a 
new topic that was not considered by the previous 
questions.  
Figure 9: Section 5- Accommodation providers’ interview guide (star hotels, hotel apartments 
and tourist villages. (developed by the author). 
Lastly, Figure 9 (above) illustrates question 23 that was used in order to 
bring the interview session to a close and allow the participant to mention any issues 
that he/she perceived important that were not addressed.  
5.7.3. Tourism professionals’ and Government officials’ interview 
guide  
One of the semi-structured set of interview questions was directed at tourism 
professionals and Government officials to explore the influence of the external 
structure on the negotiations and the bargaining power of APs and TOs, hence fully 
addressing Objective 1 (section 5.2). Figure 10 and 11 below illustrate the questions 
that were addressed to the tourism professionals and Government officials and the 
purpose of each question. The interview guide was divided into four sections, 
namely introductory questions, tourism environment in the ROC, culture and 
concluding section. For the purpose of this discussion sections 1 and 2 are presented 
in Figure 10 and sections 3 and 4 in Figure 11.  
Questions 1 and 2 (Figure 10 below) were introductory questions aimed at 
obtaining information regarding the experience and knowledge of participants as 
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well as his/her job role. Questions 3 to 7 (Figure 10) explored the perceptions and 
views of the participants regarding the ROC’s tourism industry environment. This 
enabled the researcher to gain a more complete understanding regarding the 
influence of industry factors on the contractual and non-contractual relationship of 
the APs and TOs.  
Tourism professionals’ and Government officials’ interview questions’ guide 
Questions Purpose 
Section 1 
Introductory Questions 
1. Could you tell me about your job role?  
2. How long have you been working in this 
role? 
These questions firstly, elicited specific 
information regarding the participant’s 
experience and knowledge in terms of the 
tourism industry.  
Section 2 
Tourism environment of the ROC 
3. How would you characterise the tourism 
environment today in the ROC? Why?  
The aim of this question was to gain the 
participant’s insights of the current state of the 
tourism environment in the ROC Also elicit 
information regarding challenges and success.  
4. How do you perceive the current tourism 
industry in the ROC in terms of success? 
Why? 
 
The purpose of this question was to examine the 
perception of the participants’ regarding the 
competitiveness and attractiveness of the ROC 
as a destination to support a profitable business.  
5. How would you evaluate the activities of 
the Government in the tourism industry? 
Why? 
This question intended to investigate the 
opinion of the participant in terms of the 
tourism activities of the Government (central 
Government and the CTO), the support they 
provide to the industry and tourism policies and 
regulations. Accordingly deepening the 
understanding of the researcher regarding the 
impact of the Government on the bargaining 
power of the APs.  
6. Do you think the tourism and hospitality 
associations work well together? Yes/No, 
why?  
 
This question was used in order to explore the 
level of cooperation that exists between the 
actors in tourism and hospitality industry thus 
assessing and if, how this can influence the 
destination-specific resources of the APs. This 
question also indirectly explored cultural issues 
regarding the cooperative behaviour of the 
owner/managers of the ROC. Furthermore, 
exploratory findings also indicated that the level 
of cooperation between the APs influences their 
bargaining power. Thus, this question elicited 
information on the factors influencing the APs 
bargaining power.   
7. What is your opinion about the business 
activities of large tour operators operating in 
the ROC? Why? 
This question intended to elicit the view of the 
participant regarding the activities of large TOs 
in the ROC, in terms of whether he/she believes 
they are important for the industry or not as well 
as what do they offer to the industry. 
Figure 10: Sections 1 and 2 -Tourism professionals’ and Government officials’ interview guide. 
(developed by the author). 
  
137 
Questions 8 to 10 (Figure 11 below) examined the ROC culture and the 
business culture, thus aiding in identifying its influence on the phenomena. Finally, 
question 11 (Figure 11) was used as a concluding question to enable the participants 
to reflect on what was discussed and offer any additional comments that they 
perceive as important that were not discussed. 
Section 3 
ROC Culture 
8. How would you describe the mentality 
of owner/managers today in the ROC? 
Why? 
The aim of this question was to explore the 
mentality of the ROC owner/managers have in 
relation to their business activities.   
9. What is your opinion regarding the 
behaviour of owner/managers in the 
ROC in their business relationships? 
Why? 
The purpose of this question was to examine the 
behaviour of owner/managers and APs 
regarding their business relationships. Further, 
exploratory findings indicated that cultural 
issues and the cooperation between APs 
influences the bargaining power of the APs in 
relation to the TOs.  
10. How would you describe the 
relationship of tourism and hospitality 
businesses owner/managers in the ROC 
with each other? Why? 
 
This was a follow-up question intended to gain 
information regarding the business environment 
in the ROC in terms of the level of competition 
and cooperation that exists in the environment.  
Section 4 
Concluding Question 
11. Is there something else you would like 
to add in terms of what we have 
discussed? 
This question was used in order to give the 
participant time to reflect on the interview and 
offer an opportunity to the researcher to identify 
a topic that was not considered by the previous 
questions. 
Figure 11: Sections 3 and 4 - Tourism professionals’ and Government officials’ interview guide. 
(developed by the author). 
However, due to the diversity of the sectors and the experiences of each 
participant within this group, before each interview the researcher adjusted some 
questions based on the experience and knowledge of the participant and the 
relevance to the study. In addition, the diversity of the participants resulted in 
various participants having a direct relationship and contact with large TOs, such as 
travel agents. This presented an opportunity to explore the perceptions and opinions 
of other destination suppliers regarding the behaviour and actions of the TOs in their 
relationship. As Patton (2002) noted flexibility and creativity are essential during 
fieldwork and plans should be adjusted as new opportunities and sources of data 
arise. Hence, in order to elicit this information supplementary questions were added 
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in the set of interview questions for these participants, these are presented in Figure 
12 below. 
Supplementary set of questions for individuals with direct relationship with large TOs 
Questions Purpose 
Tour Operators 
1. Could you tell me a little bit about your 
relationship with the large tour operator?  
Having established that the participant has a 
direct business relationship with the large TOs 
the purpose of this question was to obtain more 
information regarding their relationship.  
2. Why do you choose to work with the 
large tour operators? 
This question examined the benefits that the 
participants receive from their relationship with 
the TOs thus identifying the resources that the 
participants want to access. As a result it 
facilitated the researcher to identify the most 
critical resources that the TOs offer to their 
suppliers. 
3. How would you describe the behaviour 
of the large tour operators in their 
business relationship? Why? 
The aim of this question was to explore the 
behaviour of the TOs with other destination 
service providers and not just the APs. Thus 
enabling the researcher to compare and contrast 
the data. This question is also indirectly related 
to Objective 2, that is exploring the use of the 
bargaining power of the TOs in their 
relationships with their suppliers.  
4. Is there something else you would like to 
add in terms of your relationship with the 
tour operators that we have not 
discussed? 
This question was used to give the participant 
time to reflect on the interview and offer an 
opportunity to the researcher to identify a topic 
that was not considered by the previous 
questions. 
Figure 12: Supplementary set of interview questions for individuals with direct relationship 
with the large TOs. (developed by the author). 
Figure 12 above depicts the four supplementary interview questions and the 
purpose of each question. All four questions, helped to address the first and second 
objective (section 5.2) by exploring the resources (sources of bargaining power) and 
behaviour of the TOs with other suppliers. Probing questions were also utilised for 
some interviews when the researcher deemed necessary to attain more information. 
The section below discusses the interview guide for the local academics.  
5.7.4. Local academics’ interview guide 
The semi-structured set of interview questions for local academics addressed 
the first objective of the study eliciting information of the current tourism and 
hospitality industry, Government and the ROC’s culture. Figures 13 and 14 below 
present the local academics’ interview guide. As seen in Figure 13, questions 1 to 5 
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are similar to the questions of tourism professionals and Government officials since 
the researcher intended to explore the same issues.  
Local academics’ interview questions’ guide 
Questions Purpose 
Section 1 
Tourism environment of the ROC 
1. How would you characterise the 
ROC’s business environment today? 
Why? 
The aim was to gain the participant’s insights 
of the current state of the tourism environment 
in the ROC and elicit information regarding 
challenges and success.  
  Section 2 
Government 
2. How would you evaluate the 
activities of the Government in the 
tourism industry? Why? 
This question investigated the participant’s 
opinion in terms of the tourism activities of the 
Government (central Government/ CTO), the 
support they provide to the industry and 
tourism policies and regulations. Hence, 
deepening the researcher’s understanding 
regarding the Government’s impact on the APs 
bargaining power.  
Section 3 
ROC Culture 
3. How would you describe the 
mentality of owner/managers in the 
ROC today? Why? 
The aim was to explore the mentality 
owner/managers have in relation to their 
business activities.   
4. How would you describe the 
relationship of tourism businesses 
owner/managers in the ROC with 
each other? Why? 
This question intended to gain information 
regarding the business environment in terms of 
the level of competition and cooperation that 
exists in the environment. Exploratory findings 
also indicated that the level of cooperation 
between the APs influences their bargaining 
power. Thus, this question elicited information 
on the factors influencing the APs bargaining 
power.   
5. What is your opinion regarding the 
behaviour of owner/managers in the 
ROC in their business relationships? 
Why? 
The purpose of this question was to examine 
the behaviour of owner/managers and APs in 
particular regarding their business 
relationships. 
Figure 13: Sections 1 to 3 - Local academic's interview question's guide. (developed by the 
author). 
However, some supplementary themes were also examined in questions 6 
and 7 (Figure 14 below) that explored the participants’ opinion and views regarding 
the success of the accommodation sector and the behaviour of the large TOs. 
Question 8  (Figure 14) investigated issues that the ROC and its stakeholders must 
consider in order to improve its future success. In turn, it offered information on the 
issues that need to be addressed in order to improve the bargaining power of the 
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APs, given that a link exists between the competitiveness of the destination and the 
tourism businesses.  
   Local academics’ interview questions’ guide 
Questions Purpose 
Section 4 
Accommodation sector and Tour operators 
6. What is your opinion regarding the 
success of the accommodation 
sector in the ROC? Why? 
This question aimed to explore whether the 
local academics have identified any issues 
within the accommodation sector.  
7. What is your opinion about the 
business activities of large tour 
operators operating in the ROC? 
Why? 
This question intended to elicit the view of the 
participant regarding the activities of large TOs 
in the ROC, in terms of whether he/she 
believes they are important for the industry or 
not as well as what do they offer to the 
industry. 
Section 5 
Future 
8. What do think the ROC as a 
destination needs to focus on in 
order to further improve its 
competitive position? Why? 
The purpose was to examine the participant’s 
opinion regarding the future of the ROC as a 
destination and issues that must be addressed to 
improve its competitiveness, thus also 
contributing in improving the APs 
competitiveness.  
Section 6 
Concluding Question 
9. Is there something else you would 
like to add in terms of what we have 
discussed? 
This question was used to give the participant 
time to reflect on the interview and offer an 
opportunity to the researcher to identify a topic 
that was not considered by the previous 
questions 
Figure 14: Sections 4 to 6 - Local academic's interview question's guide. (developed by the 
author). 
The interview process for the local academics was less structured than the set 
of interview guide directed at the APs, tourism professionals and Government 
officials, as it gave the opportunity to the researcher to ‘exploit’ the specialised 
knowledge of each academic regarding the phenomena under study.  
5.8. DATA ANALYSIS  
5.8.1. Introduction  
As noted in section 5.3.1 the research used evolved Grounded Theory’s 
coding strategies to analyse the data. Corbin and Strauss (2008) highlighted that 
coding refers to the process of breaking down the data in to distinct units of 
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meaning, which are then labelled to form concepts or categories, which are then 
developed into propositions to generate theory to elucidate the phenomena under 
study. This process entailed three types of coding: open, axial and selective. As also 
stated, in section 5.3.1, during the open coding stage an extra step was added. More 
specifically, while Grounded Theory stipulates three steps of (a) codes, (b) concepts 
and (c) categories in the open coding stage, the current study created a four step 
process unique to this study, namely (a) codes, (b) concepts, (c) sub-categories and 
(d) categories. This action was considered essential given that once the three-step 
analysis was completed the researcher deemed that the data needed to be further 
analysed and grouped together in categories that better depicted the content in order 
to ascertain the core factors that fully explain the bargaining power within 
negotiations of APs with the TOs. (Examples and further explanation on this step are 
provided in section 5.8.4). The addition of the fourth step is not surprising since as 
Corbin and Strauss (2008, 2015) stated researchers’ should trust their instincts and 
use common sense in the research process. Accordingly, in this study a four-step 
analysis process was employed during open coding, codes, concepts, sub-categories 
and categories and these terms are used in this discussion. 
The constant comparative method and memos were used to facilitate the 
analysis process (section 5.3.1.5). The constant comparative method (Corbin and 
Strauss 2008) enabled the researcher to identify concepts and categories by the 
comparison of incidents with incidents, incident with concept, concept to concept, 
and category to category to ascertain differences and similarities. Memos were an 
invaluable part of the coding process (sections 5.8.4 and 5.8.5, appendices 1, 4 and 
5). This is because they were used as a repository to record ideas and thoughts 
regarding the data to help in further developing the categories and concepts as well 
as offer a trail for the process. Furthermore, as noted in section 5.3.3.3 memos were 
also used during the data collection for the researcher to reflect on the data and 
increase her theoretical sensitivity.   
However, in order to facilitate the coding process the researcher transcribed 
and subsequently translated the data collected (as stated in section 5.5.3.3 the 
majority of interviews were conducted in Greek, the national language of the ROC). 
This was because the researcher deemed that it would be simpler to reflect on the 
data and code from the transcribed material in the same language. The subsections 
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below explain in detail this study’s analysis process. First, transcription and 
successively the translation strategies adopted are discussed. In turn, the open, axial 
and selective coding processes are explained. 
5.8.2. Transcription  
Transcription denotes the “[…] process of reproducing spoken words” for 
example reproducing the verbal words from an audiotaped interview (Halcomb and 
Davidson 2006, p.38). The level of transcription can vary depending on the needs of 
each study (Hennick et al. 2011; Gibbs 2007). Specifically, full verbatim 
transcription, referring to word-for-word transcription of verbal data and the 
inclusion of details such as language use, length of pauses, involuntary stutters and 
without the researcher making any grammatical corrections or “tidying up” (since 
natural speech does not often occur in well-structured sentences) (Silverman  2006, 
p.288; Gibbs 2007) was not deemed necessary in the current study. This was 
because in Grounded Theory analysis while transcription also “[…] attempts a 
verbatim depiction of speech” what is important is the substance of the interview, 
that is to understand the content of the words to generate concepts and the meaning 
and perceptions the participants attach to this content (Hennink et al. 2011; Oliver et 
al. 2005, p. 4). Hence, during transcription emphasis was placed on what the 
participants said (the informational content) and the researcher did not focus on 
including pauses, changes in the tone of voice, speech fillers (such as ahh and you 
know) and non-verbal communication.  
However, it must be noted that on occasions more details were included in 
the transcription (such as long pause and laughing) because the researcher deemed 
that this was important to better convey the meaning of the participant. Furthermore, 
the researcher also corrected grammatical errors and ‘tided up’ the participants’ 
speech in more structured sentences in order to make the interview data easier to 
read while focusing on the meanings and perception of the participants.  
All interviews were transcribed in order to have all the information available 
regarding what transpired during the interview. As stated in section 5.5.3.3, thirty-
seven interviews were completed in Greek and eight in English. Accordingly, all 
interviews were firstly transcribed in their original language in order to have a more 
precise account of the participants’ words, meaning and issues raised during the 
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interviews. These transcripts also aided the researcher to organise and prepare the 
data for translation, since it was easier for the researcher to translate from written 
text allowing time to think during translation. The translation process is discussed in 
the section below.  
5.8.3. Translation  
Taking into account the data were collected in both English and Greek, the 
data in Greek had to be translated in English in order to facilitate the analysis 
process and present the findings in this thesis. The section below discusses the issues 
considered during translation to keep the translated text as closely as possible to its 
original meaning.  
Squires (2008) highlighted that the translator must have discourse and 
sociolinguistic competence for an accurate translation in both languages. Discourse 
competence refers to the individual’s ability to effortlessly have everyday dialogs 
thus enabling story-telling as well as having contextual comprehension of how and 
when certain words and expressions are employed in diverse situations. 
Sociolinguistic competence signifies the ability of the individual to use and convey 
the meaning of words and expressions similar to the culture that uses the language 
and having knowledge of cultural norms in the communication processes. The 
researcher originates from the ROC therefore she has both discourse and 
sociolinguistic competence of the Greek language and an understanding of its 
culture. In addition, she has lived in the UK for more than ten years and has 
completed a UK education. Thus she has proficiency in the English language and 
sociolinguistic competence and was competent to translate the interviews collected.  
However, the researcher was also aware that translation can lead to 
misinterpretation hence certain strategies were used to diminish the possibility for 
mistranslations and misinterpretations. First, back-translation of certain extracts was 
undertaken (Santos et al. 2015), which involved the researcher translating Greek text 
to English text and then English text to Greek text in order to identify uncertainties 
or inconsistencies in meaning. These back-translations were also discussed with her 
supervisor who is a bilingual fluent speaker, with her native language being Greek. 
Due to time constraints back-translation of all text was unfeasible, however this 
strategy permitted the identification of discrepancies in translation and to make 
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changes accordingly.  
Consultation was also used (Filep 2009) which involved discussion with 
bilingual speakers regarding the meaning of certain words and expressions, which 
were found as problematic by the researcher. The researcher discussed problematic 
words or phrases with her supervisor who, as noted in the paragraph above is also 
bilingual, in order to convey the accurate meaning of words and phrases used by the 
participants.  
Moreover, particularly in the case of idiomatic expressions used by the 
participants the researcher consulted with a native English speaker (University 
lecturer) to review translations in order to ensure a more accurate representation of 
the meaning of the participants in the English language. The same individual also 
reviewed extracts from the translated text to ensure that the translation had meaning 
in the English language as well. In order to facilitate the data analysis all interviews 
in Greek were translated in English, given that it was more straightforward for the 
researcher to read and think in one language rather than switching.  
The translation was done keeping as close as possible to the meaning of the 
words rather than literal (word-by-word) translation hence, the words used by the 
participants were adapted, for two reasons. First, Grounded Theory is concerned 
with the meaning and perceptions of the participants therefore the researcher was 
more concerned ensuring that the meaning of the participants was not lost.  Second, 
literal translation decreases the readability of the text which can also inhibit the 
ability of the reader to understand “[…] what is going on” (Filep 2009, p.67). 
Accordingly, to make quotes more ‘readable’ the researcher occasionally altered the 
structure and added words to help the reader understand what was being said and to 
convey a more precise meaning of the participant’s words. Once the translation of 
each interview was completed the researcher began the open coding stage, which is 
discussed in the following section.  
5.8.4. Open coding  
Open coding refers to the identification, analysis and classification of data 
collected (Collis and Hussey 2003). Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss 1962; 
Strauss and Corbin 1990; Collis and Hussey 2003) notes that in open coding, (a) 
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codes are identified and (b) concepts and (c) categories are developed, as such 
specifying three analysis steps. However, in the current study the researcher deemed 
necessary to add an extra step, namely sub-categories, which is unique to this study. 
Therefore, four steps were utilised, (a) codes, (b) concepts, (c) sub-categories and 
(d) categories.  
This additional step took place because following the completion of the three 
steps, codes, concepts and categories, as specified in Grounded Theory, the 
researcher recognised that the meaning, characteristics and attributes of the initial 
categories indicated that they could be further grouped together under categories that 
could better depict their content, which could then lead to the identification of the 
core factors that explained the bargaining power interactions and negotiations of the 
APs with TOs. For this reason she deemed it necessary for her study to add an extra 
step, sub-categories23. Hence, the categories developed originally (as stipulated by 
Grounded Theory) were labeled sub-categories and the researcher continued to 
compare and contrast the sub-categories to form categories to better portray their 
content and identify the core categories (or factors) pertinent to explain the 
bargaining power interactions and negotiations of the APs with the TOs. For 
instance, the category resources was developed, that included the sub-categories 
tangible and intangible resources, Government policies/regulations, culture and 
industry characteristics, since all these sub-categories referred and influenced the 
resources of the APs and TOs and influenced their bargaining power. (Further 
examples are provided later in this subsection). Therefore, for the needs of this study 
a four-step analysis process occurred during open coding stage, codes, concepts, 
sub-categories and categories and these terms are utilised in this discussion.  
The open coding stage is linked with the initial concept development since 
the researcher sought to discover the units of information (codes) related to the 
                                                
23 This decision was taken in conjunction with the researcher’s supervisor an experienced grounded 
theorist, therefore, this decision was also checked by an external observer, which Corbin and Strauss 
(1990) noted that it contributes to the credibility of the research process and findings. (section 5.9.2).    
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research. Specifically, the researcher searched for words, phrases, sentences or 
paragraphs that indicated experiences and attitudes of the participants as well as 
actions and outcomes that could aid in explaining the contractual and non-
contractual negotiations and bargaining power interactions of the APs with the TOs. 
An AP stated “[…] TOs take advantage of the situation and they push the prices 
down.” The words: “they push” indicated that the APs experienced pressure in their 
relationship with the TOs, thus the code “they push” was identified. 
As noted in section 5.3.1.5, classical Grounded Theory’s approach to data 
analysis was followed (Glaser 1992) and that enabled the researcher to code in a 
more spontaneous and flexible manner focusing on the codes with direct 
significance to the research, while also being aware not to force on the data 
preconceived ideas deriving from the literature. Frequent consultations with her 
supervisor aided the researcher to avoid forcing the data (section 5.9.2).  
Once the codes were identified questions such as who, where, what, how and 
why were asked in order to inspect the data in more detail, understanding their 
meaning and comparing and contrasting the codes for similarities and differences. 
For example, questions such as (a) what is the participant experiencing?; (b) who is 
involved in this incident such as APs/TOs/Government?; (c) why does this code 
(incident, attitude, outcome) occur?; (d) how is this code related to the negotiations 
and bargaining power?; (e) does this code occur during contractual or non-
contractual negotiations?; (f) what connections exist between these codes? This 
constant comparison enabled the researcher to identify and develop concepts. This 
was because during the data interrogation the codes that referred to a similar idea or 
meaning were placed together under a concept to represent their conceptual 
similarities. For example, in relation to the negotiation process three codes identified 
(underlined in italics) in one AP’s interview transcript were: “[…] having the right 
arguments”, “[…] they [TOs] calculate everything, they use numbers, they have 
their statistics, like we do.” and “[…] to have some arguments that will convince the 
other party.” These codes were placed under the concept rationality to denote an 
attribute of negotiations. 
Once the initial three interviews were coded the researcher began to compare 
and contrast the codes identified from the three participants for similarities and 
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differences to further develop the concepts. For example, the researcher further 
questioned how might this experience (code) of one AP be similar to another 
experience (code) noted by another AP. This open coding process continued as the 
researcher progressed in the analysis. For instance, following from the example of 
the concept rationality mentioned above, as the analysis continued codes relating to 
rationality during the negotiations of APs with TOs were evident in other APs’ 
interview transcripts. Three more codes (underlined in italics) identified, for 
example, were: “[…] his [TOs] demands were unjustifiable”,  “[…] there must be a 
reason” and  “[…] when you want a concession it must always go hand in hand with 
a justification.” All these codes by various APs provided further evidence of the 
relevance of rationality as a concept to help to explain the negotiations of the APs 
with the TOs.  
As an example, Figure 15 below illustrates an interview transcript from an 
AP during open coding stage. The codes identified are highlighted in yellow while 
the concepts developed are highlighted in green. As seen in the figure below, the 
two codes identified were: have a certain frame that they operate in and follow and 
nobody is working uncontrollably. These codes indicated a certain behaviour of the 
APs and TOs during negotiations, namely that there are restrictions and inflexibility 
in their negotiations. Accordingly, these codes were placed under the concept of 
inflexibility a concept considered as a characteristic of the negotiations occurring 
between APs and TOs.   
Interviewer: Following a negotiation with the tour operators what is your opinion about the 
outcome?  
Participant: […] Well [pause] except from a very few cases, I always sign and feel that is a win-win 
situation. (code: I always sign and feel that is a win-win situation; concept: Win-win situation). Both 
for us and the TO, the people responsible for signing the contracts have a certain frame that we 
operate in and follow. Nobody is working uncontrollably. (code: have a certain frame that they 
operate in and follow/ nobody is working uncontrollably; concept: Inflexibility). Our company for 
instance has a pre-agreed pricing policy that we follow. So I follow these margins and pricing policy 
to bargain, these margins are based on the market and the specific colleague I am bargaining with. As 
a company we have the philosophy of align pricing. (code: pre-agreed pricing policy / follow these 
margins and pricing policy/ philosophy of align pricing; concept: Price sensitivity).		
Figure 15: Extract of a coded interview by an accommodation provider (AP). (developed by the 
author). 
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It must be noted that as the data analysis continued and the understanding of 
the researcher regarding the phenomena was enhanced, initial concepts identified 
were renamed and modified to better represent the meaning of the participants. For 
example, an initial concept identified was called price wars to denote the importance 
of pricing in negotiations. However as the coding progressed the researcher believed 
that the words price wars as a concept was too restrictive. This is because it 
indicated a strong negative connotation of pricing issues between the parties and as 
the coding progressed it was evident that not all participants perceived pricing in 
such a way. Therefore, this concept was changed from price wars to price 
sensitivity. The researcher deemed that the words price sensitivity better indicated 
the significance that price plays in the relationship between APs and TOs as well as 
both parties sensitivity to price fluctuations that occur.  
Altogether seventy-one (71) concepts were developed from this stage of 
open coding (appendix 3). Table 6 below presents examples of six concepts and 
representative codes.  In the table, the first column illustrates the concepts and the 
second column illustrates the statements of participants and the codes identified, 
codes are underlined and in italics.  
Concepts Example of codes**  
Win-win situation 
“[Y]ou always have to follow a win-win policy - it suits me and it suits you. 
You have to find the balance, that equilibrium to create the sense that it is a 
win-win situation.”(IG:2*) 
“[…] I always sign and feel that is a win-win situation.” (SH:5*) 
Pressure 
 
“[W]e have probably been a lot more demanding with the suppliers as well, 
and pushing them, driving them on how we want them to be.” (TO:2*). 
“[D]on’t, don’t, don’t.…drop, drop, drop… decrease, decrease the price! 
This is all we hear; in the end this will end up reducing the quality of the 
product because on the other hand we are also a business, we also want to 
make a profit.” (SH:7*). 
Financial Insecurity 
“[T]here is no cash flow, banks are not giving out loans and do not help at all 
[…] businesses are struggling to survive.” (GO:1*) 
“[…] with the current prices it is extremely difficult to balance everything, to 
keep your costs low and to give a low price, it is extremely difficult to keep 
your head above water.” (TV:3*) 
Inflexibility 
 
“[…] there is control from the head office and inflexibility in negotiations.” 
(IG:3*) 
“[I]f I insist on something that they don’t agree with, they can go 
somewhere else.”(SH:6*). 
Flexibility “[I] had to give something  to the TO [a discount] in order to show that I am flexible because when you close the door on someone then he will also close 
  
149 
the door on you.” (SH:4*) 
 “[…] when expected demand changes, the TO might want to cancel the 
commitment or lower the commitment or drop this, drop that. The season is 
always flexible, so we must be flexible.” (HA:3*). 
Dependency 
“[….] because when you depend on the TOs then they dictate their own 
terms and most of the time these terms are not very pleasant.” (IG:1*). 
“[…]imagine if the TOs will not succeed and they leave the ROC. Who is 
losing? They are not they only ones losing, we are losing as well, so for us is 
very clear we do need the TOs and without them we cannot do much.” 
(HA:3*). 
Table 6: Open coding: Example of concepts and codes. (developed by the author). 
*Participant codes: SH: Star Hotel; HA: Hotel Apartments; TV: Tourist Villages; IG: Participants 
Group; TA: Travel Agent; TO: Tour Operator. **Codes are underlined and in italics. 
Following the identification of the concepts, a comparison of concepts 
ensued based on their meaning (content), similarities, differences, characteristics and 
attributes to generate sub-categories24, in other words the concepts were arranged 
under more abstract labels. Figure 16 (next page), presents a memo indicating this 
process. As the figure shows the meaning (content) of each concept and its 
characteristics were considered in order to aid in comparing and contrasting one 
concept with another. This action led the researcher to identify the similarities of 
each concept in order to place them under the same sub-category. As seen in Figure 
16 the concepts did not denote tangible (such as physical) resources but intangible 
resources that were tacit, time consuming and difficult to achieve. In turn, these 
intangible resources are owned by the APs and determined their bargaining power 
and influenced negotiations with the TOs.  Hence, these concepts were placed 
together under the sub-category intangible resources.  
 
 
                                                
24As noted at the beginning of this section the generation of sub-categories was an extra step taken in 
the open coding, unique to the current research, since the researcher, along with her supervisor, 
deemed that the sub-categories could be further grouped under more encompassing labels to generate 
categories and identifying the core phenomena to explain the negotiations and bargaining power 
interactions of the APs with the TOs. 
  
150 
 
Figure 16: Memo: integrating concepts into sub-categories. (developed by the author). 
By following this constant comparative process eleven sub-categories were 
developed, namely, pricing, volume of sales, industry characteristics, culture, 
tangible resources, intangible resources, governmental ineffectiveness, relationship 
Date:	13/08/2014	
Title:	 Integrating	 concepts	 in	 the	 sub-category:	
Intangible	Resources		
Stage	of	Coding:	Open	coding		
Concept:	Repeat	Clientele	
Meaning	of	the	concept:	Repeat	clientele	refers	to	the	customers	that	intent	to	repeat	their	visit	to	the	
specific	unit.		
The	level	of	repeat	clientele	that	an	accommodation	unit	has	increases	the	bargaining	power	of	the	APs.			
The	data	show	that	repeat	clientele	reduces	the	risk	of	the	TOs	in	contracting	a	unit.	That	is	to	say	repeat	
clientele	gives	 the	TO	and	the	AP	a	certain	 level	of	guaranteed	occupancy,	 in	other	words	making	 the	
unit	a	safer	bet	for	the	TO	to	agree	to	a	large	contract.		
The	data	 indicate	that	repeat	clients	are	 loyal	to	the	unit	therefore	 it	 is	a	resource	owned	by	 the	APs	
that	the	TOs	want	to	access	it.	Hence,	repeat	clientele	is	a	resource	that	contributes	to	the	bargaining	
power	of	the	APs.	It	is	also	an	intangible	resource	given	that	it	is	tacit	and	cannot	be	codified.		
Concept:	Reliability		
Meaning	of	the	concept:	The	concept	reliability	depicts	the	importance	that	APs	place	on	the	TOs	ability	
to	fulfil	the	contracts	they	have	agreed.	
Reliability	of	the	APs	towards	the	TOs:	the	ability	of	the	APs	to	fulfil	their	contract	 in	terms	of	services	
offered	and	consistently	providing	the	number	of	rooms	agreed	is	an	important	resource	and	source	of	
power	that	the	APs	own.	Given	that	it	reduces	the	uncertainty	of	the	TOs	in	the	relationship.		
Reliability	of	the	TO	towards	the	APs:	to	pay	within	the	agreed	timeframe	and	consistent	tourism	flow.		
Therefore,	reliability	 is	critical	for	the	APs	given	that	 it	 increases	their	confidence	that	the	TO	will	 fulfil	
the	contract	and	they	feel	safer	in	the	relationship.	A	reliable	TO	will	sway	their	decision	in	negotiation	
to	accept	the	demands	of	the	TO.		
Reliability	is	an	intangible	resource	given	that	it	 is	tacit	and	cannot	be	codified.	The	parties	own	this	
intangible	 resource	 and	 it	 contributes	 to	 their	 bargaining	 power	 and	 can	 influence	 the	 negotiation	
outcomes.		
Concept:	Value	for	money	
Meaning	of	the	concept:	The	concept	denotes	that	the	TOs	perception	that	the	unit	(product	quality	and	
service)	is	worth	the	value	of	the	price	paid.			
Value	 for	money	 is	a	 source	of	power	 for	 the	APs.	For	 the	APs	value	 for	money	 refers	 to	 the	product	
(unit)	 to	 be	 considered	 as	 value	 for	 money	 both	 for	 the	 TO	 as	 well	 as	 the	 consumer.	 The	 analysis	
suggested	that	for	the	TOs	value	for	money	refers	to	a	unit	contracted	at	a	price	that	offers	to	the	TO	the	
expected	profit,	but	still	considered	value	for	money	for	the	consumer	so	they	can	have	high	sales.	Value	
for	money	is	an	important	demand	for	the	TO	due	to	its	significance	in	the	current	competitive	market	
that	exists.		Therefore,	value	for	money	 is	a	resource	that	the	APs	have	and	the	TOs	want	to	access,	
thus	it	contributes	to	the	APs	bargaining	power	during	negotiations.		
Value	 for	 money	 is	 not	 a	 physical	 resource	 but	 a	 tacit	 resource	 hence;	 it	 is	 a	 significant	 intangible	
resource	for	the	APs.		
Concept:	Differentiation	
Meaning	of	the	concept:	Differentiation	of	a	unit	refers	to	a	unit	associated	with	a	well-known	brand,	
whether	the	TOs	perceive	the	unit	as	offering	something	unique	when	compared	to	the	other	units	in	
the	market	and	whether	the	unit	offers	something	unique	in	comparison	to	the	variety	of	products	that	
the	TOs	offer.		
Differentiation	is	critical	to	improve	the	APs	bargaining	power	in	relation	to	the	TOs	because	the	more	
unique	and	differentiated	your	product	is	the	higher	number	of	TOs	want	to	include	it	into	their	
programme.	Therefore	the	more	alternatives	(choice)	the	AP	has	in	choosing	a	TO		to	enter	into	a	
contractual	relationship.	This	increase	in	alternatives	that	the	APs	have	reduces	its	dependence	on	a	
single	TO	to	achieve	its	organisational	objectives;	based	on	resource-dependence	theory	the	less	
dependency	a	party	has	the	more	bargaining	power	the	less	dependent	party	has.	
Therefore,	differentiation	is	a	resource	that	the	APs	own	and	the	TOs	want	to	access,	hence	it	is	
considered	as	an	important	source	of	power	for	the	APs.		
Given	that	differentiation	is	not	a	physical	resource,	it	is	considered	as	an	intangible	resource	owned	by	
the	APs	and	the	TO	want	to	access.		
	
All	the	above	lead	to	the	identification	of	the	sub-category:	Intangible	resources.	
Sub-category:	Intangible	resources	
This	sub-category	explains	the	intangible	resources	that	along	with	the	tangible	resources	determine	and	
determine	the	parties	bargaining	power.	These	intangible	resources	are	time	consuming	and	difficult	to	
achieve	are	significant	resources	that	the	APs	own	and	the	TOs	want	to	access	through	an	agreement.	
Furthermore,	 these	resources	can	decrease	the	dependency	of	 the	APs	on	the	TOs	thus	 improve	their	
bargaining	ability.	These	resources	influence	the	outcome	of	the	negotiations	with	the	TOs.		
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constructs, emotions, negotiation characteristics, type of contracts. More details 
regarding these sub-categories and their content can be found in appendices in a 
form of a memo (appendix 4).  
Figure 17 and 18 below, illustrate all the concepts and the sub-category that 
they were placed under. As shown in the figures eight concepts (highlighted in 
colour) were placed under more than one sub-category. This was done because all 
concepts were interrelated and interconnected therefore some concepts were related 
to more than one sub-category.  
 
Figure 17: Open coding: concepts and sub-categories induced from data (see also Figure 7). 
(developed by the author). 
 
Figure 18: Open coding: concepts and sub-categories induced from data (see also Figure 7). 
(developed by the author). 
In Figure 17 above, for example, the concept pressure was placed under the 
sub-categories pricing and negotiation characteristics. This is because the concept 
pressure was related and evident to both pricing issues as well as in other aspects of 
the negotiations. Figure 19 below, illustrates how pressure was related to both sub-
categories. As indicated in the figure, the participant’s statements revealed that 
pressure was evident in relation to pricing issues with the code “don’t, don’t, 
Sub-categories	 Pricing	 Volume	of	Sales	 Industry	Characteristics	 Negotiation	Characteristics	 Tangible	Resources	 	Intangible	Resources	
Concepts	 Financial	insecurity	 Direct	sales		 Monopoly/oligopoly	 Inflexibility	 Infrastructure	 Repeat	clientele	
		 Expensiveness	 Saleability		 Dependency	 Flexibility	 Product	quality	 Reputation	
		 Price	sensitivity	 Promotional	ability		 Interdependency	 Rationality	 Location	 Value	for	money	
		 Discounts	 Consistent	tourism	
flow	
Oversupply		 Threats	 Size	of	unit	 Reliability	
		 Soft	concessions	 Seasonality	 Competition	 Uncertainty	 Destination	
attractiveness	
Differentiation	
		 Profit	 Tourist	arrivals	 Flight	connectivity	 Pressure	 Destination	
characteristics	
Information		
		 Value	for	money	 Flight	connectivity	 State	of	affairs	 Deviance	 	 Product	quality	
		 Pressure	 Supply	diversity	 Control	 Control	 	 	
		 Saleability	 Ownership	(customer	
ownership)	
Seasonality	 Information		 	 	
		 Win-win	situation	 Visitor's	trends	 Visitor's	trends	 State	of	affairs	 	 	
		 Risk	 	 	 Risk	 	 	
		 	 	 	 Liability	 	 	
		 		 		 		 		 		 				
Sub-categories Governmental	Ineffectiveness Relationship	Constructs Emotions Culture Type	of	Contracts
Concepts Governmental	Ineffectiveness Trust Fear Greek-Cypriot	mentality Allotment	contract
Funding	misuse		 Reciprocity Uncertainty Short-termism Exclusivity	contract
Inadequate	government	
devolution
Personal	relations Deviance Commitment	contract
Obsolete	and	inadequate	policy-
making	and	regulations	
Cooperation Bitterness
Clientelism	 Competition Pressure
Inadequate		government	
intervention
Incentives
Clashing	of	individual	interests	
Insufficient	tourism	leadership
Insufficient	
Government/industry	sector	
cooperation			
Government	centralisation	
Inadequate	governmental	
knowledge
Public	sector	insufficient	
incentives
Accountability
Flight	Connectivity	
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don’t.…down, down, down… decrease, decrease” the price as well as in other 
aspects of the negotiations such as negotiating stop-sales signified by the codes 
“push it to the limits”, “pushing them”, “driving them on how we want them to be”. 
Therefore, the concept pressure was added under both sub-categories.  
 
 
Figure 19: Example of developing sub-categories. (developed by the author). 
Following the development of sub-categories the researcher continued to 
utilise the constant comparison method to capture their meaning in more 
encompassing categories to explain the phenomena and develop a Grounded Theory. 
The sub-categories were compared and contrasted based on their meaning, 
characteristics and attributes to detect their similarities and differences. The 
researcher also considered how these sub-categories may be linked, by utilising the 
literature reviewed and her scholarly knowledge, to help explain the bargaining 
power interactions and negotiations of the APs with the TOs. For example, the sub-
categories negotiation characteristics, relationship constructs, emotions were all 
placed together, because they indicated relationship-specific factors that influence 
the negotiation interactions between the parties and thus denoted elements of an all-
encompassing category labelled relational factors. The type of contracts was also 
placed under this category because each contract has different characteristics that 
influence the bargaining power and negotiations.  
Statements	made	by	two	APs:
“[D]on’t,	don’t,	don’t.…down,	down,	down…	decrease,	decrease	the	price!	This	is	
all	we	hear;	this	will	end	up	reducing	the	quality	of	the	product	because	on	the	
other	hand	we	are	also	a	business	we	also	want	to	make	a	proﬁt.”
“[T]he	TOs	are	now	more	demanding,	more	sensiCve	on	price.	If	it	were	possible	
they	want	you	to	give	them	the	lowest	price	possible.”
Relevance	of	pressure	on	price
The	 codes:	 “[D]on’t,	 don’t,	 don’t.…down,	 down,	 down…	 decrease,	 decrease”,	
“more	demanding”	and		“If	it	were	possible	they	want	you	to	give	them	the	lowest	
price	possible”stated	by	two	APs	indicated	that	the	APs	are	under	strong	pressure	
regarding	price	during	their	negoCaCons.	
	
Statement	made	by	a	TO:
“[W]e	have	probably	been	a	lot	more	demanding	with	the	suppliers	as	well	and	
pushing	them,	driving	them	on	how	we	want	them	to	be.	[…]	we	are	not	going	
to	 just	accept	a	stop	sale	based	on	an	email	a	 supplier	 sends	us	 […].	We	will	
push	it	to	the	limits"
Statement	made	by	an	AP:
"[T]he	demands	of	the	TO	have	increased	over	the	years,	since	compeCCon	has	
been	increasing	year	on	year.	The	TOs	are	very	forceful	and	demanding	and	of	
course	their	behaviour	is	jusCﬁed.”
Relevance	of	pressure	in	other	aspects	of	the	nego>a>ons
The	codes:	“demanding,	pushing	them,	driving	them	on	how	we	want	them	to	
be”	 “push	 it	 to	 the	 limits”,	 “demands	 of	 the	 TO	 have	 increased”	 and	 “very	
forceful	and	demanding”	stated	by	a	TO	indicated	that	the	concept	pressure	is	
evident	not	only	in	relaCon	to	price	but	other	aspects	of	their	relaConship	in	
general	 and	 negoCaCons	 in	 parCcular.	 For	 instance,	 pressure	 is	 also	 evident	
while	negoCaCng	stop-sales.
AnnotaCons:
APs:	AccommodaCon	Providers
TOs:	Tour	operators
Codes	idenCﬁed	are	underlined	and	in	italics.
Pressure 
(concept)
Pricing and 
Negotiation 
characteristics 
(sub-categories)
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As a result three categories were developed, resources, relational factors and 
market characteristics. All three categories are interrelated and interconnected as 
together they offer a detailed understanding and explanation of the bargaining power 
interactions and negotiations between the APs and TOs. Table 7 below presents the 
sub-categories and the categories induced from the data.  As seen in the table, six 
sub-categories (industry characteristics, culture, relationship constructs, emotions, 
negotiation characteristics and type of contracts) are placed under more than one 
category. This was because the concepts, sub-categories and categories are 
interrelated and interconnected. For example, the sub-category type of contracts 
plays a critical role in all categories because each contract agreed has different 
characteristics and influences the interactions between the APs and TOs. Hence, 
type of contracts was placed under all categories to explain the negotiations between 
the parties.   	
 
Table 7: Sub-categories and categories induced from the data. (developed by the author). 
Subsequent to the identification of the three categories the open coding stage was 
completed and axial coding ensued.  
5.8.5. Axial coding  
In axial coding the researcher fits “[…] the pieces of the data puzzle 
together” (Strauss and Corbin 1998, p. 229). In other words, the researcher sought to 
identify the interrelationships between each category with its sub-categories, by 
reorganising and rebuilding the data into various patterns. To help this process a 
storyline (narration) was developed that linked each category and its sub-categories 
based on their content. Particularly, the researcher reflected on what has this 
Categories	 Resources	 Relational	factors	 Market	characteristics	
Sub-
categories	
		
		
		
		
		
		
Government	
policies/regulations	
Type	of	contracts	 Type	of	contracts	
Culture	 Negotiation	characteristics	 Industry	characteristics	
Industry	characteristics	 Relationship	constructs	 Culture	
Tangible	resources	 Emotions	 Negotiation	characteristics	
Intangible	resources	 	 Pricing	
Type	of	contracts	 	 Volume	of	sales	
	 	 Emotions	
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category and its sub-categories indicated so far that could help explain the 
contractual and non-contractual negotiations and bargaining power interactions of 
the APs with the TOs. In turn this aided her to identify relationships and interactions 
between the sub-categories and each category and how and why they related to the 
negotiations between the parties. 
For example, Figure 20 below presents the storyline developed for the 
category resources and its sub-categories in the form of a memo. As seen in the 
figure, the researcher noted that the category resources related information regarding 
the context of the negotiations in terms of the resources that each party has that in 
turn determines their bargaining power (sub-categories: tangible and intangible 
resources). The storyline also indicated that structural factors (sub-categories: 
Government policies/regulations, culture and industry characteristics) influenced the 
bargaining power of the parties. It was also revealed that the valuable resources 
(tangible and intangible) that each party had in relation to each other determined the 
type of contract (sub-category) agreed between the parties.  
Date:23/08/2014	
Title:	Category	Resources	and	the	story	 Stage	of	Coding:	Axial	coding			
Aim:	To	explore	the	contractual	and	non-contractual	relationship	of	APs	and	large	TOs	in	Cyprus.	
Category:	RESOURCES	
	
Sub-categories:	
Government	policies/regulations		
Culture	
Industry	Characteristics	
Tangible	resources	
Intangible	resources	
Type	of	Contracts	
	
Storyline:	
The	 above	 category	 provides	 information	 on	 the	 context	 of	 the	 contractual	 and	 non-contractual	
relationship	 and	negotiations.	More	 specifically,	 this	 category	 identifies	 the	 resources	 available	 to	
both	 parties	 (firm-specific	 and	 structural).	 These	 resources	 determine	 both	 parties’	 bargaining	
power.	Moreover,	 influential	structural	conditions	such	as	government	policies/regulations,	culture	
and	industrial	characteristics	can	both	enable	and	constrain	the	resources	availability	and	in	turn	the	
bargaining	power	of	the	parties.	In	addition,	the	most	valuable	resources	(in	relation	to	each	other)	
that	the	parties	have	are	identified	and	the	way	that	these	resources	determine	the	type	of	contract	
that	the	parties	choose	to	sign	is	indicated	and	explained.					Figure 20: Axial Coding - memo developing a storyline for a category. (developed by the 
author). 
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Corbin and Strauss (2008, p.104) stated that if theory development is the 
purpose of the research, as it was with this study, then the findings must be 
portrayed as “[…] a set of interrelated concepts, not just a listing of themes” that 
together explain the phenomena under investigation. Accordingly, propositions were 
developed to present the interrelationships induced from the data. The propositions 
were developed based on interrelationships identified in the storyline and the aim 
and objectives of the study to fully explain the bargaining power and negotiations of 
the APs with TOs. These interrelationships or propositions are the basis for the 
formulation of theory (Goulding 2002). Six propositions were developed under the 
three categories. Table 8 below illustrates all six propositions and the categories. 
Categories  Resources Relational Factors Market Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Propositions 
Firm-specific tangible and 
intangible resources 
determine the type of 
contract during 
contractual negotiations. 
 
 
Contractual and non-
contractual negotiations 
are influenced by 
negotiation 
characteristics and 
relationship constructs. 
Culture and industry 
characteristics are 
influential factors in 
pricing and volume of 
sales during contractual 
and non-contractual 
negotiations. 
Government 
policies/regulations, 
culture and industry 
characteristics influence 
contractual and non-
contractual negotiations 
through their impact on 
destination-specific 
resources. 
Emotional factors 
influence contractual and 
non-contractual 
negotiations. 
Negotiation 
characteristics, 
relationship constructs 
and emotions during 
contractual and non-
contractual negotiations 
determine market 
characteristics in terms 
of pricing and volume of 
sales. 
Table 8: Axial coding: propositions developed. (developed by the author). 
As seen in the table, under the category resources two propositions were 
developed that addressed the first objective, ‘to discover the sources of power of 
both the APs and the TOs, from the APs perspective in order to determine their 
bargaining power within the contractual and non-contractual negotiations.’  To 
determine the bargaining power of a party’s external structural factors (Government, 
culture and industry) as well as firm-specific resources must be considered. 
Therefore, one proposition developed addressed the firm-specific resources that 
determine the bargaining power of the APs and TOs. This proposition was: 
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• Firm-specific tangible and intangible resources determine the type of 
contract during contractual negotiations. 
A second proposition under the category resources addressed the structural factors 
(government policies/regulations, culture and industry characteristics) that can 
constrain or enable the bargaining power of the APs and TOs. The proposition was:  
• Government policies/regulations, culture and industry characteristics 
influence contractual and non-contractual negotiations through their impact 
on destination-specific resources. 
In addition, two propositions developed under the category relational factors 
tackled the second objective, namely ‘to investigate how bargaining power is 
employed within the relationship, from the APs perspective, in order to establish the 
influence strategies adopted by both parties during their contractual and non-
contractual negotiations.’ The two propositions were:  
• Contractual and non-contractual negotiations are influenced by negotiation 
characteristics and relationship constructs; 
• Emotional factors influence contractual and non-contractual negotiations. 
Lastly, under the category market characteristics two propositions were 
developed to address the third objective of the study, ‘to examine how bargaining 
power is exercised within the relationship, from the APs perspective, in order to 
ascertain the consequences on the negotiation outcomes. The propositions were:  
• Culture and industry characteristics are influential factors in pricing and 
volume of sales during contractual and non-contractual negotiations;  
• Negotiation characteristics, relationship constructs and emotions during 
contractual and non-contractual negotiations determine market 
characteristics in terms of pricing and volume of sales. 
Although the analysis process could have been completed at the axial stage, the 
researcher continued to develop a theory to explain the phenomena.  Hence, the third 
stage of analysis, selective coding followed. 
 
  
157 
5.8.6. Selective coding  
Selective coding entails integrating all the propositions together to build a 
Grounded Theory. Glaser (2005) noted that the purpose of Grounded Theory is to 
generate a theory that explains a pattern of behavior that is pertinent for the 
individuals involved. To accomplish this the researcher connects all the propositions 
together considering the relationships and interactions, narrating all the main 
phenomena to explain the negotiation process and bargaining power interactions of 
the APs with the TOs. Accordingly, the researcher connected all the propositions 
induced from the data analysis to narrate all the key phenomena and aid in theory 
development. This is presented in a form of a storyline in Chapter 6, section 6.3.3. 
This storyline helped the researcher in the development of a substantive theory 
which is presented subsequent to the storyline in Chapter 6, 6.3.3.  
The theory developed explicitly addresses the research’s aim and objectives 
and fully explains the contractual and non-contractual bargaining power relationship 
within negotiations between the APs and TOs. A substantive theory was generated 
because it is closely related to the empirical field. That is to say it focuses on 
providing an explanation of a certain substantive area: that is the contractual and 
non-contractual bargaining power relationships within negotiations that exist 
between tourism and hospitality suppliers and buyers, namely APs and European 
large TOs in the ROC, from the APs perspective. In contrast, formal theories are 
more abstract and have explanatory power across a broader variety of disciplinary 
concerns and problems (Strauss and Corbin 1998). However, the study intended to 
offer insights for a specific substantive area to better understand an under-researched 
area, the negotiations and bargaining power between suppliers and buyers within a 
tourism and hospitality context.  
5.9. EVALUATION  
5.9.1. Introduction  
Qualitative research focuses on the trustworthiness of the data within a 
certain context (Flick 2014). To evaluate the quality of the study, namely its 
trustworthiness, three criteria were adopted; credibility, transferability and 
dependability (Guba and Lincoln 1994). The influence of the researcher in the study, 
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reflexivity, is also discussed in order to enhance the trustworthiness of the research 
(Callery and Hall 2001). A research project must be evaluated in terms of its process 
and its outcomes (findings) to ensure the quality of the research (Flick 2014).  
5.9.2. Credibility  
Credibility refers to whether the research outcomes correspond with the 
perspectives of the participants (Bitsch 2005; Shenton 2004). Credibility can be 
assessed on how precisely the theory explains the situation that occurs, whether it 
‘fits’ with the experience of the participants (Corbin and Strauss 2008; Cooney 
2011).  Hence certain strategies are used to ensure that the theory generated has 
credibility. These strategies are prolonged engagement, constant comparison 
method, frequent debriefing sessions and the translation process. The strategies are 
discussed below.  
Prolonged engagement deals with the question of whether the researcher has 
spent sufficient time on the research site to develop trust in order to discover and 
understand the culture and context of the study (Bitsch 2005). As stated in section 
5.5.3 the researcher undertook two primary data collection stages, exploratory and 
main. Hence, altogether she spent seven months in the ROC to collect the necessary 
primary data, that is two months for the exploratory stage and five months for the 
main collection stage. During both stages of primary data collection the researcher 
travelled extensively in the ROC and in all locations the research was undertaken 
(Limassol, Paphos, Ammochostos (Ayia Napa and Protaras) and Larnaka) as well as 
Nicosia (the capital) and the hinterland areas. During this time, in addition to the 
study’s participants, the researcher socialised and spoke with various locals (such as 
restaurateurs, shop keepers and coffee shop owners) in all major towns regarding 
their life in the ROC, politics, and the daily challenges that they face. 
Due to the fact that the researcher was born and raised in the ROC, spoke the 
same language as the locals, and had a similar cultural background, helped her to be 
perceived as a local by the local residents. This enabled her to establish trust and 
rapport with the locals and the study’s participants, making them more comfortable 
to disclose information in terms of their thoughts, beliefs and opinions for instance, 
regarding daily life in the ROC, social issues, politics and the economy. 
Furthermore, due to the researcher’s circle of family and friends established over the 
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years she was able to take part in the social life in the ROC and constantly engage 
with them, not only in a professional capacity (as a researcher) but also in a social 
capacity. Accordingly, the time frame of seven months spent to collect the data as 
well as the fact that the researcher was born and raised in the ROC gave her a good 
understanding of its culture as well as of the tourism and hospitality industry, thus 
fully understanding the context of the study to explain the negotiations of the APs 
with the TOs. 
Additionally, the researcher worked in the accommodation sector in the ROC 
for a period of two years in the front of house (front office and guest 
communications) and food and beverage departments in two accommodation units 
in Limassol (large-size 5 star and medium-size 3 star hotels25). This gave her 
insights into the tourism and hospitality industry in terms of daily operational issues 
that APs face within the unit and in their relationship with travel agents and TOs. 
This is because as front of house staff the researcher had to deal with various 
reservations issues that involved communication with travel agents and TOs. The 
researcher’s parents were directly involved in the hospitality and tourism industry in 
the ROC, as they previously owned and operated a small hotel (under 150 beds) in 
the ROC for over twenty years (section 5.9.5). Furthermore, they are still involved 
indirectly in the tourism and hospitality industry as food suppliers of various 
hospitality establishments (such as accommodation units and restaurants). As a 
result they have developed various professional tourism and hospitality contacts 
over the years. During her stay in the ROC to collect the primary data (exploratory 
and main primary data) the researcher participated in various informal discussions 
that occurred during the business day with members of the tourism and hospitality 
industry (such as APs, travel agents and restaurateurs). These discussions related to 
politics in the ROC, the challenges of the business environment in the ROC and the 
tourism and hospitality industry. As a result the researcher gained a better 
understanding of the tourism and hospitality industry contributing to the credibility 
of the study.  
                                                
25 The European Consumer’s Centre classification identifies a small unit as one with a capacity of up 
to 150 beds, a medium unit as 151-400 beds, and a large unit as having over 400 beds (ECC-Net 
2009). 
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Credibility is also ensured by the researcher gaining details of the 
phenomena under investigation and identifying the most relevant aspects to focus on 
(Guba and Lincoln 1994; Goulding 2002). The constant comparative method 
stipulated by Grounded Theory contributes to credibility (Tucket 2005; Elliott and 
Lazenbatt 2005). For instance, evidence of modifying assumptions regarding the 
data, concepts or categories as the data analysis progresses to fit with what is 
pertinent for the participants (Cooney 2011; Elliott and Lazenbatt 2005). The 
researcher adopted this method and provided a detailed description and examples of 
comparing and contrasting codes, concepts, sub-categories and categories between 
them, seeking their pertinence in the research and representativeness in the data 
(section 5.8). For instance, in section 5.8.4 the researcher explained how a concept 
labelled price wars at initial stages of the analysis was renamed price sensitivity at a 
later stage since the negative connotations of the label price wars were not 
supported by all participants. Hence, the use of the constant comparison method 
during the data analysis contributed to the accuracy and relevance of the data to the 
tourism and hospitality suppliers and buyers regarding their contractual and non-
contractual bargaining power relationship in negotiations.  
Frequent debriefing discussions between the researcher and her supervisors 
also took place to discuss the findings of the study, thus allowing the findings to be 
checked against other individuals’ perception enhancing credibility. Corbin and 
Strauss (1990) in relation to Grounded Theory also highlighted that opening up the 
analysis, displaying concepts and relationships for others to inspect can safeguard 
the findings from bias but can also result in new insights through the discussion. 
Throughout the data collection and analysis process the researcher was in frequent 
contact and consulted with her supervisor, an experienced grounded theorist 
researcher.  
These sessions aided the researcher to compare her own thoughts regarding 
the data against that with an external observer (her supervisor) reducing her bias. For 
example, at the initial stages of data collection and analysis the researcher had 
difficulty keeping an open mind to permit the data to tell their own story resulting in 
imposing preconceived ideas, and confusion, which is as Goulding (2002) stated a 
common problem with Grounded Theory analysis. A debriefing session with her 
supervisor was critical at this stage for the researcher to recognise that she must 
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follow what the data say, while also using her own perspective to make the text 
meaningful offering a richer explanation of the bargaining power relationship in 
negotiations of the APs with the TOs. Hence, these frequent discussions reduced the 
bias of the researcher on the data and findings contributing to the credibility of the 
research process and findings. Furthermore, these discussions also gave new insights 
to the researcher on how to proceed in terms of the data analysis process. For 
instance, following a debriefing session it was apparent that certain concepts needed 
to be revised to better capture the meaning of the participants and experience, such 
as Pricing which was initially a concept but was later promoted to a sub-category 
due to its importance in the negotiations between the parties (appendix 5).  
Debriefing sessions also aided in addressing a limitation of Grounded 
Theory. Specifically, Goulding (2002) noted that some researchers might leave the 
field too early or under-analyse the data at hand resulting in the researcher simply 
describing the phenomena based on participants’ description and not on more 
abstract concepts developed to offer a broader explanation. The debriefing sessions 
that the researcher had with her supervisor throughout the collection and analysis 
process facilitated the decision in terms of sufficient level of analysis throughout all 
the coding stages thus avoiding premature closure and establishing credibility.  
Lastly, the competence of the translator plays an important role in the 
credibility of the study (Squires 2008; Santos et al. 2015). In section 5.8.3 the 
translation process of the data from Greek to English was discussed in detail. The 
researcher justified her ability in translating the text based on her discourse and 
sociolinguistic competence in both languages. In other words, because the researcher 
originates from the ROC, has completed a UK education and has lived in the UK for 
more than ten years she had discourse competence, that is proficiency to have 
everyday dialogues and to understand when and how certain words and expressions 
are used in various situations. The researcher also had sociolinguistic competence: 
that is she had a good understanding of both the UK and the ROC culture, and 
cultural norms in communication. Additionally, she adopted various strategies for 
translating the data to reduce the possibility of mistranslations and convey the 
meaning of the participants as accurately as possible (section 5.8.3). For instance, 
strategies such as back-translations, consultations with a fluent bilingual speaker 
(English and Greek) to check the back-translations and discuss problematic 
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expressions were used. The translation process followed contributed to the 
credibility of the process and findings.  
5.9.3. Transferability  
Transferability signifies the applicability of the findings outside the focal 
study and derives from the similarity between two contexts (Lincoln and Guba 
1985). Qualitative researchers must provide the necessary details to the reader to 
picture the context from which the theory was generated and decide of the 
possibility of transferability to another context (Chiovitti and Piran 2003). Rich, 
detailed and accurate description of the sample and setting are critical to aid the 
reader to reach the decision regarding transferability (Bryman and Bell 2011; 
Chiovitti and Piran 2003). As mentioned throughout the thesis the study focused on 
exploring the relationship between APs and external TOs in the ROC, from the APs 
perspective. Chapter 4 provided the reader with a detailed account of the ROC 
(research setting), an economically developed, mature, mass sun-and-sea 
Mediterranean destination. Chapter 4 discussed the ROC as a destination, its culture, 
tourism industry and accommodation sector highlighting its attributes, 
characteristics and challenges in the tourism market. Further, in section 5.6, a 
thorough description of the sample and its characteristics was provided in order to 
enhance the knowledge of the reader regarding the context of the study. These 
detailed discussions can facilitate the reader to arrive at a judgment regarding the 
transferability of the findings in a similar context. Morse and Singleton (2001) 
argued that if a problem is similar and pertinent in other settings then the theory 
should have meaning and be applicable to those settings. In Chapter 7, section 7.3 
the transferability of the findings and the theory in other tourism destinations and 
other economic activities is discussed in detail.  
5.9.4. Dependability  
Dependability is ensured through the researcher providing a detailed and 
complete documentation of the research process and decisions made to assert the 
dependability of the findings (Flick 2014). This can be achieved by providing an 
adequate audit trail for another researcher to be able to replicate the study, such as 
details regarding methods of data collection, sampling decisions and analytical 
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procedures (Denscombe 2010; Tucket 2005; Chiovitti and Piran 2003).  
Section 5.3 offered an in-depth explanation and justification of the Grounded 
Theory research methodology and design adopted ,that combined elements from 
both evolved and classic Grounded Theory versions, in order to fully address the 
aim and objectives of the study. In addition, section 5.5 clarified the methods of data 
collection and the use of both secondary and primary data. Section 5.5 also 
explained in depth the process of the two stages of primary data collection 
(exploratory and main) and the use of semi-structured interviews as the primary data 
collection tool. In section 5.6 sampling decisions were discussed providing detailed 
information and justification of the key sample frame of the study (APs who directly 
engage in negotiations with large European TOs), the choice of a purposeful 
snowballing sampling technique to attain rich and detailed data and the size of the 
sample (forty-five interviews following data saturation). Further, the choice of four 
types of participants (APs, tourism professionals, Government officials and local 
academics) was explained and a detailed profile of all the participants provided 
(section 5.6.5).  Hence, offering a detailed audit trail of the research process.  
Furthermore, the researcher has discussed in detail the analysis process 
followed to develop the theory to explain the phenomena (section 5.8). During the 
discussion of open coding (section 5.8.4), the researcher provided various examples 
explicating and justifying decisions regarding the codes discovered, concepts 
identified, sub-categories and categories developed. Decisions made during axial 
and selective coding (sections 5.8.5 and 5.8.6) were explicitly discussed and 
justified offering an audit trail to the theory developed. All the above actions provide 
an audit trail for the decisions made in the study and enhance the dependability of 
the research. Moreover offering a reflective account of the role of the researcher in 
the process contributes to a detailed audit trail for a Grounded Theory study 
(Cooney 2011) further enhancing the dependability of the study; accordingly the 
section below discusses reflexivity.   
5.9.5. Reflexivity  
Reflexivity is a method of communicating self to the reader and increases the 
rigour and credibility of the study (Callery and Hall 2001; Heath 2006; Cooney 
2011). A researcher must be reflective on how her ‘self’, that is cultural background, 
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idiosyncrasy and implicit assumptions, have influenced the gathering and 
interpretation of the data (Bryman and Bell 2011). Willig (2001) highlighted that 
two forms of reflexivity must be evident, personal and epistemological.  
Personal reflexivity encompasses reflecting on how the researcher’s “[…] 
values, experiences, interests, beliefs, political commitments, wider aims in life and 
social identities” have influenced the process (Willig 2001, p.10). The current 
researcher had to be reflective about how her values, experiences, interests, beliefs, 
idiosyncrasy and social identity have influenced the research process in order to 
offer an understanding and explanation of the bargaining power and negotiations of 
the APs with the large TOs that has credibility. Epistemological reflexivity 
stimulates the researcher to consider the assumptions that were made during the 
process and enables her to consider the influences of those assumptions on the 
inquiry and its outcomes (Willing 2001). Thus the researcher had to consider 
questions such as: How has the study’s research question defined and limited what 
can be found? How have the study’s qualitative Grounded Theory methodology and 
analysis method ‘constructed’ the data and the findings? How could the bargaining 
power and negotiations between tourism buyers and supplier have been investigated 
differently? The subsections below firstly discuss personal reflexivity, and 
subsequently epistemological reflexivity.  
5.9.5.1.	 Personal	reflexivity	
Growing up in the ROC, a close-knit society, in the 1990s where its 
economic development had tremendous growth, mainly due to tourism, has 
influenced my development as an individual and has shaped my social identity. 
Relatives and especially family played a very influential role in my growth as an 
individual. In the ROC, it is not surprising for children to follow in their parents’ 
footsteps regarding their career choice. Tourism and hospitality is one of the main 
industries in the ROC and my parents were directly involved in the hospitality sector 
for over twenty years. Specifically, they owned and operated a small (under 150 
beds) accommodation unit. In the ROC children are often involved in the family 
businesses, hence, from a young age my parents always encouraged me to help out 
alongside them.  
Consequently, I grew up in a vibrant environment and constantly surrounded 
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by individuals from different cultural backgrounds. I found such an environment 
fascinating and my interest in tourism and hospitality started at an early age which 
also led me to work in other accommodation units (medium and large-size units) for 
a period of two years in order to enhance my knowledge on how larger units 
operated. In turn, this guided me in choosing my undergraduate degree in 
Hospitality Management. As I continued my studies, and my knowledge regarding 
the hospitality industry was enhanced, I started to better understand the issues that 
the hospitality sector faced in the ROC. Moreover, various discussions with industry 
professionals in the ROC, and my Master’s thesis that explored the Republic’s 
seasonality helped to augment my knowledge on the tourism and hospitality 
industry. 
At the same time media reports in the ROC were reporting the stagnation of 
its tourism industry and the difficulty of tourism and hospitality related businesses to 
make a viable profit. This was particularly true for accommodation units. This 
resulted in various businesses closing-down or struggling to survive. This also 
affected my parents’ hospitality business resulting in the closure of the unit. This 
stimulated me to research the subject further to understand the challenges that 
hospitality businesses face. 
From professional experience and scholarly knowledge I was aware of the 
pivotal role that the TOs have in the success of the tourism industry in the ROC as 
well as their strong negotiating position with their suppliers and particularly the 
accommodation providers. In turn, two questions developed in my mind ‘why do the 
businesses in the ROC struggle to survive whereas the TOs are thriving?’ and ‘how 
can tourism related businesses improve their bargaining position?’. These questions 
encouraged me to research the topic further, to understand the reasons behind the 
occurrence and offer recommendations to the tourism and hospitality related 
businesses to improve their businesses viability.  
However, my research revealed that a limited number of researchers’ had 
explored the dyadic relationship of the TOs with their suppliers and most of the 
research was dated. This stimulated my interest to explore the situation further and 
led me to the topic of the current research project. I chose to focus on the 
accommodation sector for two reasons. First, the accommodation is a strategic 
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product for the TOs and the APs and TOs engage in constant negotiations, thus APs 
have direct experience negotiating with the more powerful TOs. Second, due to the 
fact that my parents operated an accommodation unit in the ROC it played a large 
role in my life growing up and hence it is the type of business that I understand and 
interests me to research further.  
Since leaving the ROC to further my education my involvement with the 
industry has been more as an observer rather than a stakeholder. However, my 
experiences led me to choose the topic of investigation and begin the research with 
certain views regarding the relationship of the APs and TOs in the ROC. For 
instance, I considered that the APs and TOs had an extremely competitive 
relationship particularly during negotiations. Nevertheless, from the beginning of the 
process I sought to discard my views and opinions and adopt a ‘neutral’ stance 
regarding the relevant parties and the phenomena to reduce bias in the study. 
Furthermore, the strategies adopted to ensure the credibility of the findings, such as 
prolonged engagement, constant comparison method, frequent debriefing sessions 
aided in reducing the bias of the process (section 5.9.2).  
Particularly, through frequent debriefing sessions that I had with my 
supervisors I exposed myself, the research process and findings to criticism by 
external parties hence decreasing bias of the study. Still, considering the 
epistemological interpretivist stance adopted, value-free research is impossible and a 
level of interpretation was required to make sense of the shared meanings of the 
participants. As Schwadt (2000) argued the interpretivist lens focuses on 
understanding the meaning of human action, and to obtain this understanding of the 
world of the participants an individual must interpret it. Hence, the interpretivist 
epistemological stance enabled me to utilise my own understandings, knowledge 
and experiences in order to provide insights and elucidate the contractual and non-
contractual bargaining power relationship and negotiations of the APs with the TOs, 
from the APs perspective. However, at the same time these interpretations were also 
seeking to stay close to the participants’ meanings and understandings to bring out 
their voices to capture their reality. The researcher believed that my previous 
connection with the industry helped me to integrate myself in the social world of the 
actors and assisted me to better understand the social reality through the actor’s 
perspective. Hence, this was an advantage for me and not a restriction that enabled 
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me to generate findings that can help tourism and hospitality related businesses to 
better manage their relationship with more powerful parties and improve their 
financial viability. 
5.9.5.2.	 Epistemological	reflexivity		
A qualitative, epistemological interpretivist, inductive approach was adopted 
to address the aim and objectives of the study. This is because I believe that 
knowledge is socially constructed and various subjective realities (interpretations) 
exist that can offer insights on the same subject thus gaining a more comprehensive 
view on the phenomena. Further, I aimed to explore the relationship and bargaining 
power interactions and negotiations in particular of the APs with the TOs, and 
consider relationships as a collection of internal realities formed by each individual, 
which influence the negotiation experience and interactions between the parties. A 
positivist epistemological stance that assumes a single objective reality for any 
single phenomenon could hinder the in-depth exploration of the negotiations and 
bargaining power interactions of the APs and TOs. Therefore, a positivist stance 
would not only go against of my own beliefs but could hinder the exploratory 
purpose of the study to generate new insights regarding the negotiations and 
bargaining power interactions.  
My aim was to gain a broad understanding and explanation of the 
relationship of the APs and TOs to offer practical recommendations on how they can 
improve their bargaining position in relation to the TOs. A case study strategy could 
have been adopted but the case study strategy facilitates researchers with pre-
determined theoretical frameworks and theoretical propositions.  However, due to 
the limited and dated research and information on the subject the thesis aimed to 
examine the phenomena under a new light by adopting a qualitative interpretivist 
inductive approach and utilising the bargaining power concept. In turn, I was able to 
generate theory and inform current knowledge regarding the bargaining power and 
negotiations of APs and TOs. Therefore, the inductive nature of Grounded Theory 
enabled me to achieve this aim. Also Grounded Theory offered systematic steps for 
data analysis that aided in developing concepts and categories in order to identify 
the shared meaning of the participants and generate theory to explain the 
relationship. 
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Therefore, I did not undertake a narrative of individual experience, as one 
would in narrative research, rather I chose to go beyond the individual stories and 
identify common meanings of various participants regarding the negotiations that 
occur. Accordingly, Grounded Theory aided me to move beyond a single 
experience. Grounded theory permitted me to consider various reasons and 
conditions that influence this relationship both at macro and micro level in order to 
fully explain the phenomena. Hence, I went beyond the cultural influence that one 
would in an ethnographic research. Accordingly, Grounded Theory helped me to 
first, understand ‘what is going on’ through developing a theory, and second, to 
offer practical recommendations for the participants to improve their position during 
contractual and non-contractual negotiations.  
5.10. RESEARCH ETHICS 
Research ethics in qualitative research refers to “[…] what social researchers 
ought, and ought not, to do as researchers and/or about what count as virtues and 
vices in doing research” (Hammersley and Traianou 2012, p.36). In other words, 
what is good behaviour for a researcher throughout the research process? Research 
ethics should be considered in terms of gaining informed consent, ensuring, 
confidentiality, respect the privacy and anonymity of the participants as well as the 
honesty of the researcher regarding the nature of the research topic (Creswell 1998; 
Shaw 2008).  
In respect of the interviews the researcher contacted all the participants prior 
to the interview process. Specifically, due to the snowballing technique adopted, 
where individuals already interviewed referred other participants within their 
business network, the researcher was able to contact the participants prior the 
interview process and invite them to take part in the research. The researcher 
informed the participants regarding the topic under investigation and gained verbal 
consent. On visiting the interview setting the researcher provided the participants 
with a participant information letter that informed them on the research topic and the 
interview process (appendix 6). Moreover, the letter informed the participants of 
their right to withdraw at any time. The researcher also assured the participants that 
confidentiality and anonymity would be kept and that they had the right to decline to 
answer any question. In turn, written consent was obtained (appendix 7).  
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Prior to the beginning of the interview the researcher obtained verbal consent 
in order to record the interviews thus adhering to ethical standards. This was 
particularly important for participants since due to the topic of investigation, 
contractual and non-contractual negotiations, sensitive information regarding their 
business activities were revealed. For this reason the researcher was also cautious to 
ensure the anonymity of the participants in terms of the recorded interviews. She 
adopted a coding system to identify each participant, and did not use any personal 
information. For instance, regarding the APs this coding system entailed an 
abbreviation consisting of the type of unit, its location, the participant’s job role and 
interview date. In addition caution was also exercised during the analysis and 
reporting of the findings in order to ensure anonymity for the participants. 
Therefore, during transcriptions the researcher changed or omitted any words that 
may have identified the participants such as individual’s names and company names 
and no participants names were reported in the thesis.  
5.11. LIMITATIONS 
The limitations of the study are discussed in this section. Power is relational 
concept, and bargaining power specifically is based on the perceptions of one party 
on the power of the other. The current study focused on exploring the perceptions of 
the APs regarding their perceived power sources, to determine the bargaining power 
of the APs in relation to the TOs, as such the perceptions of the TOs regarding the 
APs power sources and bargaining power were not explored; this is considered as a 
limitation. Although three interviews with external large TOs were achieved, to 
support the data, if there had been time and financial resources available the 
researcher would have sought to attain more interviews with individuals from 
external European large TOs. This would have facilitated examination of the TOs 
perspective regarding the APs power sources and contractual and non-contractual 
relationship with the APs. As a result the researcher would have been able to 
compare and contrast the findings for similarities and differences. Extensive 
literature review was used in order to address this limitation. However, this would 
have taken the work beyond its aim and objectives that limited the work to the APs 
perspective. 
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Furthermore, although the semi-structured interviews were utilised in the 
current study offered detailed insights on the bargaining power relationship within 
negotiations of the APs with the TOs, it would have been beneficial if the researcher 
was able to observe first-hand the negotiations and interactions between the two 
parties. This would have complemented the semi-structured interviews used 
(Hennick et al. 2011) by providing more detailed insights of the negotiation setting 
and the behaviour of APs with the TOs and their interactions. However, due to the 
sensitive matter of the phenomena under investigation (contractual and non-
contractual bargaining power within negotiations) gaining access was not possible 
for the researcher. Nevertheless, the use of semi-structured interviews was a 
powerful method to attain in-depth insights and understanding of the setting, the 
experiences and the reasons behind the behaviour of the APs in order to fully 
explain the bargaining power relationship within negotiations of the APs with the 
TOs (section 5.5.3).  
5.12. CONCLUSION  
This chapter has set out the study’s aim and objectives and has examined in 
detail the methodological and research design decisions taken to address them. A 
Grounded Theory methodology and design was chosen, combining elements of two 
versions of Grounded Theory: evolved and classic, to tackle the study’s aim and 
objectives (section 5.2). Both secondary and primary qualitative data were collected 
in order to achieve the aim and objectives of the study. Primary data were collected 
in the ROC at two stages; exploratory stage and main stage. Semi-structured 
interviews were used to collect the necessary qualitative primary data. Four different 
types of participants were interviewed: APs (owner/managers), tourism 
professionals, Government officials and local academics. Due to the participant’s 
different roles within the tourism and hospitality industries and diverse knowledge 
and information required three semi-structure interview sets of questions were 
developed. One was directed at APs, the second to tourism professionals and 
Government officials and the third to local academics. All together forty-five 
individuals were interviewed and purposive snowballing sampling technique was 
employed to identify information-rich participants. Grounded Theory analytical 
techniques of coding strategies, constant comparative method and writing memos 
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were also utilised that led to the development of a substantive theory. Moreover, 
credibility, transferability, dependability and reflexivity were discussed since they 
were used to evaluate the study process and its findings. Lastly, the study’s ethical 
considerations were set out and the study’s limitations were discussed. The 
following chapter presents the analysis and discussion of the findings. 
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CHAPTER 6 - ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyses and discusses the findings of the study induced from the 
Grounded Theory analytical process. These findings explain the contractual and 
non-contractual bargaining power interactions within negotiations between the 
accommodation providers (APs) in the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) and large 
European tour operators (TOs). As mentioned in Chapter 5, in the axial coding stage 
(5.8.5) six propositions were developed under the core categories, namely resources, 
relational factors and market characteristics. Under the category resources, the 
propositions developed were:  
(a) firm-specific tangible and intangible resources determine the type of 
contract during contractual negotiations; 
(b) government policies/regulations, culture and industry characteristics 
influence contractual and non-contractual negotiations through their impact 
on destination-specific resources. 
Under the category relational factors the propositions were: 
(c) contractual and non-contractual negotiations are influenced by negotiation 
characteristics and relationship constructs;  
(d) emotional factors influence the contractual and non-contractual 
negotiations. 
Under the category market characteristics the propositions developed were: 
(e) culture and industry characteristics are influential factors in pricing and 
volume of sales during contractual and non-contractual negotiations;  
(f) negotiation characteristics, relationship constructs and emotions during 
contractual and non-contractual negotiations determine market 
characteristics in terms of pricing and volume of sales.  
It should be noted that Grounded Theory analysis frequently guides the 
researcher to themes that were not considered before data collection. This is because 
the exploratory and inductive nature of Grounded Theory requires the researcher to 
focus on the data to guide her towards inducing new insights regarding phenomena. 
Therefore, apart from the literature reviewed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, in the 
examination of each proposition additional literature is reviewed and utilised to 
critically analyse the findings and offer a richer explanation of the issues discovered. 
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The research fields that the additional literature employed draws upon are explained 
in the introductory subsection of each proposition (section 6.2).  
All propositions are closely related and interconnected, thus certain concepts 
and sub-categories relate to more than one proposition and they may be repeated to 
better support the discussion (Chapter 5, section 5.7.3) Moreover, considering the 
varied profile of participants interviewed (Chapter 5, section 5.5.4), in order to 
facilitate the current discussion, the participants directly involved with the industry 
are referred to as the industry sector. Hence, the term ‘industry sector’ refers to the 
APs, TOs, travel agents, food and beverage providers, recreation providers, and 
participants from tourism and hospitality associations. The ‘government sector’ 
refers to individuals who work within governmental organisations such as the 
Ministry of Energy, Industry, Commerce and Tourism, and Cyprus Tourism 
Organisation (CTO). ‘Local academics’ are individuals working in the academic 
institutions of the ROC. Further, to adhere to ethical considerations (Chapter 5, 
section 5.9) each participant was given an identification code followed by the 
number of each interview. Hence, within this discussion all participant quotes are 
followed by their identification code and a number, for instance, SH:1 refers to the 
first participant interviewed managing a star hotel. The identification codes utilised 
are: star hotel: SH, tourist villages: TV, hotel apartments: HA, interviewee group 
(chain of accommodation units): IG, travel agent: TA, tour operator: TO, 
Government official: GO, recreation provider: RP, tourism and hospitality 
associations: THA, food and beverage: FB, and local academics: LA.  
The chapter is divided in four sections including this introduction. In section 
6.2 the six propositions developed are analysed and discussed. Each proposition acts 
as a heading and is followed by a critical analysis. In section 6.3, and in accordance 
with Grounded Theory, selective coding is presented. It takes the form of a storyline, 
setting out the key phenomena that led to theory development. The theory generated 
depicts that the resources of the tourism and hospitality buyers and suppliers 
determine their relative bargaining power and the type of contract agreed. These 
factors subsequently influence the relational factors that in turn, determine market 
characteristics in terms of pricing and volume of sales in contractual and non-
contractual negotiations. Lastly, section 6.4 concludes the chapter. 
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 6.2. PROPOSITIONS INDUCED FROM PRIMARY DATA 
ANALYSIS  
6.2.1. Proposition 1: Firm-specific tangible and intangible resources 
determine the type of contract during contractual negotiations 
6.2.1.1.	 Introduction	
This proposition discusses the firm-specific resources of the APs and TOs 
and how these resources influence the type of contract agreed between the APs and 
TOs. This is done in order to identify the dependence patterns between the parties 
that determine the bargaining power of APs and TOs in relation to each other during 
negotiations. To critically analyse the findings, in addition to the literature on 
bargaining power (Chapter 2), literature on exchange partner selection within the 
business-to-business (B2B) marketing, supply chain and strategic management field 
is also utilised. Further, additional literature on buyer-supplier contracts, and 
exchange partner selection within the tourism and hospitality field is also employed, 
to fully explain the findings. As mentioned in section 6.1, when employing 
Grounded Theory, supplementary literature is often used to support new themes that 
were not considered prior to data collection. 
The tangible and intangible firm-specific resources of the parties influence 
the type of formal contract agreed between them. The tangible resources of the APs 
are size-of-unit, product quality (facilities), infrastructure and location while the 
intangible resources of the APs are repeat clientele, reputation, value for money, 
reliability, differentiation and product quality (service). The most critical resources 
of the TOs are financial, flight capacity, promotional ability and information. 
Following power-dependence theory, these resources are considered to be the 
sources of power of the APs and TOs and they determine the bargaining power of 
each party given that they influence the level of dependence that each party has on 
the other. However, some resources are perceived to be more valuable than others 
and can increase or decrease the dependence of a party on the resources of the other. 
This proposition explains the importance and value of each resource for the parties 
and their influence on the type of contract.  
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The findings indicate that the contracts are determined by the dependency 
that each party (APs and TOs) has on the resources of the other. This coincides with 
the findings of Lusch and Brown (1996) who maintained that the dependence 
structure that exists in a relationship influences the type of contract on which the 
parties agree. This is because, following resource-dependence theory, a relationship 
rests upon the dependence one party has on the other in order to reduce uncertainty 
in the environment and achieve its firm’s objectives (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003).  
Equally, Dwyer et al. (1987, p.16) argued that “[…] potential exchange 
partners first consider obligations, benefits and burdens” of the relationship. In 
particular, the investment that each party is prepared to give to the relationship 
depends on each party assessing the benefits (such as improved performance) and 
costs involved. Hence, the parties assess the value or stakes (level of dependence) 
they have in the relationship. Therefore, the level of dependence that exists between 
the firms determines the level of investment that each party gives to the relationship 
and determines the type of contract. Selecting an exchange partner for particular 
services is vital for tourism firms since the tourists usually perceive the tourism 
product as a uniform activity and the performance of the exchange partner can 
influence the performance of the firm (Zhang et al. 2009).  
The key formal contracts that the study detected between the APs and TOs 
are commitment, exclusivity and allotment. Each contract has distinct characteristics 
that determine the interactions between the parties. Thus, the discussion below is 
divided in two sections. The first section, discusses the features and function of each 
contract and the second section examines the resources that determine the type of 
contract agreed between the parties.  
6.2.1.2.	 	Discussion	of	proposition	1	
6.2.1.2.1.	 Types	of	contract	and	their	context		
Three types of formal contract are evident in the relationship between TOs 
and APs, namely, commitment, exclusivity, and allotment. Grounded Theory 
analysis directs the researcher to issues not considered prior to data collection, and 
for this reason literature regarding buyer-supplier contracts within a tourism and 
hospitality context is used in this analysis. This is done to better understand the 
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characteristics of each type of contract and their implications on the relationship and 
negotiations of APs and TOs.  
Interview data indicated that commitment, exclusivity, and allotment 
contracts are the three types of contracts typically identified between APs and TOs. 
On the other hand, Buhalis (2000) and Ivanov (2014) identified commitment and 
allotment contracts as the two major contracts between APs and TOs and discussed 
exclusivity contracts or exclusive rights as an additional condition within these 
contracts. However, the APs and TOs in this study distinguished between the 
commitment contract, exclusivity contract, and allotment contract. Thus in this 
examination this distinction is followed. 
In relation to commitment contracts two AP participants stated: 
“[…] commitment contracts are very beneficial because you receive 
advance payment and you reserve the rooms of the unit, so whether 
the TOs use the rooms or not, they always pay for the rooms.” (TV:3) 
“[T]he best contract is the commitment, to sell all the rooms in 
advance. This gives you back to back occupancy meaning every two 
weeks you have new customers in the hotel.” (SH:9) 
Thus, in commitment contracts the APs receive an advance payment from the TOs 
for the contracted number of rooms and the rooms must be paid for regardless of the 
ability of the TOs to fulfil this allocation. On the other hand, the APs are obliged to 
allocate the rooms to the TOs, as per the contract, regardless of whether the rooms 
will be used. However, with such a contract APs are not aware of the booking 
situation (Buhalis 2000). This is because in commitment contracts the TOs control 
the rooms contracted. As one TO participant asserted:  
“[…] we have hotels that are fully committed, and by that I mean we 
have all those beds and we pay for them in advance. They are ours to 
manage how we like.” (TO:3) 
An AP participant also affirmed: 
“[A]t the moment we have 204 rooms out of which 150 are allocated 
to one TO with a commitment contract. There are times that we have 
150 rooms allocated or even 187. So we do not have many rooms to 
sell to other TOs in the summer, we have to keep those rooms for our 
partner.” (SH:7) 
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The above statements show that in commitment contracts the TOs gain full control 
of the allocated rooms to use at any time they deem necessary, thus gaining 
flexibility in their operations. Despite the flexibility with commitment contracts, 
TOs need to allocate substantial financial resources. On the other hand, APs receive 
guarantees (financial) that the rooms will be sold. One AP participant stated, 
however:  
“[…] with commitment contracts you always give a lower price to 
your partner in comparison to other contracts because they buy a lot 
of rooms at one time and pay for these rooms in advance, so you give 
them a lower price.” (SH:12) 
That is to say, although the APs receive advance payments with commitment 
contracts and thus are secure in the knowledge that their perishable product is sold, 
the TOs require a lower price from the APs compared with other types of contract. 
In short, while commitment contracts may be beneficial in the short-term, since the 
APs obtain advance payments, they have the lowest prices (Buhalis 2000; Ivanov 
2014).   
Exclusivity contracts are also evident in the ROC. Exclusivity contracts 
signify a condition in the contract where APs offer exclusivity rights to TOs. This 
exclusivity may either give the TOs the right to be the sole seller of the unit in 
certain markets or it may give them exclusivity on the type of board (RO, B&B, HB, 
FB, AI26) for the unit in certain markets. In particular, exclusivity rights allow the 
TOs to manage a unit’s distribution mix given that they are able to regulate which 
other actor within the channel can promote a specific unit in their programme 
(Buhalis 2000). For instance, two AP participants stated: 
“[…] exclusivity means that only that specific TO will be promoting 
and using that hotel. Of course you might give exclusivity on a type of 
board but this is not often the case.” (SH:11) 
                                                
26 Type of board refers to the type of dining arrangements that the customers choose with their 
accommodation, which is included in the price paid. RO indicates Room Only (with no meals 
included), B&B indicates Bed and Breakfast, HB indicates Half Board (two meals included), FB 
indicates Full Board (three meals included), and AI indicates All Inclusive (all meals and snacks are 
included in the price).  
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“[…] exclusivity contracts allow the TOs to have absolute control 
over a product in terms of its promotion, thus the TOs also have 
absolute control over the profit margins.” (IG:3) 
As the above statements indicate, with exclusivity contracts the TOs have sole 
control over the unit’s promotional plan either in certain source markets or in all 
source markets depending on the contract. As a result, the TOs are also able to 
control the price at which each unit is promoted in the market which could enable 
the TO to protect its profit margins from competition. Hence, exclusivity rights offer 
more control to the TOs to manage the unit to their advantage when compared to a 
commitment contract.  
Commitment and exclusivity contracts often go hand in hand, as a TO 
participant highlighted:  
“[…] we use the commitments to tie suppliers down to give us the 
exclusivities that we want […] we offer exclusivity on a board basis 
as well, so for example [name of unit] you can only book on an all 
inclusive basis if you book through us.” (TO:2) 
An AP participant also commented:  
“[…] usually if you have a large agreement on a commitment 
contract, you also have an exclusivity to the TO in order to help him 
sell the rooms.” (HA:3) 
The strong financial position of the TOs allows them to offer advance payments to 
the APs in order to gain exclusivity on the product. As a result, the control of the 
TOs over the APs increases since the APs are highly dependent upon the TOs to 
achieve their organisational objectives. Both commitment and exclusivity contracts 
allow the TOs to safeguard their accommodation capacities at a certain destination 
and to have more control over the unit, quality of service and product provided to 
achieve their organisational objectives (Cavlek 2002). Consequently, the conditions 
of these contracts require high financial and time investment between the parties and 
create dependencies, given that both parties are strongly dependent upon the other to 
fulfil their contractual agreement, at least for the duration of the contract. Therefore, 
the conditions of these contracts denote a very close relationship between the two 
parties.  
In contrast, an allotment contract signifies a more distant relationship with a 
lower dependency level between the parties. In an allotment contract the APs are 
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responsible for providing a specific number of rooms or capacity for the TOs but the 
TOs are not obliged to pay for any unused rooms. Furthermore, no advance payment 
is given to the APs. Payment is received once the booking occurs and prior to the 
guest arrival or following the guest arrival. In an allotment contract the TOs are 
obliged to book the room or inform the APs about their inability to comply with the 
contract (Radolović 2011). Rooms not sold have to be released back to the APs 
within the release period27 in order for the AP to offer the rooms through other 
channels. As two AP participants stated:  
“[W]ith the allotment contract you can sell more rooms than you 
actually have. […] for example, if your whole unit is comprised of 
100 rooms, you can give 4 different TOs 50 rooms each, so ultimately 
you have sold 200 rooms, even if you only have 100 rooms. This is 
something you have to do with allotment contracts given that the TOs 
are not obliged to sell all of the rooms you allocate to them or to pay 
for them just because you have reserved these rooms for them, but 
you are obliged to provide the rooms for them if they ask.” (SH:9) 
 “[…] because we work with an allotment contract with the TOs, we 
allocate a percentage of rooms to the TOs to sell. […]. However, 
given that a specific TO may not sell all the rooms allocated to him 
and we lose out in sales in order to ensure high occupancy we also 
promote the rooms through other channels and TOs.” (SH:1) 
As the statements above show, allotment contracts allow both APs and TOs more 
flexibility in their operations than commitment and exclusivity contracts. This is 
particularly true for TOs since they do not need to sell or pay for any unused rooms. 
The allotment contract is mainly used by TOs for surplus capacity in periods of high 
demand (Ivanov 2014). In contrast, APs are more flexible in their operations given 
their ability to choose various distribution channels to sell their product.  
From the above examination it is evident that exclusivity contracts denote a 
higher level of dependency between the two parties than commitment and allotment 
contracts. This is because in exclusivity contracts the accommodation unit is 
exclusively available to one TO in a single market, thus the AP is limited in terms of 
supply alternatives to a single market. On the other hand, in a commitment contract, 
                                                
27 The release period is negotiable between the two parties; in other words it can be any number of 
days before the arrival of the guest that the parties choose. However, the data suggest that the 
common release period is either seven or fourteen days before the guest’s arrival.  
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other TOs in the same market can promote the unit. However, this also depends on 
whether a unit is fully committed or partly committed. Full commitment contracts 
refer to a unit giving all of its capacity to a certain TO, whereas in partly committed 
contracts the unit commits only a certain percentage to the TO. Nevertheless, 
commitment contracts typically entail a very high dependency structure between the 
parties when compared to allotment contracts.  
Furthermore, given the characteristics and function of each contract, each 
type of contract denotes a different level of closeness between the parties. For 
instance, commitment and exclusivity contracts denote a closer relationship with a 
higher level of resource investment (such as time, financial investment and volume 
of sales) by the two parties to achieve the expected benefits. On the other hand, an 
allotment contract denotes a more discreet exchange with a lower level of resource 
investment (such as time, financial investment and volume of sales). This is not 
surprising given that the relative dependence contributes to the level of closeness 
between the parties (Goffin et al. 2006; Mayer and Teece 2008). 
Having identified the characteristics of formal contracts, the section below 
discusses how the firm-specific resources of the APs influence the type of contract 
agreed between the parties and determine their bargaining power in relation to the 
TOs.  
6.2.1.2.2.	 Determining	the	resources	that	influence	the	type	of	contract		
The most important firm-specific resources that the APs have that determine 
the type of contract and, in turn, their bargaining power are discussed below. This 
subsection draws on bargaining power literature (Chapter 2) to analyse the findings. 
However, in line with the Grounded Theory analysis adopted, additional literature is 
also utilised to better support the findings. Specifically, literature pertaining to 
exchange partner selection within the business-to-business (B2B) marketing, supply 
chain and strategic management, and tourism and hospitality field is also employed. 
The size-of-unit is identified as one of the key tangible resources that APs 
have. Within this study the size-of-unit refers to the capacity, or number of beds, 
that one party has at its disposal. Accommodation chains, for instance, have a 
number of units and thus possess a large number of beds. According to the European 
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Consumer’s Centre (ECC)28 a medium unit is one with a capacity of more than 151 
beds and a large size unit is one where APs manage more than 400 beds (ECC-Net 
2009). One AP participant with a large room capacity stated: 
“[…] it is much easier for the TOs to secure the necessary number of 
beds from larger companies or large units rather than to look for 
them in small companies and we work with a lot of commitment and 
exclusivity contracts with various large TOs.” (IG:1) 
Two TO participants corroborated this: 
“[…] we look at primarily working with them [chain of 
accommodation units] because we know they can give us the 
capacities that we need.” (TO:2) 
“[I]f I need to move a guest to another unit I will look for a room 
within the group and move them within the accommodation chain. 
We can move the guests for free when it is within the same group. So 
we try to keep it within the group.” (TO:1) 
The participants above highlight that the size-of-unit of the APs is an attractive and 
valuable resource that facilitate TO operations. The importance of owning a large 
size unit can be attributed to the high volume of tourism flow that large TOs control, 
which creates the need for TOs to access a sufficient number of beds, and 
subsequently support their operations.  
Equally, two AP participants stated: 
“[…] especially when you have a big unit there is no way to survive 
without the TOs. This hotel has, let’s say, 270-290 rooms. It is 
impossible to fill it up alone.” (SH:10) 
“[S]mall units could stop working with the large TOs, but for big 
units it’s impossible. Bigger units do not have this luxury, because 
you have limited choices in terms of TOs and you need tourists to 
have a full unit.” (SH:2) 
These statements depict the dependency of medium and large accommodation units 
and accommodation chains on the large TOs to generate the necessary tourism flow 
for them to survive. This was noted by fifteen participants (APs and TOs), and is in 
                                                
28 The European Consumer’s Centre classification identifies a small unit as one with a capacity of up 
to 150 beds, a medium unit as 151-400 beds, and a large unit as having over 400 beds (ECC-Net 
2009). In studies focusing on the accommodation sector, size is often considered in terms of bed 
capacity rather than number of employees (Calveras and Orfila 2014). 
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line with a study by Pereira-Moliner et al. (2012) in Spain, who identified that larger 
accommodation units often choose intermediaries (TOs and travel agents) for their 
tourism flow. This is because the risk of the APs reduces due to the fact that large 
TOs can guarantee the necessary tourism flow. Consequently, the size-of-unit is an 
important resource and factor that often leads to commitment and exclusivity 
contracts between the parties in order to ensure the necessary volume of tourists for 
the APs and necessary bed capacity for the TOs.  
On the other hand, the data revealed that smaller units primarily work with 
allotment contracts, as one TO participant affirmed: 
“[…] small units cannot give us the drive we need. Hence, we 
predominantly work with them more on an allotment basis in the 
ROC.” (TO:2) 
An AP participant also noted:  
“[I]t’s not as easy with a small company. It might be easier for the 
TOs to control a small company but the small company will 
somewhat resist in allocating all the rooms of the unit in a 
commitment contract to a single TO. […] if you have 10,000 beds 
and you give 2,000 or 3,000 to a single TO you still have enough 
beds to cover the rest of the market.” (IG:3) 
That is to say, smaller size units typically agree to allotment contracts, with the APs 
choosing to operate with numerous TOs so that they have diverse sources of supply 
(tourism flow) and can avoid being fully dependent on a single TO. This finding is 
in contrast to those of Buhalis’s (2000) study in Greece, which ascertained that 
smaller category accommodation units engage in commitment contracts due to their 
low marketing budgets and depend on large TOs for their visibility in the market. In 
the ROC this is not the case, the data indicated that the majority of participants 
operating smaller units predominantly agree to allotment contracts with the TOs.  
This difference may be attributed to the stronger ability of smaller units in 
the ROC to promote their product through other channels. For instance, two AP 
participants commented:  
“[…] we have a small number of rooms, one unit has 64 and the 
other one 45, therefore one way or another we are able to sell 
through other channels rather than work with one large TO.” (SH:4) 
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“[…] I focus more on the online trade rather than packaged TOs as 
it offers more opportunities for a small unit like this one to advertise 
your product.” (SH:6) 
The above statements indicate that, due to the small size of the units, the APs are 
able to generate sales through other channels rather than engage in commitment or 
exclusivity contracts with a large TO. Furthermore, as noted in the above section, 
commitment and exclusivity contracts denote heavy relationship investment to fulfil 
the needs of each party and also give the large TOs strong control over the unit. This 
may deter smaller units from entering such relationships given that they may lead to 
the smaller units being highly dependent on a single large TO, reducing the AP’s 
bargaining power. Considering that smaller units require a smaller amount of 
tourism flow to achieve satisfactory occupancy levels, the data indicate that APs 
managing smaller units predominantly work with allotment contracts and are 
hesitant to agree to commitment and exclusivity contracts. (The promotional ability 
of APs is discussed in further detail in section 6.2.5).  
Three industry participants (APs and TOs) indicated that another reason for 
large TOs operating with medium and larger units is the lower costs that they can 
achieve. One TO participant affirmed that: 
 “[…] if a unit is a one-off, meaning it is not linked to a chain, they 
are very limited to what discounts they can give you [to boost sales] 
because they can never get the capacities that a big chain can. […] 
the smaller family units find it difficult to survive against the big boys 
[...] because you cannot compete on those sorts of levels that the big 
guys do.”(TO:2) 
An AP participant managing a small unit also noted:  
“[W]e are a smaller unit, our prices are non-negotiable. If we don’t 
sell with these prices then we will certainly close down. We cannot 
operate if we are given 50 Euro per room for two people. Our prices 
follow a feasibility study, and based on that these are the prices that 
we need to charge in order to have a bearable occupancy rate of 85-
90% and survive.” (SH:1) 
As the participants above describe, when large TOs contract a large number of 
rooms from large units or chains, larger APs can offer a lower price than a small unit 
can. Therefore, APs with large bed capacity can offer the TO economies of scale 
through bulk purchasing thus reducing their costs. Similarly, Chand and Katou 
(2012, p.176) examined the partner selection criteria of large international TOs in 
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India and found that, in accordance with transaction cost theory, “[…] less cost for 
the company” is a key selection criterion for large TOs. Hence, size-of-unit provides 
access to an important tangible resource, namely capacity, and can offer lower costs. 
Thus, it is a critical valuable resource that leads APs and TOs to agree on 
commitment and exclusivity contracts during negotiations.  
Another factor that influences the type of contract is the geographical 
location of the unit. As two AP participants stated: 
“[…] we work mostly with allotment contracts because the demand 
for commitment contracts in Limassol is not as high as in the areas of 
Ayia Napa, Paphos or Protaras.” (SH:12) 
“[I]n Paphos the dependence on the English leisure market is very 
high. […] and this is why this hotel has a huge agreement with a 
specific TO […] and by this I mean that we have a very large 
commitment agreement with rooms reserved solely for this TO. […] 
We have committed a certain percentage of rooms to this specific TO 
and we also have some extra rooms in case the TO needs more 
rooms; we must supply this specific TO.” (SH:3) 
The above statements indicate that for the ROC the location of the unit plays a part 
in the choice of contract, because in different coastal tourist resorts a predominant 
type of contract exists. More specifically, in Paphos, Ayia Napa and Protaras, 
commitment and exclusivity contracts are dominant, whereas in Limassol allotment 
contracts are primarily used.  
This variation can be ascribed to the characteristics of each tourist resort, for 
example the type of tourist market (such as leisure or business) and major source 
market. Two AP participants noted: 
“[…] in Paphos 90-95% of tourism is leisure tourism and we are 
dependent on the English market thus it has a very high percentage of 
business from TOs.” (SH:11) 
“[L]imassol has conferences and corporate clientele that come from 
the local market; their dependency on the TOs is smaller. This is 
because in general the holidaymakers’ market or the leisure market 
clientele that they have represents a smaller percentage in their total 
sales.” (SH:3) 
In other words, the focus on leisure tourism in Paphos, and its reliance on the UK 
market, leads to strong dependence on large TOs for its tourism flow. This is 
because large TOs predominantly operate in the leisure market (Čavlek 2006).  
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Paphos is the most popular resort in the ROC and receives the highest 
number of tourist arrivals, with 38.7% in contrast to the second most popular resorts 
of Ayia Napa and Protaras with a combined percentage of 30.05% (CTO 2014a). 
Leisure tourism and particularly packaged tourism (over 50% in 2013) is the most 
frequent type of tourism in the ROC (CYSTAT 2013), therefore, Paphos receives 
the highest number of leisure-packaged tourists. Additionally, in 2013, 46% of UK 
holidaymakers travelled on a packaged holiday making it the most frequent type of 
holiday arrangement for the UK (ABTA 2014). Consequently, the resort-specific 
characteristics of Paphos cause APs to be highly dependent on large TOs to achieve 
their organisational objectives. On the other hand, the popularity of Paphos makes it 
important for the TOs to operate in the resort, and renders it a critical resource to 
access through commitment and exclusivity contracts to secure the necessary 
capacity and continue their operations.  
One reason for the popularity of  Paphos may also derive from the benefits 
that the TOs receive from the concentration of their resources in certain areas. This 
concentration of operations can offer economies of scale for businesses 
(Papatheodorou 2004) such as lower operational costs resulting from the transfer of 
tourists. In addition, Karamustafa (2000) investigated the interactions between TOs 
and hotel operators in Turkey and identified that each TO concentrated on certain 
sections along the Turkish coast for its operations. He argued that this action 
allowed the TOs to monopolise and ultimately control the market of the location 
particularly during contractual agreements. Therefore, location characteristics play a 
major role in the type and outcome of contracts between the APs and TOs. 
Accordingly, location is considered to be an important resource and source of power 
for the APs.  
The importance of a unit’s location as a resource, and its influence on 
intermediaries’ selection process, price, customer satisfaction and in turn a unit’s 
success, is identified in the tourism literature (Dolnicar and Otter 2003; Theuvsen 
2004; Aguiló et al. 2005; Pearce 2007; Alegre et al. 2013). However, unlike the 
current research, the above mentioned studies do not identify the influence that 
location (resort) has in the type of contractual agreement between APs and TOs. 
Particularly, this study finds that the location of the unit can increase the dependency 
between the parties due to the benefits that they receive resulting in a closer 
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relationship, through a commitment or exclusivity contract agreed between the 
parties.  
Additionally, the unit’s infrastructure is recognised as a factor in determining 
the type of contract. As two AP participants described: 
“[U]ntil last year we had a lot of TOs. […] This year, over the winter 
we renovated the hotel, and after this renovation we signed an 
agreement with [name of large TO] which has exclusivity for the 
English market for the summer season.”  (TV:2) 
“[…] there is a condition in the contract where we have to inform the 
TO if we are considering a new project. The TO wants to be the first 
to see whether any new project that [his] partner is doing matches 
other activities the TO pursues. If that is the case [the TO] thinks ‘I 
will take it, I’m not going to allow anyone else to be involved.’ […] 
so the TO controls all the new accommodation complexes that are 
built. Thus the TO controls the market.” (IG:1) 
That is to say, a unit whose infrastructure has been renovated or up-dated, is a 
valuable resource and source of power in the AP and TO relationship. It can increase 
the AP’s competitiveness and their bargaining power during negotiations. This was a 
view shared by all the AP participants. As one AP participant asserted:  
“[I]f you are running an older unit it is very difficult to be 
competitive because you need to offer the same service standards as 
the others.” (SH:9) 
An older unit may not be able to meet the needs of the current market in terms of 
both consumer and operational needs, thus decreasing its attractiveness as a resource 
for the buyers. The unit might not, for example, be able to comply with new trends 
(such as environmental issues) or it may not be able to offer similar services and 
facilities to customers as its competitors thus reducing its competitiveness 
(Hassanien 2005). In contrast, if a firm is able to offer a new and unique product to 
the market then it can gain a competitive advantage (Barney 1991). (As also noted in 
section 6.2.2 a unit’s infrastructure is an important resource for the APs contributing 
to their bargaining power in relation to the TOs, and government intervention to 
improve these resources can enhance the APs bargaining power in relation to the 
TOs).  
The ability of the APs to have a renovated, modern and differentiated 
product in the market can give them a competitive advantage and thus having a 
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renovated, modern and differentiated is considered a critical resource. This can be 
attributed to the importance of tangible factors, such as the unit’s infrastructure, in 
customer accommodation selection, satisfaction and loyalty (Dubé et al. 2000; 
Hassanien 2007; Han and Ryu 2009; Suh et al. 2015). Akbaba (2006) investigated 
the service quality expectation of hotel customers in Turkey and discovered that 
tangibles, referring to the physical aspects of the unit, modern equipment and 
atmosphere, were the most important factors in predicting the customers’ assessment 
regarding service quality and satisfaction. Therefore, the unit’s infrastructure plays 
an important part in contributing to the satisfaction of a TO’s customers, and is 
considered to be a valuable resource that can contribute to the competitiveness of the 
TO. In turn, this is a valuable and attractive AP resource that increases the 
dependence of the TOs on the APs, and leads to commitment and exclusivity 
contracts with the TOs. Moreover, it is a source of power for APs that contributes to 
their bargaining power in negotiations with TOs.  
Product quality is another major resource controlled by the APs. Two of 
them noted: 
“[…] we work closely with the TOs on commitment contracts […] we 
work with them and they work with us because of the quality of the 
hotel.” (TV:3) 
“[A] professional TO wants the level of customer satisfaction to be 
high; this does not only apply to the accommodation aspect of the 
holiday, but to the restaurants, car rentals, cruises and so on. The 
TOs want all their partners to have a high level of quality services 
and customer satisfaction and this is justifiable.” (HA:3) 
As the statements reveal, product quality, in terms of variety of facilities and service 
offered by the APs, is considered to be a valuable resource and leads to large 
agreements between the APs and TOs. This was mentioned by all the AP 
participants, one of whom stated:   
“[…] from my experience through our units [chain of 
accommodation units] that have very good large agreements with 
very strong TOs it is due to the product quality.” (IG:2) 
More specifically, from this participant’s interview, the researcher deduced that 
‘good agreements’ often refer to commitment and exclusivity contracts thus 
stipulating high-investment and close relationships. Ku et al. (2011), when 
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examining the relationship between accommodation units and their suppliers, found 
that product and service quality were key criteria in achieving a more collaborative 
relationship with suppliers that could lead to increased revenue and the maintenance 
of competitiveness. Therefore, high product quality can result in a closer, more 
collaborative, relationship between APs and TOs.  
One reason why a good quality product, in terms of facilities and service, can 
result in a closer relationship is the benefits that the TOs receive. Two AP 
participants stated: 
“[…] if your service is low and the TO’s customers are not satisfied 
then this creates problems.” (SH:12) 
“[I] think the TO’s main concern is good quality products with good 
facilities because if they did not offer a good quality product they 
would be rejected by the client whatever the price.” (SH:10) 
To be precise, the quality of the product plays an important role in customer 
satisfaction. Product quality, referring to both the tangible offering (facilities) and 
intangible offering (service), is recognised as a factor that enhances customer 
satisfaction29 in an accommodation unit (Albayrak and Caber 2015). Additionally, 
Tavitiyaman et al. (2011) argued that when guests are satisfied with the 
accommodation’s products and services the probability of commitment to a unit’s 
brand increases and thus enhances its competitiveness. Consequently, the guests’ 
commitment to the unit can also promote the commitment to the TO and contribute 
to the TO’s competitiveness. Accordingly, accessing a good quality product through 
their exchange relationships is of critical importance to the TOs, thus the TO’s 
dependence on the APs increases. In such circumstances, a high-investment form of 
contract (exclusivity or commitment) is likely to occur.   
An AP participant also pointed out:  
“[…] on the contracts that we sign with the TOs there are specific 
conditions regarding the standards of service and quality of the hotel. 
We are committed as per the contract that we will offer a high 
standard.” (TV:4) 
                                                
29 Overall customer satisfaction refers to the outcome of the evaluation that customers make between 
their expectations regarding a service or a product and their perception of how this service was 
carried out or performed (Albayrak and Caber 2015). Customer satisfaction includes the rating of the 
product and service attributes.  
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Within the formal contracts between the two parties, the TOs stipulate the level of 
service, facilities and customer satisfaction rate that the APs need to provide based 
on the category of the accommodation unit. The researcher was also able to access 
and review written contracts between the APs and TOs, and found that these 
conditions referred to the responsibility of the APs for providing product quality in 
terms of facilities and service of the expected standard for each category of unit. The 
contracts stipulated that the APs were liable for any deviation from the agreed 
standards. Similarly, Medina-Muñoz et al. (2003), when examining the control of 
large European TOs over APs, identified that TOs exercise high control over issues 
such as operational factors (service and food and beverage offerings) and facilities 
through their contracts. Hence, the TOs place considerable emphasis on the quality 
of the product due to the expected benefits that they receive (such as increased 
customer satisfaction). Therefore, contractual negotiations typically result in 
commitment and exclusivity contracts. 
Value for money is a critical intangible resource owned by the APs and can 
influence the type of contract between the parties. Value for money30 is perceived as 
the quality of the offer relative to price (Murphy and Pritchard 1997; Murphy et al. 
2000; Rondan-Cataluña and Rosa-Diaz 2014). Within the context of the study, value 
for money refers to the perception of the TOs that the unit’s product offer is worth 
(the value of) the price paid. Two AP participants highlighted: 
“[A] TO wants a unit that is value for money for the customer and 
also offers a reasonable price for a TO, where he can generate a 
good profit […] then he can have the hotel on an exclusivity basis.” 
(HA:2) 
“[…] what is important for the buyer and the seller is value for 
money. The buyer asks ‘do I get back what I’ve paid for?’ Or me, 
selling the product, ‘do I get back what I think I have provided to the 
customer, is it value for money?’” (IG:1) 
                                                
30 Customer perceived value is an evaluation made by the customer between the benefits (economic, 
social and relationships received) and sacrifices (price, time, effort, risk) of a product or service (Graf 
and Mass 2008; Rondan-Cataluña and Rosa-Diaz 2014). Perceived value is a subjective notion, 
however in this study value for money refers to quality relative to price (Rondan-Cataluña and Rosa-
Diaz 2014; Murphy et al. 2000; Murphy and Pritchard 1997), given that the AP statements refer to 
the price element of perceived value.  
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Hence, a product should be perceived as value for money both for the TOs and the 
consumer market. This view was shared by sixteen APs. As also mentioned in 
section 6.2.3, in order for a supplier and buyer to engage in a relationship an 
exchange of value (benefits) must exist. Therefore, it can be argued that accessing a 
product that is value for money offers the TOs financial benefits, because they add a 
satisfactory profit-margin and promote this product to the end consumer. Similarly, 
Mysen et al. (2012, p.270) examined the perceptions of buyers and suppliers across 
industries and identified that the economic benefits (namely “[…] good value for 
money” from the buyers’ perspective and “fair price” from the supplier) play a 
significant role in increasing the perceived value of the relationship. Thus, due to the 
financial benefits that the TOs can receive, value for money is one of the AP’s 
important intangible resources.  
Moreover, Rondan-Cataluña and Rosa-Diaz (2014) found that perceptions of 
price and value for money played a vital role in the purchasing decision process of 
consumers because the images that are generated about the price of a product are 
critical to the decision process. Martín-Consuegra et al. (2007), also within a B2C 
service context, ascertained that perception of price fairness31 by the customer was 
positively linked with customer satisfaction and loyalty towards the seller. This is 
because when customers assess that the price paid for a product or service is fair 
then they are more likely to be satisfied and repeat the purchase. Value for money 
contributes to the perception of price fairness (Røkenes and Prebensen 2012). 
Therefore, if the TOs perceive that a product is value for money and engage in the 
relationship with the APs, it implies that the TOs can add their profit-margin to the 
product and still provide a product that the consumers perceive to be value for 
money. This can directly influence consumer decision-making, generate sales, and 
enhance customer satisfaction and intention to return for the TOs. Considering the 
benefits that the TOs receive, value for money is a vital intangible AP resource that 
can increase the stakes (dependence) of the TOs in the relationship leading to 
commitment and exclusivity contracts. As such, value for money is an important 
                                                
31 Price fairness judgment entails “[…] a comparison of the price of procedure with a pertinent 
standard, reference, or norm.” (Martín-Consuegra et al. 2007 p.460). That is to say, price fairness 
refers to the customer’s evaluation of whether the variation (if any) of a seller’s price and the price of 
a similar (comparative) other seller is reasonable, acceptable or just (Xia et al. 2004).  
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source of power for APs that contributes to their bargaining power in negotiations, 
whether contractual or not.  
The reputation of the firm, referring to the stakeholders’ total perception of a 
particular firm (Lienland et al. 2013), is identified as an intangible resource for both 
APs and TOs. In relation to an accommodation unit’s reputation, three AP 
participants stated: 
“[W]e only have positive experiences with the TOs, maybe because 
we have the right products for them. We have a good reputation […] 
amongst the TOs, they know our product.” (IG:2) 
“[…] the TOs would want to contract a unit on an exclusivity basis if 
it has a good name in the market and is easy to sell in terms of having 
a good reputation.” (SH:9) 
“[T]he TOs know what they are buying with our units so they are 
confident to sell them.” (IG:3) 
On the other hand, in relation to the reputation of the TOs, three AP participants 
highlighted: 
“[…] if a TO is unknown and new in the market, so you don’t know 
who he is and the company he represents, you have to take some 
security measures [in terms of payment].” (SH:8) 
“[T]he TOs working in the destination are very well known, they 
have a big volume of business and the ones that have a good name 
are the ones we usually aim to work with.” (HA:4) 
“[…] Thomson, TUI, Thomas Cook are all established TOs and they 
have a strong reputation in the market. They don’t operate only in the 
ROC but all over the world and of course you trust that they will 
perform.” (TV:4) 
The statements indicate that reputation has a central role in selecting the exchange 
partner and determining the type of contract; this was supported by fifteen industry 
participants (APs and TOs). A good reputation for the APs rests upon the TOs’ 
perception of a unit’s quality regarding its services, ability to consistently perform in 
the same manner, the degree to which it is known among its stakeholders 
(competitors and consumers) and its ability to generate sales. The reputation of the 
TO is based on the APs’ perception of the TO as a prominent actor who has a good 
name in the market in terms of financial strength and will consistently perform 
(consistent tourism flow) in the same manner.  
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Bennett and Gabriel (2001) noted that a good reputation lowers the risk when 
purchasing a product or service because it increases trust and confidence in the 
performance of each organisation. This is because reputation is a valuable asset that 
takes time and considerable investment to attain and can offer a competitive 
advantage to organisations (Hall 1992; Keh and Xie 2009). Thus, if an organisation 
has a good reputation it is believed that it will not jeopordise it by behaving 
opportunistically since any benefits from opportunistic behaviour can be gained 
from the rewards of a good reputation (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003; Doney and 
Cannon 1997).  
Consequently, the reputation of the parties increases trust and confidence in 
the relationship and lowers the perceived risk of the investment hence creating a 
more attractive proposition to commit substantial resources through a contractual 
agreement (such as commitment and exclusivity contracts). This is in line with Keh 
and Xie (2009) who investigated the impact of reputation on customer purschasing 
intention within a B2B context. They showed that firms with a good reputation are 
in a better position to build trust and identification among their buyers and in turn 
positively influence the commitment of the buyer to build a more long-term 
relationship. Hence, the good reputation of both the APs and TOs is an intangible 
resource that plays an important part in the selection of partners and commitment of 
resources through a commitment, exclusivity or allotment contract to develop a 
long-term relationship. Reputation increases the dependence between the parties and 
it is considered to be an important source of power for APs in negotiations.  
Another factor that influences the type of contract is the reliability of the APs 
and TOs. Three AP participants stated, regarding the reliability of the TOs: 
“[W]e would not work with a TO who would not be reliable […] in 
terms of the responsibilities and obligations we have agreed in the 
contract.” (SH:12) 
“[I] choose my associates based on their volume of business and how 
reliable they are in terms of payments; this is a critical factor.” 
(SH:7) 
“[A]s a unit we do not cooperate with small TOs. The TOs that we 
cooperate with are the largest in the market so we don’t have any 
issues with payments. We have had smaller TOs in the past; however, 
we have stopped working with them now and focus on working with 
reliable associates.” (SH:10) 
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The APs focus on a TO’s financial resources and ability to bring in the agreed 
tourism flow in order to perceive a TO as a reliable partner. From the TO 
perspective, two AP participants noted: 
“[…] what is the agreement? You have to offer the rooms that you 
agreed. You cannot tell the TO ‘you have 10 rooms to sell’ at the 
beginning of the season, and tell the same TO one month later to 
‘stop-sales for the rest of the season’.” (SH:1) 
“[T]he TO will perceive the hotel as reliable, if they have been 
working with them for many years and have not had any major 
problems.” (TV:1) 
Accordingly, reliability refers to the AP’s ability to offer a consistently high quality 
product to the TO’s customers and maintain the allocation of rooms as per their 
contractual agreement. Hence, reliability in the context of this study refers to both 
parties’ ability to keep their promises, indeed fulfil their contractual agreement. 
Equally, Hald et al. (2009) noted that reliability involves the ability of the parties to 
fulfil their commitments and be consistent in their behaviour and performance, so 
that the parties can depend on each other. An effective choice of exchange partner 
can generate a competitive advantage for the organisation and can have a positive 
influence on its performance (Tsaur and Lin 2012). An unreliable partner that does 
not fulfil his contractual agreement can have adverse effects on an organisation’s 
performance and viability. Andriotis (2003) explained for example that, in Greece 
delays in payment and loss of revenue from empty rooms, due to the inability of 
TOs to fulfil their room allocations, are common problems faced by APs. He went 
on to say that, as a result of this, in the past owners had had to sell their units due to 
their inability to cover their debts.  
Organisations engage in exchange relationships to access external resources 
and protect the organisation from an uncertain environment (Pfeffer and Salancik 
2003). Hence, reliability is a vital intangible resource and a reliable partner that 
honours the contract and consistently performs reduces the uncertainty of the 
organisation and thus increases the value of the relationship. The study indicates that 
this significant resource typically encourages the parties to agree to a commitment 
and exclusivity contract during contractual negotiations.  
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The level of repeat clientele32 as a resource for the APs influences the type of 
contract. Repeat clientele in this study are the guests who intend to repeat their visit 
to a specific unit. As three AP participants stated:  
“[…] for example, the TO knows that for [hotel name] he gets 50 
requests per day from repeaters, for another hotel X he gets no 
requests. So, for a hotel to have requests when the TO comes here, it 
would be easier to sign the contract because he does not want to lose 
me.” (SH:2) 
“[W]e have a number of people that come every year again and 
again. Therefore, this basis gives us a good occupancy rate.” (TV:1) 
“[I]n this unit [5 star] we have a lot of repeat customers. For 
instance, we have many customers that visit this hotel twice a year 
for the last 15-20 years. If the TO tries to suggest to this customer to 
go to another hotel with the same standards, he may lose the 
customer given that our repeat clientele go to the TO and specifically 
ask to book our unit and of course the TO knows that this customer is 
a repeater for our unit. This helps a lot; it increases our power 
during negotiations.” (SH:11) 
Put differently, repeat clientele offer a consistent occupancy rate, and thus consistent 
sales for the APs and TOs alike, which also enables the TOs to better estimate the 
level of sales for that specific unit during the season.  
Repeat clientele are considered to be an outcome of customer loyalty, where 
the intended action of a customer towards a service is identified (Andreassen and 
Lindestad 1998; Petrick 2004). The loyalty of customers is considered a great 
advantage to any organisation because it offers a stable source of revenue, positive 
word-of-mouth advertising, and it is less expensive to sustain the customer base 
(Corstjens and Lal 2000; Petrick 2004). This is particularly relevant for the tourism 
                                                
32 In this study repeat clientele, and thus loyalty, as resources are owned by the APs since the repeat 
clientele visit the same unit for a number of years. However, the findings indicated that most APs and 
large TOs have long-term relationships, therefore it can be argued that the loyalty of the customer 
may lie with the TO rather than the AP. This is because, in tourism, consumers see the tourism 
product as a unified entity thus loyalty can be difficult to distinguish (Hanefors and Mossberg 1999). 
Hanefors and Mossberg (1999) argued that, in a tourism context, travel agency loyalty, hotel loyalty, 
TO loyalty and destination loyalty is evident and one cannot anticipate that a tourist is loyal to all 
these components simultaneously. Therefore, customer loyalty may be owned by the TO or even the 
destination, and in turn, the dependence of the TO on the AP will decrease. Identifying where the 
customer loyalty lies is beyond the scope of this study. In this research repeat clientele is considered 
to be an intangible resource owned by the APs and can increase the dependence of the TOs on the 
APs, thus it can result in a commitment or exclusivity contract.  
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industry where uncertainty of future demand is a major challenge, specifically taking 
into account the increasing choices for tourists and the multifaceted tourism 
marketplace (Zhang et al. 2009; Chen and Yeh 2012). Therefore, repeat clientele 
reduce the uncertainty of demand for the unit and, in turn, the risk the TO takes 
when contracting a large percentage of rooms, thus making a high investment in the 
relationship. Consequently, repeat clientele are thought to be a noteworthy AP 
resource since they decrease the uncertainty for TOs in a volatile market. Access to 
this resource increases the dependency of TOs on APs, making TOs more confident 
to invest considerable resources in the form of a commitment and exclusivity 
contract. For these reasons, repeat clientele are a source of power that strongly 
contributes to the bargaining power of APs in negotiations with TOs. 
Information is another significant resource that influences the type of 
contract. A Government official noted: 
“[…] the APs have the TOs who tell them what the customer wants 
because the TOs have a better feedback […] they transport a large 
number of tourists and know the needs of each market.” (GO:2) 
A TO participant also highlighted: 
“[…] sometimes the Government and industry [in the ROC] don’t 
know the depth of what their competitors have to offer and we do 
because we are in those countries.” (TO:2) 
Two AP participants also stated: 
“[…] the TOs are extremely professional […] they consider 
everything, they look at the trends, they see what factors influence 
and what factors do not influence the current demand. They are very 
knowledgeable in the meetings; you cannot fool them.” (SH:13) 
“[T]he TO knows what is the expected demand for every single hotel 
that he has in the brochure.” (SH:8) 
The TOs’ intermediary position within the distribution channel and their large size 
allows them to operate in various countries. Hence, they are in a position to gather 
information about demand and supply trends through their agreements; not only 
within the destination but also outside the destination. Information is an important 
resource because the party that has more accurate information can use this 
knowledge to their advantage to alter the perception of the other party (Frazier and 
Summers 1984), and influence the other party’s decisions and actions to its 
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advantage. Consequently, the bargaining power of the buyer intensifies when buyers 
have a large amount of information regarding the market, the supplier’s costs, and 
offers of suppliers to other buyers (Porter 1980). 
It can be argued that the advent of information technology completely 
transformed the tourism distribution channel and has created opportunities for 
suppliers to connect with customers (Kracht and Wang 2010). However, as Frazier 
et al. (2009, p.31) maintained, the direct contact that distributors have with both 
competitors and customers causes distributors to access and possess “[…] 
information that is difficult, if not impossible, for suppliers to obtain otherwise”. 
Hence, the intermediary position of the large TOs enables them to have direct 
contact with customers and competitors through their agreements. In addition, the 
sheer size of their operations facilitates access to, and possession of, information; 
and that can increase their bargaining power. In contrast, the structure of the tourism 
distribution channel and the smaller size of the APs do not facilitate access to 
information on demand trends and competitors, thus restricting the bargaining power 
of the APs in relation to the TOs, in both contractual and non-contractual 
negotiations.  
Furthermore, Kim and Fragale (2005) stated that, in negotiations, party A 
can influence the outcome of the negotiation by altering the value of party B’s best 
alternative to the negotiated agreement. Hence, with more accurate information the 
TOs are in a position to influence the perception of the AP, for instance, regarding 
the value that an exclusivity contract might have in contrast to a commitment 
contract. Consequently, information is an important resource that can increase the 
perceived value of APs in the relationship with TOs and in turn influence the type of 
contractual agreement. Information is also a critical source of power that the TOs 
have that contributes to their bargaining power in negotiations with APs.  
Product differentiation is another significant resource for APs. Three AP 
participants asserted:  
“[Y]ou are in a better position to negotiate when you have a 
differentiated product. Your product may be differentiated from its 
history and feedback from customers [quality], or the hardware 
[physical infrastructure], or if the TO perceives that your product is 
differentiated from other products he offers.” (IG:2) 
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“[…] so if the product is good then the TOs want it. For example, 
[name of a unit] was working with [name of TO], however another 
large TO also wanted to start working with them because there are 
only a few products that are family oriented in the market.” (SH:8) 
“[T]his unit is different from other units and in part this is due to the 
fact that it is a member of an international chain hotel organisation 
that houses a number of well-known brands. […] We have also so 
many facilities that differentiate our product in the ROC market.” 
(SH:5) 
Within the context of the study a unit might be differentiated based on a number of 
aspects: whether the unit is associated with a well-known brand, whether the TOs 
perceive the unit as offering something unique in comparison to the other units in 
the market, or whether the unit offers something unique in comparison to the variety 
of products that the TOs offer. This differentiation is an important resource that 
increases the attractiveness of the unit for the exchange partner. This finding is 
similar to that of Pearce (2007), who examined international intermediary supplier 
selection activities in New Zealand and identified that product, a new differentiated 
product, and market fit (fulfilling the intermediaries’ customers’ needs) are vital 
factors in supplier selection. 
A product can be considered as differentiated if any noteworthy element 
exists that distinguishes the product of one seller from another and results in one 
variety of the product being favoured over the other (Becerra et al. 2013). Porter 
(1980) emphasised that differentiation can insulate a firm against competition since 
buyers have favourites and loyalties to specific suppliers. A unit that is perceived as 
differentiated by the TOs, and is of importance to the achievement of their 
organisational objectives, can result in dependence from the perspective of the TO as 
there are limited alternatives to accessing this unique resource. The hospitality 
industry also has high entry barriers due to the enormous amount of investment that 
is needed for buildings (Tavitiyaman et al. 2011). Further, within the context of the 
mature tourism industry of the ROC, high construction and operational costs exist 
(Tsangari 2012). Thus, although current units renovate their product, new 
differentiated products are not common. Hence, a differentiated product increases 
the stakes that the TOs have in the relationship with the APs to access a valuable 
resource, which typically results in commitment and exclusivity contracts agreed in 
negotiations. Additionally, given that a differentiated product is perceived as 
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valuable by the TOs it is also considered a source of power for the APs, influencing 
their bargaining power in negotiations. 
Closely related to differentiation, the researcher found that a small number of 
luxury units that are perceived as differentiated products with a good reputation and 
repeat clientele (which are important intangible resources), predominantly operate 
with allotment contracts with the TOs. As two AP participants noted:  
“[…] with our hotel being a 5 star luxury resort, we don’t have any 
commitments like other hotels or large special allotment contracts. 
The TOs want my hotel and I want them to come.” (SH:13) 
“[W]e have different products, they are niche market products, 
therefore, contracts with the TOs do not make much difference for 
us.” (SH:4) 
That is to say, these luxury units target niche markets away from the mass packaged 
market of the large TOs and choose to operate predominantly with allotment 
contracts. This is because the APs do not believe that their products correspond to 
the requirements of large TOs that could lead to high investment contracts such as 
commitment or exclusivity. Furthermore, these units are able to generate sufficient 
sales through other distribution channels due to their strong competitive product. 
Their dependence on large TOs for tourism flow is, therefore, reduced. Hald et al. 
(2009) claimed that dependence between the parties moderates the perceived value 
and in turn the level of closeness of the relationship between a buyer and supplier. 
Due to the low dependence in these cases it can be argued that neither APs nor TOs 
perceive that they can gain significant benefits or value from the relationship to 
justify a close high investment relationship. Consequently, a small number of units 
who own valuable intangible resources mainly operate with allotment contracts.  
6.2.1.3.	 Conclusion		
This proposition identifies the firm-specific resources of the APs and 
examines their value as perceived by the TOs in order to establish how they 
influence the type of contract agreed between the parties. Firm-specific resources 
create dependencies between the parties that determine the type of contract agreed in 
negotiations. The more valuable the resources each party has to offer to each other, 
the higher the degree of dependence between the APs and TOs. In turn, a higher 
dependency level leads to a closer contractual relationship between the parties. Each 
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type of contract has different characteristics and function and signifies the 
relationship context of the negotiation interactions. These firm-specific resources are 
recognised as sources of power for the APs. This is because the more valuable the 
resources the parties have to offer to each other, the higher the dependence between 
the parties, which in turn determines the bargaining power that each party has in 
relation to the other. 
Having discussed the firm-specific sources of power for the APs and TOs 
and determined their bargaining power, the section below focuses on the destination-
specific sources of power for the APs. In particular, how the external structure 
government policies/regulations, culture and industry characteristics, influences 
these sources of power and as such their bargaining power in relation to the TOs in 
contractual and non- negotiations. 
6.2.2. Proposition 2: Government policies/regulations, culture and 
industry characteristics influence contractual and non-contractual 
negotiations through their impact on destination-specific resources 
6.2.2.1.	 Introduction		
This proposition focuses on the destination-specific resources of the APs, 
destination attractiveness and destination characteristics. Specifically, the analysis 
shows that destination attractiveness and destination characteristics, are sources of 
power for the APs and contribute to their bargaining power in relation to the TOs. 
However, the analysis also indicates the external structure, government 
policies/regulations, culture and industry characteristics, can increase or constrain 
the attractiveness of these resources towards the TOs, thus influence the APs 
bargaining power in relation to the TOs in contractual and non-contractual 
negotiations. All propositions are interrelated and interconnected. Thus, to avoid 
repetition a more detailed examination of industry characteristics (such as 
destination expensiveness, oversupply of accommodation units in the ROC and 
seasonality) and their impact on the bargaining power of APs and TOs and their 
negotiations is made within the discussion for the fifth proposition (section 6.2.5). 
To critically analyse this first proposition, bargaining power literature (Chapter 2) 
and tourism literature (Chapter 3 and 4) is employed. Furthermore, as mentioned 
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earlier, in line with Grounded Theory, additional literature is used to fully analyse 
the findings, in particular literature relating to tourism policy, and tourism 
destination management and competitiveness. 
The data analysis reveals that destination-specific resources, namely 
destination characteristics and destination attractiveness, are important resources that 
contribute to the bargaining power of the APs. Hence, they can either constrain or 
increase the bargaining power of APs in relation to the TOs during their 
negotiations. This can be attributed to the fact that the tourism product is an 
amalgamation of activities, services, attractions and destination characteristics that 
shape the tourist’s experience (Meethan 2004). Therefore, tourism and the tourism 
product are embedded in the particular nature of specific destinations (Meethan 
2004), and it is not surprising that destination characteristics (such as climatic 
conditions and natural resources) and destination attractiveness are identified as 
important AP resources. This is because the destination-specific resources contribute 
to the total product offering from the APs to the TOs, and thus contribute to the 
AP’s bargaining power. Destination attractiveness denotes the extent to which the 
destination can fulfil the tourist’s needs in terms of accessibility, quality and 
management of tourism services, the destination’s physical attributes, and tourist 
motivations (Crompton 1979; Cracolici and Nijkamp 2009). Crouch (2011) also 
found that a destination’s climatic conditions and physiography (natural scenery) are 
major resource advantages that contribute to its attractiveness and its 
competitiveness.  
The competitiveness and attractiveness of a destination are critical given that 
a less competitive and attractive destination can drive tourists and TOs to explore 
other destinations (Kozak 1999). As stated in Chapter 4, the ROC is a popular mass 
sun-and-sea Mediterranean destination (European Commission 2015b). Hence, it is 
a destination that can fulfil the needs of tourists. The data analysis indicates that 
these destination-specific resources are critical sources of power, that contribute to 
the bargaining power of the APs, which in turn influences their bargaining power 
interactions with the TOs during negotiations. Therefore, it is important to consider 
how the external structure, government policies/regulations and culture, in the ROC, 
can influence the destination-specific sources of power of the APs as the external 
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structure can restrict or increase the bargaining power of APs in relation to the TO. 
This is discussed below.  
6.2.2.2.	 Discussion	of	proposition	2	
This discussion elucidates how government policies/regulations and culture 
influence the destination-specific resources of APs and in turn their bargaining 
power in relation to the TOs in negotiations. More specifically, the section below 
discusses government related issues such as the centralised Government system, 
government intervention, governmental knowledge, leadership, funding misuse, 
government devolution, clientelism, clashing of individual interests, accountability, 
and Government/industry cooperation. In addition, cultural factors induced from 
interview data are also examined, namely, short-termism and Greek-Cypriot 
mentality. These issues are interrelated and interconnected and are discussed 
together to explain the influence of the external structure on the APs destination-
specific resources (destination characteristics and destination attractiveness), and 
subsequently their bargaining power in relation to the TOs.  
The current centralised Government system of the ROC constrains its ability 
to improve destination attractiveness. As two of the Government officials in this 
study stated:  
“[T]he governing party should pay attention in identifying the 
problems in the current procedures we have. We must simplify the 
procedures to facilitate tourism investment and planning to improve 
the destination. As the CTO we are constantly asking for a 
simplification of the current procedures, but it is difficult to get 
through the red tape.” (GO:2) 
“[…] the current policies and regulations are helpful but we are 
trying to modernise them, in order to be more flexible and relevant. 
[…] just to let you know that 3-4 years ago we prepared a new 
institutional framework for the accommodation industry, we re-
examined the entire framework that coordinates the tourism industry 
and we submitted this to the General Attorney for editorial and legal 
control. Three years later and that document is still in the General 
Attorney’s department waiting to be reviewed!” (GO:3) 
Two AP participants also pointed out:  
“[…] the bureaucracy that exists in this country is ridiculous. We 
need to re-organise the system to avoid this bureaucracy. […] we 
have all the ingredients to be successful […] we just need to make 
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some changes and to package everything better to make our product 
more attractive to the tourists and the TOs.” (SH:3) 
“[…] what worries me is that the ROC as a destination does not have 
any tourists that book directly. I hope that some people are thinking 
about this problem, but from what I can see this is not of particular 
concern to the Government and the CTO. […] it is worrying because 
the ROC as a destination does not have an identity or a particular 
attribute in order to attract demand unassisted so we depend 100% 
on the TOs […] we rely on these agreements. […] the Government 
must finally develop some tourism areas correctly to gain an identity, 
but you know how difficult it is to get things done here […] with all 
this bureaucracy.” (SH:7) 
The statements above highlight the frustration of the majority of participants with 
the current governmental system that inhibits tourism development and destination 
attractiveness. The findings indicate that the centralised bureaucratic Government 
system often delays policy-making and prevents issues from being addressed that 
could contribute to the success of the ROC as a destination. This is because such 
government structures are often inflexible and unresponsive (Yüksel et al. 2005; 
Meyer and Hammerschmid 2010) to the demands of a dynamic market such as 
tourism. In particular, the “[…] top-down, centralised and bureaucratic approach” 
(Ruhanen et al. 2010, p.5) that the ROC has adopted has resulted in central 
Government being the decision-maker for the provision of the necessary 
infrastructure, planning control, the marketing and promotion of the destination and 
the development of the public good. This bureaucratic system hinders such activities 
such as improving the current tourism product and addressing obsolete and 
inadequate policy-making and regulations.  
With regard to the improvement of the destination’s attractiveness, a 
Government official asserted: 
“[…]we could have been at a better position as a destination […]but 
so many things are missing from the tourism product of the ROC due 
to the bureaucracy that exists on this island.” (GO:7) 
Three AP participants also noted: 
“[T]he CTO is good at advertising and creates lovely campaigns but 
you need to have the necessary infrastructure to support your 
advertising.” (SH:13) 
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“[…] none of the cultural heritage areas are well kept. […]. Most of 
the roads are in bad shape, there are no pavements […] there is no 
infrastructure.” (SH:2) 
“[T]he tourism product of the ROC is not unique, like other 
destinations such as Sardinia for example which has beautiful well 
thought-out surroundings and can attract high paying clientele.  In 
that resort [Sardinia] TOs are begging the APs to give them rooms, 
but they [APs] don’t really need to because they can keep the 
occupancy high on their own. […] unfortunately this is not the case 
for the ROC, unfortunately most of the hotels are dependent on the 
TOs. For example we only just started building marinas […] I 
remember when they first mentioned developing marinas; that was 23 
years ago.” (SH:4) 
The above statements highlight the fact that the centralised governmental structure 
leads to the unsuccessful enrichment, diversification and improvement of the current 
sun-and-sea product. 
Government policies/regulations and the management of the destination play 
a critical role in enhancing the destination’s attractiveness and in turn its 
competitiveness (Crouch and Ritchie 1999; Crouch 2011). Since 2003, for instance, 
the enrichment and improvement of the sun-and-sea product has been an important 
strategic objective for the ROC, aiming to increase its attractiveness, diversify its 
source markets and decrease seasonality (CTO 2003). More than 10 years on, 
however, over-reliance on the sun-and-sea product is still evident. Further, this 
dependency contributes to the diminishing tourism season resulting in seasonal 
employment, overstretching of physical resources and low profitability of the 
suppliers during the low season (Farsari et al. 2007; Karyopouli and Koutra 2012). 
Indeed, as Sharpley (2001) pointed out, and in line with the findings of this thesis, 
there are substantial differences between planned and actual tourism development in 
the ROC.  
This is also in agreement with Saveriades (2014) who argued that the 
implementation of tourism strategies in the ROC is hindered significantly by the 
bureaucratic processes that a suggested project has to undergo to be accepted. Thus 
it can be argued that the delays that occur due to the Government system contribute 
to the poor performance of the ROC in achieving its strategic aims (such as 
diversification and product differentiation) which are to improve its competitiveness. 
This constrains the bargaining power of the APs in relation to the TOs because the 
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value of the AP’s destination-specific sources of power (such as destination 
attractiveness) is restricted. That is to say, failure to improve the attractiveness of the 
ROC also reduces the attractiveness of the AP product offered to the TOs, thus 
reducing their bargaining power in negotiations.  
The findings indicate that the problem may lie in inadequate governmental 
devolution.33 The CTO is a semi-governmental organisation and the principle entity 
involved in tourism, and it relies on government funding from the Ministry of 
Energy, Industry, Commerce and Tourism34 for its operations. In relation to the 
insufficient governmental devolution, two Government officials stated: 
“[…] we began discussing building casinos in the 1990s, however 
the CTO could not just take the decision. This issue was, and still is, 
a political decision.” (GO:1) 
“[…] the development of new tourism products and infrastructure is 
not only down to the CTO […], you also need other governmental 
bodies to show the same interest.” (GO:4) 
A participant from the food and beverage sector also asserted:  
“[T]he role of the CTO is not legally established, it has no authority. 
The CTO as it is today does not even have the power and was never 
given the authority that it needed to have a more active role in 
implementing the policies and strategies for tourism.” (FB:1) 
In other words, although the CTO is responsible for planning, promotion and 
marketing, they have little authority over tourism development and decision-making 
is left to the Central Government, resulting in delays.  
Where the CTO has a more influential role, little authority is given. As 
Sharpley (2003) noted, although the CTO has control over licences for tourism 
related establishments it does not have the authority to decide whether 
establishments should be built in the first place. Therefore, there is inadequate 
governmental devolution (Pastras and Bramwell 2013) with the Central Government 
still retaining control by enforcing an audit culture about actions taken and control 
                                                
33 ‘Governmental devolution’ refers to the relocation of decision-making power from central states to 
other entities such as a semi-governmental organisation (Furqan and Mat Som 2010). 
34 The Ministry’s key responsibilities entail enactment of laws, policies and regulations, coordination 
of governmental entities involved in tourism development, approval of plans, and budget allocation. 
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over financial resources to create dependency. In the ROC, as per the regulations 
imposed by the Government, any expenses of the CTO over £50,000 must be 
approved by the Minister (Republic of Cyprus Regulation: P.I. 175/97). 
Consequently, although the central state has ceded responsibility for tourism to the 
CTO, in an effort to decentralise its activities, it failed to devolve authority to the 
CTO to effectively and efficiently fulfil its responsibilities and to facilitate tourism 
development in the ROC. 
As a result, as one AP participant stated, “[…] the CTO is a ‘dead’ 
organisation, all talk and no action” (SH:5). That is to say, as it stands the CTO does 
not serve a useful purpose in the tourism industry, which is a view shared by a 
number of industry participants. In turn this has a direct impact on the bargaining 
power of the APs. This is because the only organisation solely responsible for 
tourism does not have the necessary authority to drive and implement tourism 
policies and strategies that can improve the attractiveness their product offering to 
the TOs, thus enhancing their bargaining power towards the TOs.  
In addition, the lack of accountability in the Government is another factor 
highlighted by all industry participants as a major constraint on tourism 
development. Three AP participants commented: 
“[I]f you don’t give someone a target and a deadline and check on 
them, time goes on without anything happening.” (SH:11) 
 “[…] who evaluates you as a CTO employee? Nobody. The 
employees of the CTO work whenever they feel like it.” (HA:2) 
“[…] in order to improve the situation with the CTO they need to 
take away the security of working in the public sector. How can 
someone keep his job until his retirement without assessing if he is 
good at his job or not? They need to be assessed like in the private 
sector.” (TV:4) 
The above statements signify that in the government sector, for example in the CTO, 
the majority of employees are not held accountable for failing to efficiently and 
effectively fulfil their responsibilities. Hence, it can be argued that there is 
insufficient accountability, and therefore responsibility, within the government 
sector causing delays in planning and implementation of tourism related activities. 
Equally, Dodds (2007), commenting on sustainable policy in Malta, highlighted that 
a barrier to sustainability was the fact that Government officials were not held 
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accountable for implementing policies. Insufficient accountability becomes 
particularly relevant when implementing policies and strategies to enhance 
destination attractiveness and increase its competitive value. Elliot (1997) claimed 
that accountability is essential in civil servants to direct their power towards 
achieving broadly accepted national aims, with the highest level of efficiency, 
effectiveness, integrity and prudence.  
However, this is not the case for the ROC, where promotion within 
Government is based on years of service rather than individual performance and 
political contacts play an important role in promotions. Therefore, remuneration of 
individuals is not linked to performance and low-productivity employees are not 
monitored or regulated directly (Scoppa 2009). As a result, Government employees 
are not held accountable, and thus responsible, for their individual performance or 
for actions that need to be taken. Hence, within the context of the study, it is 
apparent that insufficient accountability, and thus responsibility for tourism related 
actions, impedes the efficiency and effectiveness of Government bodies such as the 
CTO. In turn, the implementation of policies and strategies that can increase 
destination competitiveness and its success are hindered. 
Considering the issues discussed above, it is unsurprising that the majority of 
industry participants highlighted the inadequacy of tourism leadership. As one 
participant from the tourism association stressed: “[…] nobody is leading tourism in 
the ROC; nobody cares” (THA:1), whilst a TO participant said: “[…] the CTO is 
just not proactive” (TO:1). A Government official also stated: 
“[…] our Government leaders used to tell us: ‘keep quiet, the least 
said the better’. If our leaders have the mentality of don’t change 
anything, don’t improve anything, isn’t only natural for things to take 
a turn for the worst?” (GO:5) 
Three AP participants also noted: 
“[…] we are losing ground in the tourism arena, there is no strategy 
in place from anyone.” (IG:3) 
“[C]TO staff are afraid to take initiative […] Government parties 
are scared to lose their seat. They just turn a blind eye to the 
problems of tourism.” (TV:1) 
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“[W]e must find people to lead us. People who only care about […] 
their salary like the Government officials do not have vision.” 
(SH:11) 
The above statements indicate that participants perceived the current tourism 
leadership as inadequate and inactive in dealing with the challenges that the industry 
faces. This is because satisfying individual interests and the interests of their 
political parties are at the forefront at the CTO, the only organisation solely 
responsible for tourism in the ROC. This is a characteristic that Garci and Dodds 
(2010, p.65) termed a “[…] pass the buck” mentality, transferring the responsibility 
to other stakeholders (such as other businesses, the Government or tourists) and 
resulting in inactivity. This can be attributed to the governmental labour structure 
where individuals focus on satisfying political agendas.  
From the researcher’s experience, derived from growing up in the ROC, 
Government jobs are particularly attractive due to the fact that they offer a 
significantly higher salary than private sector jobs, job security, and good working 
conditions. Therefore, Government employees frequently avoid taking actions or 
initiatives that risk their position. They prefer to accept the status quo, in the sense 
that they choose to act in accordance with what is expected of them, regardless of 
the consequences for tourism related issues. Bornhorst et al. (2010) found that 
personnel and the leadership style of the Destination Management Organisation 
(DMO) significantly influenced the success of the destination. Hence, it can be 
asserted that the idleness of the leadership in the CTO has a negative impact on 
destination success. In turn, this has restricted the bargaining power of the APs 
because inadequate improvement is evident in destination-specific resources. 
Furthermore, all industry and Government participants stated that flight 
connectivity is inadequate, which is also a factor that restricts the ability of the 
destination to enter new markets. Four AP participants stated:  
 “[…] we have to do something regarding the flight connectivity. We 
have to increase them and reduce our dependence on the TOs.” 
(SH:2) 
 “[…] there are insufficient flights. There is not enough traffic from 
the main heart of Europe.” (IG:3) 
“[…] every TO decides on a certain number of seats on a plane and 
in the ROC that is what is important. No one can come here without a 
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plane so the biggest dependency is which TOs, from where, and how 
many seats.” (IG:1) 
“[W]e are stuck on the UK market, and of course it is going well but 
we need to find new markets for a change. We need to increase our 
connections in terms of flights with other markets, because currently 
we are stuck with the same markets so we are stuck with the same 
TOs.” (SH:6) 
A travel agent also noted: 
“[W]e have not managed to create a successful combination of 
different source markets […] we should not rely on 1 or 2 markets 
but on 7 or 8 markets.” (TA:1) 
The statements indicate the need to improve accessibility from current markets as 
well as open new markets to decrease the ROC dependency on a small number of 
TOs which operate in established markets such as the UK and Germany. Crouch 
(2011) ascertained that accessibility to the destination is a major determinant in a 
destination’s attractiveness and competitiveness. He suggested that destinations 
should place emphasis on the identification of solutions to facilitate travel to those 
destinations. 
Since joining the EU in 2004, the ROC has followed the fully liberalised air 
transport regulations stipulated by the EU. Specifically, EU Council Regulations 
2407/92, 2408/92 and 2409/92, that took effect in January 1993, eliminated all 
government constraints, resulting in the establishment of a single uniform air market 
with no government restrictions within its Member states (EC 2012). Accordingly, 
in the case of the ROC, the number of air carriers increased with more charter 
airlines such as Monarch and low-cost carriers such as easyJet and Ryanair entering 
the market (Monarch 2007; easyJet 2008; Hermes Airport Ltd. 2010). In 2013, for 
example, easyJet added a new direct route from Larnaka to Liverpool (Hermes 
2013). This increase in air carriers improved accessibility to the destination but it did 
not result in the opening up of any new markets for the ROC. This is also supported 
by the fact that, the CTO’s strategic plan identified three major markets, the UK, 
Russia and Germany, as high priority markets, with Scandinavian countries as 
secondary markets in 2003 (CTO 2003). In the 2011-2015 strategic plan, the UK, 
Russia, Germany, and northern countries such as those of Scandinavia were still 
identified as high priority markets (CTO 2011). Therefore, it can be asserted that the 
increase in the number of air carriers did not reduce the dependency on the few 
  
209 
traditional large TOs that generate most of the tourism traffic from the established 
markets, such as the UK and Germany. In 2013, 58% of tourists visiting the ROC 
travelled on a packaged arrangement (CYSTAT 2014). Consequently, the level of 
control of the small number of large TOs on the tourism flow, and subsequently on 
the APs, still stands.  
This has a considerable impact on the industry and the bargaining power of 
the APs. For example, four AP participants highlighted:  
“[…] if TUI, Thomas Cook and Biblio Globus decide to withdraw 
from the ROC we will definitely feel like we have pneumonia.” (IG:2) 
“[…] there are also many small TOs but their decisions in terms of 
the way they operate or how they manage their product do not really 
influence us like the large TOs. What I mean is, if today Biblio 
Globus decided to withdraw from the market, until another Russian 
TO fills the market gap it is certain that the Russian tourist arrivals 
will be reduced.” (IG:1) 
“[…] people might say that they will not accept the TOs’ demands, 
they will react and fight and so on, but at the end of the day they will 
submit because there is no alternative solution for the APs.” (HA:4) 
“[…] it is a monopoly. The TOs control all the tourists, so you can 
understand that when someone has the monopoly for something 
he/she has the upper hand. So the TOs have the upper hand in the 
ROC with all their suppliers.” (SH:2) 
Put differently, these three large TOs, TUI, Thomas Cook and Biblio Globus, are the 
backbone of tourism flow for the ROC, hence they have a highly influential role in 
the destination and their operations can have an impact on the industry as a whole. 
Consequently, it can be argued that, due to the oligopolistic tour operating market in 
the ROC there is dependency on a small number of large TOs. An industry that is 
highly concentrated, meaning a small number of firms holding a large market share, 
is characterised by durable relative power (Porter 1980). This is because, following 
power-dependence theory, the power of a party derives from the dependence that 
that one party has on the resources of the other to accomplish its organisational aims 
(Emerson 1962). Thus, given that APs have a limited number of alternatives (TOs) 
from which to receive a critical resource (tourism flow) that they need, their 
bargaining power is restricted in contractual and non-contractual negotiations. As an 
AP participant also noted “[…] if you have direct bookings, then you can be 
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independent from the TOs […] control your rates, currently they control most of the 
tourists.” (SH:13). (The control that the TOs have over the tourism flow in the ROC 
is discussed further in sections 6.2.5 and 6.2.6). Therefore, it can be argued that the 
fact that the ROC has not been able to diversify its source markets and facilitate 
other TOs to enter the market considerably restricts the APs’ bargaining power.  
One reason that the ROC was not able to enter new markets may be the 
inadequate flight deregulation from non-EU markets. This view was supported by 
twelve participants (both from the industry and the government sector). As four AP 
participants stated: 
“[I] hope in the future, for the benefit of future generations, a 
deregulation of flights will occur, that the market will be free.” 
(SH:6) 
 “[T]he only way that we might be able to get a little bit of freedom in 
our decisions [in relation to the TOs] is to attract a more low-cost 
airlines. […] in this way customers are free to make their own 
accommodation arrangements thus the intermediary is gone. […] 
The Government needs to lift the flight restrictions that they have and 
improve accessibility.” (SH:1). 
“[…] the Government needs to take action and fully deregulate the 
flights and promote open skies and hopefully increase tourist arrivals 
in the ROC.” (SH:8) 
 “[…] we must enter new markets and deregulate the flights not only 
from Europe but also from other countries. […] such as the Gulf 
countries […]currently the TOs control 80% of the flights and seats 
to the ROC. We depend on them we need them.” (SH:11)  
Inadequate flight liberalisation allows the Government to impose regulations in 
terms of the number of airlines, frequency of flights, and fares for certain routes 
through bilateral agreements between countries (IATA 2007). Hence, the lack of an 
‘open-skies’ policy that advocates the full deregulation of routes, with no 
government-imposed restrictions, further constrains the accessibility of the island. In 
addition, it contributes to the bargaining power of the large TOs since the over-
reliance on the traditional markets (UK, Russia, Germany and Scandinavian 
countries) and established TOs is maintained. Hence, it can be asserted that given 
that a small number of large TOs control the tourism flow from the traditional 
source markets, this increases the bargaining power in relation to the APs enabling 
the TOs to dominate the negotiations with the APs.  
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Regarding the insufficient deregulation of flights it should be noted that 
participants mentioned that the Government was protecting Cyprus Airways, the 
national carrier, by refusing to deregulate the flights from non-EU countries. This 
was due to their financial interests in Cyprus Airways given that the ROC 
Government was the majority shareholder owning 93% of shares (BBC 2015). 
However, following the completion of the data collection, further developments 
occurred regarding Cyprus Airways. Specifically, the continuing state aid to Cyprus 
Airways prompted an investigation by the European Commission (EC) to examine 
whether further state aid can ensure the long-term viability of the airline (European 
Commission 2014). In January 2015, however, the EC decided that Cyprus Airways 
was not a viable organisation and halted the proposed state aid. As a result in 
January 2015 Cyprus Airways closed its doors (SigmaLive 2015b).  
Although the impact that the closure of Cyprus Airways will have on tourism 
arrivals is still not evident, the fact remains that it effectively reduces the 
accessibility of the ROC. This reduced accessibility could further contribute to the 
bargaining power of large TOs in relation to the APs because the TOs are able to 
transfer tourists using their own flights. Therefore, the mismanagement of the 
national carrier by the Government has reduced the accessibility of the destination 
and, as such, its competitiveness.  
Another factor that hinders tourism policy and flight deregulation is the clash of 
individual interests between stakeholder groups, for example the Government and 
the industry sector (such as individual firms, and tourism and hospitality 
associations). Two AP participants highlighted:  
“[…] the ROC Government gave the operation of the two airports to 
a single private company. They gave them the monopoly. As a result 
the Government reached a point where it had to plead and beg the 
company, as well as incentivise them, to allow Ryan Air to fly to the 
ROC. […] It is absurd.” (SH:8) 
 
“[…] I don’t think it is the Government that does not endorse the 
deregulation of flights; this is based on the interests that some parties 
have, to keep the monopolistic markets. This is similar to the 
Electricity Authority of the ROC, or the telecommunications company 
that had a monopoly for so many years. There are so many individual 
interests that need to be considered.” (SH:3) 
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The above statements point to the importance of private industry interests in tourism 
policy-making given that both airports are privately owned. In 2006, Hermes 
Airports Ltd, a private company, assumed the management and full control of both 
Larnaka and Paphos airports under a 25-year agreement with the ROC Government 
(Hermes Airports Ltd 2014). This action created a monopolistic market and gave 
one single company a very strong position in the industry in terms of influencing 
tourism policy-making in general and aviation policy in particular. Therefore, the 
interests of Hermes Airports Ltd had to be considered in the incentive scheme that 
the Government pursued to develop and implement. In particular, the current 
incentive scheme, in the form of monetary contribution per passenger and lower 
landing fees, which Hermes Airports Ltd offers, derives from a joint agreement with 
the Government to contribute to this monetary incentive (Hermes Airports Ltd. 
2014).  
The clash of individual interests is a common issue that constrains policy 
development and implementation (Hall 1999; Bramwell and Sharman 1999; Bianchi 
2004; Czernek 2013). Similarly, Sharpley (2003, p.259) identified that tourism and 
hospitality associations in the ROC were relatively powerful and often engaged in 
“[…] fierce lobbying” to achieve their objectives. He noted that accommodation 
associations had often prevented past efforts by the Government to reduce the 
growth of mass tourism in order to keep their occupancy levels. Therefore, it is 
apparent that the clash of diverse interests (such as Hermes Airports Ltd. and the 
Government) influenced policy-making and the deregulation of flights, thus 
reducing the destination’s competitiveness. In turn, this restricts the bargaining 
power of the APs in relation to the TOs. 
Nevertheless, despite the clash of individual interests that often occurs 
during policy-making, the majority of the AP participants commented on inadequate 
government intervention to improve their product. ‘Government intervention’ is 
defined as government activity aimed at changing the flow of resources to specific 
groups or actions in the economy in search of social economic and other objectives 
(Michael 2001). These government activities can take the form of subsidies and 
incentive schemes. As five AP participants highlighted: 
“[…] the Government must give strong incentives, tax incentives, for 
the APs to upgrade their units.” (SH:6) 
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“[A]ll the incentives given by the Government go to the TOs. There is 
no support for the APs. The units are tired and not renovated and 
have very high costs.” (SH:7) 
“[T]he hotels are tired in comparison to what the tourists can find in 
other competitive destinations.” (HA:3) 
“[A]fter 10-15 years of operations you will need to renovate the 
product and unfortunately due to the low profit margin that the hotel 
has had over the years there won’t be enough money left to reinvest 
in your business.” (TV:2) 
“[…] the units that have partnerships with large TOs or receive 
advance payments are the units that are able to renovate and 
constantly upgrade and improve their product.” (TV:3) 
In other words, most APs are asking for incentive schemes, such as tax incentives, to 
relieve some of the high operational costs and to offer financial aid to improve their 
infrastructure. Twenty APs supported this view. Given the high operational costs for 
the APs and inadequate profit, the financial capacity of the APs to renovate, with no 
aid from external actors, is limited.  
On the other hand, two Government officials commented:  
“[…] the APs should not constantly ask for subsidies. The CTO paid 
13 million Euro as subsidies for APs to renovate their products.” 
(GO:6) 
“[T]he Government has always given subsidies to the APs […] of 
course the APs are always asking for them either to help with 
upgrading their product or reducing the electricity tax […] however 
the Government cannot be constantly responsible.” (GO:3) 
The above statements indicate that Government officials believed that there had 
been sufficient aid given to the APs. This was supported by three Government 
officials. In 2010 the Government allocated 500 million Euro for the economic 
rejuvenation of the ROC following the global economic crisis, a share of which was 
allocated to the accommodation sector in the form of planning incentives to improve 
and enrich their infrastructure (Republic of Cyprus 2010).  
Nonetheless, five years after the above mentioned incentive by the 
Government, the APs are again calling for more government aid to help them 
renovate their product. As also discussed in section 6.2.1 a unit’s infrastructure and 
product quality have been identified as two key resources that increase the 
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bargaining power of the AP in relation to the TOs. This is because the physical 
aspects and design of the room are two significant factors that steer the purchasing 
decisions of consumers and contribute to customer satisfaction (Hassanien 2006). 
Therefore, these are considered to be valued resources that increase the 
competitiveness of the APs, and can also improve the competitiveness of 
destinations (Claver-Cortés et al. 2007) such as the ROC. Claver-Cortés et al. (2007) 
examined the competitiveness of Benidorm, a mass sun-and-sea destination in 
Spain, and claimed that the competitive strategy of the accommodation sector in a 
destination has a direct influence on the competitiveness of the destination as a 
whole. This is because the success of the area depends on the performance of its 
businesses. Thus, it can be asserted that the difficulty experienced by APs in terms 
of improving their infrastructure has a direct influence: it not only restricts their 
bargaining power in relation to the TOs, but also constrains the competitiveness of 
the ROC as a destination. As a result, the dependence of the APs on the TOs 
remains, and it restricts the AP’s bargaining power in negotiations.  
The unsuccessful government intervention regarding incentives for APs can 
be attributed to the short-term perspective that the Government adopts with regard to 
tourism policy. All industry participants noted the short-term perspective the 
Government takes regarding tourism issues. For example, in relation to government 
intervention to increase tourist arrivals a TO participant noted: 
“[P]utting a greater volume of tourists into the industry is a quick fix 
for the situation but it is certainly not a long-term fix for the industry 
here.” (TO:2) 
Equally, an AP participant argued: 
“[E]verything is short-term in the ROC. If you measure the distance 
from the door of your house to the pavement it is probably around 2-
3 metres and this is approximately as far as locals consider, they are 
not interested in reading the road ahead.” (IG:2) 
A travel agent also commented: 
“[I]n the ROC we don’t have long-term planning […] particularly in 
the Government. I asked them to invest in building ties with a new 
market and to help me promote the ROC in a European country, to 
increase tourist arrivals. They told me there are not enough tourists 
coming from that market so we cannot invest in anything. How are 
the tourists going to come if they don’t invest in promoting the ROC 
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in that market in the first place? […] they only stay faithful to what 
they know, we have to learn to consider the future as well.” (TA:1) 
A local academic also stated: 
“[A]lthough incentives can help to a certain extent they are not the 
appropriate policy for the ROC. […] they do not help in building the 
viability of the destination in the long-term.” (LA:2) 
As the participants noted, the Government places emphasis on short-term benefits, 
for instance increasing the number of tourists each season rather than turning their 
focus on policies that can offer a more long-term solution to the challenges that the 
industry faces. A short-term approach to tourism actions and policies is not 
unexpected given that political agendas are often for a term of five years, and more 
often than not the aim is to generate immediate results (Dodds and Butler 2010; 
Bramwell 2011). Further, the government has a responsibility to work and support 
collective interests that reflect popular will in order to maintain its legitimacy 
(Bramwell 2011). It can be claimed that increasing the current tourist arrivals is one 
such economic objective that reflects the interests of popular will (industry and 
community), due to the economic importance of tourism in the ROC. However, 
subsidies that focus on increasing tourist arrivals, thus generating immediate results, 
do not promote a long-term approach to tourism development on the island.  
This is in line with Boukas and Ziakas (2013, p. 342) who examined the 
policy responses of the ROC to the global economic crisis and concluded that 
tourism policy “[…] merely reacted” to the changes that occurred in the tourist 
arena. They continued by noting that policy in the ROC focuses on attracting tourist 
arrivals but fails to fully understand and examine the factors that lead to these 
changes and their long-term implications for the destination. Accordingly, the 
Government should promote a more long-term approach, away from short-term 
political agendas, emphasising sustainable restructuring of the destination by 
addressing key issues such as moving away from its current strong dependence on 
the TOs. Doing so could reduce the bargaining power of TOs within the destination 
and, in turn, in relation to the APs. A more successful and attractive destination 
could help the APs to offer a more attractive product to the TOs and the tourist, thus 
enhancing the bargaining power in negotiations of the APs. 
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In addition, all participants agreed that cooperation35 between the industry 
and the government sector is critical for successful tourism development. For 
example, a Government official noted:  
“[…] the cooperation of the tourism associations is critical as it 
leads to the development of a joint strategy for the future of tourism. 
Developing a strategic direction for tourism is not only a matter for 
the CTO but also of other entities whose opinion and involvement the 
CTO seeks.” (GO:2) 
An AP participant also asserted:  
“[N]owadays it is necessary for everyone to work together. This is 
where the hotel associations are helpful. The members meet regularly 
to discuss and decide on how they can increase tourism arrivals in 
the ROC. They also cooperate with the CTO.” (SH:12) 
Cooperation between the Government and industry sector interest groups is evident 
in tourism related issues, such as creating the tourism strategy and policy-making. 
Policy-making entails the agreement and cooperation of all parties involved to 
effectively and efficiently implement policy and contribute to the competitiveness of 
the destination (Bramwell 2011). Cooperation and communication between the 
industry and government sector is critical to policy-makers in order to gain expert 
information and knowledge regarding sectors that aid policy development (Tyler and 
Dinan 2001). Moreover, as mentioned earlier, Sharpley (2003) found that the 
accommodation associations in the ROC prevented attempts made by the 
Government to restrict mass tourism. Thus cooperation is vital to achieving 
consensus, avoiding conflict and creating effective tourism policies. 
Despite some participants noting that good cooperation between the Government 
and industry sectors exists, this is not a view shared by all participants. A participant 
from the tourism association highlighted: 
“[T]here is very good cooperation between the associations and the 
CTO. Don’t get me wrong, we cooperate very well […] but there are 
things that need to improve and we are cooperating in the hope of 
improving them.” (THA:2) 
An AP participant also stated: 
                                                
35 ‘Cooperation’ in tourism refers to a form of voluntary common pursuit whereby independent 
stakeholders participate in an interactive, reciprocal process by means of mutual rules, norms and 
structures to behave and decide on tourism related issues within the region (Czernek 2013).  
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“[T]here is a professional cooperation between the tourism and 
hospitality associations in the ROC, not just between them but also 
with the CTO and the Government. There is a mutual understanding 
in terms of the challenges that we face.” (SH:6) 
A Government official noted:  
“[…] we [the CTO] have an excellent cooperation with both the 
accommodation providers’ associations because at the end of the day 
the purpose is the same, to improve tourism in the ROC.” (GO:2). 
However, two AP participants argued:  
“[…] the Government must pay attention to the APs because they 
have experience and they know exactly what is going on since they 
experience it every day. […] the Government has never asked for 
advice or feedback from APs.” (SH:10) 
“[S]ometimes I go to the meetings that are organised here 
occasionally, you know between the Government and industry but it 
is a waste of time. There are only a few people there we have our 
meetings we might decide on something but nothing is implemented 
anyway […] this is all rubbish.” (SH:8) 
As the above statements indicate some participants (government and industry) 
perceive that a beneficial cooperation exists between the Government and industry 
sectors and feel engaged in tourism policy-making, whilst in contrast, other industry 
participants feel disengaged from the government sector. 
The diverse opinions may be attributed to the roles held by the participants. 
Industry participants who considered that a cooperative relationship exists between 
the industry and government sector are actively involved in, and occupy key 
positions within, tourism and hospitality associations such as the Association of 
Cyprus Travel Agents (ACTA) and Cypriot Hotel Association (CHA). These 
participants are involved in lobbying for the interests of their parties and in direct 
contact with government bodies. Equally, the majority of the government 
participants also perceived that good cooperation exists between the Government 
and industry sectors given that the Government officials interviewed hold key 
positions within the government sector, such as in the CTO. Due to their key roles in 
the tourism and hospitality associations and Government respectively, the 
participants who perceived that good cooperation exists are the first point of contact 
for communication. 
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More specifically, industry participants who occupy important positions in 
the associations have a more powerful position from which to directly influence 
policy formulation. This is in line with Farmaki et al. (2015) who found that the 
private sector in general, and particularly the tourism and hospitality associations, 
play an important part in policy-making in the ROC because tourism development is 
largely based on private investment due to the resources (land and financial) that 
they have. Hence, the study suggests that individuals actively involved in 
associations, and holding key positions, believe that there is good cooperation. 
However, most participants who perceived there was limited cooperation 
may be members of tourism and hospitality associations but are not actively 
involved in the activities. As two AP participants stated: 
“[T]he only person I see from the CTO is the inspector that visits us 
to check on the unit’s license. We have a very good relationship with 
him. He comes around he checks that everything is in order writes his 
report and that’s that.” (SH:4) 
“[T]here are no collaborative efforts and cooperation between the 
public and the private sector to understand the problems that exist. 
The Government does nothing.”(SH:11) 
As the above participants highlighted, they have limited communication with the 
government bodies and do not feel engaged with Government and industry 
initiatives for cooperation. Therefore, it can be argued that although cooperation and 
involvement in tourism policy may be evident at higher corporate tiers, this does not 
effectively transfer to operational tiers. Bramwell and Sharman (1999) found that 
dissemination of information and open communication between the representatives 
and the stakeholders positively contributes to a more successful tourism planning 
process and conflict resolution. However, the findings indicate that in the ROC, not 
all stakeholders feel engaged in tourism related policy-making, which may hinder 
successful implementation because they may believe that certain policies do not 
represent their interests and so discard them. 
A more collaborative approach by the Government and industry to engage all 
relevant stakeholders in policy-making could gain the support of all stakeholders, 
facilitating the successful implementation of tourism policies (Wray 2011). 
Therefore, in the context of the ROC there are still steps to be taken to improve 
communication between all tiers of the tourism sector, and to increase stakeholder 
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engagement to take all interests into account. This could increase commitment to 
policy implementation and promote destination success, which would help the APs 
to increase their bargaining power in relation to the TOs.  
Conversely, cultural factors also influence cooperation between the 
Government, the industry sector36 and tourism development on the island. A 
Government official stated: 
“[…] if everyone would share the vision and strategy with the CTO 
[…] tourism would be able to offer more to the economy as a whole.” 
(GO:5) 
However, as three AP participants highlighted: 
“[…] everybody has his/her own philosophy and everybody takes 
care of their own entity and their own project.” (SH:4) 
“[W]e always think we are the best […] we must understand that we 
are not the centre of the world.” (SH:5) 
“[…] we might be discussing and deciding together on issues that 
concern the industry, but the moment they leave the room the 
mentality that prevails is ‘everybody focuses on their own interests’. 
This is natural, it is human.” (TV:2) 
That is to say, the individualistic mentality that characterises the island emphasises a 
notion of self-interest and short-termism instead of the interest of the long-term 
public good and importance of collective action. The social characteristics of society 
can have an impact on policy-making and implementation (Hall and Jenkins 2004; 
Anastasiadou 2008; Czernek 2013). This is because tourism policy does not occur in 
a vacuum and socio-cultural and economic destination structures influence the 
policy-making and implementation process. Hence, the findings indicate that the 
individualistic mentality hinders tourism development and policy implementation in 
the ROC and can act as a constraint to its successful development because tourism 
actors may disregard policies that do not fit their interests.  
                                                
36 Furthermore, the negative perception of the public sector by industry participants, in one case 
describing them as clueless political cronies, also influences cooperation. However this issue will be 
discussed later (p.220).  
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Similarly, Dodds and Butler (2010) found that the individualistic nature of 
actors in Malta/Calvia acted as a barrier to effective cooperation between the private 
and public sectors and hindered policy planning and implementation as well as 
contributing to resort decline. Therefore, the study reveals that the individualistic 
and short-term mentality constrains cooperation between individuals in the ROC in 
general and between the industry sector and Government in particular. Such a 
mentality also inhibits the development and implementation of suitable strategies to 
improve the destination’s competitiveness and enhance the bargaining power of the 
APs.  
Another factor that restricts successful tourism development and thus the 
destination attractiveness is evidence of clientelism37 within the government sector. 
Two Government officials stressed: 
“[I] was forced to register with a political party so as not to lose 
another chance to get a promotion.” (GO:5) 
“[…] some older units were not built with the specifications of an 
accommodation unit as stipulated by government regulations but they 
were approved by the Parliament as tourist apartments just before 
national elections. You know how it is, the usual.” (GO:6) 
An AP participant also stated: 
“[A]s long as politicians like the CTO influence tourism and the 
decisions that political parties take influence [the industry] it is a 
difficult situation.” (TV:2) 
A participant from the hospitality association highlighted: 
“[…] for thirty years now we see the same faces in the political and 
governmental arena and even the new faces are absorbed by the 
system. This is a mistake. […] They are all actively involved in the 
political parties so naturally they support each other.” (THA:2) 
The statements indicate that political parties are at the forefront and influence 
tourism issues in the ROC through the exchange of favours, despite the fact that 
tourism activities may not adhere to official regulations. Yüksel and Yüksel (2008) 
argued that clientelism can act as an obstacle to tourism development, hampering 
effective planning and implementation of tourism objectives. This is because 
                                                
37 ‘Political clientelism’ involves the dissemination or exchange of resources (or promises) for 
political support, often but not always in the form of a vote (Auyero 1999; Hilgers 2011). 
  
221 
agreements and actions may occur that favour clientelism or patronage relationships 
within close-knit groups, rather than benefitting the destination.  
Similarly, Farmaki et al. (2015) found that personal relationships and 
clientelism govern the ROC. They (p.185) argued that the small size of the ROC 
means that “[…] political and economic elites are inevitable interlinked” creating a 
system of reciprocal exchange of favours with politicians often using their position 
to benefit and make concessions for private financial supporters. A large luxury 
development project was built, for example, in Limnis in an environmentally 
protected area (Farmaki et al. 2015). Therefore, exchange of favours, particularly 
within close-knit groups, negatively influences the planning and implementation of 
tourism policies and strategies that can help to enhance tourism resources and 
improve the attractiveness of the destination.  
Moreover, clientelism creates a lack of confidence in the knowledge of 
Government officials in tourism from the industry participants’ perspective. As one 
AP participant asserted, “[…] the CTO and the Government in general are clueless 
political cronies.” (SH:7) Two others said: 
“[…] the board of directors [CTO] always consisted of architects, 
lawyers, high school teachers, people that have connections with 
political parties […] give me one example of one person in the board 
of directors that knows how the hospitality industry works.” (SH:1) 
“[F]or example, on the board of directors they have never appointed 
a travel agent, or an AP or any other individual who understands and 
knows the industry. […] The CTO employees do not care and they 
don’t know how to do anything.” (TV:4) 
A local academic also asserted:  
 “[…] I don’t believe we have the right individuals, in the right 
positions or that they have the necessary knowledge or experience to 
deal with the problems that we have as an island, and this extends to 
the tourism industry. […] I believe that in the Government only 1% of 
the individuals are actually the right people to do the job they are 
supposed to do. The rest are useless.” (LA:1) 
That is to say, Government officials holding influential positions within tourism in 
the ROC have no direct knowledge or experience from within the tourism and 
hospitality industry. From a review of the CTO’s organisational structure, it is 
evident that only one person within the Board of Directors has a background focused 
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exclusively on the tourism industry (CTO 2014b). Other Board members have 
diverse backgrounds such as law, engineering, economics and dentistry but they are 
actively involved in various associations in relation to their profession (CTO 2014b). 
This provides further evidence of clientelism.  
Additionally, it offers partial justification for the industry sector’s perception 
that influential individuals within tourism in the ROC are not sufficiently 
knowledgeable. To secure a better management of tourism it is critical that 
government capacity with regard to employees’ understanding and knowledge of 
tourism, is adequate (Churugsa et al. 2007; Bornhorst et al. 2010). However, 
interview data indicate that the individuals responsible for directing the ROC in the 
facilitation of its current and future aims may not have the necessary tourism 
knowledge to achieve this, and this could prevent it from becoming a more 
competitive sustainable destination.  
Funding misuse by government bodies impedes also successful tourism 
development. One AP participant noted, for example, “[…] the CTO wastes money 
and time” (HA:4), and another AP participant also asserted: 
“[…] we [the CTO] have wasted huge funds instead of investing in 
the successful promotion of tourism.” (TV:1) 
Moreover, a Government official corroborated:  
“[…] now, due to the decrease in our CTO budget, we must 
concentrate on making better choices that have a return on 
investment. We must be more sensible with our budget allocation 
because we had periods that we were not sensible. […] when we had 
available budget we did not have a sensible allocation of the budget; 
our rationale was ‘since we have this available budget we should just 
invest it’ without thinking about the return on investment.” (GO:4) 
Particularly, government financial resources are not effectively used by 
governmental bodies (such as the CTO) to successfully promote tourism 
development in the ROC and in turn the destination in the global arena. Efficient 
and effective financial management by governmental tourism bodies plays a key 
role in a destination’s success. This is because effective deployment of financial 
resources to support appropriate strategies and policies can improve destination 
competitiveness (Bornhorst et al. 2010). For example, Tsartas et al. (2014) noted 
that an unsuccessful and poor marketing campaign, emphasising the saturated mass 
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tourism product, contributed to the drop in tourism arrivals in Greece between the 
years of 2008 and 2009, whereas Farmaki (2012) asserted that the Balearics, Spain, 
were able to reduce their over-reliance on the mass sun-and-sea product by 
aggressively promoting the variety of products that they offer. Hence, it can be 
asserted appropriate financial management by governmental bodies is crucial in 
enhancing destination attractiveness.  
In the case of the ROC, diversification and enhancement of the sun-and-sea 
product has been a key objective in the strategic plans of the CTO since 2000 (CTO 
2011; Farmaki 2012). However, more than a decade later, the destination’s over-
reliance on the sun-and-sea product and the same source markets is still evident. 
Accordingly, it can be argued that the inefficient and ineffective allocation of funds 
by governmental bodies act as a constraint on the ability of the destination to 
achieve its strategic objectives. In turn, this hinders tourism improvement that could 
increase the bargaining power of the APs in relation to the TOs. This is because 
reciprocity exists between the businesses and the destination, where a competitive 
and successful destination leads to competitive and successful businesses and vice-
versa (Meethan 2004). 
With the above discussion in mind it is not surprising that an AP participant 
noted: 
“[W]e need to find individuals who are wise to reorganize and 
reshape this destination, and I am talking about everyone, the 
Government included, starting from the bottom and going to the top.” 
(SH:13) 
In other words, the current tourism governance model in the ROC is not efficient or 
effective, thus it needs to be restructured to improve the destination. Governance38 is 
seen to have a broader understanding, encompassing not just the Government but 
including non-governmental actors involved in governance such as industry 
(Bramwell and Lane 2011). The effectiveness of governance can be assessed by the 
views of the relevant actors involved in policy-making (Yuksel et al. 2005). Hence, 
                                                
38 ‘Governance’ refers to the systems of governance and the methods by which societal systems are 
“governed, ruled and steered” (Bramwell and Lane 2011, p.411). It focuses on the processes for the 
control, management and “[…] mobilisation of social action and for producing social order” 
(Bramwell and Lane 2011, p.412). 
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following on from the above discussion, the findings indicate that the current model 
of governance of the Government sector in the ROC does not facilitate effective and 
efficient performance which, as Ruhanen et al. (2010) noted, are two key 
characteristics of a good governance model. As a result, this decreases the 
attractiveness of the sources of power of the APs and restricts their bargaining 
power in relation to the TOs during contractual and non-contractual negotiations.  
6.2.2.3.	 Conclusion		
External structure, government policies/regulations, culture, and industry 
characteristics, influence the destination-specific resources of APs (destination 
attractiveness and destination characteristics), and in turn either constrains or 
enables the bargaining power of the APs in relation to the TOs. In particular, the 
findings indicate that the external structure considerably restricts the ability of the 
ROC to improve its destination attractiveness and particularly to differentiate its 
product offering from other similar destinations. The analysis reveals how 
government policies/regulations and the individualistic short-term mentality restrict 
actions that need to be taken to improve tourism development. Due to these factors 
the attractiveness of the destination, and so its competitiveness, is constrained. The 
ROC is a destination that may be easily substituted by both the TOs and tourists. As 
such, the destination’s substitutability increases the substitutability of the 
accommodation product that the APs offer to the TOs. Consequently, the ROC and 
the APs are dependent on the large TOs to attract a sufficient tourism flow. Hence, 
the bargaining power of the APs in relation to the TOs is restricted.  
The above proposition examined the destination-specific resources of the 
APs, and specifically how the external structure in terms of government 
policies/regulations and culture influence these resources and in turn their 
bargaining power. In the next proposition the negotiation characteristics and 
relationship constructs are discussed to improve understanding of how this 
bargaining power is used in the contractual and non-contractual negotiations.   
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6.2.3. Proposition 3: Contractual and non-contractual negotiations are 
influenced by negotiation characteristics and relationship 
constructs 
6.2.3.1.	 Introduction	
The negotiation characteristics evident between the contractual and non-
contractual negotiations of the APs and TOs are examined in this proposition. This 
is done in order to uncover the exercise of bargaining power of both parties through 
the influence strategies that they adopt to sway the negotiation outcome. Influence 
strategies and tactics, namely rationality, threats, pressure, liability, deviance, 
inflexibility and flexibility, are identified. Further, relationship constructs, namely 
trust, reciprocity, personal relations, cooperation, competition and incentives, and 
their role in contractual and non-contractual negotiations is critically analysed. As 
noted earlier (section 6.1), Grounded Theory allows for additional literature to be 
reviewed to explain new themes discovered from the data. Thus, additional literature 
in B2B relationship marketing management, B2B supply chain management, 
influence strategies in B2B marketing management, and contract theory is utilised. 
Tourism and hospitality literature on buyer-supplier relationship management is also 
employed to better support the findings. 
The findings indicate that the type of formal contract that the parties agree 
upon affects their interactions during contractual and non-contractual negotiations. 
This is because contracts directly outline the appropriate behaviours between the 
parties (Lusch and Brown 1996; Lumineau and Malhotra 2011; Lumineau and 
Henderson 2012; Mouzas and Blois 2013). In particular, they act as coordinating 
and control mechanisms, establishing norms to guide, control and coordinate the 
behaviour of the parties. Contracts, for instance, endorse cooperation by positioning 
boundaries on the behaviour of each party and thus moderate the risk of 
opportunism by the other party (Williamson 1985, 2002).  
Therefore, each contract denotes a relationship with different characteristics 
between the APs and TOs and the type of contract gives the context to the 
interactions that occur. As highlighted in section 6.2.1, commitment and exclusivity 
contracts between APs and TOs signify a high level of dependency between the 
parties, and a close relationship characterised by high resource investment. In 
contrast, an allotment contract indicates a lower level of dependence and a more 
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distant relationship characterised by lower resource investment. Hence, 
organisations enter into a range of diverse relationships to achieve their 
organisational objectives (Bensaou 1999; Moeller et al. 2006; Caniëls and 
Gelderman 2007).  
Furthermore, the findings indicate that the type of contract and relational 
context influence the exercise of bargaining power between the parties. This 
exercise of bargaining power is manifested through various influence strategies 
(such as rationality and threats) that the parties adopt during their contractual and 
non-contractual negotiations. Influence strategies could be described as the 
communication of the bargaining power of party A to party B in an attempt to 
influence and modify the behaviour of party B according to party A’s interests 
(Wilkinson and Kipnis 1978; Frazier and Summers 1984; Gaski and Nevin 1985; 
Kumar 2005; Gelderman et al. 2008). Influence strategies signify the structure and 
content of the communication which an organisation (source) uses in their attempt to 
regulate or modify the behaviour of another organisation (target) (Ghijsen et al. 
2010). These strategies can be adopted by one party to simply coordinate with the 
other party or for more critical issues such as compliance with inter-firm initiatives 
(Payan and McFarland 2005).  
With the above in mind, this proposition is divided in two sections. The first 
section explains the characteristics of each exchange relationship based on the type 
of contract in order to set the scene (context) for the interactions that occur between 
APs and TOs. The second section discusses the bargaining power interactions 
manifested as influence strategies and tactics used by the parties and the role of 
relational constructs in the negotiations.  
6.2.3.2.	 Discussion	of	Proposition	3	
6.2.3.2.1.	 Relationship	context	determined	by	the	type	of	formal	contract		
The discussion elucidates how the characteristics of each type of contract ‒ 
commitment, exclusivity and allotment ‒ between the APs and TOs coordinate the 
behaviour and interactions that occur in their relationship, whether contractual or 
not.  
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Large TOs often engage in strategic partnerships with APs, as two AP participants 
highlighted:  
“[I]n the last three years the large TOs and especially [name of TO] 
have begun creating partnerships, through commitment and 
exclusivity contracts. Essentially the TO says to you, ‘if your hotels 
or your company works with me then you are my partner and I will 
look after you and I will give you priority in terms of bookings. And if 
I want something, such as to create a new product, I will ask you first 
and then go to someone else.” (IG:1) 
“[M]any TOs have their commitment contracts with certain APs, and 
the tourism flow that they bring to the ROC is only for their own 
hotels, their partner hotels.” (SH:4) 
As the APs mention above, the TOs create partnerships through commitment and 
exclusivity contracts, in order to secure the necessary bed capacity that they need. 
This is because, as stated in section 6.2.1, these units own important tangible and 
intangible resources that are able to fulfil the product and operational needs of the 
TO. Within these partnerships the TOs prioritise these units in terms of bookings 
and financially support them, for instance in the case of renovations. On the other 
hand, the TOs expect the APs to satisfy their requests effectively and efficiently, for 
example in terms of product needs or business needs (such as offering a lower 
price).  
Strategic partnerships indicate that a certain supplier has a better 
understanding of the buyer’s needs than most of the other firms, that the supplier has 
allocated substantial resources to fulfil the buyer’s requirements, and the two parties 
are now working more effectively together (Brennan 1997). Therefore, being a 
strategic partner with a TO operating with a commitment and exclusivity contract 
denotes a close collaborative relationship between the APs and TOs.  
Bensaou (1999) explored types of supplier-buyer relationships in the 
manufacturing sector and identified that strategic partnerships are close 
relationships. He noted that such relationships are characterised by (a) frequent 
communication, information sharing, (b) relationship-specific investment in product 
and processes, (c) long-term collaborative orientation and (d) interdependence. From 
the interview findings and the review of the contractual agreements (Chapter 5 
section 5.4.1), it is evident that these characteristics are similar in the strategic 
partnerships of APs and TOs. The researcher noted that the APs that are strategic 
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partners of the TOs often operate with long-term commitment or exclusivity 
contracts (2-3 years) and are the key accommodation suppliers of the TOs. They also 
have frequent communication due to the large volume of bookings that the APs 
receive from the TOs and relationship-specific investments are also evident. Two 
AP participants stated:  
“[…] we started a collaboration with a Russian TO […] and I have 
now enrolled most of the reception staff in a Russian language course 
so they can communicate with the clients.” (SH:7) 
“[…] once a week we organise a day full of activities only for the 
customers of our key TO. We organise a barbeque for them, we have 
a football match where the staff joins in […] when the guests are 
happy the TO is happy as well.” (HA:4) 
Hence, within a strategic partnership the APs invest resources (financial and time) to 
better serve the needs of an important key buyer, namely the TO. 
Relationship-specific investments or relational behaviours indicate activities 
that are explicitly targeted to benefit and increase the perceived value of a certain 
exchange relationship (Kim 2007). Rokkan et al. (2003) examined buyer-supplier 
relationships in the manufacturing channel and found that relationship-specific 
investments employed by one partner can increase the value of the relationship. 
Rokkan et al. (2003) also stated that relationship-specific investments can create a 
bonding effect with the receiver if the partners have a long-term view of the 
relationship and high norms of solidarity, namely the willingness of the partners to 
achieve joint benefits. Hence, specific investments that an AP makes to increase his 
ability to better serve a particular TO can establish a bond or a closeness with the 
TO.  
The TOs also invest in their relationship with the APs, as two AP 
participants stated:  
“[…] the new hotel we have built solely targets German tourists and 
the TO gave us an advance payment on bookings and contributed to 
help us build this.” (IG:1)  
“[…] the large TOs give advance payments for future bookings to 
their partners either for renovation or if an AP needs cash flow to 
continue their operations. If you have a good partnership then they 
trust you.” (TV:1) 
One TO participant also asserted:  
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“[…] when choosing accommodation units, we look at the suppliers 
that we have long-term agreements with, and we are committed to 
investments with our partners.” (TO:2) 
That is to say, both the APs and TOs take risks and invest in their strategic 
relationship engendering trust and making relationship-specific investments in order 
to support their partnership. Relationship-specific investments can increase the risk 
for opportunistic behaviour in the relationship because they can lock in the investing 
organisation to a specific relationship and the receiving organisation can take 
advantage of this (Dyer and Singh 1998; Rokkan et al. 2003). However, as Kim 
(2007) argued, specific investment and risk taking in a relationship is likely to be 
reciprocated. Thus it is evident that both parties invest and support the relationship. 
It can be argued that this enhanced bond between the AP and TO, can result in 
increased dependency of the AP on the TO given that these investments are 
implemented to enhance a particular relationship. However, specific investments of 
the supplier, to better serve the buyer, also increase the dependence of the buyer on 
the supplier (Lusch and Brown 1996). Consequently, these relational behaviours 
denote a collaborative and a long-term orientation for the relationship with high 
dependence between the APs and TOs.  
The high dependence that exists signifies a more relational exchange (Dwyer 
et al. 1987) between the partners with a commitment and exclusivity contract. A 
more relational exchange indicates a long-term relationship that develops over time 
(Dwyer et al. 1987; Benton and Maloni 2005). It also involves high levels of trust, 
cooperation, complex communication, joint planning and openness between the 
parties where the benefits and risks are shared (Ganesan 1994; Benton and Maloni 
2005). These characteristics of the relationship influence the behaviour of the parties 
and their interactions (Stanko et al. 2007; Vidal 2014).   
On the other hand, in relation to allotment contracts, three AP participants 
noted: 
“[O]ur contracts are on an allotment basis. We cooperate with all 
the TOs, the only difference is that they send us bookings once they 
fulfil their commitment contracts, or special agreements or friendly 
agreements, with the hotels that they usually operate with. Once they 
are fully booked they begin sending tourists to the rest of the hotels.” 
(SH:4) 
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“[I]f a TO has booked a certain number of seats on the plane and 
has booked a certain number of beds with its partners, they will 
firstly support and honour their contracts and then the rest of the 
bookings will be taken to the units with which they have signed an 
allotment contract.” (IG:2) 
“[…] the TOs will firstly fulfil the commitment and exclusivity 
contracts that they have, since they have a direct financial benefit 
with the prepayments they give. This is only natural so they don’t lose 
any money. Then they will go to the hotels that they have an allotment 
contract with.” (HA:4) 
Accordingly, in allotment contracts a more distant discreet relationship exists 
between the parties representing a more transactional short-term exchange. A 
discreet exchange is characterised by a short duration focusing on one-off 
transactions that occur between the parties (Whipple et al. 2010). Such exchanges 
are characterised by (a) limited communication, (b) limited information sharing 
between the parties, (c) independent planning, and (d) the benefits and risks are not 
shared (Dwyer et al. 1987; Benton and Maloni 2005). As such, these types of 
relationship do not promote trust, communication and information sharing. Hence, 
in allotment contracts the relationship between the APs and TOs is a more discreet 
short-term exchange that occurs once the large TOs fulfil their commitment and 
exclusivity contracts.  
However, even in discreet short-term exchanges relational content (such as 
cooperation, communication, commitment and reciprocity) is evident in the 
relationship to some degree (Lambe et al. 2000;	 Blois 2002; Mouzas and Blois 
2013). Therefore, in all types of contracts (commitment, exclusivity and allotment) 
between the APs and TOs some relational content is evident in the relationship. 
Commitment and exclusivity contracts, however, signify a closer relationship with 
high dependence and encompass large volume agreements, thus a more relational 
exchange exists than in an allotment contract. In turn, this influences the interactions 
and negotiation characteristics between the parties. 
Furthermore, as identified in sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2, as well as Chapter 4, 
the relationship between the APs and TOs in the ROC is characterised by 
asymmetric dependence giving the TOs stronger bargaining power in relation to the 
APs. This is partly because the ROC as a destination, and in turn the APs, is highly 
dependent on the TOs for tourism flows (Tsangari 2012; CYSTAT 2014). 
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Dependencies between parties determine the structure of the relationship and they 
have a direct influence on the interactions that arise within the relationship (Mouzas 
and Ford 2007; Frazier and Rody 1991). Hence, the influence strategies and 
interactions of the APs and TOs must be examined keeping in mind the asymmetry 
in dependencies or the asymmetry of the bargaining power between the parties. 
Having analysed the relationship characteristics for each contract, attention now 
shifts to an analysis of the contractual and non-contractual bargaining power 
interactions that occur between the APs and TOs.  
6.2.3.2.2.	 Contractual	 and	 non-contractual	 bargaining	 power	 interactions	
are	influenced	by	negotiation	characteristics	and	relational	constructs		
The analysis critically discusses the impact of negotiation characteristics 
(such as rationality, threats, and flexibility) and relational constructs (such as 
reciprocity and personal relations) on the negotiations between APs and TOs.  
Rationality is identified as an important influence strategy that is adopted in 
negotiations. As three AP participants noted:  
“[I] believe that by having the right arguments you leave no choice 
to the other party to tell you anything different.” (SH:2) 
“[…] one must always make calculated decisions. You have to have a 
plan A and a plan B when you go into a discussion, possibly even a 
plan C, but you must have a plan B. […] There is a strategy that is 
perfect for you; it’s game theory. What would my collaborator do if I 
reacted in this way, what would I do if he reacted in that way?[…] 
You must consider how you will persuade the contract manager with 
logical arguments.” (IG:3) 
 “[…] you must be able to justify to the other party what you ask. For 
example, despite asking for some things, such as an increase in price, 
you must make sure to point out what you have done to deserve this 
increase in price, to show that what your are asking is not random.” 
(SH:11) 
The APs perceive that rationality, meaning having the right arguments to justify 
their demands, is crucial in contractual and non-contractual negotiations with large 
TOs and can help them to achieve the desired outcome. This was supported by 
fifteen APs. Equally, a travel agent who negotiates with the TOs asserted, “[T]he 
TOs are methodical and organised.” (TA:2) 
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Two AP participants also commented: 
“[L]arge TOs are extremely professional, they calculate everything, 
they use numbers, they have their statistics, like we do.” (SH:13) 
“[A]ll negotiations are based on facts. The TOs base their demands 
on the results they receive from each hotel, for instance on the 
questionnaires and sales […]. The TO comes prepared to the 
negotiations. He will tell you ‘I have seen your scores and I had this 
and that complaint and you need to address them. You have 
decreased your service quality so on what basis are you asking me 
for an increase?’” (HA:2) 
The above statements indicate that rationality as an influence strategy is adopted by 
the TOs as well, who attempt to influence the AP’s perception to gain the desired 
outcome, particularly in contractual negotiations.  
Rationality, or rational persuasion, refers to an actor using logical arguments 
and factual data to convince the other party of the viability of the request and that it 
will result in the achievement of desirable objectives (Yukl and Tracey 1992). More 
specifically, APs attempt to alter the perception of TOs by constructing rational 
arguments and the TOs also adopt rational arguments to change the perception of the 
APs to achieve their objectives. Strategies based on rationality relate to party A (the 
influencer) attempting to influence the perception of party B (the target), and to 
persuade party B to follow their demands, giving the choice to party B whether to be 
persuaded (comply) or not (Payan and McFarland 2005). Hence, rationality as an 
influence strategy can be perceived as a non-coercive strategy that can enable the 
APs to influence the perception of the TOs regarding their demands, and vice versa.  
However, two AP participants highlighted: 
“[T]here is no way that you can change the opinion of contract 
managers through a set of arguments.” (SH:8) 
“[T]he TOs enter negotiations with their policies already in mind 
stipulated by their companies, it is near impossible to change their 
mind.” (SH:7) 
That is to say, the APs are not in a position to substantially influence the TO 
contract manager’s perception in contractual negotiations. One reason for this can be 
attributed to the dominant position of the TOs during negotiations due to their higher 
bargaining power. This is particularly so in relationships where large commitment 
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and exclusivity contracts exist and the TOs are considered to be key strategic 
partners, enabling them to direct negotiations.  
Frazier and Rody (1991) argued that non-coercive strategies within 
marketing channels are most effective for parties with high power given that the 
party with lower power will give more attention to their more important partner and 
facilitate the use of the non-coercive strategy. Payan and McFarland (2005) also 
examined influence strategies within a supplier-buyer context and found that the 
level of dependence between the parties played a critical role in the effectiveness of 
the influence strategy and compliance of the other party. Therefore, although 
rationality as an influence strategy is adopted by both parties, in reality such a 
strategy is more effective for large TOs, rather than the APs, in their efforts to 
achieve compliance from the APs. This is because the high dependence of the APs 
on TOs to mediate rewards (sales), and the lack of alternatives for tourism flow, 
causes the APs to agree to the TO’s demands.  
Furthermore, despite the AP participants stating that rationality can aid in 
negotiations with the TOs, most industry participants (APs, travel agents, 
participants from the recreation sector) who had had direct experience of negotiating 
with large TOs also highlighted their inflexibility in negotiations regardless of the 
type of contract. Three AP participants stated: 
“[T]he contract managers that negotiate the contracts come with 
certain policies in mind that is determined by their respective 
companies. […] flexibility does not exist.” (SH:6) 
“[W]hen the contract managers come to negotiate they tell you 
straight away what their instructions are and that they are only 
allowed to give a tiny increase [in price].” (HA:1) 
“[I]n the good old days things were different [...] there was 
flexibility, you could negotiate, now this flexibility does not exist.” 
(SH:11) 
A participant from the recreation sector also affirmed: 
“[T]he TOs will not accept changes to anything on the contract, to 
add or remove, unless it is something minor, a detail. The TOs would 
never accept a contract drafted by you. The TOs have their own 
contracts that are standardised and they also have a lot of fine print, 
you know on the back pages, which you can barely read. Those are 
the contracts.” (RP:1) 
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The statements above indicate that, more often than not, large TOs are inflexible in 
their contractual negotiations with the APs, and determine and control the 
negotiation process relative to their own targets.  
This inflexible attitude of the TOs in negotiations can be characterised as an 
aggressive negotiating style, where ‘aggressive negotiation’ refers to the degree to 
which a negotiating party stands strong in their position and adopts tactics in order 
to gain concessions from the other party (Perdue and Summers 1991). Equally, the 
inflexible and rational attitude of large TOs in negotiations coincides with the 
findings of Papageorgiou (2008) who explored the relationship between the APs and 
large TOs in Greece. He found that large TOs are often aggressive and cold in their 
contractual negotiations and follow strict guidelines based on computer data. Indeed, 
large TOs enter negotiations with pre-determined guidelines on the outcomes that 
they want to achieve and are inflexible in terms of changing their position to 
facilitate the negotiation process. 
One reason for this behaviour by the TOs is their higher bargaining power in 
relation to the APs. Large TOs recognise that the APs are dependent on them to 
achieve a satisfactory tourism flow and thus their organisational objectives. 
Therefore, it can be asserted that due to the asymmetric bargaining power that exists, 
large TOs are in a position to adopt a more aggressive negotiation style in 
contractual negotiations and gain concessions from the APs.  
In contrast, APs adopt a more flexible attitude, as three AP participants 
operating with commitment and exclusivity contracts stated: 
“[I]f you need the TOs then inevitably you will go to extremes to 
satisfy them.” (TV:2) 
“[…] we would do everything possible to keep both the TOs and their 
customers satisfied. Especially if the TO is one of our large TOs, we 
would do anything to satisfy them.” (HA:4) 
“[I] had to give something to the TO [a discount] in order to show 
that I am flexible because when you close the door on someone then 
he will also close the door on you.” (HA:2) 
However, two AP participants operating with an allotment contract asserted: 
“[I] will always try to help the TOs we work with; however I will 
never do anything that I think is against my company.” (SH:4) 
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“[W]hen I go into negotiations I will keep in mind that we are two 
parties, that we come into an agreement. You will tell me about your 
company and what you want, I will tell you about my company and 
what I want and we will meet somewhere in the middle, in order for 
both to win.” (SH:5) 
As the above statements suggest, APs are likely to be flexible in their contractual 
negotiations with the large TOs to satisfy the TO’s demands particularly when large 
volume agreements are taking place. However, in allotment contracts APs may be 
less flexible because smaller agreements are taking place. The flexibility, again, of 
the APs in contractual negotiations, particularly in commitment and exclusivity 
contracts, can be ascribed to the high dependence that the majority of the APs have 
on the large TOs. 
Due to the fact that large TOs represent a large volume of sales for these 
APs, the latter need to be more flexible in accommodating the demands of the 
former. This finding is in line with Romero and Tejada (2011) who found that the 
concentration of sales of the APs with certain TOs resulted in asymmetrical 
bargaining power between TOs and hotels in Andalusia, Spain. They argued that, 
particularly in sun-and-sea destinations, due to the high level of control that TOs 
have over hotels, those hotels, despite being independent companies, have a feeling 
of subordination. Similarly, in the ROC, due to the large dependence that APs have 
on TOs operating with commitment and exclusivity contracts, participant APs 
perceive that they must find ways to satisfy the TOs’ demands.  
Furthermore, the AP participants highlighted that pressure is often evident in 
negotiations with the TOs; three AP participants asserted: 
 “[…] you depend on the TOs, they give you their conditions and 
naturally they have influence in the market and its operation. […] 
usually the APs come up short [in negotiations] because we need the 
TOs.” (SH:7) 
 “[…] because when you depend on the TOs then they dictate their 
own terms and most of the time these terms are not very pleasant.” 
(IG:1) 
“[…] it is somewhat an attitude of I don’t want to be losing money so 
I make it happen.” (IG:2) 
As the statements indicate, large TOs exert pressure on APs in negotiations in order 
to influence the negotiation outcome. This was highlighted by eighteen APs. Due to 
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the high dependence of the APs on the TOs, and the limited alternatives that exist to 
receive tourism flow, the majority of the AP participants believe that they have no 
option but to agree to the demands of the TOs. This is in line with Bastakis et al. 
(2004) who found that the enormous power of the large TOs, and the limited 
alternative distribution options for Greek APs, gave TOs an important advantage 
during negotiations, forcing APs to agree to the prices offered by the TOs. That is to 
say, that APs are forced to accept the TO’s demands due to the TO’s ability to 
mediate rewards (benefits) that stem from their large distribution channel.  
The pressure that the TOs put on APs to accept their demands can be 
described as a direct influence strategy that focuses on altering the behaviour of the 
APs (to comply with the TOs). Direct strategies place emphasis on achieving 
compliance by a specific party, rather than on altering the perceptions of that party 
regarding the positive outcomes of the intended behaviour (Frazier and Summers 
1984; Ghijsen et al. 2010; Bandyopadhyay 2004). In particular, the APs feel 
pressure to accept the requests (or demands) of the TOs during contractual 
negotiations. Frazier and Summers (1984) and Frazier and Rody (1991) argued that 
when a party A (influencer) adopts a request influence strategy, party A simply 
informs the party B (target) of the expected behaviour without any reference to any 
positive or negative outcomes that may occur in terms of compliance or non-
compliance. Therefore, the consequence of compliance or non-compliance with the 
requested action is dependent on the target’s inference (Payan and McFarland 2005). 
For instance, a target might perceive that there is a rational basis behind such a 
request, or the target might perceive that negative sanctions may follow for non-
compliance.  
Within the context of this study, the findings indicate that pressure or request 
strategies constitute a coercive influence strategy, given that the APs perceive that if 
they do not follow the large TOs’ requests then negative consequences will ensue. 
Two AP participants noted: 
“[…] hotels were forced to accept this price decrease because they 
were exclusively committed to these TOs. How can they say no? They 
will lose the TO and what is the point in that?” (SH:6) 
“[I]f you want to have guests in your hotel you have to succumb […] 
because if you lose the TO who will you have in the hotel? The local 
market stays in hotels twice a year, it is not enough.” (SH:8) 
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AP participants perceived that the TO may discontinue the relationship if their 
demands are not satisfied and particularly in relationships with large agreements 
(commitment and exclusivity contracts) the APs have no option but to accept. 
Gelderman et al. (2008, p.224) examined the use of coercive influence strategies 
within an asymmetric buyer-supplier relationship and found that often the weaker 
party “[…] complied under protest”. They argued that the weaker party has no 
viable alternative as the dominant party is in a position to execute negative 
sanctions, making it infeasible for the weaker party to continue their business. 
Likewise, the majority of the APs in the ROC are highly dependent on the TOs for 
their business and thus have a lower bargaining power in relation to the large TOs. 
As one AP participant stated “[…] you need to make money so it becomes a matter 
of survival” (SH:12) and as such the APs do not want to risk not signing a contract.  
Accordingly, it can be argued that coercive influence strategies and 
antagonistic behaviour characterises most of the large TOs’ contractual negotiations 
regardless of the type of contract. This is an interesting finding because commitment 
and exclusivity contracts denote a closer and more relational exchange characterised 
by collaboration and long-term orientation, where parties make short-term sacrifices 
to achieve benefits in the long-term. Given these characteristics, a more cooperative 
negotiation strategy may have been anticipated as both parties seek to achieve 
mutual benefits. Lumineau and Henderson (2012), for instance, investigated conflict 
resolution between a buyer-supplier within the manufacturing sector and discovered 
that a relationship characterised by cooperative relational experience39 is likely to 
lead to more cooperative negotiation strategies emphasising a win-win situation. 
They claimed that a competitive relational experience with lower relational norms 
leads to a more competitive negotiation strategy with parties seeking individual 
gains. However, this is not the case for this study, where the data indicate that large 
TOs adopt a more competitive negotiation style, regardless of the type of relational 
experience (whether cooperative or competitive). 
                                                
39 Lumineau and Henderson (2012) asserted that a high level of flexibility, participation, and 
solidarity norms between the exchange partners indicates a cooperative relational experience.   
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In contrast, APs follow a more cooperative negotiation style, as three AP 
participants asserted: 
“[A]s a hotel manager you cannot say, ‘these are my rates, take it or 
leave it’ because next year you might need the TO more than the TO 
needs you this year. So you must have a balance […] all your 
arguments must be towards maintaining a balanced meeting that can 
then result in a win-win situation.” (SH:11) 
“[…] you must seek to achieve a rational cooperation. You always 
have to follow a win-win policy ‒ it suits me and it suits you. You 
have to find the balance, that equilibrium to create the sense that it is 
a win-win situation.” (IG:2) 
“[I] believe that both parties have to win in negotiations. I don’t 
think that the TOs want the hotelier to lose out, nor does the hotelier 
want the TOs to lose out. It is beneficial for both.” (TV:3) 
In other words, AP participants emphasise a win-win situation and thus a more 
cooperative strategy in their negotiations with large TOs. This was identified by all 
the AP participants, and is in line with Ivanov et al. (2015) who explored the 
relationship of APs and travel agents (including TOs) in Bulgaria. They identified 
that APs follow a cooperative approach to conflict resolution. One reason for this 
could be that in long-term asymmetric relationships the criticality of the relationship 
is frequently one-sided, with the weaker party perceiving the relationship as more 
critical to their operations (Johnsen and Ford 2001). Thus the weaker party must 
preserve the goodwill of the stronger party (Johnsen and Ford 2001).  
Therefore, when APs adopt a more cooperative strategy and attitude, it can 
be argued that they emphasise the value (economic and non-economic) that they can 
achieve from the relationship by gaining the favour of the large TO. Two AP 
participants highlighted:  
“[I] cannot simply say the TO is constantly pushing me and I get 
nothing at the end of the day, I cannot say that. I have my share of 
profit as well, otherwise I would not be here.” (HA:2) 
“[…] having a commitment contract provides security for us because 
the TO is responsible for selling these rooms and the TO will sell 
them.” (SH:10) 
A TO participant also affirmed: 
 “[…] taking over the management of an existing hotel or creating a 
product, we would have more faith in our partner suppliers to get it 
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where we want it to be. […] we will always go to our partner 
suppliers first. So from that point of view we quite heavily rely on our 
suppliers.” (TO:2) 
The above statements show that, despite the difficult negotiations that participant 
APs have with large TOs, they also receive benefits from their relationship. Large 
TOs are considered reliable partners as they have a consistent tourism flow, can 
offer financial security for the APs and provide support for future investments. This 
is particularly the case in close relationships that have commitment and exclusivity 
contracts.  
Organisations may choose to enter relationships with other strong 
organisations in order to reap the benefits or value that stem from these relationships 
despite being asymmetric (Mouzas and Ford 2007). Ku et al. (2011) argued that 
hotels are pursuing ways to establish long-term relationships and boost their revenue 
by collaborating with contract firms (travel agencies and TOs). This action is taken 
to cost-effectively increase sales, build trust and become a preferred hotel for the 
contract firm based on service competence (Ku et al. 2011). Accordingly, the study 
reveals that APs comply with the TOs’ demands while focusing on maintaining a 
cooperative negotiation strategy in non-contractual negotiations, despite the TOs’ 
coercive influence strategies, to achieve long-term benefits from the relationship.  
Additionally, all the AP participants noted that the relationship in general 
and negotiations in particular are characterised by flexibility, and that non-
contractual negotiations are ever present. As two AP participants stated: 
“[…] in both allotment and commitment contracts if the year is not 
going well the TO will come and request either a special offer or to 
renegotiate the contract. This of course depends on both parties to 
find a solution.” (SH:3) 
“[…] when expected demand changes, the TO might want to cancel 
the commitment or lower the commitment or drop this, drop that. The 
season is always flexible, so we must be flexible.” (SH:7) 
That is to say, the formal contract between the parties is considered flexible due to 
fluctuating demand levels during the season, which can lead to informal 
renegotiations between the APs and TOs to accommodate changes. For example, if 
demand is low, the TO might ask for a discount, or to reduce its bed allocation, or if 
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demand is high APs may request that the TO stops selling that specific unit for a 
certain period. 
Contract theory states that renegotiations or post contractual adjustments are 
often evident in supplier-buyer relationships, one reason being bounded rationality 
leading to incomplete contracts40 (Mouzas and Blois 2013; Lumineau and Malhotra 
2011). With regard to bounded rationality, the rationality of humans is restricted by 
cognitive limits on formulating and processing information, and on communication 
abilities (Williamson 1981, 2002). More specifically, it is impossible to consider all 
of the contingencies that may influence the contract, or may occur in a relationship, 
during the formal contracting process. Contingencies may, however, be identified 
post-contract (Seshadri and Mishra 2004).  
Within a tourism context, which is characterised by demand uncertainty 
(Chapter 3), Gurcaylilar-Yenidogan (2013) argued that environmental uncertainty, 
depicted as fluctuations of demand, further augments the difficulty for parties in 
designing more complete contracts that take into account communication and 
conflict resolution processes to handle changing demand. Romero and Tajeda (2011) 
highlighted that contracts between APs and TOs are typically negotiated a year in 
advance, but tourists are increasingly booking their holidays at the last minute, thus 
demand is uncertain. Hence, in the tourism context, fluctuating demand levels 
intensify the incompleteness of the contract. As a result, informal non-contractual 
negotiations between APs and TOs are ever-present and the flexibility of the APs 
and TOs is critical in the relationship. 
Moreover, data analysis indicates that this flexibility of the contract and 
demand uncertainty gives rise to deviant strategies adopted in non-contractual 
negotiations between the parties. For instance, two AP participants stated: 
“[T]here are TOs that always get last minute special offers during 
the season […] what happens is, the tourists book our hotel two 
months in advance but the TO may not send this booking through to 
us. Since we don’t have any bookings we think that demand is low so 
we give a special offer to promote demand. So, the TO holds the 
                                                
40All contracts are considered incomplete (Tirole 1999; Lumineau and Malhotra 2011). One reason is 
bounded rationality, but others may be incomplete by design. In other words, organisations may 
decide to limit the degree to which they depend on a contract to govern a relationship (Lumineau and 
Malhotra 2011). 
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bookings until the last minute, until we give them a special offer. […] 
if the TO gets, twenty bookings without the special offer, they say 
‘we’ve done them with the special offer’. There is no way to check if 
these bookings were made with the special offer or not.” (SH:9) 
“[F]or example the TO might tell you that your hotel is not selling in 
England, but the case might be that he is not actually promoting it 
because he might not have the desired profit. […] and the special 
offer we gave is not promoted and they don’t offer it in England. The 
TO might take advantage of the price reduction that you give.” 
(SH:2) 
The above statements point to the fact that the TOs may manipulate information on 
demand levels to influence the non-contractual negotiations with APs. Information 
exchange is an important influence strategy given that information can be used 
strategically by a party A to change the perception of a party B and influence party 
B’s actions to its advantage (Frazier and Summers 1984). Consequently, the 
manipulation of demand level can influence the AP’s perception and result in TOs 
gaining special offers and discounts to increase their profit. 
Additionally, one AP participant noted, “[…] if demand is low the TOs will 
take advantage of this to ask for discounts.” (SH:8) As another AP participant 
described: 
“[…] if the demand is low the TO will say ‘you must give a special 
offer or price reduction’; and because I need customers to come to 
the hotel, I will do it, to generate demand.” (SH:7) 
Hence, the data reveal that information exchange is adopted with a recommendation 
influence strategy during non-contractual negotiations. Recommendation influence 
strategy is a strategy where the influencing organisation (the source) stipulates and 
predicts that the target (other party) will achieve a higher profit if the target acts in 
accordance with the suggestion of the influencing organisation (Frazier and 
Summers 1984). Therefore, in the case of this study, the TO uses information 
exchange and recommends an action for the AP (to offer a discount or special offer) 
resulting in an increase in the TO’s sales. Dominant parties use recommendations to 
hasten the decision-making process of weaker parties and such recommendations are 
often founded on the information advantage of the dominant party (Gelderman et al. 
2008). Indeed, as identified in section 6.2.5, the position of the TOs as 
  
242 
intermediaries in the tourism distribution channel creates information asymmetry 
between the two parties.   
Kähkönen and Tenkanen (2010) examined information exchange in a power 
asymmetric buyer-supplier relationship and found that the powerful party may be 
hesitant to disseminate information in order to maintain its power. Therefore, it can 
be argued that the large TOs may take advantage of their position in the distribution 
channel and manipulate information exchange in a timely manner to influence the 
AP’s behaviour in non-contractual negotiations and achieve their objectives. 
Likewise, Bastakis et al. (2004) investigated the power of large TOs in Greece and 
identified that the information, or better insight, that the TOs have, enhances the 
bargaining power of the TOs in negotiations. Consequently, the study suggests that 
deviant strategies such as manipulating information on demand levels are evident in 
the relationship and give an advantage to the large TOs in non-contractual 
negotiations with APs.   
However, the analysis indicates that these deviant strategies lead to mistrust, 
as two AP participants asserted: 
“[…] there is a trust issue. We try to give [the special offers and 
discounts] in advance in order to have them advertised and issued in 
their brochure, otherwise we are not sure if it ends up with the 
consumer or stays with the TOs. I have had this experience before.” 
(SH:13) 
“[W]e want to believe that the special offers we give reach the clients 
[…]but a smaller TO might take advantage of the situation and not 
inform the client, thus benefiting from the price difference. However, 
most of the large TOs inform their clients, they are professionals. 
This is something that you can check on their website as well […] 
and we do check up on this as well.” (SH:2) 
As highlighted above, due to the fact that some AP participants perceive that the 
TOs may act opportunistically by manipulating information on demand using 
deviant strategies, mistrust is evident in the relationship. Opportunism can include 
behaviours such as cheating, stealing, deceiving, withholding information and 
misrepresentation (Hawkins et al. 2013). Opportunistic behaviour has a negative 
impact on trust in relationships (Morgan and Hunt 1994) because establishing a 
supplier-buyer relationship involves a certain degree of vulnerability between the 
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parties. Thus parties will only pursue partners that they can trust to attain long-term 
benefits.  
The findings indicate that, for APs and TOs who have large commitment and 
exclusivity contracts, and the relationship is characterised by a closer relational 
exchange, a higher level of trust exists. For instance, as one AP participant noted: 
“[T]here are little lies that can be said and be overcome accordingly, 
however, it is not a situation where everyone is trying to cheat each 
other; professionalism also exists. We do trust our partners.” (HA:4) 
That is to say, although some opportunistic behaviour might be evident through 
“[…] little lies” as the AP participant stated above, he still describes the relationship 
with the large TO as trustworthy. This was supported by six other AP participants. 
On the other hand, the AP participants earlier, who operate with smaller 
commitment or allotment contracts, noted that they do take steps to curb the 
opportunistic behaviour, thus it can be argued that a level of mistrust exists.  
Brown et al. (2009) examined the relationship between individual lodging 
units and their respective brand headquarters. They asserted that a more relational 
exchange, enabling the development of relational norms such as solidarity (referring 
to overcoming self-interest to protecting the relationship), conflict harmonisation 
and role integrity (referring to stability in the roles that each party executes in the 
exchange) can help to restrict opportunistic behaviour between the parties. This is 
because a more relational exchange, and relational norms, foster openness of 
communication between the parties and continuous information exchange promotes 
trust in the relationship and helps to decrease the level of uncertainty and anxiety 
(Wang et al. 2008; Brown et al. 2009). Therefore, the study suggests that despite 
evidence of opportunism a higher level of trust is evident between APs and TOs that 
operate with a large commitment and exclusivity contract, since a more relational 
exchange exists. Nonetheless, it can also be argued that the APs have limited 
alternatives to achieve the necessary tourism flow, thus they must continue their 
relationship with large TOs despite suspicions of deviant behaviour.   
Moreover, two common issues of conflict between the APs and TOs that 
lead to non-contractual negotiations and require the adoption of influence strategies 
are overbookings and stop sales. Specifically, overbooking is a common business 
practice adopted by APs in an attempt to safeguard the unit from the losses that may 
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arise from cancelled bookings (Ivanov and Zhechev 2012). In such situations the 
APs confirm more bookings than available capacity at the unit, in the belief that the 
number of overbooked rooms will correspond to the same number of last minute 
cancellations, changes in bookings, or customers not arriving (no-shows). If an AP 
has an overbooking situation, then the guests have to be transferred to another unit. 
A stop sales situation arises when an AP asks their TO(s) to stop the sale of rooms 
for a certain period due to high demand that may lead to overbookings. An action 
that an AP participant noted, “[…] you are essentially cancelling the contract. […] 
you are not honouring the agreement.” The TO has the decision making power to 
decide whether or not to accept a stop sales request. If the TO does not accept the 
request then it is likely that the unit will have an overbooking situation, in which 
case based on their contract the APs are legally liable for paying compensation to 
the TO and the customer. 
In the case of overbookings, or in the case of the APs asking for a stop sales, 
data reveal that the TOs often use coercive influence strategies to achieve their 
objective. Two AP participants noted: 
“[…] sometimes they might say no way I do not accept the stop sales, 
if you do this I will not pay you.” (SH:6) 
“[S]ometimes the TOs will have their arguments to persuade you, 
other times they threaten that they will stop the cooperation.” (TV:1) 
A TO participant also asserted: 
“[I]f the APs say they have overbookings, we threaten them with how 
much compensation we are going to charge them as per our contract. 
We try also to convince them to send the guests of another TO to 
other hotels and not our guests.” (TO:2) 
The above statements highlight how TOs often adopt threats and legalistic pleas 
(legal arguments) to discourage APs from their intended behaviour (that is, 
overbooking and asking for stop sales). Legalistic pleas refer to strategies where the 
influencing organisation (source) argues that the formal contract between the parties 
obliges the other party to perform a specific action (Frazier and Summers 1984). For 
instance, the influencing organisation may impose a penalty for not following the 
agreement (Gelderman et al. 2008; Payan and McFarland 2005). Conversely, a 
threat strategy is evident when the influencing organisation (source) conveys to the 
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other party that negative sanctions will ensue if it does not comply with the desired 
action of the influencing organisation (source) (Frazier and Summers 1984). 
Accordingly, the study reveals that the TOs use the contractual agreement to 
threaten the APs with negative sanctions in order to make the AP to comply with the 
TO’s demands. One could argue that a negative sanction is the financial cost that the 
APs incur in the case of overbooking, taking the form of a higher room rate for the 
customer who has to be moved to another unit. Another negative sanction for APs 
could be related to relationship costs such as a decrease in the trust of the TO (Wang 
and Bowie 2009) in terms of the reliability of the AP as a partner, particularly if this 
is a common occurrence. Hence, within the context of this study, the negative 
sanctions that can be implemented by the large TO seek to influence APs to comply 
with the demands of large TOs. 
Coercive influencing strategies can have a negative effect on the relationship. 
Leonidou (2005) argued that excessive adoption of coercion in the supplier-buyer 
relationship can have damaging effects such as poor coordination between the 
parties, destructive conflict and lack of satisfaction that can ultimately result in a 
decrease in performance for both parties. Nevertheless, within this study’s context, 
threats and legalistic pleas are often adopted in the relationship between APs and 
TOs. This is in contrast to the findings of Payan and McFarland (2005) who, within 
a manufacturing context, noted that legalistic pleas are not often used in practice. 
One reason for this contrast could be the dynamism of the tourism industry. 
Overbooking and stop sales are common practice for APs who need to tackle the 
fluctuating demand levels that characterise the tourism industry and to offset any 
losses. However, despite the fact that this is common practice, and expected 
behaviour, it is in violation of the contractual room allocation agreed with the TOs. 
In turn, it results in the TOs using legalistic pleas and threats to influence the AP’s 
actions and achieve compliance with the contract.  
Additionally, regarding the issue of overbookings one TO participant 
highlighted: 
“[…] we always get overbookings […] even if you assist hotels by 
accepting the stop sales and decrease the bookings that they can 
receive […] by not fulfilling their contract of the allotment, a hotel 
can still threaten to overbook you.” (TO:1) 
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That is to say, changes in their contracted room capacity may harm the operations of 
the TO given that as the TO participant noted above the TO is threatened by such 
behaviour. One reason for the TOs to feel threatened may be that overbookings can 
lead to customer complaints and have an impact on the TO’s reputation and result in 
a decrease in customer loyalty (Hwang and Wen 2009). Hibbard et al. (2001), within 
a supplier-buyer context, examined destructive actions, which are actions taken by 
one party that may cause negative repercussions such as loss of revenue for the other 
party. They asserted that the greater the harm that a certain act may cause the party 
the more forcefully in a negative way the other party will react. Hence, it can be 
argued that overbookings can have negative repercussions for the TOs and thus they 
adopt threats and legalistic pleas to achieve their objectives.  
On the other hand, AP participants noted that the TOs may also violate their 
contract with the APs. As three AP participants stated: 
“[W]hen demand is low the TOs come back to you and they say ‘if 
you want me to work with you, then you must drop the price by 10, 
15, 30 per cent’ and of course you do that.” (HA:2) 
“[C]ommitment contracts are the worst, you can have a commitment 
of 120 rooms and the TOs may say, ‘Oh, I can’t sell 120 rooms I can 
only sell 70 rooms’ so you have no choice but to accept this. What 
can you do? Take them to court? What are you going to gain from 
that? You are going to ruin the relationship with the TO and the 
other TOs as well. This happened to me.” (SH:1) 
“[…] we had to cancel some commitment contracts this year given 
that some TOs were not able to have a sufficient number of 
bookings.” (SH:7) 
Accordingly, AP participants interviewed noted that the TOs may also breach the 
contract given that changes to the formal agreement with the APs occur, such as a 
request to reduce the room allocation. This occurs to offset any losses that they may 
incur from demand fluctuation. Although, one could claim that a reduction in price 
or special offer to increase demand is also for the benefit of the APs, the fact 
remains that the TOs violate the formal agreement.  
However, if a party is dependent on a strong party then it is unlikely that the 
weaker party will reciprocate coercive strategies that may disturb the relationship 
(Kumar et al. 1998; Tse 2003). Therefore, although the TOs are also in violation of 
the agreement, the AP participants do not reciprocate with coercive strategies such 
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as legalistic pleas concerning the financial liability of the TO. This is because the 
APs, as the weaker party, want to avoid harming the relationship as this may 
rebound on the AP’s performance.  
This is particularly pertinent in relationships where high dependence exists, 
through large commitment and exclusivity contracts. As stressed by one TO 
participant: 
“[…] we expect more from our key suppliers. We wouldn’t expect a 
heavily branded hotel to treat us the same as they would treat 
another TO.” (TO:2) 
In relationships where large TOs represent a large volume of sales for the AP the 
pressure is higher to comply and avoid any responses that may damage the 
relationship or risk retaliation. This is due to the AP’s high level of dependence on 
the TO, thus constraining their bargaining power. Hibbard et al. (2001) identified 
that a party with a lower bargaining power may perceive that a strong party can 
afford to ignore any response from the weaker party and as a result has little 
alternative but to accept the actions of the stronger party. Thus, most AP participants 
believed that it may be futile to respond with similar coercive strategies given that 
such strategies may harm the relationship in the future; instead they place emphasis 
on less coercive strategies in order to achieve their objectives.  
On the other hand, the majority of the AP participants adopt non-coercive 
strategies during non-contractual negotiations. For instance, three AP participants 
asserted:  
“[…] we will request that the TOs stop sales, however it is up to them 
to accept it or not, and they can say no and then you have a 
problem.” (SH:13) 
“[F]or example in the case of overbookings the TO will demand that 
you accept the reservation. During these situations, it is exactly 
where personal relationships come in, because using this relationship 
that you have developed you might persuade the TO to send one 
reservation and not the five that they might have. Whether you 
manage to persuade them or not depends on the type of relationship 
you have gradually developed, and not just on a single occasion that 
something occurs.” (SH:11) 
“[I]t is always easier to ask for something when you have a good 
relationship and you know them […] with a smaller TO that might 
not send bookings as often you do not have this daily communication, 
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therefore the relationship we have is not as close and it is more 
formal, and this applies to both sides.” (HA:4) 
The APs can request the aid of the TOs by recommending that they 
(recommendation influence strategy) send the bookings to another unit but the 
decision whether to do this lies with the TO. Still, despite the fact that the TO may 
demand that the AP accepts the booking, the analysis indicates that personal 
relationships between the members can act as a mediating factor in gaining a more 
favourable outcome. The importance of personal relationships was supported by 
fifteen of the AP participants. Papageorgiou (2008) examined the relationship 
between hoteliers and TOs and identified that the human dimension (for example, 
personal relationships) plays a critical role in the success of the interaction between 
actors. Therefore, the use of personal relationships, along with the recommendation 
influence strategy, facilitates the AP’s achievement of compliance from the TO.  
A recommendation influence strategy can be considered a non-coercive 
strategy given that the influencing organisation aims to change the perception of the 
other party (target) by noting that it will be more beneficial (profitable) for the other 
party to follow the proposal of the influencing organisation (Frazier and Summers 
1984; Payan and McFarland 2005). The adoption of personal relations, or what Yukl 
and Tracey (1992) and Yukl et al. (1996) named personal appeal, refers to the 
influencing organisation appealing to the other party’s (target’s) sense of loyalty or 
friendship to achieve compliance. This is because when a target has a strong sense 
of friendship it is more likely that he/she will accommodate the request by helping 
out with a problem (Yukl and Tracey 1992).  
Hence, it can be asserted that the APs adopt less coercive influence strategies 
focused on changing the perception of the TOs by emphasising the benefits (such as 
avoiding customer complaints) for the TOs following compliance with their request. 
Further, personal relations play an even more important role in relationships where 
large agreements exist and communication is frequent, as both parties have the 
opportunity to build a closer and more personal relationship. Consequently, within 
the study’s context the APs adopt these non-coercive strategies to influence the 
negotiation outcome with the TOs, particularly during non-contractual negotiations. 
However, two AP participants did assert:  
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“[…] no matter how good your personal relationship is, business is 
business, vested interests must be satisfied.” (IG:3) 
“[T]he TOs might be positive towards a stop sales request, however, 
they will not just accept it, you have to negotiate. This is because the 
TO wants you to feel that you owe him one, thus when he asks for 
something you will remember that he helped you so you owe him a 
favour.” (SH:12) 
The above statements show that although the TO may decide to comply with the 
AP’s request the AP is required to give something to the TO as a reward or benefit. 
Within this context, rewards could include a greater room allocation in another 
period or a special offer. This was highlighted by twenty of the AP participants. 
Hence, APs adopt a promise influence strategy. A promise influence strategy refers 
to the source promising the target a certain reward if he/she complies with the 
proposed action (Frazier and Summers 1984). Ghijsen et al. (2010) explored 
influence strategies within a buyer-supplier context and found that promises have a 
strong effect on achieving compliance since a reward or an incentive is offered. 
They further argued that a promise influence strategy also has a positive effect on 
the increase of commitment for the rewarded party because such actions are 
perceived to promote relationship continuity. Therefore, participant APs adopt 
promises and personal relationships as influence strategies in order to achieve their 
desired outcome when negotiating with the TOs, while also focusing on maintaining 
their relationship with the TOs.  
The majority of the AP participants interviewed more often than not adopt 
non-coercive influence strategies in contractual and non-contractual negotiations. In 
contrast, large TOs adopt more coercive strategies in their contractual and non-
contractual negotiations. The use of coercive influence strategies tends to promote 
more competitive behaviour in interactions between firms given that each 
organisation attempts to gain at the expense of the other (Schurr and Ozanne 1985; 
Frazier and Rody 1991). This can lead to conflict, mistrust, and dissatisfaction on 
the part of the APs and poor performance of both parties. However, despite the use 
of coercive strategies some APs interviewed still describe the TOs as associates and 
partners. Three AP participants stated:  
“[…] we have a cooperative relationship with the TOs. We are 
associates, he wants me to do well and I want him to do well.” 
(HA:3) 
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“[I]t is a cooperative relationship and our relationship is extremely 
good. It is also friendship because after so many years we know them 
and we have a good friendly relationship. There is communication 
and we are professionals.” (SH:10) 
“[…] we have an excellent relationship, for sure. Without 
cooperation we would not be able to keep this relationship. And this 
applies to all our associates, not just the TOs.” (TV:3) 
The statements demonstrate that some AP partcipants perceive that a cooperative 
mutually beneficial relationship exists facilitating the maintenance of the 
relationship. Other AP participants within the study, however, claimed that 
competition is also evident. Two, for example, asserted: 
“[W]ithin the relationship between the accommodation units and the 
TOs you can find both competition and cooperation, it is a 
combination.” (SH:4) 
“[W]hen you are working with the TOs you are constantly 
experiencing cooperation, competition, defensive feelings, it is a little 
bit of everything. When something goes wrong you always try to do 
the best for your company.” (SH:3) 
The difference in opinion between the AP participants can be ascribed to the 
closeness of the relationship that the parties have. To be precise, in relationships 
with high commitment and exclusivity contracts, and where the APs consider the 
TOs to be strategic partners, AP participants tended to describe the relationship as 
more cooperative. In smaller contractual agreements most AP participants also 
mentioned that competition is evident.  
This is not surprising since various studies identify that organisations 
concurrently participate in strategies of cooperation and competition in their 
relationships, in other words ‘coopetition’41 is evident (Bengtsson and Kock 1999; 
Nair et al. 2011; Fang et al. 2011; Raza-Ullah et al. 2014). Nair et al. (2011) within a 
buyer-supplier context claimed that coopetition can be evident in collaborative 
relational exchanges as well as more discreet exchanges such as arm’s length 
relationships. Therefore, from Nair et al.’s (2011) assertion, and the above 
discussion on influencing strategies, within the study’s context it is argued that the 
                                                
41 The term ‘coopetition’ refers to the “[…] simultaneous pursuit of cooperation and competition 
between firms” (Raza-Ullah et al. 2014, p.189). That is to say, organisations jointly compete and 
cooperate to achieve their organisational objectives.  
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relationship of the APs and TOs is one of coopetition; where strategies are focused 
both on attaining a collaborative competitive advantage and on achievement of 
individual organisational goals. Fang et al. (2011) argued that a balance between 
cooperation and competition is the key contributor to sustaining a business 
relationship. This is because extreme competition may result in excessive self-
protection with partnering organisations ignoring the benefits of cooperation (such 
as resource sharing) and the losses from extreme competition surpassing the short-
term losses of cooperation. Therefore, it is important that APs and TOs pursue the 
achievement of an appropriate balance between cooperation and competition to 
maintain their relationship.   
6.2.3.3.	 Conclusion		
The analysis reveals that the APs and TOs exercise their bargaining power 
through various influence strategies to modify the contractual and non-contractual 
negotiation outcome. In particular, although the TOs adopt some non-coercive 
influence strategies (such as rationality) they typically use coercive influence 
strategies and APs perceive them as inflexible in their negotiations. As such, a more 
competitive negotiation style is used by the TOs, seeking profit-maximisation. The 
APs frequently use non-coercive influence strategies and are typically more flexible 
with a cooperative style focusing on a win-win situation. This is attributed to the 
higher dependence of the APs on the TOs, thus the TOs have a higher bargaining 
power in relation to the APs during negotiations. Further, due to the asymmetric 
bargaining power, APs refrain from adopting or responding with coercive influence 
strategies during negotiations to engender goodwill and avoid any harm to the 
relationship or retaliation from the TOs. 
The type of contract agreed between the parties also influences their 
contractual and non-contractual negotiations because each contract type has different 
relational characteristics. For instance, a commitment and exclusivity contract 
signifies higher dependence between the parties than an allotment contract. 
Therefore, in large commitment and exclusivity contracts the parties are more 
cooperative in their negotiations with the TOs and more willing to satisfy their 
demands, compared with APs operating with allotment contracts. The section below 
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discusses the emotional factors that influence contractual and non-contractual 
negotiations between the parties.  
6.2.4. Proposition 4: Emotional factors influence contractual and non-
contractual negotiations 
6.2.4.1.	 Introduction		
Emotions are found to play an important role in influencing contractual and 
non-contractual agreements between the APs and TOs. APs’ emotions, namely fear, 
pressure and bitterness, have an impact on their interactions with the TOs. Business 
exchanges are rooted in social systems in which social and emotional outcomes co-
occur with economic utilitarian ones (Hallén et al. 1991; Stanko et al. 2007; 
Tähtinen and Blois 2011). In other words, within rational self-interest economic 
behaviour (such as a business relationship), social, and emotional factors are also at 
play and have a direct impact on the interactions and outcomes of the relationship. 
To fully understand the negotiations between the APs and TOs the role of emotions 
must be considered. Thus, in accordance with Grounded Theory analysis, additional 
research on emotions is here reviewed. More specifically, research on emotions in 
organisational behaviour and negotiations literature is used; which primarily draws 
from the social psychology field. Research pertaining to emotions in B2B marketing 
management and B2B tourism and hospitality is also utilised. 
Emotions are considered to be a temporal affective reaction experienced in 
response to a significant event or change that is important to the actor (or the firm) 
or an appraisal of events regarding the ability or inability to attain goals (Kopelman 
et al. 2006; Andersen and Kumar 2006; Tähtinen and Blois 2011). Emotions can be 
distinguished and examined at two levels: intrapersonal and interpersonal (Morris 
and Keltner 2000). The intrapersonal level emphasises the internal emotional 
experience and its consequences, whereas an interpersonal perspective emphasises 
emotions as interpersonal communication, the expression of the emotion in a 
relationship and the interpretation of that emotion. For instance, emotions can be 
socially-induced through emotional expressions such as happiness that can lead to a 
reciprocated expression (Druckman and Olekanlns 2008). To better understand 
human emotion, both the intrapersonal and interpersonal perspectives must be 
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considered (Morris and Keltner 2000). Within this study both levels of analysis are 
considered to fully explain the influence of emotions in contractual and non-
contractual negotiations between APs and TOs. 
Emotions can be distinguished in terms of basic (or specific) emotions such 
as fear, surprise, sadness, happiness, disgust and anger, or in terms of social 
emotions such as sympathy, empathy, embarrassment, shame, guilt, jealousy, envy, 
gratitude, admiration and indignation (Kopelman et al. 2006; Lakomski and Evers 
2010). Social emotions or self-conscious emotions regulate and coordinate social 
behaviour to become embedded in social situations and can sustain relationships 
(Fiske 2002; Tähtinen and Blois 2011). Social emotions can be strategically chosen 
from different coping reactions to mediate an individual’s feelings and behaviour to 
gain advantage based on the consequences of previous experiences (Bagozzi 2006). 
On the other hand, basic emotions create more restrictive responses and do not allow 
the flexibility and self-regulation that the social emotions offer (Bagozzi 2006). 
Basic emotions such as disappointment, joy, fear, frustration, happiness and sadness 
arise from the appraisal of the attainment of certain goals.  
When considering the importance of emotions that influence organisational 
behaviour, it is critical to understand their role in the contractual and non-contractual 
negotiations between the APs and TOs. This is discussed below.  
6.2.4.2.	 Discussion	of	proposition	4		
A feeling of fear is evident for the majority of the AP participants, which 
influences the outcome of their contractual and non-contractual negotiations with the 
TOs. Three AP participants asserted:  
“[…] the TOs will not come back if they do not make any profit. If the 
TOs do not win [make any profit], then you lose [profit] forever. The 
hotel will be here for the next 30 or 40 years we are building a future 
with these TOs.” (SH:2) 
“[T]he TOs can punish APs if they want to. They can stop sales, they 
can give you the worst page on their website or they might not put the 
advantages of your hotel on the website.” (SH:3) 
“[…] if we do not go along with them then we will not be able to keep 
them.” (HA:4) 
Following the above statements two forms of fear are felt by the APs, namely fear of 
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losing the TO as a buyer and fear that if unresolved conflicts exist the TO may 
punish the APs and lead to the discontinuation of the relationship. Equally, Buhalis 
(2000) found that, due to fear of confrontation and negative sanctions which could 
be applied in the future, hotels in Greece did not reduce the agreed allocation for 
TOs that had not been able to fulfil their contracts. Specifically, the high dependence 
that exists between the APs and TOs results in the APs participating within the study 
focusing on satisfying the demands of the TO in negotiations. This is done in order 
to maintain their relationship and despite the fact that they may be losing in the 
short-term, due to fear of losing the TO.  
Discontinuation of their relationship with a TO can threaten an AP’s survival 
and can create uncertainty for them given their high dependence on the TOs in order 
to achieve their organisational objectives. Tähtinen and Blois (2011) explored 
emotions in problematic B2B relationships and noted that fear of losing a major 
customer and uncertainty result in efforts by the dependent party to protect and 
avoid the dissolution of the relationship. Therefore, within the study context, APs 
fear of losing the TO leads APs to accommodate the demands of the TOs in order to 
prevent a discontinuation of their relationships that could lead to financial loss.  
In addition, three AP participants operating with large agreements with the 
TOs stated: 
“[...] if you are totally dependent on the TOs if they want to harm 
your business they can. This is how much power they have.” (SH:13) 
“[T]he large TOs, the big players who transfer the masses […] know 
they are strong, they know that they can make or break some hotels.” 
(HA:4) 
“[I]t is not advisable to depend a lot on one TO because if something 
goes wrong he can destroy you.” (SH:7) 
That is to say, where APs are highly dependent on one TO for their volume of sales, 
through commitment and exclusivity contracts, the feeling of intrapersonal fear is 
more intense for the APs. In section 6.2.3 it was indicated that strategic partners of 
the large TOs, that mainly operate with commitment and exclusivity contracts, have 
a high bargaining power, due to their highly desirable resources (such as product 
quality and reliability). However, the APs have a higher dependency on the large 
TOs due to the limited alternatives that they have for generating a satisfactory 
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tourism flow from other sources. Thus if a large TO decides to change suppliers then 
the highly dependent AP’s viability is at risk.  
Consequently, the majority of the AP participants noted that they prefer to 
accept the demands of the TOs, rather than risk losing them. For instance, two AP 
participants highlighted: 
“[O]f course, the open market is better, what I mean is to have all the 
TOs rather than have exclusivity. However, will all these TOs still 
give you the same occupancy levels? Or by cooperating with a strong 
TO and giving him an 80% guarantee of the hotel, will you be in a 
better position? […] You will know that you have 80% guaranteed 
occupancy. […] despite the pressure on price […] you cannot risk 
doing something else given that you have something that is 
guaranteed with the desired turnover.” (IG:2) 
“[W]e have continued working with the same TOs for the past 10 
years because you cannot risk doing something else given that you 
have something that is guaranteed, with the satisfactory turnover and 
the number of people that the TO brings for you.” (SH:11) 
A statement which is illustrative of the insecurity and fear felt by some AP 
participants is given below:   
 “[…] if the TO is not satisfied, I will not have any guests; he will 
stop working with me. So what can I do after that? Stand on the edge 
of the motorway with a gun and tell people to check-in at my hotel?” 
(SH:7) 
Therefore, despite the pressure that APs experience in terms of price, the majority of 
those interviewed, particularly large size units, do not want to risk working with 
alternative or smaller TOs. This is because smaller TOs can create a level of 
uncertainty in terms of receiving the necessary tourism flow and receiving payment. 
This was a view supported by twenty AP participants.  
Bastakis et al. (2004) argued that a contract with a TO reduces the risk for 
APs because APs are able to sell their product in bulk and do not need to spend on 
promotional material. Hence, the large distribution network of large TOs and the 
financial power that they have makes the APs feel more secure that they will achieve 
their organisational goals. This is despite the fact that commitment and exclusivity 
contracts increase the dependence of the APs on the TOs and give the TOs more 
control over the unit. Lerner and Keltner (2001) found that fear, associated with a 
sense of uncertainty and a feeling of lack of control, resulted in actors that 
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experience fear making risk-averse decisions to enhance certainty and avoid loss. 
Similarly, Young (2006) identified feelings of security and confidence as emotions 
that help to sustain the relationship given that they can influence assessments of risk. 
Therefore, within the study’s context, APs more often than not engage in large 
commitment and exclusivity contracts and follow the TO’s demands in negotiations 
to sustain their relationship because they are afraid to lose the TO, and in turn their 
security. 
However, in situations where dependence on the large TOs is lower, such as 
in allotment contracts, the APs fear decreases. An illustrative statement was offered 
by one AP participant: 
“[…] the APs are afraid of the TO and they are frightened in case the 
TO threatens the hoteliers that they will stop their cooperation, but 
one should never be afraid during negotiations.” (SH:3) 
That is to say, for some APs intrapersonal fear may be lower (or non-existent), thus 
they are not afraid of the potential for non-agreement. This view was highlighted by 
five AP participants. Specifically, the participant above operated with an allotment 
contract, and had a diversified supply of tourism flow comprised of a number of 
TOs, and thus a low dependency on the large TOs.  
In the past, this specific accommodation unit operated with commitment and 
allotment contracts with large TOs. However, the AP stated that the relationship was 
not profitable due to the very low prices that the large TO demanded and as such a 
strategic decision was taken to stop operating with large commitment and 
exclusivity contracts. This decision was facilitated by the size of the unit (medium 
size) given that a smaller unit requires a smaller tourism flow. Consequently, the 
unit began operating with allotment contracts and various smaller and niche TOs. 
The AP participant also asserted, “[….] it was the right decision for our unit” despite 
the lower occupancy rate that they now have. 
Negotiators understand and evaluate their negotiation outcomes as either 
gains or losses, such as the outcome of non-agreement or their expected gain (De 
Drue et al. 1994; Bagozzi 2006). When the prospect of potential gains in the 
relationship is more prominent, negotiators are likely to act in ways that will result 
in a successful completion of the interaction, whereas if the potential for loss is more 
evident, then actors may act in ways that may damage the likelihood of completion 
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(Anderson and Kumar 2006). Accordingly, for the AP participant above, operating 
with the allotment contract, the intrapersonal feeling of fear was lower (or even non-
existent) given that the loss of (or non-agreement with) one TO can be recouped by 
an agreement with another TO. 
Furthermore, in relation to the AP’s fear of losing their TO, three AP 
participants highlighted: 
 “[…] you keep quiet […] because if you say something you have a 
bad relationship with the TO and since they can find rooms 
everywhere, this is not helping you. We don’t even say anything.” 
(SH:11) 
“[T]here is no way a hotelier can take advantage of a TO, the TOs 
have the upper hand and it is their game. As hoteliers we are just 
going along with them. However, we do not blindly obey them but 
they do have the upper hand.” (SH:10) 
“[O]n the one hand you want the TO to bring tourists to your hotel 
and on the other hand you can see them taking advantage of the 
situation sometimes. And you feel that you have no choice but to 
accept what the TO wants in order to continue your cooperation. 
Because if you don’t do this then the TO will stop the cooperation 
because he will say ‘there is no point in continuing with you if you 
are going to make my life difficult’.” (SH:9) 
The above statements show that AP participant’s fear of losing a TO often leads 
them to avoid confrontation with the large TOs. In order to prevent any damage to 
the relationship, this also applies in situations where they suspect the TO of 
opportunistic behaviour.  
One can interpret such views as illustrating a sense of powerlessness on the 
part of the APs in their relationship with large TOs and slight mistrust since they 
will avoid conflict to avoid damaging the relationship. Gaski and Ray (2004) argued 
that the feeling of powerlessness suggests a sense of loss of control in dealings with 
the exchange partner. The sense of powerlessness contributes to the alienation of the 
exchange partner: that is, a feeling of separation or distancing from the norms and 
ideals of the distribution channel institutions and procedures (Gaski and Ray 2004). 
Bairstow and Young (2006) explored harmful acts (such as consolidation of the 
distribution channel) within a supplier-buyer setting. Bairstow and Young (2006, 
p.8) found that smaller size partners are often reluctant to react to harmful acts by 
the larger partner and typically accept the behaviour through passive acceptance and 
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an internal “[…] deep psychological sense of dissatisfaction and separation” with 
their exchange partner.  
Hence, within the context of this study it may be argued that, due to 
asymmetric dependence, APs feel a certain level of alienation from and 
dissatisfaction with the large TOs, and particularly a feeling of powerlessness in 
controlling their business activities; thus they passively accept large TO behaviour. 
This is in line with the findings of Papageorgiou (2008) who examined the human 
dimension of the relationship between TOs and hoteliers in Greece and recognised 
that, specifically for smaller hoteliers, the asymmetric power relations often result in 
blind acceptance of the terms of the TO. This was displayed in an attitude of 
fatalism or resignation in the relationship (Papageorgiou 2008). Similar feelings 
were also evident in the relationship between the APs and TOs within this study, 
where the feeling of alienation or powerlessness led to a feeling of resignation and 
thus a likelihood that they would follow the demands of the TO rather than make a 
stand.  
Alienation of the exchange partner creates dissatisfaction and can decrease 
loyalty and commitment due to the exchange partner’s feeling of separateness 
(Bairstow and Young 2006). However, within this study it is argued that despite the 
APs’ dissatisfaction, in terms of feeling powerless, the higher dependence of APs on 
the TOs leads APs to avoid any actions that may harm their relationship, due to fear 
of losing the TO. Hence, for the majority of the APs the intrapersonal emotion of 
powerlessness has an impact upon their decisions in contractual and non-contractual 
negotiations. 
Although all industry and Government participants highlighted that TOs 
control the tourism industry, a small number of AP participants did not feel 
powerless in their relationship with the TO. As two AP participants asserted: 
“[I]f I know the key people in the companies that are relevant to my 
vicinity, my area, I can then influence things. Having a good overall 
product, and if the TOs trust you and they know you they will usually 
respond to your requests.” (IG:3) 
“[U]sually the TOs are the ones asking for things. When we ask for 
something we might not be able to come to an agreement. But, this 
also depends on how important an associate is to the unit and how 
important the unit is to the TO. Also on how good the relationship is 
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between the AP and the TO […]; and always provided that the 
interests of the TO are not harmed.” (HA:1) 
These AP participants feel that they do have some control over their decisions. 
These diverse opinions can be attributed to organisation specific characteristics. One 
of the AP participant above is a director in one of the accommodation chains in the 
ROC, controlling a large number of beds (a critical resource for TOs). He also has a 
very close relational exchange, engendering cooperation and trust, with the TOs. 
Thus, due to the long-term relationship between the AP and the TO, a personal 
relationship has been created together with emotional bonds.  
Within a B2B context, Paulssen (2009) identified that feelings of attachment 
(feeling secure and able to rely on one’s business partner), and having a personal 
comfort, both influence the level of trust and satisfaction in the relationship. 
Personal relationships between suppliers and buyers are characterised by trust, 
respect and reciprocity (Carey et al. 2011). Therefore, due to the close relational 
exchange between the large TO and this specific AP, and the creation of a personal 
relationship, a sense of comfort is created. As a result, the feeling of powerlessness 
of the AP is lowered. This creates a sense of control in business decisions for the AP 
given that he feels in a position to make requests and achieve benefits in contractual 
and non-contractual negotiations.   
Moreover, two AP participants operating with allotment contracts with TOs 
noted:  
“[…] we have our prices. I have to sell at this prices, otherwise I will 
not make a profit.” (SH:4) 
“[W]e have a certain pricing policy that we cannot change, we have 
certain operating costs and payroll expenses that we cannot change, 
and we cannot change our margins.” (SH:1) 
In other words, the statements above indicate that APs who operate with smaller 
allotment contracts typically feel that they have more control over their decisions 
and the feeling of powerlessness is lower, particularly in terms of pricing. This can 
be attributed to their lower dependence on large TOs to help achieve their 
organisational objectives due to their diverse supply channels. As a result, the fear 
for these APs regarding losing a specific TO and powerlessness is decreased. The 
feeling of fear can cause a negotiator to conform, to avoid actions that might offend 
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or harm the other (Morris and Keltner 2000). Therefore, due to the lower level of 
fear and powerlessness, AP participants operating with smaller allotment contracts 
feel that they have more control in their relationship, and can decide either to 
comply or not with the TO’s request.  
Additionally, the majority of industry participants who had a direct 
relationship with the TOs mentioned that TOs take very high risks (such as financial 
risks) to support their operations in the ROC. As one travel agent highlighted: 
“[D]ue to competition and the risk they are taking, large TOs are 
much more careful and assertive when it comes to their contractual 
negotiations.” (TA:3) 
Two AP participants commented:  
“[…] of course where competition exists you [TOs] need to be 
aggressive, you [TOs] need to take risks and be tougher in terms of 
your associates, the employees, the payroll, the prices you [TOs] are 
going to agree on with the hoteliers, the benefits we provide for 
example to the representatives of the TO such as free food and 
accommodation.” (SH:13) 
“[T]he TOs also take risks in chartering planes in advance and they 
operate in a very competitive market […] and of course they will ask 
for discounts if demand is low. They take a very high risk and they 
invest in the ROC so this behaviour is not surprising.” (HA:3) 
The above statements indicate that industry participants, including the AP 
participants, understand the reasons behind the TOs’ behaviour in negotiations, their 
tough negotiation stance, and can rationalise the TOs’ behaviour. This could be 
attributed to the dependence of the APs on the TOs, resulting in the TOs’ high 
bargaining power.  
Van der Toorn et al. (2011) examined the influence of dependence on 
legitimacy within dyadic social relations using system justification theory. System 
justification theory stipulates that individuals are motivated to system justify 
because it aids in decreasing uncertainty, mediating threats, and forms a feeling that 
there is shared understanding with which to sustain a common reality (Van der 
Toorn et al. 2011). Van der Toorn et al. (2011) found that power can give legitimacy 
to an actor. This is because, when an actor is dependent on a powerful other to 
achieve his/her outcomes, he/she is motivated to perceive the authority figure 
(powerholder) as comparatively legitimate in order to rationalise the system of 
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power relations and to “[…] feel better” about the status quo (Van der Toorn et al. 
2011, p.128). Moreover, within a buyer-supplier context, partners may be wary of a 
partner’s actions, however a partner that has legitimacy then his behaviour is also 
considered legitimate and can sustain contractual and competence trust, and reduce 
uncertainty and risk (Ireland and Webb 2007). Legitimisation also gives the power 
holder more discretion to make decisions and increases compliance of the weaker 
party (Van der Toorn et al. 2011).  
Following the above rationalisation, it can be asserted that, in a sense, AP 
participants have legitimised the actions and behaviour of the TOs and have 
accepted their authority in the tourism industry and in their relationship. In 
particular, the large organisational power of large TOs, stemming from their control 
of critical resources (such as financial, information, customer base), and the high 
dependence of the APs, gives more discretion to the TOs to make decisions in the 
relationship. Thus, it results in the APs’ acceptance and compliance with the 
requests and actions of the TOs who seek to maintain their competitive advantage. 
This can also be supported by the fact that in the tourism literature large TOs are 
considered to be key to promoting sustainable practices in the tourism supply chain 
(Carey et al. 1997; Budeanu 2005; 2009; VanWijk and Persoon 2006). This is 
because their powerful position (stemming from their large size and buying power) 
allows them to influence behaviours and attitudes prompting suppliers into actions 
regarding sustainable practices (Budeanu 2005; Sigala 2008). Céspedes-Lorente et 
al. (2003) investigated the adoption of environmental practices by Spanish hotels. 
They argued that despite the lack of regulation the strong power of TOs as major 
stakeholders of the hotels plays a major role in hotels adopting environmental 
practices. Thus large TOs are considered to be a legitimate authority and APs feel 
that they have the right to influence their behaviour.  
Furthermore, interview data reveal that in highly dependent relationships 
APs regulate their opportunistic behaviour, not only in negotiations but also in 
strategic and operational decisions, to prevent any damage to their relationship with 
the TOs. Two AP participants commented:  
“[I]f the TOs find out that you gave a special offer to another TO and 
not them they will call you out on it. That is why the decision of most 
APs is that once you give a special offer to one market, that is to one 
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TO, you give it to all. […] Therefore it is better if you give it to all 
and you are fair with each and every one, so next year they do not 
punish you or they don’t stop the sales; you need to have good 
cooperation with them.” (SH:2) 
“[…] our current collaborators would not want us to work with some 
specific TOs that are known for driving volume and might attract 
lower cost tourists to our hotels. […] so sometimes our decisions are 
also influenced by the wants of our associates because you don’t 
want to have any problems.” (IG:1) 
The above statements point out that APs consider the response or reaction of large 
TOs in business decision-making in order to avoid harming the relationship in any 
way that may lead to retaliation from large TOs or discontinuation of the 
relationship. Fiske (2002) argued that social and moral emotions such as ‘fear of’ 
judgments, punishment or rewards are self-regulating emotions that allow 
individuals to cooperate and maintain relationships. This is because, they cause 
individuals to resist the temptation to defect or shirk due to fear of negative 
sanctions or loss of reward. An individual who consistently resists the temptation to 
defer is considered trustworthy (Fiske 2002). Hence, the ‘fear of’ judgments, 
punishment or rewards, can motivate individuals to guide and adapt their behaviour 
to preserve important relationships and build or maintain trust. Accordingly, within 
the study’s context AP participants’ intrapersonal fear of punishment or loss of 
reward (discontinuation) motivates them to self-regulate their self-interest behaviour 
to avoid harming a relationship which is critical to their business, namely their 
relationship with the TOs.   
Thus, APs direct their behaviour and actions in maintaining their relationship 
with the TOs through avoiding temptation and engendering a positive emotional 
atmosphere. Zehetner (2012) argued that in long-term relationships positive 
emotional atmosphere, in the form of happiness, pleasure, and thrill, are crucial to 
maintaining the business relationship, whereas negative emotions such as 
annoyance, tension and anger have a negative impact. He further noted that positive 
emotions significantly contribute to satisfaction and influence actors’ behaviour 
given that they play a key role in forming and influencing the cognitive evaluation 
of the relationship. Positive emotions also reinforce trust in the relationship because 
actors often use their feelings as the information basis on which to assess the 
trustworthiness of the other (Andersen and Kumar 2006). Hence, the actions of the 
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AP participants, which avoid creating negative emotional atmosphere in the 
relationship enable them to maintain the relationship with positive emotions, 
increase the TO’s perceived satisfaction with the exchange, and build trust and thus 
increase the likelihood of continuity. 
Moreover, in order to maintain their relationship, APs offer incentives to the 
TOs, as highlighted by two AP participants: 
“[…] with our major TOs we are willing to give them something 
extra because we have daily communication, a good relationship and 
they send us a big volume of business. […] If they want a room for a 
colleague and we have availability we will give it to them.” (SH:10) 
“[We] also insist that, when the TOs have empty seats on their planes 
[…] to invite their agents and sales representatives to organise 
educational trips to promote the hotel and the ROC. […] We offer 
them 3 to 4 days’ free accommodation, we show them around the 
hotel so they learn what we offer, and we meet them face-to-face as 
well. We educate them regarding our product. […] so they will 
recommend the hotel as well. These things help in the relationship.” 
(HA:2) 
Therefore, some APs are flexible and offer incentives in order to maintain a good 
personal relationship with the TOs. This view was supported by fifteen of the AP 
participants. Incentives, or ‘extras’ as APs describe them, are given to the TO 
directly or the TO’s customers. These APs make an effort to form a more personal 
connection with the TOs that can create emotional bonds between the APs and TOs 
and thus a positive emotional atmosphere in the relationship. 
Interpersonal emotions, which are emotions expressed in a relationship, can 
influence the subsequent interaction and can induce reciprocal behaviour (Morris 
and Kelner 2000). Stanko et al. (2007) argued that emotional bonds and their 
intensity, referring to the feelings that partners have beyond the fiscal exchange such 
as emotional attachment and excitement expressed in the relationship, lead to 
harmony and support between the parties. As a result, emotional bonds can increase 
the commitment and involvement of the parties in the relationship (Stanko et al. 
2007). This is because they enable the creation of deep-rooted norms that posit 
fairness and honesty and they offer the support needed to manage changes and 
uncertainty in the relationship. Within the study context, positive feelings are 
expressed in the relationship because the APs adopt a more personal approach and 
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offer incentives to the TOs. Consequently, this induces positive reactions from the 
TOs and enables the formation of emotional bonds that engender commitment on the 
part of both partners.  
The above tactic is not surprising since in asymmetric power relationships 
weaker parties tend to emphasise social aspects (such as honesty, openness and 
loyalty) and create emotional bonds by treating the stronger party in a more 
personalised way or less standardised way (Morrissey and Pittaway 2006; Johnsen 
and Ford 2008). Hence, by the APs promoting a close relational exchange, through 
offering incentives and building personal connections (friendships), a positive 
emotional atmosphere can be created, engendering satisfaction for the TOs. 
Accordingly, it can be claimed that these actions help APs to achieve their 
negotiation objectives and to maintain the relationship.  
However, despite the fact that AP participants are generally satisfied in their 
relationships with the TOs, describing the TOs as “friends” and “partners”, the 
findings also indicate that some APs harbour feelings of bitterness. An AP 
participant asserted: 
“[S]uperficially we might be smiling and shaking hands when the 
contracts are signed, however deep down I personally believe there is 
always a feeling of bitterness between the parties. The bitterness goes 
from the weaker party towards the stronger party. […] because as I 
mentioned earlier the contracts are always more beneficial for the 
TOs, there is a bitterness in the relationship. You cannot see it but it 
is there. A contract that occurs under these conditions can be 
considered as good.” (SH:8) 
That is to say, although APs and TOs operate in a positive emotional atmosphere, 
and interpersonal emotions of happiness are evident (portrayed by smiles when 
signing an agreement), still there is a deep intrapersonal emotion of bitterness; as the 
AP participant above stated, “[...] you can’t see it but it’s there.” This is because the 
data reveal that some APs perceive that the contracts may not be as balanced or fair 
as they should be. 
Although only one AP participant labelled the feeling of bitterness that 
derived from evaluating the situation as unfair, this feeling was evident in the 
narratives of other participants as well. For instance, when the researcher asked two 
AP participants whether they were satisfied with the current contracts the 
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participants laughed out loud and stated: 
“[W]ell everything depends on the specific TO you are negotiating 
and signing a contract with.” (SH:7) 
“[T]his is how a business relationship begins, it’s part of the process. 
You sign a contract. [...] it is something that needs to be done. You 
cannot do anything about it.” (SH:4) 
Another AP participant noted: 
“[S]ometimes the contract is a necessary evil, we must go through 
with it to have the necessary occupancy, on other occasions, we also 
want to keep the relationship going because it is beneficial to us.” 
(SH:1) 
Thus, the AP participants answered the question very diplomatically without being 
clear whether their emotions were positive (happiness and excitement) or negative 
(bitterness and disappointment) when negotiating a good deal. This could be due to 
the fact that managers who admit and accept their sensitivity to issues that derive 
from their emotions are rare. Although they may acknowledge that emotions play a 
part in other organisations, they may state it is not the case for them (Donada and 
Nogatchewsky 2009). Similarly, in the context of this study AP participants avoided 
describing feelings and used diplomacy in phrasing their answers and comment on 
their views regarding satisfaction with contracts.  
Nevertheless, from the above statements it can be argued that negative 
intrapersonal emotions are evident, namely a sense of bitterness. For instance, the 
AP participant above described a business action as a “[…] necessary evil”, in other 
words an unpleasant action that must be accepted to realise a certain outcome 
(Cambridge Dictionary 2015). As mentioned previously, this can be attributed to the 
fact that some AP participants perceive that the contracts are not as balanced or fair 
as they could be. Bitterness is described as anger and disappointment stemming 
from the perception of being treated unfairly (Oxford Dictionaries 2015).  
Perceptions of fairness are perceived to have two key elements: procedural 
fairness and distributive fairness (Kumar et al. 1995). Within the context of supplier-
buyer relationships, Ting (2011, p.64) argued that procedural fairness refers to the 
“[…] processes by which the distributive outcome is produced” such as 
participation, communication, dialogue and decision-making processes. Distribution 
fairness refers to the fairness of the rewards or outcomes that the parties receive in 
  
266 
the relationship relative to their efforts, particularly economic issues such as profit, 
pricing factors, promotional support and sales generated (Kumar et al. 1995; Ting 
2011). AP inputs could be economic and non-economic resources to ensure the best 
quality product for TOs and their customers (tourists); for example, investments in 
renovation and human resources, as well as resources to maintain a good 
relationship with the TO such as price concessions and flexibility.  
Barclay et al. (2005) argued that perceptions of unfairness are often 
associated with negative emotions (such as anger and hostility) towards the 
individual that caused the injustice. Anger can indicate various messages such as 
dissatisfaction with a treatment or action, violation of justice, or abuse of power, and 
individuals tend to react with resentment and bitterness (Barclay et al. 2005; Lazarus 
and Cohen-Charash 2001). This occurs because perceived unfairness causes the 
individual to feel less valued, not respected or not considered as important within the 
social context (Barclay et al. 2005). Therefore, it can be argued that some AP 
participants perceive that there is an unfair distribution of outcomes (fiscal) in the 
relationship relative to their efforts (inputs). This perceived unfairness leads to 
bitterness towards the TOs given that these participants (APs) feel that they are not 
valued and respected in the relationship.  
One reason for this can be attributed to the asymmetry of bargaining power 
that exists between the two parties. As two AP participants stated: 
“[…] fairness depends on the power balance of the two parties; the 
one who has more power and controls the situation will decide what 
is fair and the party with lower power follows.” (SH:6) 
“[T]he party that will win the [negotiations] game is the one that has 
the higher power. The party that has the power always changes 
depending on the situation.” (SH:9) 
As highlighted earlier, more often than not, large TOs dominate the relationship in 
general and negotiations in particular and APs have a sense of powerlessness, a 
feeling that they have limited or no control over their decision-making. Procedural 
fairness emphasises that individuals have a desire to control the decisions that 
influence their outcomes and if they have no control over the process they may 
perceive the process to be unfair (Hegtvedt and Killian 1999). Consequently, within 
the study’s context, due to the unequal power between the parties the TOs dominate 
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negotiations and use coercive influence strategies to gain concessions, thus APs 
have a feeling of powerlessness, or more precisely, a loss of control in the decision-
making that leads them to perceive the process as unfair.  
However, some APs disagreed that unfairness exists. As one AP participant 
emphasised, “[F]air is a win-win situation” (SH:5). Two AP participants also 
asserted: 
 “[Y]ou have to create a win-win situation everywhere in this life. 
[…] Why do you enter into this agreement? […] why do you sign a 
contract with the TO? The TO wants to win and you want to win. And 
when you win you have to make sure that he wins as well.” (TV:1) 
 “[F]rom our side I believe that a win-win situation exists. And I 
believe that for most businesses in the ROC that consist of 
professionals a win-win situation exists.” (TV:3) 
The above statements indicate that not all AP participants express a feeling of 
bitterness or perceive that there is unfairness in their relationship with the TOs. 
Some claim that they have a win-win situation. Another AP participant commented: 
“[I] believe we do have a win-win situation with the TOs of the 
highest degree […] at least in most cases.” (IG:3) 
That is to say, although this AP participant stated that a win-win situation exists he 
also noted that this may not always be the case. The AP participant making this 
particular comment manages a large chain of units and has a close strategic 
relationship with the TOs, thus he is also highly dependent on the TOs for tourism 
flow.  
Gu and Wang (2011) examined the role of fairness in relationship 
enhancement in an asymmetric distributor-manufacturer relationship and found that 
when a party is highly dependent on another the dependent party is less influenced 
by judgements of fairness. This is because the dependent party has limited control 
over accepting or rejecting an offer or directive by the powerful party. Following on 
from Gu and Wang’s (2011) observation one could argue that, due to the high 
dependence of APs on the TOs, any issues of unfairness may be disregarded. 
Conversely, although the majority of the AP participants may perceive that they 
have a win-win situation, and perceive that fairness exists in the relationship, still a 
deep intrapersonal sense of unfairness may be detected.  
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On the other hand, the fact that perceptions of unfairness exist in some 
relationships between the APs and TOs can have a negative effect on the future of 
their exchange. Samaha et al. (2011, p.99) identified that perceptions of unfairness 
in buyer-supplier relationships can act as a “poison” because they can intensify the 
negative impact of conflict and opportunism and can inhibit cooperation, flexibility 
and the ultimate success of the relationship. Hostility and bitterness caused by 
conflict in a relationship can result in relationship dissolution (Morgan and Hunt 
1994).  
Moreover, Ting et al. (2011) identified that distributive and procedural 
fairness between a supplier and buyer increases satisfaction and engenders a high 
level of trust and commitment. As one AP participant stated, “[…] if the contracts 
were fairer then we would have more trust in the relationship” (SH:6). Therefore, 
increasing the perception of fairness is critical to the success of the relationship. 
Moreover, if parties feel that they are fairly treated then they feel more confident and 
their self-esteem increases, thus it is more probable that they will develop and 
sustain a long-term relationship (Gu and Wang 2011). Hence, it can be argued that 
perceptions of unfairness can have a negative impact on the relationship between the 
APs and TOs, for example, decreasing the trust between the parties, increasing 
opportunistic behaviour, or creating a negative emotional atmosphere that may harm 
a successful relationship.  
Conversely, three AP participants asserted: 
“[T]he relationship between the APs and TOs is a commercial 
transaction […] the target is profitability for both parties. Once an 
agreement is reached, it is reached.” (IG:1) 
“[…] we need to survive and working with a large TO who you know 
will pay you on time you are more relaxed.” (SH:7) 
“[…] you shouldn’t be happy that the TO is paying you on time 
because he is just honouring the contract but strangely enough this is 
how we APs think. We are happy.” (SH:10) 
A travel agent stressed:  
“[U]ltimately it comes down to the fact that the APs need to pay the 
banks and the TOs need good prices.” (TA:2) 
In other words, perceptions of whether the agreement is fair or not should not be an 
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issue in the relationship and both parties enter the relationship to achieve certain 
financial gains. Further, considering that the majority of the AP participants are 
highly dependent on the TOs their relationship bestows a sense of financial security 
and allows them to continue their operations.  
Gassenheimer et al. (1998, p.325) commented, “[…] some relationships 
demand that parties compromise in order to survive.” Consequently, it can be argued 
that these three participants believe that this is the nature of commercial 
relationships. Hence, due the nature of the relationship it has nothing to do with 
perceptions of fairness, but rather an acceptance of the market forces, economic 
motivations and fear of losing the TO. As Pillutla and Murnighan (1996, p.221) 
affirmed, “[…] money can overcome negative feelings.” Few people will decline 
large sums of money, even though they may feel angry with the individual offering 
that money, and may perceive that the offer is not fair. Therefore, within the study’s 
context the AP’s dependence on the TO to achieve their organisational objectives 
restricts their bargaining power and prompts them to accept the demands of the TO 
in order to survive. 
Tähtinen and Blois (2011) claimed that both positive and negative emotions 
can be evident in the relationship and influence the business interactions that occur. 
Business owner/managers in general, and tourism owner/managers in particular, 
have to deal with emotionally demanding situations in their working environment, 
for example, changes in demand levels requiring continuous negotiations, stress in 
terms of receiving payments on time, and maintaining important relationships such 
as their relationship with the TOs. Hence, within this study, positive and negative 
intrapersonal and interpersonal emotions are evident in the relationships that 
influence contractual and non-contractual agreements between the APs and TOs. 
6.2.4.3.	 Conclusion		
The examination indicates that positive and negative emotions influence the 
interactions and outcomes during contractual and non-contractual negotiations. The 
APs have a feeling of fear and pressure in their relationship with the TOs, and in 
particular, a fear of losing the TOs. This is mainly attributed to the demand 
uncertainty that exists in the tourism industry and the high dependence of the APs on 
a small number of TOs. Therefore, the APs more often than not comply with the 
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TOs’ demands during negotiations in order to safeguard their relationship and secure 
a contract with a large TO in order to survive. Further, perceptions of unfairness 
creating a feeling of bitterness for some APs towards the TOs are also identified. 
Also, the asymmetric bargaining power between the parties results in TOs being 
considered an authority in the relationship. This allows the TOs more discretion to 
take decisions, and prompts APs to comply with the TOs during negotiations. 
Nevertheless, regardless of the negative emotions identified, the APs comment that 
the TOs are their friends and partners, noting that positive emotions such as 
happiness and confidence exist in the relationship, engendering its maintenance.  
The above discussion focused on the relational factors, and specifically on 
the role of emotions in the contractual and non-contractual negotiations of the APs 
with the large TOs. The proposition below discusses the influence of external 
structural factors (industry characteristics and culture) on the AP’s ability to 
negotiate pricing and volume of sales outcomes. 
6.2.5. Proposition 5: Culture and industry characteristics are influential 
factors in pricing and volume of sales during contractual and 
non-contractual negotiations 
6.2.5.1.	 Introduction		
This proposition analyses how external structural aspects, industry 
characteristics and culture, influence the bargaining power of the APs and TOs, and 
as such their ability to negotiate pricing and volume of sales. Specifically, it 
examines the impact of industry-specific factors, such as the expensiveness of the 
destination, oligopolistic TO market, oversupply of accommodation units, 
competition between the APs and seasonality. Further, it discusses the cultural 
factors that can constrain or strengthen the bargaining power of the APs and 
influence pricing and volume of sales outcomes. To fully examine this proposition, 
the bargaining power literature reviewed in Chapter 2 is utilised as well as additional 
literature. The additional literature pertains to pricing research in B2B marketing 
management and strategic management within a tourism and hospitality context, 
particularly focusing on the influence of market forces such as demand and supply 
and industry competition (domestic and international). 
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As stated earlier (section 6.1.) all propositions are interrelated and 
interconnected, thus, all factors discussed in previous sections influence pricing and 
volume of sales negotiation outcomes. Therefore, to fully explain these negotiation 
outcomes it is critical to include sub-categories noted in previous propositions, such 
as culture. Accordingly, the section below examines the influence of culture and 
industry characteristics on pricing and volume of sales outcomes.  
6.2.5.2.	 Discussion	of	proposition	5	
All industry participants highlighted the expensiveness of the ROC as a 
destination. For example, four AP participants stressed: 
“[C]ompetition is high. Our tourism product is not differentiated 
enough from much cheaper countries with a lower cost structure than 
ours.” (HA:1) 
“[…] the flights and the airports are expensive. We have very high 
costs, everything is expensive.” (SH:13) 
“[W]e are in direct competition with Turkey. They are much cheaper. 
They are not in Europe. So they do not have the 18% VAT we have 
here, salaries are lower, their supply is enormous and they can have 
lower rates.” (TV:2) 
“[…] the ROC as a destination is not for the mass market, we cannot 
compete on price.” (SH:6) 
The above statements indicate that the ROC is considered to be an expensive 
destination in relation to its competitors such as Turkey and Greece, constraining its 
competitiveness. This is mainly a result of high airport taxes and charges, taxation at 
the destination, cost of fuel, and high salaries of tourism employees that contribute 
to the price competitiveness of the ROC (Tsangari 2012). Equally, Farmaki (2012) 
argued that the high cost structure of the ROC is confusing and conflicts somewhat 
with the island’s focus on mass packaged sun-and-sea price sensitive tourists, thus 
diminishing its competitiveness for the mass market. This intensifies the pressure on 
APs to offer a lower price to the TO in order to be able to compete with similar 
destinations that have a lower cost structure such as Turkey and Greece. As such it 
can be argued that the expensiveness of the destination restricts the bargaining 
power of the APs in negotiating with the TOs. 
Indeed, two AP participants noted: 
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“[…] in negotiations the TOs usually argue that the ROC is 20% to 
30% more expensive than our competitors.” (SH:11) 
“[T]he TO knows that businesses are trying to survive and they will 
say ‘you can’t give us an increase; Turkey is much cheaper.’ They 
use the competition of different countries and the game starts.” 
(SH:7) 
That is to say, prices of competing destinations are often mentioned in contractual 
negotiations as a lever for obtaining lower prices, thus constraining the AP’s ability 
to negotiate price during contractual and non-contractual agreements. Tsangari 
(2012) examined the key determinants of demand for the ROC and identified that 
the relative prices between the ROC and competitive markets such as Greece, Spain 
and Turkey influence demand levels. In particular, the ability of competitor 
countries with lower operating costs to offer a better value for money proposition 
increases competition for the ROC (Tsangari 2012). Therefore, price 
competitiveness is vital to enabling the ROC to stimulate demand and compete in 
the price sensitive packaged sun-and-sea market. The importance of destination-
specific resources influencing the bargaining power interactions of the APs with the 
TOs has also been identified in section 6.2.2. However, as mentioned in section 
6.2.2, the current centralised Government system in the ROC, characterised by 
bureaucracy, hinders tourism development and enrichment of its sun-and-sea 
product that could improve its attractiveness, and in turn its competitiveness in the 
international market. Hence, it can be asserted that the fact that the ROC is 
perceived as expensive by the TOs in relation to competitive destinations, restricts 
the ability of the AP participants to negotiate price, since the APs often need to offer 
a low price to the TO in order to be competitive and ensure satisfactory demand 
levels. 
Moreover, two AP participants stated:  
“[T]hese TOs have good packages, they have good agreements, they 
have their own flights with lower financial cost so they create a very 
competitive package for the ROC and they consistently bring tourists 
to the island.”  (TV:2) 
“[T]he TOs take advantage of the fact that the ROC is isolated from 
Europe and the surrounding countries so accessibility is low. 
Therefore, TOs organise the flights and they are very effective in 
transferring tourists to the island, so it’s very difficult for us.” (SH:1) 
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In other words, the TO’s capacity to attract and transport a large tourism flow is 
critical due to their ability to create an appealing cost-effective package for the 
tourists. This ability mainly derives from the standardised tourism product and 
economies of scale they can achieve from their large distribution network (Bastakis 
et al. 2004; Alegre and Sard 2015). The capacity of the TOs to create a cost-effective 
package is particularly significant for the ROC, a mature destination that has a 
highly substitutable sun-and-sea tourism product targeting an extremely price 
sensitive tourist with diverse and demanding needs (Machlouzarides 2010; 
Karyopouli and Koutra 2012). Therefore, the intense competition that APs face from 
destinations offering a similar sun-and-sea tourism product increases their 
dependence on the large TOs to transfer the necessary tourism flow. In turn, it 
restricts the AP’s bargaining power and their ability to negotiate.   
Indeed, the majority of the AP participants mentioned that promoting their 
units effectively in the source markets is difficult. Four AP participants highlighted:  
“[W]ho is going to advertise you? TOs offer that. We cannot reach 
the source markets on our own.” (HA:4) 
“[…] the TOs have a huge customer database and they also have the 
Internet. The TOs probably have over 30,000 email addresses to 
contact and promote the hotel and the special offers we give.” 
(SH:10) 
“[…] also marketing wise we do not have so much money to spend 
on marketing our unit all over Europe, but the TOs do.” (SH:8) 
“[W]e also work with the TOs on one aspect of promotion through 
brochure contributions or on marketing campaigns though their 
marketing channels.” (SH:12) 
A travel agent also stressed: 
“[P]articularly the TOs who have a good name in the market if they 
decide that they want to promote a certain destination they can.” 
(TA:3) 
A TO participant also stated:  
“[…] we are also helping the APs raise the profile of what they have 
to offer not just as a company but as individual hotels as well.” 
(TO:3) 
The statements depict the importance of the promotional ability of the TOs in the 
tourism industry and for the APs in particular. This was supported by nineteen 
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participants (thirteen APs, two travel agents and one participant from the recreation 
sector). Through the exploitation of their large distribution network large TOs have 
the financial resources, knowledge and means to communicate with the tourists 
(Clerides et al. 2008). Hence, the large TOs are able to effectively promote the 
accommodation units to the market. 
Furthermore, in relation to the promotional ability of the TOs, two AP 
participants asserted:  
“[…] the money you need to advertise and attract the tourists may 
not be worth it in the end […] with the TOs they get their commission 
and they do it for you and you do not have the headache and costs to 
do this yourself.” (TV:2) 
“[…] we don’t do any promotions as an individual until we do our 
contracts and give brochure contributions to the TOs.” (HA:2) 
Accordingly, due to high costs and difficulties in reaching the right market, the 
majority of the AP participants mainly depend on the TOs to promote their product. 
The TOs, as intermediaries, exist to help the transaction between the tourist and the 
supplier (APs) to be more efficient and effective by minimising the transaction costs 
(Calveras 2006; Clerides et al. 2008). Calveras and Orfila (2014, p.729) explored the 
role of TOs in the Balearic Islands and found that TOs act as “[…] providers of 
reputation” for the APs to distribute their capacity. They explained that, in terms of 
purchasing a holiday, quality is unobservable for the tourist, thus the tourist is 
unsure about the true quality of a unit. Therefore, the good reputation and brand of 
the TO indicates the quality of the product in a credible manner. Hence, within the 
study’s context, the APs utilise the reputation and customer base of the TOs in order 
to effectively and efficiently reach their target market. In turn, the TOs’ promotional 
ability enables them to control the tourism flow in the ROC and consequently the 
volume of sales for the APs thus restricting their bargaining power.  
However, three AP participants stated: 
“[…] we also use online databases to promote our hotel and it has 
been very beneficial, and in this way I can also change the price of 
the room myself.” (SH:2) 
“[…] things are gradually changing. For example, this year 20% of 
our arrivals are from online bookings, so we are gradually becoming 
more independent from the traditional TO. Therefore, if this 20% that 
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I have now becomes 30% next year and then moves to 40% or 50%, 
some independence from the TOs will be evident.” (SH:10) 
“[…] you can use online databases although most Internet bookings 
go through online TOs again, you cannot avoid it.” (SH:9) 
As the statements indicate, the Internet has had a considerable impact on the APs’ 
ability to promote their product, be flexible on price and reach their target markets. 
Kracht and Wang (2010) and Ling et al. (2014) argued that the advent of 
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) and the Internet has 
transformed the traditional distribution channel giving an opportunity to the 
accommodation sector to connect with the customer. Ling et al. (2014) found that, 
by using online distribution channels, and particularly online travel agencies (such 
as Expedia), an accommodation unit can increase its occupancy rate.  
Conversely, DiPietro et al. (2010) noted that the adoption of ICT and 
effective online strategies required considerable investment by the accommodation 
unit, including investment in the hardware needed and employee training. Thus, it 
can be difficult for some APs to effectively implement online strategies to increase 
their distribution channel, hence online distribution may not be a viable strategy for 
all APs. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the effective use of online distribution 
channels can offer an opportunity for the APs to increase their bargaining power in 
relation to the TOs in negotiations since their dependence on the large TOs for their 
tourism flow decreases.  
In contrast, in relation to online channels one AP participant stated: 
“[…] if you search on Google for hotels in the ROC you will see 
millions of results come up so the competition is fierce […] as a 
customer you can see everything about the hotels, the product, price, 
reviews, so you have to offer a good product for a good price.” 
(SH:5) 
A travel agent also noted:  
“[…] the only thing that the online TOs say to the APs is to have an 
attractive price in order to sell, because with online TOs it is the APs 
who take the risk. For the online TO it makes no difference; if this 
specific unit does not sell then other units will sell.” (TA:1) 
That is to say, although the Internet has been beneficial it has also increased the 
competition between the APs in terms of offering a good value product with an 
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attractive price because it is easier for the consumer to compare the prices of various 
units. The advent of Internet enabled transparency between various tourism 
providers, particularly with regard to price, and has resulted in tourism providers 
often competing on price to attract the consumer (Kracht and Wang 2010; Standing 
et al. 2014). Further, online intermediaries have strong bargaining power and are 
extremely price sensitive, since they focus on achieving the most profitable 
commission rates (Lee et al. 2013; Standing et al. 2014). DiPietro et al. (2010, p.62) 
found that the low prices that online intermediaries offer encourages consumers to 
search for the “[…] best deal” which reduces the profit margin for APs. Therefore, it 
can be suggested that although online channels may offer more flexibility for the 
APs in terms of controlling their prices they can also face similar challenges to the 
large traditional TOs, including price sensitivity. Thus, an AP’s profitability may be 
lower.  
Porter (1980) also stated that buyers have a high durable bargaining power 
when an industry is highly concentrated and organisations have a high market share; 
such high bargaining power allows the dominant organisations to enforce discipline 
and price. Hence, although the Internet provides an opportunity for APs to diversify 
their supply sources, the large market share that large TOs control and their ability 
to contract rooms in bulk in advance enables them to retain their strong bargaining 
power. In turn, during negotiations the TOs have the upper hand in relation to the 
APs. 
Moreover, most industry participants maintained that tourists in the ROC 
favour the traditional packaged holiday arrangement further contributing to the 
bargaining power of the TOs. For instance, a travel agent asserted: 
“[I]n the UK, tourists travelling with the traditional TOs and 
dynamic packaging are about 50-50, however in Russia about 90% of 
tourists travel with a packaged holiday. In Germany most tourists 
prefer to travel with the traditional TOs.” (TA:3) 
Two AP participants also affirmed:  
“[…] we need the TOs. Even though we have the Internet. [...] people 
are still geared towards the idea of a TO. Secondly, booking through 
a TO gives the customer some kind of a guarantee if anything goes 
wrong.” (HA:3) 
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“[T]he majority of the tourists that we have in the ROC will not book 
through the Internet directly with us, because they have to pay for an 
expensive flight to come. On the other hand, the TO who operates a 
charter flight gives the tourist the opportunity to come with a more 
cost-effective package.” (SH:2) 
The above statements suggest that the ROC’s major source markets (UK, Russia and 
Germany) predominantly prefer to travel with a packaged arrangement given that it 
facilitates their holiday. This was a view shared by fifteen industry participants. For 
instance, for the UK the packaged holiday is the most popular type of holiday 
arrangement (ABTA 2014). Further, in 2013 over 58% of tourists visiting the ROC 
travelled on a packaged arrangement (CYSTAT 2014). Hence, it can be argued that 
the large TOs are, critical to the tourism industry in the ROC despite the 
opportunities for promotion and bookings that the Internet and ICT provide. 
Kracht and Wang (2010) claimed that, on the one hand, the Internet enables 
the consumer to connect and compare various offers from a number of tourism 
providers. On the other hand, it has made independent travel and price-comparison 
very challenging and time consuming for the consumer (Kracht and Wang 2010). 
Further, Calveras and Orfila (2014) argued that due to the information asymmetries 
over the Internet in terms of uncertain quality regarding the accommodation unit 
bought by customers, intermediaries will always have a major role in the tourism 
industry.  
Hence, the TOs ability to guarantee quality and security at the destination, 
and promote a cost-effective package for the tourist, gives them a critical role in the 
tourism industry in the ROC in terms of controlling the tourism flow and type of 
tourist (packaged tourist). Furthermore, this control restricts the ability of some APs 
to diversify their sources of supply and increases the TOs’ bargaining power to 
negotiate lower prices with APs. Following the above discussion, it is not surprising 
that the majority of AP participants seek to achieve a contract with a large TO in 
order to maintain their business. 
However, the analysis reveals that some APs are able to diversify their 
sources of supply and reduce their dependency on a small number of TOs. For 
instance, two AP participants maintained:  
“[…] having different source markets is not always possible for all 
the hotels, but our unit has been in operation for the last 23 years. 
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Over the years you can enter other source channels and not be 
dependent on 2 or 3 market players.” (SH:7) 
“[W]e have different channels that we receive our guests from. We 
do not only receive them from one source. We have a lot of repeaters 
from different channels through TOs, Internet, loyalty programmes 
and direct bookings.” (SH:5) 
This difference can be attributed to the firm-specific resources and location of the 
units. The findings indicate that high quality units, and units associated with branded 
international chains, appear to have more diversified distribution channels enabling 
them to achieve satisfactory tourism flow. However, independent accommodation 
units appear to rely more on the TOs’ distribution channels. Calveras and Orfila 
(2005) found that, in the Balearic Islands, large and reputable hotel chains had a 
lower dependence on large TOs for their tourism flow. This was because they were 
able to build and create their own reputation and brand. Branded accommodation 
chains can share resources, distribution channels, loyalty programmes and the 
likelihood of more commercial accounts achieved at the corporate level leading to a 
higher occupancy rate (O’Neil and Carlbäck 2011). Hence, it can be suggested that 
these branded units are better able to diversify their source markets and lessen their 
dependency on the TOs, thus increase their bargaining power during negotiations. 
On the other hand, a very small number of independent units are also able to 
diversify their supply, as two AP participants noted:  
“[…] to disentangle our unit from the TOs we started a marketing 
campaign targeting special interest groups, such as religious tourism 
and conferences.” (SH:8) 
“[W]e made a strong effort to reduce our dependence on the large 
TOs by targeting business and conference tourism and we have 
invested considerably in facilities and the technology needed to offer 
these services.” (SH:1) 
That is to say, niche special interest markets such as conferences presented an 
opportunity for some AP participants to lower their dependence on large mass price 
sensitive TOs. Such action can also enable the unit to charge higher prices given that 
business tourists are less price sensitive (since typically the trip is paid for by their 
employer) and have softer budget restrictions (Figini and Vici 2012).  
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However, the location characteristics can restrict the APs from diversifying 
their sources of supply. As identified in section 6.2.1, location characteristics 
influence the contractual and non-contractual negotiations given that differences 
exist regarding the type of clientele. Two AP participants from Paphos noted: 
“[…] maybe if we had other sources of tourists apart from leisure 
tourists we would have more bargaining power to negotiate with the 
large TOs.” (SH:11) 
“[…] our hotel in Limassol has a variety of customer sources, such 
as through the Internet, TOs and travel agents as well as different 
types of tourism. It is not just leisure tourism as it is in Paphos.” 
(SH:3) 
An AP participant in Limassol highlighted: 
“[…] we do not target mass tourism. Given that large TOs mainly 
work with mass leisure tourists their financial interests for our unit 
are low so they do not put a lot of pressure on price.” (SH:5) 
To be precise, the above statements indicate that the degree of pressure that the APs 
have from the TOs on price restrictions is influenced by the type of target market. 
Therefore, the focus on leisure mass tourism in Paphos can restrict the ability of 
participant APs to negotiate price and diversify their supply. This is because mass 
tourism is a highly competitive sector that is dominated by large TOs that place 
emphasis on low price holidays and large numbers (Falzon 2012). In order to be 
competitive, TOs push APs to achieve a competitive price and a satisfactory volume 
of sales.  
Nevertheless, the analysis indicates that any attempts by the APs to diversify 
the sources of tourism supply are hampered by insufficient flight accessibility. More 
specifically, three AP participants commented that:  
“[…] if you had 100% direct business [...] you can control your rates 
and the quality of your clients.” (HA:2) 
“[T]he majority of repeat clientele are through TOs and they have no 
other option to come to our hotel due to the flights but some do come 
directly.” (SH:10) 
“[T]here are also individual guests who visit our hotel and usually 
they book their tickets directly on their own without the assistance of 
the TO. However, I still think there is no hotel that can survive only 
with individual customers [booking directly with the hotel], because 
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there are not enough cheap flights and our tourism product is more 
attractive to tourists travelling on package arrangements.” (SH:13) 
In other words, the inadequate number of flights from independent air carriers, and 
the lack of direct flights from source markets restricts the available options for 
tourists to access the island and book directly with the APs. This is also supported 
by the fact that as reported in section 6.2.2, insufficient flight connectivity constrains 
the APs’ bargaining power in relation to the TOs. Specifically, participants (industry 
and government sector) highlighted the need for flight deregulation for non-EU 
markets in order to improve accessibility to the ROC (section 6.2.2). Hence, 
inadequate flight connectivity further enables the large TOs to control the tourism 
flow and the type of tourists visiting the ROC, namely price conscious packaged 
tourists.  
The insufficient flight connectivity is particularly restrictive in terms of 
attracting tourists on an independent basis, for instance through direct sales, since 
there are limited options for tourists to find seat-only tickets. Improving flight 
connectivity by attracting low cost carriers could increase the number of tourists 
visiting on an independent basis. For instance, an increase in scheduled air services 
saw a growth in independent travellers in Mallorca (Jacobsen and Munar 2012). 
Hence, it can be argued that this could in turn help the APs to increase their 
alternatives for tourism flow, thus diversifying their supply sources. Accordingly, 
the dependence of the APs on the TOs for tourism flow might then decrease, thus 
increasing their bargaining power during contractual and non-contractual 
negotiations. In the absence of seat-only tickets, other destinations may look more 
appealing to tourists, and the TOs’ control on tourism flow, and the dependence of 
APs on packaged tourism that goes hand in hand with low pricing, is maintained. 
The power balance between TOs and APs thus remains unchanged.   
This reliance on mass price sensitive packaged tourists, and the oligopolistic 
TO industry, enable the TOs to push for lower prices. Four AP participants claimed:  
“[T]he TOs want to operate in a monopolistic structure. What I mean 
by this is that the TOs want to exercise their leverage on a 
businessman that ultimately results in a take it or leave it attitude 
thus getting the price they want.” (SH:8) 
“[T]he TOs are now more demanding, more sensitive to price. If it is 
possible they want you to give them the lowest price.” (HA:1) 
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“[I]n our unit we have the Russian market, like most hotels. We just 
go along with whatever they [the TOs] ask. We are forced to do that; 
we don’t want to lose them and we will give them the price they ask.” 
(SH:2) 
“[…] a lot of the time [large TOs] try to dictate the price that you 
have to give them. What I mean is that they might come and tell me 
that ‘The company has decided that this year they will not give any 
increases on the price’ or ‘The company has decided that this year 
we will achieve a decrease of X% [in prices]’. And you start 
negotiating and you try to negotiate the best deal for you.” (SH:11) 
Moreover, a travel agent stated: 
“[…] the TOs will always put a lot of pressure on price when it 
comes to the APs, they always put pressure.” (TA:2) 
The majority of the AP participants operate in a very disadvantaged power structure 
in relation to the large TOs given that there are only a small number of TOs. This 
restricts the AP’s ability to negotiate a more profitable price leading them to accept 
the price proposed by the TOs. Therefore, it is common practice and expected for 
the large TOs to apply pressure to the APs and to try to dictate prices in 
negotiations. One reason for this pressure on APs is that accommodation plays a 
principal role in determining the price of a holiday package (Thrane 2005; Aguiló et 
al. 2001). Aguiló et al. (2001) examined the prices of German TOs in Mallorca and 
asserted that hotel category, hotel location and type of board had a significant effect 
on the overall price of the holiday package offered by the TO. Since accommodation 
is a strategic product for the TOs, and has a considerable influence upon the price of 
the holiday, the analysis reveals that the TOs use their bargaining power to put 
pressure on APs to achieve their expected profitability and be competitive in the 
market.  
Furthermore, two AP participants noted:  
“[…] in exclusivity contracts the TO can set the prices at a point 
where as a company they are comfortable with and implement the 
pricing policy that they want. [….] But not many TOs can do this. 
For the ones that can it’s due to the volume that they bring to the 
ROC.” (TV:3) 
“[T]he TOs demand low prices for high quality services, and they 
achieve this based on the large number of tourists they are able to 
bring to the units.” (IG:2) 
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In other words, the large TOs, exploiting their financial resources and ability to 
control a large tourism flow, are advantageously placed to contract a large number 
of rooms to gain a more beneficial price. This is in line with Aguiló et al. (2003) 
who examined TO package holidays in the Balearic Islands. They found that the 
TOs with high market power and ability to contract a large number of beds, due to 
their control of large tourism flows, were able to negotiate lower prices than others 
through their wholesale negotiations. Similarly, it can be argued that in the ROC the 
large TOs have the necessary bargaining power to make large wholesale agreements 
through exclusivity and commitment contracts and negotiate low prices with the 
APs. 
On the other hand, three AP participants highlighted: 
“[W]e make agreements and we do negotiate on price. However, 
sometimes it might be better not to ask a higher price and go with a 
low price in order to have a higher volume of guests.” (SH:10) 
“[…] the way the TOs promote the hotel is more important for us 
than asking them about a little bit of increase in the price and a little 
bit of this, and that, this is irrelevant. The point is to keep your 
occupancy high and the TOs can do that.” (HA:1) 
“[B]ookings and reservations, we need nothing else but these two 
things. […] you just need to have tourist traffic and an agreement to 
keep you going and to have a profit; we need nothing else.” (IG:3) 
The above statements demonstrate that APs focus on achieving a high volume of 
sales, and thus high occupancy rates, rather than seeking to gain a small increase in 
price from the TOs. This was a view shared by the majority of the AP participants, 
particularly AP participants who operate with large agreements. Sard et al. (2002) 
pointed out that, given the price sensitivity of the TOs, the APs’ mark-up is low and 
therefore the APs’ profits are dependent on the volume of tourists that the TOs bring 
to the unit, further strengthening the bargaining power of the TOs. Hence, within 
this study, the APs concentrate on maintaining a consistently high occupancy rate 
rather than on gaining an increase in price.   
Two AP participants managing large room capacities also stated:  
“[T]he secret is to maintain a high occupancy rate. […] so when you 
have large guaranteed contracts even if you might have periods of 
crisis, such as lower bookings, if you make some price adjustments 
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with your partner, you are still going to fill up your beds and make a 
profit.” (IG:1) 
“[I]f you have a contract that gives you at least a high occupancy 
percentage, you get a certain percentage of the profit to keep your 
business going.” (TV:1) 
That is to say, for AP participants managing large sized units maintaining a steady 
occupancy rate is vital, therefore TOs with the ability to provide a consistent tourism 
flow are even more important to the continued operation of these units. 
Consequently, volume of sales takes precedence over achieving a higher price. This 
is supported by Sard et al. (2002) who found that chain accommodation units in the 
Balearics that had an agreement with a TO were more anxious to attain high 
occupancy rates than higher prices. Espinet et al. (2003) also explored TO brochure 
prices in Costa Brava, Spain, and identified that the size of the unit has an influence 
on the price. More specifically, the larger the capacity of a unit the lower is the 
price. This can be attributed to the fact that a higher price can also mean a low 
occupancy rate (Sard et al. 2002). Further, given the perishability of the tourism 
product which means that, as one AP participant stated, “[…] an empty room is lost 
money”, the ability to sustain a high occupancy rate is key. For this reason, 
participant APs focus on offering a lower price and generating high occupancy 
rather than a higher price to make a profit. 
In contrast, two AP participants operating with an allotment contract 
highlighted: 
“[W]e have two rates, one is for the individual customers and the 
other one is the TO rate. If we do not sell at these prices we cannot 
make any profit.” (SH:6) 
“[W]e have our prices that we go through vigorously based on our 
costs and demand. I will never do anything that will have a negative 
effect on the hotel, because, if you sign a contract with a low price, 
and you disregard the costs, that are still very high, our profitability 
will go down.  Why should our profitability reduce? […] The TOs 
don’t care about my costs, why should I care about theirs?” (SH:4) 
The above statements indicate that some AP participants follow a pricing strategy 
that aims to achieve a certain profit margin for each room with higher prices rather 
than a low price strategy to generate volume of sales. This is because these APs 
operate with an allotment contract that typically entails higher prices than 
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commitment and exclusivity contracts, due to the lower volume of sales that the TOs 
generate for the units. Although higher prices can offer a higher profitability in the 
short-term there is a risk of losing in volume of sales what is gained in high prices 
(Pellinen 2003). Thus, more often than not, these APs have lower occupancy rates. 
However, as one AP participant commented: 
“[…] although we have a lower occupancy rate our profitability 
some months is higher than when we had commitment contracts with 
the TOs.” (SH:3) 
The pricing strategy that the TOs often impose on the majority of AP participants, 
namely low prices to generate volume, is not viable for some units in the ROC, a 
view that was supported by five APs. Hence, the analysis indicates that this often 
leads these APs to discontinue large agreements in order to be able to cover their 
costs and achieve higher profitability.  
The viability of the decision by these AP participants to operate with 
allotment contracts as a means to achieve higher profitability can be attributed to the 
unit’s size and their respective tourist target markets. These APs are small size units 
(with a capacity of less than 150 rooms) and thus require a smaller volume of 
tourists to achieve minimum occupancy rate. Consequently, it is possible for them to 
generate sales through smaller distribution channels such as using online channels or 
smaller, niche TOs. Further, large TOs mainly focus on the mass price sensitive 
tourist (Aguiló et al. 2005) whereas these APs target less price sensitive tourists, 
such as the luxury and business segments. Therefore, facilitated by their size, their 
target market and their lower dependence on the TO, these AP participants are able 
to increase their bargaining power in relation to the TOs and are able to offer higher 
prices to the TOs using allotment contracts.  
However, given the ability of the TOs to guarantee a high occupancy rate 
most AP participants still preferred to give a lower price to the TOs to be 
competitive and generate sales. TOs seek to offer a good value holiday for their 
customers by utilising mark-up pricing formulas, where the price of the holiday is 
determined by the cost of the packaged components plus a margin (Davies and 
Downward 2007; Alegre and Sard 2015). Hence, large TOs focus on maximum 
return on investment in order to increase their profitability (Falzon 2012). As a 
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result, it can be argued that price competition between the APs is high to achieve 
their organisational objectives. Five AP participants stressed: 
“[I]n business it is all about competition, we have the same product 
so we are working towards getting our share of the market; this is 
what it is all about, you do what you can.” (SH:7) 
“[…] due to the high supply the TO knows that if he goes a little bit 
further down the road he will be satisfied.” (SH:8) 
“[I]f you give a TO a good price they prefer to promote and sell your 
unit.”(HA:4) 
“[I]t is all about supply and demand. They know that in the ROC they 
can find a number of units with room availability. They believe that 
they can negotiate the prices, and they do.” (HA:2) 
“[…] for example in the ROC we have a lot of 4 star hotels. If you 
visit and see all these 4 star hotels you will realise that they are more 
or less the same; there is no wow factor in any of them. […] so in 
order for the TOs to have a price where they can make a profit they 
push for lower prices and they do achieve them.”  (IG:3) 
Due to the highly substitutable product, namely the accommodation unit, and the 
evident oversupply (Chapter 4, section 4.4), most of the AP participants are pushed 
to adopt a lower price, higher volume strategy in order to be competitive and achieve 
a contract with the TOs.  
Scholars have argued that accommodation units are not perfect substitutes 
and that they can be differentiated for instance through quality (such as star 
category), brand values, location and the units’ attributes (Espinet et al. 2003; 
Thrane 2005; Lee and Jang 2013; Becerra et al. 2013; Alegre et al. 2013). Cirer-
Costa (2013, p.454) identified that in Ibiza, Spain, “[…] each type of unit is a bad 
substitute for the rest” and a variety of units share a large market with each 
individual unit targeting specific demand. Put differently, the APs have some control 
over the prices due to the fact that differentiation exists between the units. This 
thesis agrees with this stance given that firm-specific resources can increase the 
bargaining power of a specific hotel in negotiating contractual and non-contractual 
agreements.  
On the other hand, two AP participants asserted: 
“[I]f I was the general manager of a 5 star hotel in the same area on 
the same stretch of beach, there you have to be competitive you have 
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to use the strong points of your hotel in order to get the better rate 
from the TO.” (SH:5) 
“[W]e do not have any bargaining power, the only way you could 
have some [bargaining power] is if you have a unit by the beach and 
in a location with limited development, then you can get the price you 
are asking for. If there are, for example, only 10 hotels by the beach 
that sell well, you will get what you want. However, here in Paphos, 
we have around 200 licensed accommodation units and they are still 
building 3 new units. We have already self-destructed and now things 
will get even worse.” (SH:11) 
In other words, geographical location plays a critical role in increasing competition, 
in general and price competition in particular between the APs. Equally, Lee and 
Jang (2013) found that geographical distance between accommodation units, 
meaning the concentration of competitors in certain areas, increases the likelihood of 
substitutability between units and cross-dependence in their pricing strategies. 
Additionally, competition in the accommodation industry is steered by the number 
of direct competitors offering similar products (for example, accommodation 
category) and contributes to price formation (Becerra et al. 2013; Cirer-Costa 2013).  
Within the context of the ROC the majority of the accommodation units at 
the most popular resorts ‒ namely, Paphos, Limassol, Ayia Napa and Protaras ‒ are 
located along the same stretch of beach. This is a typical characteristic of mature 
sun-and-sea destinations (Sasidharan and Thapa 2002; Andriotis 2006). From the 
researcher’s knowledge, in Limassol there are three five star accommodation units in 
close proximity to another on the same stretch of beach. In addition, Paphos has the 
highest number of beds in operation in four star accommodations; that is, 8,159 beds 
(CTO 2014b) in accommodation concentrated on two stretches of beach. Therefore, 
in the ROC, a number of accommodation units can be considered as direct 
competitors. This is because they offer a similar product within a close geographical 
distance thus strengthening price competition between the APs in their negotiations 
with the TOs. This is in line with Sharpley (2003, p.256) who commented that the 
oversupply of accommodation units in the ROC “[…] has played into the hands of 
the TOs” giving them the power to demand heavy discounts. Hence, it can be argued 
that due to the oversupply of accommodation units the bargaining power of the APs 
in relation to the TOs is restricted since the TOs have many alternatives from which 
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to choose. In turn, the price competition between APs further intensifies their effort 
to achieve a contract with the TOs. 
Conversely, three AP participants highlighted: 
“[S]trong competition has always been present and this is a healthy 
phenomenon. Price competition is helpful because we want to get 
nearer the price offered by other destinations such as Greece and 
Spain.” (HA:1) 
“[…] it is an open free market and healthy competition should exist. 
It can make you better.” (IG:1) 
“[…] to visit your competitor and see what he/she is offering it is a 
good thing, because competition is good and it should exist. […] we 
are all a big family and we have to know what our competitors are 
doing in order for everyone to improve. […] When you see that your 
competitor is doing much better than you, then you strive to reach 
him and become better.” (SH:13) 
The above statements indicate that AP participants perceive that the strong 
competition has a positive impact upon their operations allowing them to become 
more competitive in the domestic and international market. This was a view 
supported by twenty of the AP participants. Competition can have positive impacts 
such as product innovation, identification and development of new sources of 
supply, increased effort by management and the removal of inefficiencies (Cook 
1977; Carlin and Seabright 2000). This is particularly relevant for mature 
Mediterranean destinations that are in direct competition with other similar sun-and-
sea destinations (Kozak and Martin 2012). All businesses operate within the same 
open system where interdependencies exist and competition can enhance the 
efficiency of the market as a whole, improving the competitiveness of the 
destination and in turn the APs.  
However, in relation to the competition between the APs in the ROC, four 
AP participants commented: 
“[T]he competition that exists is about ‘How can I gain from the 
other?’ […] In small societies […] I think we are happy when 
somebody takes a wrong turn. But it shouldn’t be like this.” (IG:1) 
“[…] if I tell another AP that a TO visited me and I accepted this 
specific price they think that you are showing off, that you are better 
than them. There is jealousy in the [ROC] market in general.” 
(SH:13) 
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“[N]obody cooperates with each other, everybody follows their own 
path, however, this is not right. Each business follows its own path 
and only sees its targets and goals.”  (SH:3) 
“[…] due to the competition everyone is only interested in his or her 
own pocket. […] that is the reason why the hotel associations did not 
succeed or reach a point of unanimous decision even after so many 
years.” (SH:1) 
The statements above indicate that the mentality of Greek-Cypriot people, 
characterised by individualistic behaviour and jealousy, may restrict APs from 
benefiting from the positive impacts of competition. This is because each AP 
focuses on achieving their individual organisational goals. The view that the 
individualistic mentality of the ROC contributes to competition was supported by 
twenty-two other participants, from both the industry and government sectors. When 
individualism is present, people perceive that they are independent from others, 
focusing on attaining their personal aims rather than on group aims (Cannon et al. 
2010). Hence an environment that endorses autonomy, competition and 
independence exists (Cannon et al. 2010). However, within the study’s context, such 
competitive and individualistic behaviour limits the ability of the APs to cooperate 
in order to improve their bargaining ability in relation to the TOs. 
For example, in the past attempts were made by the APs to counteract the 
high bargaining power of the TOs by safeguarding their interests through shared 
goals and informal agreements. As two AP participants commented: 
“[W]e have the associations ‒ Cyprus Hotel Association and 
Association of Cyprus Tourist Enterprises. Sometimes these 
associations also meet together. And we go in these meetings and we 
discuss about the increases that we would have and so on, but the 
moment you leave those meetings, do not believe anything that has 
been said. And this is everywhere, not only here in Paphos. […] it is 
the same in Greece, anywhere you go it is the same. We agree in the 
meetings that we will add a 7% increase next year and then an 
individual will go and give a 2% increase, 5% and so on; everyone 
does his/her own thing.” (SH:8)  
“[U]nfortunately, there is no unanimous policy between the APs, 
every AP cares for himself/herself and his/her company. Even though 
we have associations and we meet and agree on various issues, still 
everyone does his/her own thing. For example, we [the APs] might 
agree that we will not give discounts of more than 10%, but one AP 
might decide to give more than a 10% discount and destroys the 
market.” (TV:4) 
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While such informal agreements regarding pricing issues are not commended the 
above statements are indicative of the inadequate cooperation that exists between the 
APs. The analysis reveals that the relationship is characterised by competition, 
opportunism, self-interest and mistrust, hindering cooperation. Equally, 
Papageorgiou (2008) found that the amalgamation of individualistic and egotistical 
characteristics of Greek APs in their business relationships created an impossible 
barrier to cooperation due to the fact that this behaviour hinders an environment of 
collegiality and cooperation between APs. Therefore, it can be argued that the 
individualistic mentality of the ROC restricts the APs’ ability to effectively 
cooperate and improve their bargaining power. 
Collective bargaining power (cooperation) and a congruent voice can aid all 
members when dealing with institutions in power (Luo 2007), such as large TOs. 
For instance, Wu and Choi (2005, p.127) identified that the dominant buyer in the 
buyer-supplier-supplier triad, where suppliers were “coopeting42”, was dissatisfied 
with the cooperation between the suppliers since the suppliers behaved in a 
collective way, strengthening their bargaining power. Accordingly, it can be claimed 
that the congruence of competitors (for example, of APs) to lobby for a shared aim 
or address a challenging situation, could solidify and increase their bargaining 
power.  
However, when firms are locked in competitive relationships individualistic 
behaviour is not unexpected. This is because, despite the fact that strategic or tactical 
goals are set separately, they are also similar (Bengtsson and Kock 1999). Thus due 
to the similarities in their strategic aims APs still have to access critical resources 
from the same buyer, namely the TO in order to attain these goals. Therefore, it can 
be suggested that the high dependence that the AP participants have on the TOs’ 
resources coupled with the volatile tourism environment causes this opportunistic 
behaviour, leading the AP participants to accept the price of the TOs rather than 
follow any informal agreements with other APs. 
                                                
42 Coopetition refers to “[…] the simultaneous pursuit of cooperation and competition between firms” 
(Raza-Ullah et al. 2014, p.189). In other words, when two organisations cooperate in some business 
activities and simultaneously compete in other business activities.  
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Short-term opportunistic behaviour, however, may create long-term effects, 
which can hinder an organisation’s performance, increase transaction costs and 
terminate advantageous relationships (Dahlstrom and Nygaard 1999; Hawkins et al. 
2008). In successful collaboration processes, trust, commitment and a focus on 
pursuing mutual benefits are critical factors (Fyall et al. 2012). Consequently, it can 
be argued that the individualistic short-term mentality of Greek-Cypriots hinders the 
ability of the APs to cooperate in order to gain long-term benefits and instead 
intensifies competition and constrains their bargaining power in relation to the TOs.  
Still, some cooperation is observed, as an AP participant asserted: “[…] the 
associations unite and lobby about certain things that are of shared interest” (SH:4). 
Two AP participants also noted: 
“[W]e cooperate in certain areas in case of overbookings […] I will 
call my associate in the other hotel, say that ‘I have 5 rooms 
overbooked can you help me with this?’ and he/she will also do the 
same. There is some kind of cooperation.” (HA:3) 
“[…] we will cooperate on some things, but if for example, we are 
both trying to book a certain tourist group, then, each to their own; 
every hotel manager will try his/her best to get that booking. There is 
a good relationship, a cooperation, and camaraderie, however at the 
same time everybody is doing their best for their business, because 
this is their job. It is a fair and open relationship in my opinion, 
others may see it differently.” (IG:2) 
Accordingly, there is a level of cooperation in terms of operational issues such as 
dealing with overbookings or to lobby for issues relating to the whole 
accommodation sector, as long as this does not conflict with individual interests. As 
a travel agent stated: 
“[…] when the personal interests of either party come into play then 
there will definitely be conflict. And this is not just my belief, I have 
experienced this strongly in my 50 years of work.” (TA:2) 
From the above statements it is evident that the relationship context changes. For 
example, from competition, to coexistence or coopetition or cooperation at another 
point in time according to the needs of the firm (Bengtsson and Kock 1999). This is 
because organisations are embedded within a business network of 
interdependencies, so on the one hand they must compete to guarantee that the 
network is effective but on the other hand they must cooperate to develop long-term 
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relationships. Within the study’s context, in the relationship between the APs in the 
ROC, essentially competition and pursuit of short-term individualistic goals prevail 
over cooperation and attainment of long-term common goals. This is also supported 
by the findings reported in section 6.2.2, where the individualistic culture of Greek-
Cypriots restricts cooperative actions at the destination level. 
Nevertheless, this competitive individualistic behaviour enables the TOs to 
play the APs against each other. Three AP participants highlighted: 
“[T]hey [TOs] might say you are a bit expensive so I will say, ‘OK 
tell me what are you looking for, help me to help you’. They might 
say, ‘that hotel is giving me X for what you are offering’.” (SH:7) 
“[…] the TOs may say ‘I have found a hotel which is a higher 
category than yours that gave me a lower price, so you are giving me 
a higher price.’ I will think about it and say ‘OK, tell me the price 
you are looking for.’ and you as the manager decide what you will 
do, if it is beneficial or not.” (SH:9) 
“[…] we are a three star hotel and a TO told me that there is a four 
star hotel down the road that offers a lower price than me. […] they 
will tell you this is what others offer and the market wants.” (SH:8) 
Large TOs exploit the competition that exists between the APs to achieve their 
organisational goal, a lower price that can give them an advantage over their 
competitors. The TOs use an antagonistic model of supplier management. This 
model aims to gain the best out of their relationships but also enhances the 
competition among them (Choi et al. 2002; Moeller et al. 2006). In turn, this leaves 
the APs in a more unfavourable bargaining position to negotiate their contractual 
and non-contractual agreements. The findings demonstrate that more often than not, 
in order to secure the contract, the APs reduce their asking price and follow the TO’s 
suggestion regardless of the impact that this will have on their expected profitability. 
It is natural that competition, rather than cooperation, is observed between 
AP participants since they operate in a challenging and volatile environment. Still, 
as one AP participant asserted, “[…] it’s not so much the cooperation, but what is 
needed is respect towards each other and mutual understanding” (SH:5). This is 
because firms engaging in excessive competition may dedicate unnecessary time and 
resources to gaining market share from one another and may risk disengaging from 
the rest of the business network (Bengtsson and Kock 1999). Thus, APs may miss 
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out on advantages, such as resource exchange, that can help to improve their 
business.  
Conversely, one reason for the strong self-interest and short-term 
opportunistic behaviour of APs is their high level of financial insecurity. For 
instance, three AP participants stated:  
“[…] due to cash flow issues some APs are willing to drop their 
trousers and give the TOs whatever they want. They have to pay the 
banks […] they have high fixed costs; so a bird in the hand is worth 
two in the bush.” (HA:4) 
 “[…] if someone approaches you and says, ‘I want exclusivity and I 
have the power to give you 100% occupancy, however this is the 
price I want,’ then you as a businessman begin your calculations to 
decide if you are going to accept or not. So you start thinking, OK 
this is the price he/she gave me, I might not make as much as with 
another TO, however, this money is guaranteed, of course I will 
accept. It is a matter of need.” (SH:12) 
“[P]articularly, if you have been managing a large chain of units 
and operating with the large TOs for years, you may contact the top 
people of a large TO, and say: ‘We really need your help, money’s 
tight. How about giving us X amount of money in advance and what 
I’ll do is promise you a 3% increase next year instead of 10% which 
would be the normal price increase we would ask?’, because the TOs 
have money and every business needs cash flow.” (IG:2) 
The above statements indicate that the financial insecurity that the APs experience 
has a major influence on the price that is agreed between the APs and TOs. This was 
a view shared by all the AP participants. Further, all participants (industry and 
government sectors) noted that the majority of the businesses in the tourism and 
hospitality industry are financially insecure, particularly the accommodation sector. 
APs have high operational costs deriving mainly from labour costs, which may 
account for up to 40% of the total revenue of a unit, energy and power costs (CHA 
2014). The majority of the accommodation units also have large bank debts. In fact, 
in 2014 it was recorded that the tourism sector owed 2.39 billion Euro to banks and 
societies in the ROC (Fragos 2014). Hence, it can be argued that these factors 
deepen the financial insecurity of the APs and intensify their need for cash flow and 
in turn their dependence on the large TOs, thus restricting their bargaining power. 
Moreover, delayed payments further increase the financial insecurity of the 
APs. As two AP participants asserted: 
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 “[A] key problem that presents itself with the TOs is that they might 
not pay you on time. This is important.” (TV:3) 
“[P]ayment is always an issue. There are delays in payments of 
around 3-4 months. When you have a commitment contract you 
receive an advance payment but after that it is an uphill battle to get 
paid.” (SH:7) 
Payment for the services that the APs provide frequently occurs long after the 
service has been consumed and delays in payment are often a critical issue in the 
relationship between the AP participants and TOs. Ivanov et al. (2015) found that, 
despite the fact that payment timings are regulated by contractual agreements, 
delayed payments are a major area of conflict between APs and agencies in 
Bulgaria, that constrain the capability of the APs to pay their suppliers. The delay in 
payment creates major problems for the AP participants, restricting their cash flow 
and ability to follow through with their own fiscal responsibilities towards their 
bank, suppliers and employees, further increasing their financial insecurity.  
Hence, AP participants prefer to accept a lower contractual price and receive 
an advance payment, that often comes with large commitment and exclusivity 
contracts, rather than refuse this offer. Two AP participants commented:  
“[M]oney is power. At the end of the day that’s what happens, when 
deals are struck we need them more than they need us. They have the 
power, because like many businesses our main problem is cash 
flow.” (SH:10) 
“[…] the relationship between the APs and TOs is complimentary. 
The APs need to pay the banks and the TOs need lower prices to be 
competitive.” (SH:1) 
That is to say, a contract with a large TO offers them the security that they need (a 
certain level of cash flow) to continue their operations regardless of the fact that they 
receive a lower price. Equally, Bastakis et al. (2004) maintained that large TOs give 
the ability to the APs to sell their perishable product in bulk, thus transferring some 
of their organisational risk to the TO as well as improving their ability to plan in the 
medium and long-term. Therefore, it can be claimed that the financial insecurity of 
the APs (deriving from high operational expenses and high bank debts) increases the 
bargaining power of the TOs, enabling them to negotiate a lower price with the APs 
and to be more competitive.  
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The findings also indicate that, to a certain extent, the APs depend on the 
TOs to maintain their competitiveness in the market, as two AP participants stated:  
“[T]he Russian TOs stirred things up a bit when they started 
operating in the ROC. They helped us because they brought a very 
high volume of tourists, they gave us advance payments in order to 
renovate our hotels and they asked for price decreases; so it had both 
its advantages and disadvantages.” (SH:12) 
“[…] to maintain a good relationship with the TO you have to 
provide the things that you have agreed on in the contract such as 
high quality facilities, customer service and so on. You must also 
provide services that are not in the contract but are expected of you, 
for example operational issues such as cleanliness, the food, keep 
your product up-to-date and so on. You must provide these things.” 
(HA:2) 
The APs depend on TOs not only for their tourism flow and financial viability but 
also for their significant contribution to the APs’ ability to maintain their 
competitiveness in the domestic market through product improvement. Mattsson and 
Orfila-Sintes (2014) explored innovation in hotels in the Balearic Islands and noted 
that hotels working with TOs were more likely to take decisions to improve their 
service scope (such as service expansion or reduction) and management innovation 
(such as introducing quality and environmental management). They stated also that 
adequate financial resources are critical before any decisions are made for service 
innovation such as changing the characteristics of a unit or incorporating new 
service. This is because the financial investment needed to bring about these changes 
might have an impact on the short-term profit of a unit. 
Hence, within the study’s context the pre-payments that the TOs give to the 
APs allow them to maintain their competitive position through improvements to 
both their tangible and intangible services. Accordingly, in line with Mattsson and 
Orfila-Sintes (2014) Orfila-Sintes and Mattsson (2009) the APs’ cooperation with 
the large TOs contributes to their competitiveness in the market. However, it can 
also be argued that the APs’ dependence on the TOs increases the bargaining power 
of the TOs in contractual and non-contractual negotiations. Consequently, this 
enables the TOs to exert pressure and achieve a lower price from the APs.  
Another factor found to deepen the financial insecurity of the AP participants 
as well as increasing the bargaining power of the TOs is the seasonality evident in 
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the tourism industry. Seasonality within the context of this study refers to two 
dimensions of fluctuation of demand. Firstly, seasonality denotes the concentration 
of tourist flows in somewhat short periods that reoccur in about the same period of 
each year (Koenig-Lewis and Bischoff 2005), resulting in the high and low seasons. 
Secondly, within this study, seasonality refers to the fluctuation of demand that 
occurs during the high or low season, due to demand uncertainty, that is a typical 
characteristic of the tourism industry.  
Attention is first paid to the high and low season seasonality that is evident in 
the tourism industry in the ROC, where April to October is considered the high 
season (summer season) and November to March is the low season (winter season) 
(Chapter 4, section 4.3). As noted in Chapter 4, seasonality mainly derives from 
over reliance on the one-dimensional tourism product of sun-and-sea that the ROC 
has promoted over the years (Farsari et al. 2007; Karyopouli and Koutra 2012). As a 
result, a number of accommodation units in the ROC close during the off-peak 
season (winter season) because they find it difficult to generate sufficient income to 
cover their operational costs (Boukas and Ziakas 2013). 
The findings indicate that the seasonality of the tourism industry (low 
tourism flow during the winter season) deepens the financial insecurity of the APs 
and has a negative impact upon their bargaining power. Three AP participants 
asserted:  
 “[…] the APs focus on the monetary aspect of the business I believe 
because the season is very small.” (SH:4) 
“[…] due to the diminishing tourism season you need the support of 
the TO even more in order to have customers.” (SH:8) 
“[W]hen you only have six months to work and generate enough 
income to maintain your business, and then during those six months 
you start having problems, you have to give special offers and so on, 
you are in a weaker position.” (TV:1) 
In other words, due to seasonality, that often forces some APs to close down during 
the winter, the APs become incredibly conscious of generating the necessary 
demand to make some sort of profit during the high season. This was a view 
supported by twelve AP participants. In turn, it can be claimed that seasonality 
increases AP participants’ financial insecurity and their dependency on the TOs 
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during the high season given the fact that the TOs can guarantee a certain income for 
the APs. Similarly, Buhalis (2000) discovered that, in Greece, TOs often exploited 
the agony of APs by negotiating contracts during the low season, thus easily 
convincing the APs to reduce their prices to stimulate demand. Hence, within the 
study’s context, the seasonality evident in the ROC increases the need of the APs to 
have a good high season in order to generate a profit, thus the APs may be easily 
persuaded to offer a lower price. This finding also explains the short-term 
opportunistic behaviour that is evident in the industry (mentioned earlier in this 
subsection), since seasonality increases the APs’ need to be profitable during the 
high season to cover losses from the low season.  
On the other hand, in relation to the accommodation units that continue their 
operations during the low season, three AP participants stated:  
“[…] when APs accept pre-payments, with a pre-requisite to give 
exclusivity to the TO, in theory it is a mistake. However, in practice 
one will think ‘If a TO offers me 1 million Euro for the winter season, 
how can I say no? Should I just wait to make this money during the 
summer from all the other TOs?’” (TV:2) 
“[N]o unit in ROC can declare that it makes a profit during the 
winter season. If there are units that make a profit you can probably 
count them on the fingers of one hand, but I actually believe that 
there are none.” (SH:7) 
“[T]he problem is that during the winter season the unit usually 
experiences a loss [in profit], and the profit that you make during the 
summer season is invested back in the hotel to survive during the 
winter season. Seasonality is a big problem for us.” (SH:9) 
That is to say, due to the reduced demand in the low season APs need the security of 
tourism flow that the large TOs can offer, in order to have a certain level of 
occupancy and stay operational. This is in line with Cuccia and Rizzo (2011) who 
investigated seasonality in Sicily and noted that during the winter season APs chose 
to enter contractual agreements with the TOs to reduce their risks of staying empty. 
Manasakis et al. (2013) also identified that accommodation units in Crete that 
worked with a TO experienced less seasonality. Therefore, it can be asserted that 
during the winter season AP participants (who remain operational) are more 
dependent on the TOs and enter contractual agreements to achieve a minimum 
occupancy rate.  
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However, it can be argued that due to the higher dependency that the APs 
have on the TOs during the low season, their bargaining power considerably 
decreases during contractual and non-contractual negotiations since demand is low. 
In turn, more often than not the APs are forced to accept very low prices to maintain 
a minimum occupancy rate and generate revenue to stay operational. Espinet et al. 
(2012) investigated seasonality in prices in Spain and found that lower prices during 
the low season can translate to higher revenues for businesses, but may damage the 
perception of quality and/or exclusivity for potential clients, putting the future 
profits of the business at risk. They further stated that an emphasis on improving the 
quality of the accommodation and increasing the services offered (such as 
entertainment activities or refurbishments) can smooth seasonality in prices. 
Consequently, it may be more beneficial in the long run for the APs to improve their 
offering for the winter season rather than to follow a low price strategy. Such action 
could also increase their bargaining power during negotiations with the TOs given 
that APs will offer a more attractive and competitive product to the TOs.  
Furthermore, as stated earlier, fluctuations in demand can occur during the 
season following the making of contractual agreements. Fluctuation in demand often 
leads to special offers and discounts. As two AP participants affirmed: 
“[T]he TO wants to make some money by operating in the ROC, like 
in any other destination, so if demand is low of course they are going 
to ask for discounts and special offers.” (HA:4) 
“[T]Os do not have loyalty to destinations. TOs are businesses […] 
they have to make a profit for their shareholders, they are not 
charities. And we must help them succeed.” (IG:3) 
A travel agent stated:  
“[T]he TOs take risks; it is a risk to organise packaged holidays, you 
have to charter flights, have your offices and so on. […] and if 
demand is low they are losing money.” (TA:2) 
The above statements indicate that the TOs focus on achieving their expected profit 
from each unit or destination. Hence, if demand is not as expected then special 
offers and discounts are given by the AP participants to stimulate demand and help 
the TOs reduce their loss. This is because the majority of the AP participants 
recognise that the loyalty of the TOs towards the destination and the APs in 
particular is limited. Falzon (2012) maintained that one of the characteristics of large 
  
298 
TOs is that they have a low degree of loyalty to the destinations and thus will choose 
another destination if the possibility of higher profits is evident. Therefore, within 
this study’s context, the APs perceive that they must assist the TOs to make their 
expected profit by offering discounts and special offers during the season. 
Subsequently, the TOs will continue their operations in the ROC and thus with the 
APs.  
However, the findings reveal that constant price fluctuations due to changes 
in demand further reduce the financial viability of the APs. As three AP participants 
highlighted: 
“[D]on’t, don’t, don’t.… drop, drop, drop… decrease, decrease the 
price! This is all we hear; in the end this will end up reducing the 
quality of the product because on the other hand we are also a 
business, we also want to make a profit.” (SH:2) 
“[I] think this price war has to stop because it’s affecting the 
products in the various countries.” (SH8) 
“[…] it is good to be competitive but not to the point that it can be 
detrimental to the product. The TOs want both quality and price 
which is very difficult.” (HA:1) 
Due to their restricted financial capacity this constant pressure to decrease the price 
makes it difficult for AP participants to continue to offer the quality of product that 
the TOs require. This is in line with Santos et al. (2014) who argued that oversupply 
and competition on price to increase demand have led to a number of mature tourism 
destinations losing their financial vitality.  
Falzon (2012, p.1092) examined the price competitiveness of several 
competitive Mediterranean destinations, such as the ROC, Malta, Greece and Spain, 
and concluded that the intense competition within the countries and between 
Mediterranean destinations creates “[…] an ever competitive spiral of downward 
pressure on prices.” Therefore, it can be asserted that the strong price competition 
that occurs in the domestic market of the ROC, the TO market and competitive 
destinations results in a vicious cycle of constant price competitiveness that 
constrains the economic viability of the APs. This constraint also restricts the ability 
of AP participants to improve their firm-specific resources. Firm-resources enable a 
firm to create efficiently and/or effectively a product that is of value for another 
organisation (Hunt and Morgan 1995). However, the constant price competition 
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restricts the resource capacity of the AP participants to substantially increase the 
value of their proposition through product development or improvement. Thus, it 
can be argued that strong price competition reduces the attractiveness of the AP’s 
product and in turn their bargaining power in relation to the TOs during contractual 
and non-contractual negotiations.  
6.2.5.3.		 Conclusion		
The analysis reveals that external structure ‒ namely the industry 
characteristics and culture ‒ constrains the bargaining power of the APs in relation 
to the TOs. This is mainly due to structural constraints that lead to dependencies of 
the APs on the TOs’ resources to achieve their organisational objectives. For 
example, the expensiveness and substitutability of the ROC product results in APs 
facing severe price competition from similar destinations with a lower cost structure. 
These competitive destinations are able to offer a more appealing product in terms 
of value for money to the price sensitive package tourist that predominantly visits 
the ROC. This leads to the APs’ dependence on the TOs due to the TOs’ ability to 
guarantee a consistent tourism flow and in turn a certain volume of sales for the 
APs. Hence, the bargaining power of the APs in relation to the TOs decreases and 
the ability of the AP to negotiate pricing is restricted. Furthermore, cultural factors, 
such as the individualistic short-term mentality of APs and the oversupply of 
accommodation units increases the competition between the APs enabling the TOs 
to play them off against each other to attain a lower price. More often than not the 
APs offer a discounted price to win the contract with the TO disregarding the impact 
of this price on their profitability. Other factors from the external structure that 
influence pricing and volume of sales outcomes between the parties, are seasonality, 
insufficient flight connectivity, the oligopolistic TO market in the ROC and visitor 
trends.  
The above discussion focused on the influence of the external structure, 
culture and industry characteristics, on the negotiation outcomes in terms of pricing 
and volume of sales. The next proposition investigates relationship-specific factors, 
such as negotiation characteristics, relationship constructs and emotions, that 
influence pricing and volume of sales outcomes.  
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6.2.6. Proposition 6: Negotiation characteristics, relationship 
constructs and emotions during contractual and non-contractual 
negotiations determine market characteristics in terms of pricing 
and volume of sales 
6.2.6.1.		 Introduction	
Bearing the above discussion in mind, and notwithstanding the importance of 
cultural and industry related characteristics that influence pricing and volume of 
sales, the findings also indicate the significant influence of relational factors, 
namely, negotiation characteristics, relationship constructs and emotions, all of 
which have an impact on outcomes in terms of price and volume of sales during 
negotiations. As stated in section 6.1 all propositions are interconnected. Hence, 
although the focus in this proposition is pricing and volume of sales outcomes, the 
sub-categories emotions, negotiation characteristics and relationship constructs, 
from previous propositions (6.2.3 and 6.2.4), are also included since they can also 
influence pricing and volume of sales during negotiations. Specifically, negotiation 
characteristics, such as flexibility, information and control, relationship constructs 
such as cooperation, reciprocity, trust and personal relations, and emotions such as 
fear, pressure and deviance influence the pricing and volume of sales outcomes 
agreed between the parties. As stated earlier (section 6.1), Grounded Theory analysis 
often leads to new themes not taken into account prior to data collection, thus 
supplementary literature is reviewed to support the findings. To critically analyse 
this proposition, the additional literature draws on buyer-supplier pricing research in 
B2B marketing management and strategic management. Also taken into 
consideration are tourism and hospitality context pricing research and revenue 
management literature.  
Pricing is a vital dynamic component of a firm’s marketing and competitive 
strategy and a key management activity (Indounas 2009; Pellinen 2003). Within a 
buyer and supplier relationship, in the traditional economic perspective of a 
transaction, pricing has a distributive purpose: pricing reflects the way in which the 
value of an exchange is shared between the two parties (Voeth and Herbst 2006). 
More specifically, price is perceived as a way of sharing a fixed ‘pie’ of value that is 
developed during the transaction, and the primary perspective on pricing is the 
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win/lose or zero-sum game; that is to say, if one party wins the other loses (Brennan 
et al. 2007). Price setting in classical economic theory is based upon market-based 
elements of demand and supply, where surplus demand leads to higher prices and 
over supply decreases prices (Jobber and Shipley 2012). 
On the other hand, literature in marketing and strategic management stresses 
the significance of the exchange instead of the transaction, adjusting the study of 
prices to the interests of customers (buyers) and competitors (Narangajavana et al. 
2014). The shift of marketing theory from transactional marketing towards 
relationship marketing (Grönroos 1994; Morgan and Hunt 1994) traded the notion of 
price with the notion of value (Ingenbleek 2014). This shift led to pricing policies 
and strategies being set by considering the development and management of long-
term customer (buyer) relationships (Vargo and Lusch 2004).  
However, focus on value does not disregard the emphasis on the economic 
exchange; rather it complements it and enables the organisation to achieve long-term 
survival (Indounas 2009). Thus pricing should have a long-term focus, where the 
key goal is to understand environmental changes and needs, to recognise the 
behaviour of customers (buyers) and competitors and set or adjust pricing to 
maintain and enhance value for these customers (Narangajavana et al. 2014). 
Accordingly, both the economic and value perspective in the relationship as well as 
the influence of relationship-specific characteristics should be considered to fully 
explain the negotiation outcomes in terms of pricing and volume of sales between 
the APs and TOs. This is because each party has different resources that can offer 
diverse economic and non-economic benefits to the relationship, thus pricing 
policies and strategies should consider the long-term benefits of maintaining the 
relationship. Conversely, pricing is not only a vital long-term strategic tool, it can 
also influence short-term marketing decisions (Myers and Zondag 2010) through 
operational or short-term prices. Within a tourism context Narangajavana et al. 
(2014) found long-term strategic pricing policies focusing on relationship-building 
and the customer (demand), coexisting with short-term operational prices focusing 
on transaction.  
Short-term and operational prices are a derivative of revenue management. 
Ivanov and Zhechev (2012, p.175) stated that revenue management is “[…] the 
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application of information systems and pricing strategies to allocate the right 
capacity to the right customer at the right price at the right time”. That is, it is a vital 
instrument for matching corresponding supply and demand, by separating customers 
into diverse segments depending upon their buying intentions, and assigning 
capacity to the different segments in order to maximise an organisation’s revenues 
(Ivanov and Zhechev 2012). Revenue management can contribute to businesses that 
have perishable inventories, fixed capacity, fluctuating demand, a low variable to 
fixed cost ratio, and availability of early bookings and segmented markets, such as 
accommodation businesses and TOs (Wirtz et al. 2003; Callego and Phillips 2004). 
Due to the perishability of the accommodation product, revenue management and 
pricing is a vital strategic lever with which to manage revenue and has a substantial 
impact on the accommodation’s profitability (Bull 2006; Noone and Mattila 2009). 
Hence, APs must alter their prices to influence demand, adjust to environmental 
changes and avoid being left with empty rooms and lost revenue. At the same time 
they must also consider their relationship with the TOs and the impact that pricing 
can have. Bearing in mind the above discussion, the following section critically 
analyses the proposition. 
6.2.6.2.	 	Discussion	of	proposition	6		
Pricing issues during negotiations were identified as a key concern of all the 
AP participants. Three AP participants stated: 
“[…] the large TOs are tougher in negotiations than the small TOs. 
You have to spend hours with them negotiating in order to achieve a 
small increase for the coming year, if you can.” (SH:10) 
“[…] we will negotiate on many issues such as how many rooms for 
the season, the allotment period […] but negotiations usually come 
down to price, and there is always pressure on the price.” (SH:9) 
“[T]his is a game, bargaining for a better price that occurs every 
year and it will always occur year after year, it is part of the 
negotiations process. We would ask for an 8% increase, the TO will 
want 2% or no increase at all and negotiations begin. It is healthy in 
terms of the business to occur; we have a free market economy.” 
(SH:3) 
In other words, determining a satisfactory price is key to negotiations for both 
parties and due to its critical importance more often than not it leads to tension and 
pressure between the AP participants and TOs. Similarly, Buhalis (2000) and 
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Bastakis et al. (2004) explored the relationship between APs and large TOs and 
found that price was a major source of conflict, particularly during contractual 
negotiations. This is because large TOs exert pressure on APs, in order to achieve 
the lowest price possible and increase their profitability. Ivanov et al. (2015) argued 
that the relationship between the APs and TOs in terms of prices and commissions 
has a ‘zero-sum’ pattern. To put it differently, because of the restricted tourist 
budget, one Euro more for one of the parties is one euro less for the other party, 
therefore both parties are very price conscious and profit-maximisation is at the 
forefront.  
Despite the importance of profit-maximisation, however, two AP participants 
stated:  
“[W]e always try to maintain the good relationships that we have 
with the TOs, so to the best of our abilities we are cautious with the 
increases in price that we add each year and to negotiate so that we 
achieve high occupancy rates.” (IG:2) 
“[…] we have had examples where the APs tried to negotiate a 
higher price and ended up losing out. For example, we know of a 
case where a hotel was renovated in 2012, and the owner/manager 
asked for a much higher contract price for the coming year, namely 
2013. However, eventually the price he received from the TOs was 
much lower than the price he had in the first place, in 2011, [before 
the renovation] and the year after the hotelier had no option but to 
go back to his original pricing. We’ve had a lot of such examples and 
we take them into consideration when we negotiate with the TOs.” 
(SH:11) 
As such, notwithstanding the importance of financial benefits in general and profit-
maximisation, it is evident that the majority of the AP participants’ pricing 
objectives concentrate on maintaining their long-term relationship with the TOs on 
one hand and increasing their sales in the short-term on the other. This was 
supported by eighteen of the AP participants.  
Avlonitis and Indounas (2005), in their study of pricing between buyer and 
supplier, identified that buyer related aims, such as maintaining existing buyers and 
buyer satisfaction, were two major objectives for organisations. They interpreted 
these findings in terms of the manager’s focus on customer relationship 
management, a means of protecting the long-term survival of the organisation 
through customer satisfaction and retention. There is a significant link between 
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buyer retention, buyer profitability and buyer lifetime value, hence an organisation’s 
buyers are a valuable asset (Wang 2012a). The longer an organisation can retain its 
buyers the more profit it can achieve from them in the long-term (Wang 2012a). 
Consequently, the findings indicate that APs adopt pricing policies that build and 
enhance their relationship with the TOs by determining a price that is appealing for 
them in order to protect a profitable relationship and ensure their long-term survival.  
Accordingly, two AP participants mentioned:  
“[S]ome TOs have a different price from others. If you have a TO 
that is responsible for a few rooms then you can ask for a higher 
price and you can say that the increase in price applies to all the 
TOs, apart from the TOs that have a very high volume.” (SH:7) 
“[…] we have different prices for each of our associates. The prices 
we offer are dependent on the volume of tourists that each TO 
transfers to the accommodation unit.” (SH:12) 
The majority of the AP participants typically negotiate different prices for each TO 
based on their volume of sales. Indounas (2009) examined the pricing policies of 
service organisations in Greece and identified that within a supplier-buyer context 
differentiated pricing is the most commonly adopted pricing policy. Differentiated 
pricing refers to prices for diverse buyers based on criteria such as size of 
organisation, time and size of consumption and percentage contribution to the 
organisation’s turnover (Indounas 2009). Similarly, in sun-and-sea destinations APs 
negotiate prices with the TOs based on the demand or sales that were generated in 
previous years (Espinet et al. 2003). Hence, it can be argued that APs negotiate a 
price based on relationship-specific factors, such as the volume of sales the TO 
generates, and on the long-term potential value of the relationship, such as the 
expected profitability and financial security that the TO offers.  
Competitive forces are also considered by the AP participants in relation to 
pricing, as three AP participants stated: 
“[…] even if the TOs give you 20% increase, this increase may push 
you out of  the market, people do not want to buy or they [TOs] do 
not promote you. So, in theory you are offering the suite for 300 Euro 
per night but you never sold it.” (SH:2) 
“[…] it is not about asking for a crazy price it is about offering a 
price that reflects the market, that is value for money for the TO and 
the tourist, to have demand and sell it.” (IG:3) 
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“[…] you must always consider what your competitors are offering. 
If you don’t then you can easily price yourself out of the market and 
then what’s the point if you can’t sell.” (SH:12) 
The statements suggest that, in relation to pricing, most of the APs consider their 
competitors’ prices, to stimulate sales and to satisfy the TOs in terms of the 
perceived value of the product and price paid. As noted in section 6.2.1, value for 
money refers to the perception of the TOs that the unit’s product offering is worth 
(value of) the price paid. Pellinen (2003) examined pricing in tourism in Finland and 
found it to be largely based on competitors’ prices, but also on customer value, 
which in practice are intertwined. Competition based pricing is common in 
extremely competitive markets (Hinterhuber 2008), such as that of the ROC; 
markets which are characterised by an oversupply of accommodation units with the 
majority fiercely fighting for a contract with a large TO (section 6.2.5). Hence, it can 
be asserted that it is crucial to an AP’s relationship with a TO that they consider the 
market and the needs of the TO when pricing their product. This is because the 
advantageous intermediary position of TOs in the distribution channel and their high 
bargaining power enables them to access the prices of various APs. Therefore, it is 
vital that the APs offer a competitive price in order to sign a contract with a TO and 
generate sales. 
On the other hand, the analysis indicates that the TOs focus on achieving the 
lowest price. As one TO participant highlighted: 
“[W]e would stop offering a hotel if they want too much of an 
increase year on year in terms of price and they are not meeting what 
we need them to be, if they don’t have the profit potential.” (TO:1) 
Two AP participants also commented:  
“[…] if you enter the negotiations asking for a high increase and the 
TO believes that your product is not value for money they will just 
leave and go somewhere else. So you have to keep them happy.” 
(TV:4) 
“[T]he TOs want to make a profit from their operations and if the 
price is not what they are looking for they will go somewhere else. 
[…] thus, we try to negotiate.”  (HA:4) 
In other words, for the TOs the key objective is profit-maximisation adopting cost-
based pricing. As stated in the proposition above (6.2.5), large TOs operate with 
  
306 
mark-up criteria to determine package prices, by adding a profit-margin to the cost 
of the package products, such as accommodation and transportation. Ryals (2006) 
investigated key customer accounts of suppliers in various industries including 
travel, and stated that customers mainly concentrate on cost reduction resulting in 
suppliers offering a tactical price forced by the need to win the contract. Therefore, 
it can be argued that the emphasis of the TOs on cost reduction and the high 
dependence of the APs on the TOs, leads APs to offer a tactical short-term price to 
satisfy the needs of the TOs and win the contract.  
Furthermore, the analysis indicated that the fact that the TOs control or own 
the tourism flow that they transfer to the unit intensifies the need for the APs to offer 
a tactical price. For instance, four AP participants affirmed: 
“[T]he TOs take a lot of risks but at the end of the day they are still 
the ones calling all the shots because they have the customers.” 
(SH:12) 
“[T]his is exactly what happened with the hotel I told you about 
earlier, the TO was not happy so he just moved his customers from 
one hotel to another.” (SH:11) 
“[T]he TOs play games. If they have more profit from a specific hotel 
they will shift the business to that hotel without telling you anything, 
thus gaining a higher profit.” (SH:9) 
“[…] the rule of trade is supply and demand, more profit less 
expenses; these are the facts, the rules don’t change. So all 
companies including the TOs act accordingly in order to gain this 
profit.”  (SH:1) 
That is to say, the majority of the research participants (industry and government 
sector) often referred to tourists as being owned by the TOs. In particular, the AP 
participants perceived that the TOs’ pursuit of profit-maximisation and ownership 
over the tourists meant that the TO could transfer ‘his’ (the TO’s) clients to any 
accommodation unit that the TO chooses, indicating a low level of loyalty on the 
part of the TOs towards the APs. Budeanu (2009) commented that the TOs’ focus on 
meeting demand for affordable holidays results in low levels of loyalty towards 
destinations, people and services. Hence, it can be asserted that the low level of 
loyalty increases the pressure for the APs to offer a low price, to reduce the cost to 
the TO, in order to win the contract given that they are dependent on the TOs for 
tourism flow.  
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One reason for this pricing behaviour from the APs is their fear of losing the 
contract. For instance, two AP participants affirmed: 
“[W]e have many examples where APs tried to increase their price 
and it resulted in TOs discontinuing their relationships. For example, 
one AP that I know tried to increase his prices but the TOs did not 
agree and left, despite cooperating with the hotel for a number of 
years, and in the end the AP was not able to even gain the previous 
year’s prices. […] he took a risk and lost.” (SH:3) 
“[I]f you have a signed contract you shake hands and you say ‘thank 
you very much’. If you don’t have a signed contract you cry at night 
because you are losing your business.” (TV:2) 
The statements indicate that, regardless of the length of the relationship and 
successful cooperation, the price agreed in the contract is a vital factor that 
determines the continuation of the relationship. Thus the majority of AP participants 
feared the likelihood of losing their contract, particularly those with large 
commitment and exclusivity contracts, because it could have a detrimental effect on 
their business viability. As noted in section 6.2.4, fear of losing a contract and 
risking their viability causes APs to agree to the demands of the TOs in negotiations. 
This is due to the high concentration of the TO market and the small number of TOs 
who can guarantee a consistent tourism flow.  
Similarly, Guo et al. (2013) argued that pricing is an important tool for 
developing and improving cooperation between accommodation units and third 
parties. This is because successful cooperation between accommodation units and 
third party organisations (such as TOs) relies upon the benefits that each party 
receives from the other (Guo et al. 2013); that is, whether the APs have a 
satisfactory occupancy rate and profit and the TOs (third party) receive the expected 
profit and offer a good service to tourists. Therefore, it can be argued that when an 
AP accepts a lower price that satisfies a TO it ensures the continuation and increases 
the long-term potential of their relationship.  
Most of the AP participants stressed the importance of generating sufficient 
sales for the TOs in influencing pricing issues. Three AP participants stated: 
 “[A] hotel that has a good name and is easy to sell is a good product 
for the TO. What I mean by that is that if the unit has a good 
reputation, it is value for money for the TO, and where the TO can 
gain a good profit […] the TO can easily sell it.” (SH:2) 
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“[…] if your hotel is really good and it sells a lot, all TOs want it and 
it always has 100% occupancy, you have to begin negotiations with 
this.” (HA:4) 
“[I]f a TO is one of your bestsellers, meaning that they bring a high 
volume of tourists to the unit, it means that they want also to work 
with your hotel because it sells well, so it works both ways.” (SH:7) 
In other words, the price is influenced by the ability of the unit to generate sales for 
the TOs, and also for the APs. As such, the saleability of the product is critical. 
Within this study’s context, the saleability of a unit can be explained as offering a 
good quality product (in terms of service and infrastructure) with a good profit 
margin for the TOs. This will enable the TOs to promote the unit with a price that is 
value for money for the consumer and in turn generate sales. Increasing the sales 
volume of a business is closely related to low prices which enable it to compete in 
the market by creating demand (Pellinen 2003). AP participants who operate with 
the large TOs, in particular, focus on offering a low price that will help the TOs to 
increase their volume of sales. As noted in the proposition above (6.2.5), given the 
price sensitivity of the TOs, the APs’ mark-up is low, hence the APs are dependent 
on the volume of tourism flow that the TOs transfer to the unit. Therefore, AP 
participants that operate with TOs typically offer a price that can generate adequate 
sales volume and consequently the TOs can offer a competitive price in the market, 
to earn a profit.  
The saleability of the product is particularly relevant for APs who operate 
with commitment and exclusivity contracts. Two AP participants noted:  
“[T]here are hoteliers who say ‘I am full for the whole season 
because I gave the hotel to one TO’ but if you do that as a 
commitment it means you give a lower rate but it’s guaranteed, 
theoretically.” (HA:2) 
“[…] when you have a large commitment contract you always 
receive a lower price than an allotment contract […] if you are 
negotiating a large agreement they are so difficult on any price 
increase, but you still try [to negotiate]. But sometimes at the end you 
have to accept the price that the TO says to continue your 
relationship.”  (SH:10) 
The above statements indicate that AP participants who operate with large 
contractual agreements with the TOs, and are able to generate high volumes of sales, 
are under stronger pressure to agree to low prices. Zhang et al. (2014) investigated 
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pricing between buyer and supplier in the manufacturing sector. They found that in 
negotiations where the quantity ordered is high the buyer is more price sensitive 
both in the relationship and more sensitive to market prices by competitors, because 
the stakes are high. Hence, it can be asserted due to the high stakes that large TOs 
have in accommodation units that generate a strong volume of sales, they become 
more sensitive to price, putting pressure on the APs to offer a lower price. The AP 
participants must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate the TOs requests for 
discounted prices in order to continue the contract, but this reduces their ability to 
increase their profitability. Consequently, due to the APs’ high dependence on the 
TOs their bargaining power is restricted. 
The level of repeat clientele is also identified as an important firm-specific 
resource that can aid price negotiation. As two AP participants noted: 
“[I]t is all about the standard of service and the facilities that you 
offer. That allows you to gain an increase in price and continue your 
cooperation with the TO.” (HA:3) 
“[I]t is about supply and demand; when you have repeaters then 
there is a foundation for the expected sales. […] Repeat clientele give 
you a guaranteed occupancy. I’m definitely not in the same position 
as someone that does not have repeaters.” (SH:2) 
The above statements reveal that having a unit that is considered a good quality 
product with a certain percentage of guaranteed sales due to repeat clientele can 
increase an AP’s ability to negotiate a price increase and continue the business 
relationship with their TO. Espinet et al. (2003) argued that although the TO may 
enforce the price, the attributes of each individual accommodation unit are still taken 
into account by TOs. This can be ascribed to the fact that, as identified in section 
6.2.3, an AP’s firm-specific resources (such as product quality, repeat clientele and 
value for money) can increase that AP’s bargaining power in relation to the TO 
given that they reduce the risk to the TO when a large agreement exists. Repeat 
clientele are an important resource that can lend competitive advantage to a hotel 
since they reduce the possibility that a guest will switch to another hotel 
(Tavitiyaman et al. 2011). Therefore, the repeat clientele that a unit has, provides a 
basis for guaranteed sales both for the AP and the TO. This represents an increase in 
the AP’s bargaining power which enables them to negotiate a better price during 
contractual and non-contractual negotiations.  
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A differentiated product also plays a critical role in price negotiation. Three 
AP participants stated: 
“[I]n the case where your product is similar to others you will find it 
difficult to convince the TO that it is worth the extra money, so you 
have to look at your positioning. For the TOs, very often it comes 
down to price. However, over the last two years, the products that we 
have have helped us to gain price increases in a time where TOs have 
tried to attain price reductions.” (IG:2) 
“[T]he TOs want to distinguish themselves from the competition. We 
[as a company] have some types of hotels that competitors do not 
have. Thus, if an AP is selling something unique that the TO cannot 
find somewhere else you can sell it at a better price.” (IG:3) 
“[…] therefore, the large TOs want that product and they will pay 
for it, because there are not many units that offer this family oriented 
product, they are limited.” (SH:8) 
As the participants above note, APs are in a better position to negotiate a price 
increase, firstly, when they have a good quality product that is perceived as offering 
something unique in the domestic market, and secondly when their product can 
enhance the variety of a TO’s portfolio of units. Thirteen APs supported this view. 
As emphasised in section 6.2.1, a differentiated product increases the bargaining 
power of the APs since it can create barriers to entry and a competitive advantage 
for the AP.  
Becerra et al. (2013) explored how differentiation influences the pricing 
strategies of accommodation units in Spain. They claimed that differentiated units 
charge higher prices than undifferentiated ones and are more protected from 
competitive forces within the domestic market. This is because differentiated units 
focus their efforts on attracting certain market segments whereas undifferentiated 
units focus on operating at full capacity with lower prices to lower their average 
costs (Becerra et al. 2013). Therefore, it can be asserted that a differentiated product, 
owned by the APs, decreases price competition in relation to their domestic market, 
that is the ROC. Consequently, it can be claimed that having a differentiated product 
increases the bargaining power of the AP and reduces the pressure from 
competition, enabling them to negotiate a price increase.  
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On the other hand, the analysis indicates that although the specific attributes 
of a particular unit can increase an AP’s bargaining power the large TOs are key to 
determining any price increase. As two AP participants stressed: 
“[I]f you work with an important TO, for example responsible for 
20% or 30% or even 40% of tourist arrivals for your unit, you must 
ask his opinion before going forward with any substantial increase in 
price. […]. If a hotel wants to increase its quality and increase its 
price it is better to contact the TO that he usually cooperates with, to 
hear the TO views on the matter and then consider the price increase. 
Even if a hotel undergoes renovations again this does not justify a 
substantial increase in price because you must renovate your product 
regularly.” (SH:7) 
“[I]n the past the TO would come to you for a contract and you 
would impose your demands, nowadays the TOs come and impose 
their demands. […] so you accept the price that they are comfortable 
with.” (SH:3) 
The above statements raise two issues for consideration: first, the control that the 
TOs have in the relationship regarding pricing decisions made by the APs; and 
second, they demonstrate the TO’s importance as an information source regarding 
price, particularly when large agreements exist. Zhang et al. (2014) argued any price 
increase by the seller can have a long-term impact on their relationship with the 
buyer. This is because buyers use both external and internal reference prices (Bruno 
et al. 2012; Zhang et al. 2014). External reference prices refer to prices offered by 
other firms and prices proposed by the seller, whilst internal reference prices are 
often determined by previous interactions (Bruno et al. 2012; Zhang et al. 2014). 
Zhang et al. (2014) asserted that a price increase that is considerably above the 
internal reference price (previous contractual price) can be considered as a loss by 
the buyer and thus can increase the buyer’s rigidity and price sensitivity damaging a 
favourable relationship. Therefore, it can be argued that APs who operate with large 
agreements, and for whom high dependence exists, should be extremely cautious 
regarding their pricing strategies. This is due to the fact that the TOs may perceive 
price increases as a loss thus harming or even leading to the discontinuation of the 
relationship. As such, the analysis reveals that due to their strong bargaining power, 
the large TOs act as sources of information on price and often determine price in 
contractual negotiations.  
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However, as the AP above noted, communication between the APs and TOs 
regarding any intention to alter price can be beneficial for the APs and help to 
maintain the relationship. Extensive, open and honest communication between a 
supplier and its major buyer is critical for the performance of the relationship 
reducing uncertainty, improving its efficiency and contributing to its long-term 
maintenance (Ryals and Humphries 2007). Large TOs have critical information 
regarding supply and demand due to their position and large distribution networks, 
and APs can exploit this information to identify product improvements that will help 
them achieve a price increase. Consequently, it can be suggested that open 
communication with the TO can have a positive impact on the relationship between 
the parties and help APs to sustain their profitable relationship with the TOs.  
With regard to the non-contractual negotiations that occur to mitigate 
fluctuating demand, four AP participants commented:  
 “[…] during the season the TOs might want a lower price because 
they have a lot of available seats on the plane and they need to sell 
them to reduce any financial losses from unsold seats. Or they may 
ask us to give a special offer in certain periods.” (SH:12) 
“[…] sometimes the prices change during the season. Despite having 
a commitment or performance guaranteed contract, if TOs come to 
me and tell me that they have a number of empty seats in the plane 
and tell me ‘you have to help me to fill up the flight’ I never say no. 
They make some special offers and we help also by giving offers so as 
to maximise our sales to the highest degree possible. We use yield 
management to manage these changes.” (IG:2) 
“[W]e might help the TOs by giving them some free upgrades, of 
rooms with a sea view or a better price on the H/B supplement. There 
are a lot of things that you can do to help a TO, if demand is low and 
they need to sell.” (SH:10) 
“[T]he TO tells you ‘I have a price of 100 Euro and I cannot sell, if 
you leave it like this then I will not be able to sell’. So we both reduce 
the price in order to sell.”  (TV:3) 
That is to say, contractual flexibility is evident and price renegotiations are common 
often leading the AP participants to offer reductions in contractual prices or soft 
concessions during the season in order to increase demand. These price fluctuations 
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are a result of revenue management43 practices that are used by both APs and TOs. 
This practice often leads to erratic fluctuation of price to help organisations to adapt 
to demand changes and maximise their revenue (Wang 2012b). Therefore, the use of 
revenue management by the TOs requires that the APs are sufficiently flexible to 
offer either discounts on contract prices or special offers in order to help the TOs to 
generate sales.  
However, when demand is low offering a price discount can be beneficial 
both for the AP and the TO given that it can generate sales for both parties. Ivanov 
et al. (2015) claimed that, in relation to prices, the interests of APs and TOs in the 
long-term are shared since both parties aim to increase the tourism flow and revenue 
for both sides, therefore a more cooperative relationship is evident. This is also the 
case in the current study, where following the contractual agreement between the 
APs and TOs, a more cooperative relationship in terms of price develops aligning 
their interests in order to increase sales for both parties. This is particularly relevant 
in large commitment and exclusivity contracts. Two AP participants asserted: 
“[I]f you have a large commitment agreement and you are 
dependent, of course you are going to give a discount if demand is 
low or the TO has unsold seats.” (HA:1) 
“[…] because we have a commitment contract we are both dependent 
on the sales, so we will give a discount to help each other to sell.” 
(SH:7) 
As such, due to the fact that the AP participants are locked into large contractual 
agreements with the TOs, they must follow the TO’s signal with regard to offering a 
price reduction to improve demand. Guo and He (2012) investigated pricing 
decisions between APs and TOs using game theory44 and showed that, in a 
centralised scenario where the AP and TO focus on maximising joint revenue and 
decisions are made by one party, the revenue is higher. They explained that the low 
                                                
43 As noted in section 6.2.6, revenue management is a tool that assists organisations to manage their 
capacity and pricing to sell to the right customer at the right price to maximise their revenue (Ivanov 
and Zhechev 2012).  
44 Game theory examines conflict and cooperation strategic decision-making between rational 
decision makers using mathematical models (Myerson 1997).  
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price for the holiday package increases demand and the increased demand results in 
higher total revenue for the cooperating parties.  
Consequently, it can be argued that APs and TOs with large commitment and 
exclusivity contracts have a more cooperative approach to price changes signalled 
by the TO due to the closer relationship that exists to increase their revenue. 
Conversely, as mentioned in section 6.2.1, large commitment and exclusivity 
contracts between the APs and TOs, often result in the TOs taking control of the 
majority, or even all of the unit’s capacity, to manage to their benefit. Thus, the TOs 
are the decision-makers with regard to price changes, and in order for both parties to 
increase revenue, the APs have little alternative but to agree to such price changes in 
situations of low demand.  
Moreover, the APs’ desire to engender reciprocity in the relationship also 
influences the pricing, as two AP participants stated: 
“[A]lthough at times I might think that I helped him by giving him a 
lower price or something, you create a good basis for the 
relationship and he will return the favour one way or another at some 
point.” (SH:9) 
“[…] if someone constantly helps you when you need something 
when he asks for something you must help him and not the person 
that has never helped you. You are always going to need the help of 
the TO to promote unsold stock or to ask for stop sales […] you need 
to have a good relationship.” (SH:12) 
That is to say, the APs also give price reductions and special offers in an attempt to 
promote reciprocity in the relationship which might help to increase their occupancy 
in situations of low demand or assist them when faced with excess demand (which 
could lead to overbookings). Twelve other AP participants highlighted the important 
influence of reciprocity in negotiations, particularly in non-contractual negotiations. 
Ivens and Pardo (2008), within a buyer-supplier context, identified that the 
relationship of major buyers (referred to as key accounts) with their suppliers was 
not based on increasing prices but on developing value, which could mean keeping 
prices stable (or even lower) but attaining high volumes or accessing the knowledge 
of their respective partners. The emphasis is on securing and sustaining the 
relationship between the parties. Therefore, given the dependence of the majority of 
the AP participants on the TOs, unsurprisingly the APs concentrate first on building 
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relational factors such as reciprocity into the exchange and second on pricing. In this 
way, within this study context, the AP’s aim is to attain a higher volume of sales and 
two protect the relationship in order to secure the renewal of the contract.  
In contrast, not all APs accept a request to offer a discount, as two AP 
participants mentioned: 
“[A]nother thing that the TO might use is to say, ‘This period your 
unit is not selling so we have to drop the price because we are not 
selling.’ So you can say, ‘Yes, but this period all other TOs are 
asking for my unit, I’m not going to drop my price. I don’t want to 
drop my price, so I will give you less rooms and I will give the other 
[TO] more rooms’.” (TV:2)  
“[O]ur unit is small and niche market and there is no margin for 
special offers or anything like that. So we simply have two sets of 
rates; TO rates and public rates. We offer the same rate to all the 
TOs we work with. If one TO cannot cover the allotment we just 
allocate those rooms to another TO, or agents.” (SH:4) 
The above statements show that having a diversified supply, for instance having 
more than one TO for the unit or having direct sales, gives the unit the flexibility to 
sell rooms through other buyers, targeting other source markets and increasing their 
occupancy without reducing their rates. Thus some APs interviewed stated that they 
might refuse to reduce their price. Dong et al. (2014) used game theory to examine 
the cooperative contract between TOs and a hotel. They ascertained that a hotel with 
a high occupancy rate will lead the TO to offer a higher bidding price since the hotel 
has satisfactory occupancy and wants to avoid revenue loss from the lower 
wholesale price of the TO. Hence, the occupancy rate of a particular unit influences 
the AP participants’ willingness to reduce their price if the sales of one TO are poor, 
because the AP can recover the occupancy gap and revenue from other sources. 
Accordingly, the analysis reveals that APs that do not solely depend on one TO are 
in a better position to refuse to give a discount and protect their revenue.  
However, in relation to pricing policies through other channels two AP 
participants highlighted:  
“[T]he TOs could complain about online prices. They check the 
online prices and they may become aware that you have given a 
lower price online. It is not a usual occurrence but if you do it they 
will notice it. If a competitor of the TO is cheaper or you give a lower 
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price they will notice and it can be a difficult situation. So we are 
careful.” (SH:11) 
“[…] you must be cautious about how you manage the prices you 
give to other agents, TOs, or the prices you add on the Internet 
through online channels […] nowadays with the advent of the 
Internet everyone can check the prices of all the providers and if your 
buyers notice that someone has a lower price they will complain 
about it. […] I remember once a travel agent called me and started 
shouting at me that I had given a lower price to his competitor. I told 
him that I gave them the same price but the other agent was able to 
reduce other costs of the package and offer a lower price; it had 
nothing to do with me.”  (SH:3) 
In other words, due to the competition that exists between the TOs and to avoid 
harming existing relationships, the AP participants’ pricing policy with regard to 
other channels is influenced by their pricing approach with their current key 
partners. Hence, some APs interviewed are cautious regarding the prices they offer 
through other channels. This cautiousness was mentioned by eight other APs. Vich-
i-Martorell (2004) examined the attitudes of tourism suppliers (accommodation units 
and airlines) towards adopting the Internet as a distribution channel in the Balearic 
Islands, where the large TOs have a strong presence. Vich-i-Martorell (2004, p.36) 
ascertained that some tourism suppliers, which he labelled “fearful”, believe that 
actively adopting the Internet to sell their products, bypassing the TO, is a risky 
strategy. He stated that a “boycott” by the TOs was a strong risk factor for suppliers 
that wanted to promote their products online.  
Thus, despite the fact that the Internet can offer flexibility and control over 
pricing strategies (Romero and Tajeda 2011), within this study’s context it can be 
argued that in the ROC the situation may be analogous to that of the Vich-i-
Martorell (2004) study. More precisely, although all the AP participants have 
adopted online practices to promote and often sell their products, for some there is 
still a feeling of fear and caution about harming their long-term relationships with 
their key TOs. Such a reaction by the APs is to be expected since, as explained in 
section 6.2.4, due to the concentration of their sales with certain TOs and 
asymmetric bargaining power, a fear exists regarding losing the contract or of 
retaliation. Therefore, even if the AP participants use online distribution channels to 
promote and sell their product some are still cautious about the prices offered, 
preferring to protect their relationships with the TOs.  
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In addition, some of the AP participants noted that they had observed deviant 
behaviour by the TOs in relation to price promotions (discounts). For instance, two 
AP participants stated:  
“[W]e give discounts but there are cases where we drop the price but 
the TO does not, so the TO benefits from the difference in price.” 
(SH:2) 
“[…] we give special offers and discounts to the TOs if demand is 
low because we want to generate sales […] we always check on the 
websites and brochures to make sure that the customer can see also 
and knows about our offer, […] especially in periods when sales 
might be low.” (SH:3) 
That is to say, although AP participants frequently offer price reductions to stimulate 
demand, there is a level of suspicion on the part of some APs towards the TOs, 
whether these price reductions reach the tourist. Alegre and Sard (2015) investigated 
pricing management of TOs in the Balearic Islands following the economic crisis 
and discovered that TOs are more inclined to follow commercial strategies that do 
not influence prices to deal with shocks in demand. They attributed this to the strict 
profit margins with which the TOs work. These make it difficult to reduce prices, 
thus TOs prefer to offer quality and flexible products to the consumer rather than 
enter into a price war (Alegre and Sard 2015). Equally, Davies and Downward 
(2007) stated that UK TOs prefer price stability to engender goodwill with their 
customers, and changes in demand levels or competitive shocks are tackled through 
non-pricing decisions.  
Following on from the findings of Alegre and Sard (2015) and Davies and 
Downward (2007), the suspicions of some AP participants that regarding price 
reductions during the season reaching the customers could be justified. This is 
because in this study APs stressed price reductions that occur during the season to 
stimulate demand, whereas the above studies claimed that TOs often choose non-
pricing tactics to adjust to changing demand levels. Of course, this is not to say that 
all TOs adopt these deviant practices in their relationships but interview findings 
indicate that such practices do exist, as one AP participant affirmed: “[S]ometimes 
they [TOs] lower their price sometimes they don’t.” (HA:1). Moreover, as discussed 
in section 6.2.3, information asymmetries exist between the APs and TOs. Hence, 
the TO can use this information asymmetry to manipulate demand levels to achieve 
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price reductions and soft concessions. The majority of the AP participants perceived 
that the TOs take advantage of information asymmetry to increase their profit from 
the sale by reducing their costs, namely the cost of the accommodation unit.  
In contrast, two AP participants asserted:  
“[T]Os have prepaid flights […] if the TOs realise that the seat will 
stay empty and the opportunity to sell will be lost they will reduce 
their price or find a way to reduce the costs to reduce the loss.” 
(TV:4) 
“[…] if the TOs are losing money due to low demand, they will come 
to you and tell you, ‘You know I’m losing 25 Euro on each package, 
and since I’m generating a good volume of sales for your unit, you 
have to help me reduce this loss’ […] and you give a discount to help 
them out.” (IG:1) 
Some AP participants perceive that such practices (asking for price reductions) 
occur in order for the TO to reduce the losses that may arise due to lower than 
expected demand. This view was supported by eight APs. This diversity in opinions 
can be attributed to the individual professional experiences and perceptions of the 
APs regarding the TOs. People can subjectively resolve their own understanding of 
specific situations (Watkins and Bell 2002). Thus, whether the TOs ask for price 
reductions to increase their profit or to recover losses from unsold stock is difficult 
to establish since this is sensitive business information and will not easily be 
discussed with outsiders.  
Nevertheless, the fact remains that such practices reduce the expected 
revenue for the APs. Three AP participants highlighted: 
“[W]ith allotment contracts you have a release period where the TO 
must release the rooms back to the hotel fifteen days or seven days 
before the arrival of the guest. Thus if the rooms are not released 
early you are in danger of having the rooms empty […]. However, 
with such a limited time to sell to others the rooms are in real danger 
of staying empty, thus the TOs have started another trend ‘last minute 
bookings’.” (SH:9) 
“[S]ometimes I believe that the result of negotiations is always 
illustrative, virtual. Despite thinking that you have signed a good 
deal in terms of price, by the time you get paid it is a different story, 
particularly due to last minute bookings.” (SH:3) 
“[U]sually, if we have a problem [low demand] we go and discuss it 
with the TO; we see if it is possible to give them some sort of 
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[special] offer to help us. Now all the TOs also have Internet 
companies that operate on a B2B and B2C basis, and we use these 
companies to put out last minute stock, and we play with yield 
management in order to see what we can get.” (HA:1) 
The above statements indicate that uncertainty in demand levels and information on 
the booking situation lead AP participants to discount even further at the last minute 
in order to sell their rooms either through the same TO or through different 
channels. Similarly, Buhalis (2000) investigated the relationship between APs and 
TOs in Greece. Buhalis (2000, p.133) ascertained that, due to information 
asymmetry and the very short-release period for rooms under commitment and 
allotment contracts, APs were being forced to offer further last minute discounts to 
stimulate demand in the “[…] price-sensitive last-minute market.”  
However, whilst discount pricing and last-minute pricing may stimulate a 
small level of demand, the damage to revenue will be greater (Enz 2003; O’Connor 
and Murphy 2008). Thus, it can be asserted when APs offer last-minute price 
reductions to stimulate demand and sell perishable unsold capacity, this can be to the 
detriment of their revenue. The analysis demonstrates that such occurrences are 
mostly evident in allotment contracts due to the fact that in commitment contracts 
pre-payments occur. Last-minute deals are, however, also evident in large 
commitment and exclusivity contracts. Additionally, considering that the expected 
revenue of the APs is reduced, their financial insecurity is increased which, as noted 
in the proposition above (6.2.5), can lead to the acceptance of lower contractual 
prices. Hence, it can be asserted that information asymmetry in terms of demand 
levels between the APs and TOs, can lead to price reductions during the season that 
can restrict the expected revenue of the APs. 
Moreover, as noted in section 6.2.3, manipulation of demand levels by the 
TOs and price reductions requested by them create mistrust in the relationship. As 
two AP participants stated:  
“[W]e also have hotel representatives in two source markets and 
these representatives will visit the TOs in the source market to check 
on the promotions that we might offer in periods of low demand to 
ensure that these offers are available online, that they are promoting 
them to the customers.” (HA:3) 
“[…] you always have to check that the discounts you give and 
promotions reach the end customer […] if it happens to you once 
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then you tend to check that everything is going according to plan.” 
(SH:2) 
In other words, the information asymmetry and volatility in prices that occur in the 
relationship can influence the relational exchange between the parties. For example, 
Wang (2012b) examined the influence of the revenue management practices of an 
accommodation company on its major buyers and discovered that price fluctuations 
or opportunistic pricing damaged the relationship, eroding trust between the parties 
and the long-term potential for profitability. Although Wang’s (2012b) study 
emphasised the perspective of the buyer (namely the TO) it can be deduced that 
price fluctuations in the relationship can erode trust between the parties. Within this 
study, it can be argued that asymmetry of demand information along with requests 
for price reductions created mistrust that can harm the long-term potential of the 
relationship. However, as stipulated in section 6.2.3, higher levels of trust exist in 
relationships that operate with large commitment and exclusivity contracts due to 
the more relational long-term approach adopted by the parties. Despite the 
diminished trust that the AP participants have towards the TOs, however, they still 
offer a discount in order to engender the goodwill of the TOs. 
Nonetheless, trust is a critical mediating factor that influences the 
cooperative behaviour of the parties and development of the relationship (Morgan 
and Hunt 1994). The appropriate management of price fluctuations between the APs 
and TOs is critical to protect the relationship and attain its long-term value. Perhaps 
APs would be more trusting of TOs if the price reduction process used by the TOs 
were more transparent.  
Conversely, the revenue management practices of the APs which focus on 
price strategies do not influence the relationship from the TOs’ perspective given 
that TOs operate with fixed contract rates. However, one TO participant highlighted: 
“[S]o if a unit actions stop sales that would mean we then need to 
rely more on other suppliers to supply more beds to match the 
number of available flight seats we have.[…] In overbookings some 
TOs might not ask a supplier for compensation for the guest, if the 
guest is overbooked to an identical unit of the same standard, in the 
same resort and offering exactly the same facilities [...] but we will 
still penalise the supplier because as a company we will still be 
losing out from a contract rates point of view.” (TO:2) 
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The statement above demonstrates that, although revenue management practices 
emphasising inventory control, such as overbookings45 and stop sales,46 can have a 
positive impact on the APs’ revenue, they can also lead to APs incurring costs 
because they are often liable for changes in the contract. For instance, in the case 
where an AP does not have sufficient rooms in his unit, customers need to be taken 
to other units and the AP can incur costs such as those required for the customer to 
stay in a unit that is more expensive (Todorov and Zhechev 2010). However, 
revenue management practices in terms of inventory control can negatively 
influence an AP’s relationship with a TO. TOs operate with strict and complex 
forecasting of tourism demand, capacity and pricing where “[…] one contracted bed 
is related to one contracted flight seat”, taking very high risks (Čavlek 2006, p.165). 
Hence, it can be asserted that any contingencies such as overbookings or stop sales 
can have an important impact on a TO’s forecasted sales and expected revenue. As 
such, as discussed in section 6.2.3, overbookings and stop sales can result in TOs 
using threats and legalistic pleas to deter AP participants from using these practices 
in their relationship.  
However, the analysis reveals that relationship-specific factors, such as 
personal relationships influence revenue management practices, two AP participants 
commented: 
“[I] would never overbook or disturb the customers of a TO who has 
helped me out in the past, for example by accepting stop sales, and 
whom I have a good relationship with, and it is an important TO for 
our hotel.” (SH:12) 
 “[…] if we have overbookings we always try not to overbook 
[transfer to another unit] the customers of our major TOs, because 
they will complain. If we have no choice and we need to overbook 
these customers, we will send them to a higher category unit so the 
customers will be happy and the TO will be happy as well. In a way 
you buy your way out of the problem.”  (HA:1) 
As the above statements show, the APs consider the relationship-specific factors in 
managing overbookings, such as personal relationships and the importance of the 
                                                
45 Overbooking is based on the supposition that clients who have a reservation will not arrive 
(referred to as a ‘no show’), while others may cancel or change their reservation at the last minute, 
while other clients may leave early (Ivanov and Zhechev 2012).  
46 A stop sale situation occurs when an AP asks a TO to stop selling rooms in certain periods due to 
high demand. 
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TO to the unit. This is done to avoid negative impacts on their relationship with the 
TOs. It is a common practice adopted by the AP participants and was mentioned by 
fifteen APs. Wang (2012b) examined revenue management practices adopted by 
APs in their relationship with key buyers and found that, although major buyers 
operate with a fixed contract rate they feel that some practices, such as unavailability 
of rooms at the agreed rate during high season, or inconsistent contract rate in high-
demand seasons, result in irritation of key buyers. Wang and Bowie (2009) 
identified also that the focus of the accommodation company on short-term 
behaviour, deriving from revenue management practices, comes at the cost of 
disregarding long-term valuable relationships with key buyers leading to mistrust 
between the parties.  
However, within this study most APs are aware of damaging their 
relationship with their major TOs in the application of revenue management 
practices. As noted in section 6.2.5, this awareness can be attributed to the 
asymmetric dependence that exists leading the AP participants to consider the long-
term potential of the relationship. This is particularly relevant to relationships with 
large commitment and exclusivity contracts due to the concentration of APs’ sales 
on one or two key TOs. Although it must be noted that analysis reveals that in large 
commitment and exclusivity contracts, where the TOs contract the unit as a whole, 
overbooking practices and problems do not commonly occur since the TOs 
essentially control and manage the unit as a whole. Nevertheless, despite AP 
participants adopting revenue management practices that mainly advocate short-term 
actions, their focus is still on protecting the long-term relationship with the TOs 
rather than on short-term gains.  
Still, these actions can restrict the ability of the AP participants to take 
decisions that could increase their revenue and gain more profit in the short-term. 
For instance, Villanueva et al. (2007), using game theory in a buyer-supplier 
context, ascertained that in competitive environments organisations focusing on 
maximising profits in the short-term (that is period-by-period) had higher profits 
than organisations focusing on the long-term (maximising profits over multi-
periods). Villanueva et al. (2007, p.101) clarified that this occurs due to the “[…] 
shadow of the future.” That is to say, as organisations compete to gain a contract and 
capture the buyer, they over-invest in attaining and maintaining those buyers, for 
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instance through lower prices, thus competing potential profits away and reducing 
the lifetime value of the buyer.  
Hence, within this study’s context, the price discounts that most APs offer to 
the TOs and the long-term relationship management approach that they adopt may 
limit their profitability. APs must carefully consider and evaluate the profitability of 
each of the TOs with whom they cooperate and assess the pricing strategies that they 
adopt to gain the highest value from their relationships. However, adopting a more 
short-term approach is easier said than done. This is because the asymmetry in 
dependence that exists in the relationship and the small number of TOs often leads 
APs to agree to the decisions and consider the potential reactions of the more 
powerful TOs in their operations in general and pricing in particular. Despite the 
dominant role that the TOs play in their relationships AP participants typically feel 
satisfied with those relationships and believe that they have a win-win situation 
which achieves a satisfactory volume of sales and profit. However, the majority of 
the AP participants recognise that, as one AP participant commented, “[T]Os today 
kill us with a velvet glove [are an iron fist in a velvet glove]” (IG:1). Put differently, 
although the large TOs offer strong benefits for the APs in an atmosphere of 
cooperation, in the end the TOs control and dominate the tourism and hospitality 
industry and thus the APs. Furthermore, when the interests of the TOs are harmed 
and circumstances demand it, the TOs will exercise their iron fist, namely their 
bargaining power.  
6.2.6.3.	 Conclusion		
The analysis indicates that in contractual and non-contractual negotiations 
the pricing policy of the majority of the APs, was strongly influenced by the pricing 
policies and strategic aims of the large TOs with whom they operate. The large TOs 
predominantly focus on generating a high volume of sales and profit-maximisation. 
As a result, APs typically offered lower prices to the TOs and concentrated on the 
saleability of their product in order to achieve maximum sales for both parties. This 
pricing behaviour is mainly due to the APs’ strong dependence on two of the TOs’ 
key resources, namely financial security and a consistent occupancy rate that can 
secure the viability of the unit. Furthermore, a feeling of fear from the APs regarding 
losing a contract with the large TO acts as a major constraint on their bargaining 
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power in negotiations. Thus, more often than not, the APs offer a lower price to the 
TOs rather than risk losing a contract. This is particularly important for APs 
operating with large commitment and exclusivity contracts due to the APs’ higher 
dependence on the TOs. Moreover, the APs seek to offer value to the TOs through 
reducing their operational costs by accepting a lower price, and offer good quality 
product (service and facilities). For example, during non-contractual negotiations, 
the APs are flexible and cooperative in offering price discounts and soft concessions 
to the TOs to generate sales. This is because the APs perceive that such actions 
engender reciprocity between the parties and help to maintain their relationship with 
the TOs. The analysis also indicates that, for some APs, firm-specific attributes 
(such as diversified supply and differentiation) increase their bargaining power in 
relation to the TOs and put them in a better position to negotiate pricing. This is 
because these APs predominantly operate with an allotment contract and thus have a 
lower level of dependence on the TOs. Lastly, it is observed that despite the 
dominant position of the TOs during negotiations the APs receive important benefits 
(such as a consistent volume of sales) and perceive that they achieve a win-win 
situation in their relationships.  
The above section (6.2) critically analysed the six propositions developed 
during axial coding (second stage of analysis process). Accordingly, the next section 
presents the final stage of the analysis process, selective coding. 
6.3.	 SELECTIVE	CODING	
6.3.1. Introduction 
Following on from axial coding (Chapter 5, section 5.7.4), and from constant 
comparison of the data with existing literature, selective coding takes place. As 
mentioned in Chapter 5 (section 5.7.5), selective coding is the final stage of the 
analysis process where all the sub-categories and core categories developed are 
integrated to explain the relationships that exist between them. This selective coding 
leads to the development of the Grounded Theory. To aid the development of the 
Grounded Theory a detailed storyline was developed. This storyline connected all 
concepts, sub-categories and core categories together and narrated all key issues and 
the relationships that were evident in the research. Hence, the developed storyline 
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provided an explanation of the key phenomena that influence the contractual and 
non-contractual interactions and negotiations that occur between APs and TOs. This 
storyline is presented below. 
6.3.2. Storyline 
The ROC accommodation sector is highly dependent on a small number of 
large European TOs. The small number of TOs and the large numbers of tourists 
they bring into the ROC mean that they are well placed in terms of bargaining power 
in contractual and non-contractual negotiations in relation to the APs. This is 
because the bargaining power of a party stems from the relative dependence that one 
party has on the resources of the other to achieve its organisational objectives. The 
strong bargaining power of the large TOs allows them to dominate their 
relationships with the APs in general and in contractual and non-contractual 
negotiations in particular. As a result, the interests of the APs are often ignored 
during contractual and non-contractual negotiations, restricting their profitability 
and threatening their economic viability. The APs must, therefore, increase their 
bargaining power in relation to the TOs in order to enhance their ability to influence 
negotiation outcomes and improve their economic viability. For the APs to increase 
their bargaining power, they must seek to increase the level of dependence of the TO 
on the AP in order for the TO to attain its organisational objectives. This can be 
achieved by the APs first increasing the attractiveness of their resources to the TOs, 
and second by reducing the TOs’ alternatives for accessing those resources outside 
their relationship with the APs. The more desirable the resources of the AP are to the 
TO, and the smaller the number of alternatives for the TO there are, the higher the 
level of dependence on the AP and therefore the higher the APs bargaining power in 
relation to the TO during their contractual and non-contractual negotiations.  
The analysis indicates that APs have both firm-specific and destination-
specific resources that determine their bargaining power. This is due to the fact that 
the tourism product is embedded in the specific nature of the destination. 
Consequently, firm-specific resources, such as size-of unit, product quality and 
differentiation and destination-specific resources, destination characteristics and 
destination attractiveness, contribute to the bargaining power of the APs in relation 
to the TOs. Hence, structural factors, government policies/regulations, culture and 
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industry characteristics, as well as relationship-specific factors need to be addressed 
for the APs to increase their bargaining power in relation to TOs and in negotiations 
in particular.  
Indeed, tangible and intangible firm-specific resources of the APs determine 
the type of contractual agreement between APs and TOs. This is because parties are 
dependent on each other’s resources in order to achieve their organisational 
objectives, therefore, the contracts between APs and TOs are determined by the 
dependence structure that exists between them. The AP resources that influence the 
type of contract are size-of-unit, product quality (facilities and service), 
infrastructure, location, repeat clientele, reputation, value for money, reliability and 
differentiation. These resources are regarded as important sources of power for the 
APs and help to determine their bargaining power. However, some resources are 
more valuable and desirable than others and can increase or decrease the dependence 
between the APs and TOs.  
More specifically, as stated above, the level of dependence of the TO on the 
AP is determined by how attractive the APs’ resources are perceived to be by the 
TO, and the number of substitutes that the TO has to access those resources. The 
more attractive the resources of the AP and the smaller the number of substitutes, 
the greater the TO’s dependence on the AP. A higher level of dependence often 
leads to a commitment or exclusivity contract, whereas a lower level of dependence 
between the parties results in an allotment contract. Size-of-unit (room capacity) is 
identified as an important resource which influences the type of contract. This can 
be attributed to the large tourism flow that the bigger TOs control and their 
subsequent need to access large room capacities to fulfil their operational needs, 
hence TOs often operate with accommodation chains. On the other hand, APs 
controlling large room capacities require a consistent tourism flow to achieve a 
satisfactory occupancy rate. Hence, size-of-unit considerably raises the dependence 
between the parties and often results in a commitment or exclusivity contract.  
Other resources also play an important role in increasing the dependence 
between the parties. Good product quality (service and facilities), good unit 
infrastructure and differentiation in terms of offering a unique product for a TO’s 
portfolio are all such resources. Offering value for money to the TOs and being a 
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reliable partner also increase the dependence between the parties. This increased 
dependence results in commitment and exclusivity contracts.  
In addition, to firm-specific resources contributing to the bargaining power 
of the APs in relation to the TOs, the findings indicate that destination-specific 
resources, that is destination characteristics and destination attractiveness, also 
influence the APs bargaining power. The analysis reveals that the ROC has the 
necessary destination characteristics (such as favourable climate, natural scenery, 
location and safety) to offer an appealing tourism product and fulfil the tourists’ 
needs. Therefore, it has important resources that contribute to its attractiveness as a 
destination for both the tourist and the TOs, and is thus considered to be a 
competitive destination. These resources contribute also to the tourism product that 
the APs offer to the TOs and in turn to the APs’ bargaining power in relation to the 
TOs.  
However, the analysis reveals that the ROC is not differentiated in terms of 
any specific attribute and it is dependent on a highly substitutable sun-and-sea 
product, restricting its competitiveness in relation to destinations offering a similar 
product. The insufficient differentiation and reduced competitiveness can drive both 
tourists and TOs to choose other similar destinations. A highly substitutable 
destination consequently contributes to the substitutability of the APs, restricting 
their bargaining power in relation to the TOs, and in negotiations in particular. This 
is because the substitutability of the ROC increases the TOs alternative sources 
(destinations) to achieve their organisational objectives outside their relationship 
with the APs in the ROC. In other words the TOs can choose amongst various other 
destinations, and thus APs, to fulfil their objectives.  
Therefore, developing a more attractive, and therefore competitive, 
destination could enhance the bargaining power of the APs in relation to the TOs. 
However, governmental ineffectiveness is identified as a structural constraint on the 
APs’ bargaining power. This is because government policies/regulations have an 
impact upon the destination-specific resources (destination attractiveness) of the 
APs. In particular, a centralised Government model, characterised by rigidity and 
bureaucracy, is considered to be a critical obstacle to the planning and 
implementation of tourism policies that can increase destination attractiveness. For 
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example, in the ROC, the rigid Government system delays the development of new 
products, of Government policies to increase the available source markets, and fails 
to address obsolete and irrelevant policies that hinder tourism development, which 
can improve destination attractiveness. New product development, for instance, 
could help the destination to diversify its product from over-reliance on the 
packaged price sensitive sun-and-sea market that is the focus of the large TOs. 
However, such actions are hindered by the current rigid Government system, hence, 
this over-reliance enhances the bargaining power of the TOs since they control a 
large share of that market. 
One specific external factor that reduces the bargaining power of the APs is 
the accessibility of the destination. The ROC, and by implication the APs, is 
hampered by insufficient deregulation of flights from non-EU markets. This was a 
result of an action the Government took to protect the national airline due to its 
financial interests in the company. However, this limits the ability of the destination 
to improve its accessibility, and to develop new source markets, that would help to 
reduce over-reliance on the small number of European markets controlled by the 
large TOs, including the UK, Germany and the Scandinavian countries. The current 
low levels of flight deregulation serve to increase the bargaining power of the TOs 
because the TOs have a large distribution network and are able to offer a cost-
effective way for tourists to visit the ROC. As a result the APs are dependent on the 
TOs for their tourism flow.  
Additionally, another key structural constrain highlighted is the inadequate 
government intervention that exists. For example, government intervention in the 
form of tax reliefs and subsidies could help the APs to decrease their high 
operational costs and enable them to improve their product, thus increasing their 
bargaining power in relation to the TOs during negotiations.   
Other external structural factors that constrain and create delays to successful 
policy making and implementation to improve the destination attractiveness 
identified during the interviews are: clashes between individual interests, 
clientelism, inadequate accountability of Government officials, inadequate 
governmental devolution, insufficient cooperation between Government and 
industry sectors, insufficient tourism knowledge and experience of Government 
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officials, short-term perspective and the passive approach of tourism leaders with 
regard to tourism development. All these factors restrict and create constant delays 
to decisions and actions that need to be taken to assist tourism growth and improve 
the attractiveness and competitiveness of the destination. As a result these structural 
factors constrain the bargaining power of the APs in relation to the TOs in 
contractual and non-contractual negotiations.  
Finally, in terms of external structural factors cultural issues and specifically, 
the individualistic mentality that exists in the ROC hinders actions that might 
harmonise the interests of the various stakeholder groups. This is because tourism 
actors focus on achieving their individual or commercial interests and ignore 
policies that may be in conflict with their own interests. In turn, this hampers actions 
that could lead to the planning and implementation of successful tourism policies, 
and strategies, that can enhance destination competitiveness, which could 
consequently increase the bargaining power of the APs in relation to the TOs in 
contractual and non-contractual negotiations.  
The resources of the APs and the TOs influence their relational exchange 
between the parties. This is because these resources influence the type of contract 
agreed between the APs and TOs, which in turn determines the context of the 
relationship. That is to say, commitment and exclusivity contracts denote a closer 
more relational exchange between the parties with APs and TOs adopting a more 
long-term approach to the relationship, where high levels of trust, cooperation, 
openness, and frequent communication are evident. On the other hand, allotment 
contracts are a more distant discreet exchange between the APs and TOs. This 
relationship is characterised by a more short-term approach, emphasising the 
transaction of a specific exchange and partial communication, lower information 
sharing and lower trust between the APs and TOs. These characteristics have a 
direct influence on the contractual and non-contractual interactions evident between 
the parties. 
Shared behavioural patterns of the APs and TOs are observed regardless of 
the type of contract. However, the type of contract influences the relative effort that 
each party makes to accommodate each other’s demands within contractual and non-
contractual negotiations. For instance, most APs are more flexible in their 
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contractual and non-contractual negotiations with the large TOs, often adopting non-
coercive influencing strategies to sway negotiation outcomes. APs typically use non-
coercive strategies such as rationality (or rational persuasion), recommendation and 
promises, as well as following a more cooperative negotiation style focusing on a 
win-win situation for both parties. This is due to the high dependence that the APs 
have on the TOs, particularly in large agreements, leading them to comply with their 
TO’s requests in order to ensure the continuity of the relationship. Indeed, in large 
commitment and exclusivity agreements, where the dependence of the APs on the 
large TOs is considerably increased, APs are more flexible and cooperative in their 
exchange relationships than is the case for APs operating with smaller allotment 
contracts. Still, APs focus on a cooperative strategy to gain the goodwill of the TO 
and protect the future of the relationship.  
Although the TOs adopt non-coercive influence strategies such as rationality 
and recommendations, they are typically inflexible, using more coercive strategies in 
their contractual and non-contractual negotiations. Coercive influence strategies 
such as pressure, legalistic pleas and threats are often used by the TOs to achieve 
their objectives. Moreover, the TOs intermediary position within the tourism 
distribution channel, as the link between supply and demand, enables them to gain 
important information on demand and supply. As a result, the TOs, may use deviant 
practices by manipulating information on demand levels and sales for a specific unit 
to attain special offers or discounts from the APs and gain a higher profit.  
Consequently, slight mistrust is evident between the parties that may 
engender opportunistic behaviour and lead to detrimental effects for the future of the 
exchange ‒ namely discontinuation. A higher level of mistrust is evident in 
relationships operating with an allotment contract due to the emphasis on a short-
term discreet approach rather than a long-term approach. Still, coercive influence 
strategies are evident in all types of relationship. However, due to the fact that the 
APs are highly dependent on the TOs for survival they have limited options other 
than to comply with the TOs’ requests. Additionally, the asymmetric dependence 
that exists between the APs and TOs discourages the APs from reciprocating with 
coercive influencing strategies as they do not wish to endanger their relationship and 
seek to avoid stimulating retaliation from the TOs.  
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The adoption of both coercive and non-coercive influencing strategies during 
the contractual and non-contractual interactions between the APs and TOs is 
suggestive of a relationship characterised by coopetition. In other words, the 
strategies of the parties centre on both achieving a collaborative advantage and 
attaining individual firm objectives. However, in closer more relational exchanges 
where large agreements exist, a more cooperative relationship is evident than when 
APs and TOs operate with an allotment contract. This is attributed to the higher 
dependence that occurs between parties operating with such contracts (commitment 
and exclusivity). In other words, such contracts necessitate high levels of investment 
(time and economic) from both parties. Therefore, the discontinuation of the 
relationship will result in greater losses (time and economic) for both parties. This 
leads the parties to behave in a more cooperative manner in their interactions. 
Nevertheless, considering the influence strategies adopted and relational impact, 
both relationships show competition and cooperation.  
Additionally, positive and negative emotions evident in the relationship 
affect the contractual and non-contractual negotiations between the APs and TOs. 
Indeed, a dynamic tourism environment characterised by high demand uncertainty 
and high dependence on the TOs for consistent tourism flow leads APs to have an 
internal emotion of fear during their negotiations. The reason for this fear is that 
losing a large contract with a TO can have damaging effects on the accommodation 
unit’s financial viability, threatening its survival.  
The APs perceive that a contract with a large TO reduces their business risk 
since the APs sell their product in bulk and frequently receive advance payments. 
Fear of losing the TOs operates as a major self-regulating emotion for the APs 
during contractual and non-contractual negotiations. That is to say, fear of losing the 
TOs frequently results in the APs regulating and coordinating their behaviour to 
comply with the TOs’ demands in order to avoid any financial loss. Fear of 
punishment and/or loss of contract also guide the APs to regulate their opportunistic 
behaviour to prevent negative sanctions being imposed by the TOs. This contributes 
to the creation of a positive emotional atmosphere engendering trust in the 
relationship. In relationships where large contractual agreements exist the AP’s fear 
of losing their TO contract is greater since they are highly dependent on the TOs for 
their survival.  
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This fear often results in APs experiencing feelings of powerlessness in 
relation to the TOs because the APs feel they have inadequate control over 
interactions with the operators. Such feelings lead to alienation of the APs from the 
TOs, provoking feelings of separation that can result in dissatisfaction and decrease 
the loyalty of the APs in their relationship with the TOs. However, in highly 
relational exchanges, where personal relationships, trust, reciprocity and respect are 
observed, feelings of powerlessness are less marked. This is because these 
relationships induce a sense of comfort and security for the APs where APs feel 
confident and secure to make requests of the TO during contractual and non-
contractual negotiations.  
Furthermore, it is observed that, to an extent, the APs have legitimised the 
requests and behaviour of the TOs: that is, APs have accepted the TO as an authority 
figure, both in the tourism industry in general and their relationship in particular. 
This can be ascribed to the higher bargaining power of the TOs in relation to the 
APs, motivating them to rationalise the asymmetric power structure and to perceive 
the TOs as a legitimate authority in order to ‘feel better’ about the status quo. This 
legitimisation allows the TOs more discretion to be the decision making party and 
stimulates the compliance of the APs in negotiations.  
Perceptions of unfairness are also apparent in the relationship inducing an 
internal feeling of bitterness for the APs. This is because some APs perceive that 
firstly an unfair distribution of benefits (economic) exist in the relationship in 
comparison to the APs efforts, and secondly the feeling of powerlessness that the 
APs have stimulates a feeling that they have limited control over decisions that 
influence their outcomes. Conversely, due to the financial security that the TOs 
provide to the APs, some APs disregard negative emotions, such as bitterness and 
unfairness, given that financial needs take precedence. 
Regardless of these negative emotions, APs characterise the TOs as friends 
and partners. APs are satisfied in their relationship with the TOs and continuously 
invest to engender a positive emotional atmosphere, for example by offering 
incentives to the TOs and forming emotional bonds through personalised service. 
Positive emotions, such as happiness, respect and a sense of security in their 
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relationship with the TOs, are therefore observed within the exchange, with close 
emotional bonds that can form a successful relationship.  
The above mentioned challenges and factors have a direct influence on the 
contractual and non-contractual outcomes regarding the two main concerns of both 
parties: pricing and volume of sales. Structural factors in particular constrain the 
bargaining power of the APs when negotiating pricing and volume of sales 
outcomes with the TOs. The ROC as a destination is over reliant on a highly 
substitutable sun-and-sea tourism product fiercely competing with other similar sun-
and-sea destinations that operate with lower cost structures, such as Turkey and 
Greece. The high cost structure derives from high airport taxes, taxation at the 
destination, the cost of fuel and the high salaries of tourism employees. 
Consequently, it is considered an expensive destination and faces strong price 
competition from other similar destinations that can offer a better value for money 
proposition to a price sensitive mass package tourist.  
Due to the strong competition that the APs face their dependence on the 
large TOs increases. This is because the TOs’ large distribution network enables 
them to offer the most cost-effective channel for tourists to visit the ROC, and in 
turn a consistent tourism flow for the APs. The TOs also offer the most cost-
effective method for the APs to promote their product to their key source markets, 
such as the UK and Germany. The promotional ability of the TOs stems from their 
reputation, which represents credibility and security to the tourist, and from their 
large market share. Consequently, this increases the dependence of the APs on the 
TOs.  
The goal of the majority of APs is to generate the highest possible volume of 
sales in order to achieve a satisfactory occupancy rate and earn a profit. This can be 
attributed to the low prices that the APs accept during their negotiations with the 
TOs. The TOs operate with very tight profit margins, therefore they focus on 
achieving the lowest possible price during contractual and non-contractual 
negotiations and the highest possible volume of sales in order to maximise their 
profit. Hence, the APs focus on volume of sales to generate a profit, so are highly 
dependent on the ability of the TOs to offer a consistent tourism flow.  
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Moreover, the financial insecurity of the APs intensifies their dependence on 
the TOs. Despite the fact that the TOs demand low contractual prices they provide 
financial security through their agreements. This is because large commitment and 
exclusivity contracts with the TOs involve pre-payments for future bookings. The 
financial insecurity of the APs arises from the difficulty of earning a sufficient profit 
from their operations owing to high operational costs, large bank loans, the low 
prices that they offer and seasonality. Indeed, during the low season (November to 
March) a number of units close down, while the APs who continue their operations 
struggle to earn a profit, thus increasing their dependence on the TOs. This situation 
increases the bargaining power of the TOs in relation to the APs. As a result of this 
asymmetric bargaining power APs are unwilling to negotiate price with the TOs, 
particularly in the case of large agreements. Thus, more often than not the APs 
comply with the TOs’ demands regarding pricing issues.  
Further, oversupply of accommodation units and the short-term and 
individualistic mentality that characterises the island’s inhabitants results in fierce 
competition between the APs. The advantageous position of the TOs that allows 
them to gain information on prices for each unit enables the TOs to play the APs off 
against each other to attain a lower price during contractual agreements. 
Additionally, the competitive relationship that exists between the APs and the short-
term individualist mentality of Greek-Cypriots constrains their ability to cooperate 
and enhance their bargaining position in relation to the TOs. For instance, 
cooperation could occur through collective bargaining, promoting resource sharing 
to increase the value of the product offered to the TOs as well as the international 
tourism market.  
Although slight cooperation is observed between the APs this is only in so 
far as the interests of each party is not threatened; for instance in cases of 
overbookings or lobbying for common goals in the current regulatory environment. 
However, in terms of their contractual and non-contractual negotiations, APs often 
reduce their asking price and accept the TOs’ demands in order to win a contract 
from another AP, regardless of the impact that this can have on their expected 
profitability.  
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Asymmetry of information about demand constrains the bargaining power of 
the APs during non-contractual negotiations with the TOs. The reason for this is that 
the TOs may manipulate information concerning demand, for example, by holding 
bookings until the last minute in order to achieve a discount on the contract price to 
increase their profit. Such practices further restrict the expected profitability of the 
APs. The constant price competition which is evident in the industry restricts the 
APs’ financial capacity to improve their product, for instance through renovation, 
without assistance from an external party. As a result, the bargaining power of the 
APs in relation to the TOs is restricted because the APs depend on financial input 
from the TOs for major renovations in order to improve their product and increase 
their competitiveness.  
Despite their challenging relationship with the TOs, and the low prices that 
they receive in contractual and non-contractual negotiations, the APs’ fear of losing 
a major TO is high. Large TOs have the resources to provide financial security and 
stability in sales to the APs due to their ability to contract large room capacities, 
offer pre-payments to the APs and generate a consistent tourism flow. Considering 
these critical benefits, it is not surprising that the APs determine their pricing 
policies based on the TOs’ pricing and strategic objectives, focusing on sales 
volume and profit-maximisation.  
More specifically, APs concentrate on attaining a high occupancy rate, 
highlighting the importance of the saleability of a product to generate the highest 
possible sales volume both for the APs and the TOs. As noted earlier, the APs often 
accept prices with low profit margins during contractual and non-contractual 
negotiations, thus they are highly dependent on the volume of tourists that the TOs 
transfer to the unit. This dependence restricts their bargaining power to negotiate 
price. This is particularly relevant for APs that operate with large commitment and 
exclusivity contracts. APs operating with an allotment contract agree to higher 
prices but receive less volume from the large TOs. However, APs with allotment 
contracts typically maintain a diversified supply, operating with various TOs, in 
order to achieve a satisfactory occupancy rate.  
Given the price sensitivity of the large TOs in contractual agreements the 
APs focus on offering value by reducing the costs to the TOs; that is, by offering a 
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lower price, and high product quality (service and facilities). The APs’ key purpose 
is to comply with the price demands of the TOs in order to safeguard their profitable 
relationship and ensure its continuity. On the other hand, APs possessing valuable 
firm-specific characteristics, such as a diversified supply (operating with various 
TOs), differentiation and repeat clientele, are in a stronger position to negotiate 
price. This is attributed to their decreased dependence on a single TO and the 
attractiveness of their resources, which enables them to increase their bargaining 
power. Still, inadequate flight connectivity and the small number of large TOs limit 
the APs’ bargaining power since there are only a small number of alternative TOs 
available to them through which they can achieve sufficient occupancy and earn a 
profit. Therefore, APs typically adjust their pricing strategy based on the TO’s 
pricing demands in order to avoid damaging their relationship. This in turn 
significantly restricts their ability and willingness to negotiate price. 
In conclusion, the asymmetric dependence between the APs and TOs, which 
leads to asymmetric bargaining power, enables the TOs to dominate the relationship 
with the APs in general and during contractual and non-contractual negotiations in 
particular. Regardless of the dominant role of the TOs, APs feel satisfied that their 
relationships provide good economic and non-economic benefits within a positive 
emotional atmosphere resulting in a win-win situation. While the APs recognise and 
accept the bargaining power and control of the TOs in negotiations and their ability 
to determine the outcomes, APs still perceive that there is an opportunity to 
negotiate. This may be the case for a small number of APs offering a highly 
differentiated product within the ROC market and/or possessing a diversified supply 
of tourism flow. However, the APs often have to accept the TOs’ demands. APs 
acknowledge the TOs’ ability to use or misuse (as in the case of coercive influence 
strategies or when inducing fear of retaliation) their power to safeguard their 
interests, if those are threatened or harmed, as any profit-making firm would do. All 
of the above mentioned factors and challenges lead to the APs’ high levels of 
resource dependence on TOs, since the majority of APs would not be able to survive 
without accessing the resources of the TOs. As such, the APs are trapped in a 
vicious cycle from which it is hard to break free.  
Based on the above findings the substantive theory developed was:  
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“The APs’ and TOs’ control of resources (destination and firm-specific) governs 
contractual and non-contractual negotiations, as it determines each party’s 
bargaining power and the type of contract. In turn, this influences the relational 
factors, namely negotiation characteristics, relationship constructs and emotions. 
Consequently, the type of contract and the relational characteristics determine 
market characteristics in terms of pricing and volume of sales.” 
The theory developed specifies the factors that have a significant impact upon the 
bargaining power of the APs and TOs and in turn the contractual and non-
contractual negotiations between the parties.  
6.4. CONCLUSION 
The chapter has analysed and evaluated the key findings of the study 
generated through the data analysis process focused on developing a Grounded 
Theory that explains the contractual and non-contractual bargaining power 
relationship and negotiations between the APs and TOs. The discussion focused on 
the critical analysis and discussion of the six propositions developed under the three 
core categories; resources, relational factors and market characteristics. The six 
propositions were: (a) firm-specific tangible and intangible resources determine the 
type of contract during contractual negotiations; (b) government 
policies/regulations, culture and industry characteristics influence contractual and 
non-contractual negotiations through their impact on destination-specific resources; 
(c) contractual and non-contractual negotiations are influenced by negotiation 
characteristics and relationship constructs; (d) emotional factors influence 
contractual and non-contractual negotiations; (e) culture and industry 
characteristics are influential factors in pricing and volume of sales during 
contractual and non-contractual negotiations; and (f) negotiation characteristics, 
relationship constructs and emotions during contractual and non-contractual 
negotiations determine market characteristics in terms of pricing and volume of 
sales. All the propositions together explain the contractual and non-contractual 
negotiations that occur between the APs and TOs in the ROC, a relationship that is 
characterised by bargaining power asymmetry.  
To critically analyse the findings, current literature was utilised to elucidate 
the issues identified and to help develop a theory to explain the bargaining power 
relationship within negotiations of the APs and TOs. Aside from the literature 
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reviewed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, additional literature was reviewed and employed in 
this chapter to provide a richer explanation and support for the findings. This was 
because the exploratory and inductive characteristics of grounded theory analysis 
frequently guide the researcher to themes not taken into account prior to data 
collection, thus additional literature must be reviewed to fully explain the data. 
The analysis of the findings and discussion was followed by the final stage 
of Grounded Theory analysis, that is selective coding. The selective coding section 
presented the storyline developed to aid in theory development. The storyline 
connected and identified the relationships between all the concepts, sub-categories 
and core categories discovered during data analysis and in turn delineated the main 
phenomena of the study. The storyline helped the researcher in the development of a 
substantive theory that fully explains the factors that influence the bargaining power 
asymmetric contractual and non-contractual negotiations of the APs in the ROC and 
large European TOs.  
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CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter offers an overview of the study and discusses the conclusions 
and implications of the key findings. This is followed by a discussion on the study’s 
contribution to knowledge and implications for practice. Subsequently, 
recommendations for tourism and hospitality practice are provided, specifically for 
accommodation providers (APs), tour operators (TOs) and Government officials. 
Lastly, suggestions for future research are outlined, final remarks are made and  the 
researcher’s reflections on the research experience are presented.  
7.2. OVERVIEW AND MAIN FINDINGS  
7.2.1. Introduction 
The aim of this study was to provide an understanding of the influences on, 
and the implications of, the bargaining power of the Republic Of Cyprus (ROC) 
accommodation providers (APs) when undertaking contractual and non-contractual 
negotiations with large European tour operators (TOs). This was done in order to fill 
gaps in knowledge regarding bargaining power relations and interactions that arise, 
and influence, negotiations between B2B tourism buyers and suppliers, whether 
contractual or not (Chapter 1, section 1.2 and Chapter 5, section 5.2).  The study 
provides insights and developed a substantive theory to fully understand and explain 
the buyer-supplier contractual and non-contractual bargaining power relationship in 
negotiations within a service context, namely tourism and hospitality industry.  
Accordingly, to tackle the aim, three objectives were addressed: Objective 1 
was: to discover the sources of power of both the APs and the TOs in order to 
determine their bargaining power in contractual and non-contractual negotiations. 
Objective 2 was: to investigate the way bargaining power is employed within the 
relationship, from the APs perspective, in order to establish the influence strategies 
adopted by both parties during their contractual and non-contractual negotiations. 
Objective 3 was: to examine, the way that bargaining power is exercised within the 
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relationship, from the APs perspective, in order to ascertain the consequences on the 
contractual and non-contractual negotiation outcomes.  
A qualitative exploratory study was adopted utilising a Grounded Theory 
methodology and design, combining elements from two versions of Grounded 
Theory: classic and evolved. Specifically, the epistemological interpretivist 
perspective of evolved Grounded Theory that the study adopted permitted the 
researcher to use a level of interpretation, based on her own understandings, to make 
the text meaningful, while also recognising the influence of the researcher on the 
process and seeking to uncover the participant’s concerns. Further, evolved 
Grounded Theory provided useful guidelines and clarifications regarding the 
research process, during data collection and analysis. On the other hand, classic 
Grounded Theory highlighted the significance of allowing the data to tell their own 
story. Thus it provided the researcher insights in understanding the need to be 
flexible and open throughout the research. This was particularly pertinent in the data 
analysis during the coding process where the researcher adopted a more flexible and 
spontaneous approach to uncover the participant’s concerns. The analytical 
procedures of evolved and classic Grounded theory, coding strategies (open, axial 
and selective), constant comparative method and memos were utilised in order to 
analyse the data (Chapter 5, section 5.8). This process assisted the researcher to 
develop a substantive theory to understand and explain the bargaining power in 
negotiations of the APs with the TOs.  
Additionally, the exploratory and inductive nature of Grounded Theory led 
the researcher to identify themes and issues that were not considered prior to the 
data collection, prompting the researcher to utilise additional literature to support the 
findings of the study (Chapter 6). This further enhanced the understanding of the 
situation offering a richer explanation of the contractual and non-contractual 
bargaining power relationship in negotiations between APs and TOs. The main 
findings of the study have fully addressed the aim and objectives of the study. The 
main findings are presented below.  
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7.2.2. Main findings  
This section revisits the three objectives of the study and discusses the 
propositions developed for each highlighting the key findings. These propositions 
indicate the interrelationships between each category and its sub-categories induced 
from the data during the analysis process (Chapter 5, section 5.8.5). These 
propositions assisted in the development of a theoretical explanation (substantive 
theory) of the bargaining power in negotiations of APs with the TOs  
In response to Objective 1, two propositions were developed: (a) firm-
specific tangible and intangible resources determine the type of contract during 
contractual negotiations; and (b) government policies/regulations, culture and 
industry characteristics influence contractual and non-contractual negotiations 
through their impact on destination-specific resources. This study’s findings 
indicated that the bargaining power of the APs is determined by firm-specific and 
destination-specific resources. This is because the tourism product is an 
amalgamation of activities, services, attractions and destination characteristics that 
shape the tourist’s travel experience. Hence, destination-specific resources, that is 
destination attractiveness and destination characteristics, are sources of power for 
the APs and contribute to their bargaining power in relation to the TOs.  
First, APs tangible and intangible firm-specific resources are considered 
sources of power and contribute to their bargaining power. For instance, the tangible 
resources identified were size-of-unit, product quality (facilities), infrastructure, 
location (geographical), while the intangible resources were repeat clientele, 
reputation, value for money, reliability, product quality (service) and differentiation. 
On the other hand, firm-specific resources for the TOs were the tangible resources, 
financial and flight capacity, and the intangible resources, promotional ability and 
information. Further, both the tangible and intangible resources that the parties 
command determine the type of contract negotiations. This is because parties are 
dependent on each other’s resources for survival and the resources that each party 
controls create specific patterns of dependence that determine the type contract 
agreed, namely exclusivity, commitment or allotment. The findings suggested that a 
commitment or exclusivity contract was often agreed when there was a higher level 
of dependence between the parties. An allotment contract was often agreed between 
  
342 
parties when there was a lower dependence on each other’s resources. An 
organisation commanding desirable, valuable and unique resources, as perceived by 
the other party, has greater bargaining power during contractual and non-contractual 
negotiations. 
Second, the study also found that the destination-specific resources of the 
APs, which contributed to their bargaining power in relation to the TOs, were 
influenced by the external structure, that is government policies/regulations, culture 
and industry characteristics. This was because these structural factors created and 
often intensified the dependence of the APs on the TOs resources, thus influencing 
the APs’ bargaining power during negotiations. For instance, the ROC is a 
destination that is over-reliant on the packaged sun-and-sea market, a market where 
the TOs control a large share. Diversification of the tourism product could reduce 
the dependence of the destination, and the APs, on the TOs. However, the highly 
rigid centralised Government system in the ROC hindered diversification of the 
current sun-and-sea product that would reduce the destination’s dependence on the 
packages offered by the large TOs. Thus, due to the increased dependence of the 
destination and APs on the TOs, the APs bargaining power in relation to the TOs is 
restricted.  
Further, the findings revealed that cultural factors, such as the individualistic 
mentality that is evident in the ROC delayed actions that may have resulted in the 
successful planning and implementation of tourism policies and strategies that will 
improve destination attractiveness. For instance, accessibility to the destination has 
been restricted by the clash of individual interests between the Government and 
Hermes Airports (a private company operating both airports in the ROC). Reduced 
accessibility has further increased the destination’s, and the APs’, dependence on the 
small number of already established large TOs. These structural factors often hinder 
tourism policy-making and implementation that could improve tourism development 
on the ROC and in turn the attractiveness of the destination to the TOs. If the 
attractiveness of the resources of the ROC to the TOs is reduced that makes the 
bargaining power of the TOs stronger and if the attractiveness of the resources is 
increased that makes the bargaining power of the TOs weaker. 
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Moreover, the study found that the type of contract, commitment, exclusivity 
and allotment, agreed between the APs and TOs, influenced the relational factors, 
namely negotiation characteristics, relational constructs and emotions, in the 
contractual and non-contractual negotiations. Specifically, in response to Objective 
2 two propositions were developed: (a) contractual and non-contractual negotiations 
are influenced by negotiation characteristics and relationship constructs; (b) 
emotional factors influence the contractual and non-contractual negotiations. This 
study’s findings indicated that APs and TOs exercised their bargaining power by 
adopting diverse influence strategies in their contractual and non-contractual 
negotiations. Due to their high dependence on the TOs the APs were more flexible 
and frequently use non-coercive influencing strategies in their negotiations with the 
TOs and emphasise a win-win situation. In contrast, the analysis indicated that large 
TOs were often inflexible and utilised their bargaining power through adopting more 
coercive strategies to achieve their objectives. Such coercive strategies resulted in 
competitive interactions focusing on the profit-maximisation of the TO rather than a 
win-win situation. However, the high dependence of the APs interviewed on the 
TOs detered the APs from reacting or reciprocating with coercive strategies because 
they did not wish to damage the relationship as that could lead to its discontinuation. 
Although common patterns of behaviour regarding the influence strategies used by 
parties were identified, it is evident that the interactions between the APs and TOs 
were influenced by negotiation characteristics and relationship constructs (such as 
trust, reciprocity and personal relations). For instance, due to their higher 
dependence the APs interviewed who were operating with a commitment or 
exclusivity contract were more flexible and cooperative in their negotiations with the 
TOs, in comparison to APs with an allotment contract. 
 Furthermore, APs emotions, (fear, pressure and bitterness) have had an 
impact on their interactions with the TOs. For example, the high dependence of the 
majority of the APs interviewed on the TOs, as a result of the limited alternatives for 
the APs, has resulted in a fear of losing the TO and has put pressure on the APs to 
protect their relationship with the TOs. For instance, fear of loss of contract 
stimulated the AP participants to regulate their opportunistic behaviour in order to 
avoid any negative consequences for the relationship as well as creating a positive 
emotional atmosphere promoting trust with the TOs. At the same time this fear has 
  
344 
created a sense of powerlessness given that APs interviewed felt that they have 
limited control over their decisions. Such fear can stimulate feelings of separation 
creating dissatisfaction and reducing the loyalty and commitment of APs to their 
relationship with the TOs which threatens the long-term survival of the relationship. 
Further, perceptions of unfairness were observed that led to the negative feeling of 
bitterness for some APs interviewed and that could harm the relationship in the 
future since it can increase opportunistic behaviour. Further, due to the high 
bargaining power of the TOs, the majority of AP participants perceived the TOs as 
an authority in the industry and in their relationship. As a result this meant that the 
TO had more scope in decision-making and in stimulating compliance and 
acceptance by the APs during negotiations. However, despite these negative 
emotions the analysis indicated that APs were satisfied with their relationship 
describing the TOs as friends and partners and commenting that positive 
interpersonal emotions arose in the relationship, such as happiness, and confidence 
in the TOs and those emotions led to successful long-term relationships.  
In relation to Objective 3, two propositions were developed: (a) culture and 
industry characteristics are influential factors in pricing and volume of sales during 
contractual and non-contractual negotiations; (b) negotiation characteristics, 
relationship constructs and emotions during contractual and non-contractual 
negotiations determine market characteristics in terms of pricing and volume of 
sales. The findings demonstrated that all the above issues influence the bargaining 
power of the parties and the negotiation outcomes in terms of pricing and volume of 
sales. Specifically, structural factors, culture and industry characteristics, have been 
influential factors on pricing and volume of sales during contractual and non-
contractual negotiations. For instance, one structural constraint was the fact that the 
ROC is considered to be an expensive destination due to the high cost structure that 
stems from high airport taxes, taxation at the destination, the cost of fuel and high 
salaries of tourism employees. This has made it difficult for the ROC, and its 
tourism suppliers (APs), to compete with similar destinations offering the same 
product, but having a lower cost structure, such as Turkey. Therefore, the APs 
interviewed have experienced fierce competition on price from destinations that 
were able to deliver a more attractive value for money offer to the price sensitive 
package tourist that the TOs dominate. Hence, this situation has increased the 
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dependence of the APs on the TOs because the TOs are price sensitive and have low 
loyalty, to both destinations and APs, if they cannot generate their expected profit. 
This in turn has led the majority of AP participants to focus on generating a high 
volume of sales in order to have an adequate occupancy rate. This was frequently 
achieved by the APs interviewed accepting a lower price per room and offering 
discounts when demand is low in order to have high occupancy and generate some 
profit. Consequently, as the APs were highly dependent on the TOs capacity to 
guarantee a consistent tourism flow, through their ability to offer a cost-effective 
way for the tourists to travel to the ROC, their bargaining power in negotiations has 
been restricted.  
Moreover, the study found that the majority of APs interviewed were 
financially insecure, which stemmed from the difficulty of earning an adequate 
profit due to high operational costs, large bank loans, low prices earned and 
seasonality. This increased their dependence on the TOs and restricted their 
bargaining power in negotiations. This was because although TOs demanded low 
contractual prices they also offered financial security, particularly through their large 
commitment and exclusivity contracts that entail advance payments for future 
bookings.  
Further, other industry-specific factors were the oversupply of 
accommodation units and the self-interest, short-term, mentality observed in the 
ROC which resulted in strong competition between the APs. At the same time, the 
position of the TOs in terms of knowledge of prices for each unit enabled the TOs to 
play the APs against each other in order to achieve a lower price. This often resulted 
in the APs interviewed offering a discount on their price to gain the contract with the 
TO regardless of the impact on their profitability.  
Additionally, relational factors (negotiation characteristics, relationship 
constructs and emotions) influenced negotiation outcomes, in terms of pricing and 
volume of sales. For instance, notwithstanding the challenges that the APs 
interviewed faced with the TOs, the fear that the APs have regarding losing a large 
TO has acted as key constraint on their bargaining power. The TOs offered financial 
security and a consistent tourism flow which were two key resources for the APs. 
Consequently, the pricing policies of the APs interviewed were often determined by 
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the pricing policies and strategic aims of their partnering TO, which concentrated on 
maximising volume of sales and profit. This was specifically important for AP 
participants in large commitment and exclusivity contracts because the dependence 
of the APs on the volume of sales of the TOs was higher. These APs were more 
cooperative in offering discounts and focused on the saleability of their product to 
generate high volume of sales for TOs and for themselves. However, this higher 
dependence on the TOs may have restricted their ability to negotiate pricing and 
volume of sales due to their fear of losing the TO. 
In their relationship with the TOs most APs interviewed concentrated on 
offering cost-reductions and product quality (service and facilities) in order to offer 
value. For instance, the APs interviewed provided value by reducing the operational 
costs of the TOs. That is the APs accepted a lower price. Further, the majority of the 
AP participants preferred to accept the price demands of the TOs and have often 
modified their pricing policies to meet the TOs preferences. This was due to their 
dependence on a few TOs and their need to protect and maintain their profitable 
relationship. However, it has been observed that, owing to important firm-specific 
characteristics such as a diversified supply (operating with various TOs) and 
differentiation and repeat clientele, some APs had a higher bargaining power when 
negotiating price. This was due to their decreased dependence on one TO and the 
attractiveness of their resources. Nevertheless, for most APs the TOs dominated the 
negotiations, whether contractual or not. Despite this, the APs broadly felt satisfied 
with their relationship because they gained strong benefits within a positive 
emotional atmosphere resulting in profit and a win-win situation. 
Based on the above, and the related propositions for each objective, a 
substantive theory was developed that explains the contractual and non-contractual 
bargaining power relationship of the APs and TOs and its implications on the 
negotiation process and outcomes. This is presented in section 7.3.3 below.  
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7.3. CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY  
7.3.1. Contribution to knowledge and implications for practice 
This study has contributed to current knowledge of B2B buyer-supplier 
research within the tourism and hospitality field. Furthermore, the findings of the 
study also led to important implications for practice. In the subsections below first, 
the contribution to knowledge is explained, secondly the contribution to theory is 
considered, and thirdly, the contribution to, and implications for, practice are 
discussed.  
7.3.2. Contribution to knowledge in the B2B buyer-supplier 
relationship between TOs and APs 
This thesis has contributed to knowledge in four ways. 
First, this thesis has contributed to the understanding of emotions within a 
buyer-supplier context under asymmetric bargaining power. Current research on 
emotions in a B2B context, and particularly in B2B buyer-supplier relationships, is 
limited (Anderson and Kumar 2006; Donada and Nogatchewsky 2009; Tähtinen and 
Blois 2011). This is particularly true within the tourism and hospitality field where 
the role of emotions in a B2B context has been largely ignored (Papageorgiou 2008). 
This study has offered new insights on the role and implications of emotions on the 
negotiation process and the outcomes for B2B tourism buyers and suppliers. 
Empirical evidence was offered that business decisions, and negotiations in 
particular, did not rely only on cognition (reasoning) but were also influenced by 
emotional factors. This contribution is pertinent for the tourism field since due to the 
dynamic tourism and hospitality industry owner/managers are called on to deal with 
emotionally challenging situations during negotiations.  
Second, this thesis has also contributed to knowledge pertaining to the 
management of pricing between B2B buyers and suppliers within the tourism and 
hospitality field. Pricing research in the tourism and hospitality fields has mainly 
focused on the demand side (Hung et al. 2010; Wang 2012; Guo and He 2012; Guo 
et al. 2013). The majority of current B2B research on the supply side primarily 
follows an economic perspective examining optimal pricing between the parties 
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(Dong et al. 2014; Guo et al. 2013; Ling et al. 2014; Guo and He 2012; Song et al. 
2009). However, this study has advanced current knowledge in pricing management 
by indicating that pricing between buyers and suppliers (B2B) is not only 
determined by rational decision making and market characteristics, as is commonly 
assumed by economic models. This study has found that B2B pricing is also shaped 
by culture, relative bargaining power and relational factors such as emotions and 
relationship constructs (for example cooperation, reciprocity and personal 
relationships). This supports Papageorgiou’s (2008) contention that tourism and 
hospitality research must acknowledge the influence of the human aspect in a B2B 
context. As such the study contributes to pricing management knowledge in a B2B 
buyer-supplier tourism context.  
Third, this thesis has contributed to knowledge by extending the bargaining 
power concept and resource-dependence perspective within a service sector, that is 
the tourism and hospitality industry. Hence, it has advanced current understanding 
regarding the power relations of B2B tourism suppliers and buyers and the 
implications of asymmetric bargaining power in their contractual and non-
contractual negotiations. Furthermore, by adopting a resource-dependence 
perspective to investigate bargaining power this study has advanced knowledge on 
the B2B buyer-supplier relationship in the tourism and hospitality field. This is 
because the patterns of dependence between tourism suppliers and buyers, and 
particularly the APs and TOs, were identified. Understanding the degree of 
dependence that exists between suppliers and buyers is critical given that it 
influences the behaviour of the parties and the interactions that occur in numerous 
aspects of their relationships, including negotiations.  
Fourth, the extension of the bargaining power concept within a B2B buyer-
supplier relationship in the tourism and hospitality field, has also identified a link 
between the destination-specific resources, the external structural constraints 
(government policies/regulations, culture and industry characteristics) and the 
bargaining power of APs in relation to the TOs in negotiations. Specifically, this 
study has demonstrated that the bargaining power of B2B tourism suppliers and 
buyers goes beyond firm-specific resources and embraces the destination as whole. 
This is an issue that should be taken into account to better explain the negotiation 
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outcomes between the tourism buyers-suppliers and this advances current 
knowledge in B2B buyer-supplier bargaining power interactions and negotiations.  
7.3.3. Contribution to theory: the substantive theory  
The substantive theory developed was:  
“The APs’ and TOs’ control of resources (destination and firm-specific) governs 
contractual and non-contractual negotiations, as it determines each party’s 
bargaining power and the type of contract, which in turn, influences the relational 
factors, namely negotiation characteristics, relationship constructs and emotions. 
Consequently, the type of contract and the relational characteristics determine 
market characteristics in terms of pricing and volume of sales.” 
This substantive theory explains the contractual and non-contractual bargaining 
power relationship of tourism buyers and suppliers in their negotiations. This 
substantive theory reveals influencing factors and how they constrain or enable the 
bargaining power of APs and TOs and impact of these factors on contractual and 
non-contractual negotiation process and outcomes. As a result it advances current 
understandings of buyer-supplier contractual relationships, power relations and 
negotiations within the tourism and hospitality field. Although this substantive 
theory is developed within a tourism and hospitality industry in the ROC it could 
offer insights to other B2B buyers and suppliers dealing with power asymmetry.  
7.3.3.1.	 The	transferability	of	the	substantive	theory	
Bearing in mind the qualitative approach adopted the current study is 
contextually tied to the tourism and hospitality industry in the ROC. However, it can 
be argued that the substantive theory developed could be of relevance to B2B 
buyers-suppliers in other tourism destinations and economic activities that operate in 
similar bargaining power asymmetric relationships. That is to say, that although 
qualitative studies are contextually bound, they could also be an example of a wider 
group, thus the potential of transferability and the likelihood that coinciding and 
similar understandings embedded in similar experiences may exist must not be 
instantly precluded (Shenton 2004; Misco 2007). Furthermore, the Grounded Theory 
process adopted, that enabled the researcher to generate broad and abstract 
categories, and propositions that led to the substantive theory, further contributes to 
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the potential for transferability (Chapter 5, section 5.8). As Morse and Singleton 
(2001, p. 846) argued “[C]oncepts, by definition, are abstract and not context 
bound.” Hence, as noted in Chapter 5, section 5.9, if a problem is comparable and 
relevant in other settings then the theory developed should be meaningful and 
pertinent to those certain settings as well (Morse and Singleton 2001). Accordingly, 
in the subsections below the transferability of the findings and the substantive theory 
developed is discussed, first in relation to other tourism contexts and second to in 
relation to other economic activities.   
Transferability	to	other	tourism	contexts		
As stated in Chapter 5, section 5.9, the findings of the study may be pertinent 
in other similar destinations. That is, mature sun-and-sea destinations in the 
Mediterranean that are highly dependent on the large European TOs. However, the 
reader must also consider the similarities in context in deciding transferability. For 
instance, the fact that the ROC is an economically developed European destination, 
politically stable, and the tourism and hospitality industry are significant for its 
economy. Two sun-and sea Mediterranean destinations that are highly dependent on 
large European TOs, and experience similar challenges, are the Greek islands such 
as Crete or Malta (Chalkiti and Sigala 2010; Chapman and Speake 2011). Hence, the 
study’s findings and substantive theory could be applicable and relevant to those 
destinations as well. These findings and theory could assist in explaining bargaining 
power relations and contractual and non-contractual negotiations between perceived 
weaker suppliers (such as APs) and the large European TOs.  
Transferability	to	other	B2B	situations		
In addition, to the tourism and hospitality industry, another economic activity 
that is characterised by strong power asymmetries between B2B buyers and 
suppliers is the retail grocery industry. The retail grocery industry has high market 
concentration. The industry is dominated by a few large retail organisations and 
operates with high power asymmetric relationships between the supermarkets and 
their suppliers (Hingley 2005; Hingley et al. 2015; Sutton-Brady et al. 2015; Rindt 
and Mouzas 2015). This has been identified in countries such as the U.K., Finland, 
Australia and Germany (Hingley 2005; Sutton-Brady et al. 2015; Rindt and Mouzas 
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2015). Hence, suppliers, providing goods to grocery retailers, are highly dependent 
on their retailers (buyers) in order to reach the consumer market, resulting in 
retailers being seen as ‘gatekeepers’ (Sutton-Brady et al. 2015; Dobson and Inderst 
2008).  
The strong position of large supermarket chains has resulted in them having 
more power than their suppliers enabling these dominant parties to exercise their 
power to achieve their objectives (Sutton-Brady et al. 2015). This could be attributed 
to the fact that a large number of suppliers must negotiate with a small number of 
large powerful grocery retailers (Rindt and Mouzas 2015). This is similar to the 
tourism and hospitality industry where there are a large number of suppliers (APs) 
who are highly dependent on a small number of buyers (large TOs) to achieve their 
business objectives. Further, in this study of a tourism and hospitality context, large 
TOs have a large market share and control access to the tourists that the tourism and 
hospitality suppliers need (APs). This is similar to the control of large supermarkets 
have of the consumers which restricts the access of the suppliers to the market.  
Considering the above it can be argued that the substantive theory and 
findings of the study could potentially be pertinent to the grocery retail industry as 
suppliers within the grocery retail industry may face similar challenges to those in 
the tourism and hospitality industry. As such, some or all of this study’s findings 
could potentially assist in explaining the bargaining power relationship and 
negotiation process and outcomes of perceived weaker suppliers in their relationship 
with large grocery retail chains. However, the reader must decide on the potential of 
transferability based on the contextual similarities and sample of the study.  
7.3.4. Contribution and implications for practice  
7.3.4.1.	 Contribution	 and	 implications	 for	 APs,	 TOs,	 and	 Government	
officials		
This study’s findings and above contributions can be of value to tourism and 
hospitality practice both at the destination and firm level. This is because in order to 
fully explain the bargaining power relationship of APs in negotiations with the TOs, 
the study’s participants had various roles in the tourism and hospitality industry of 
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the ROC (Chapter 5, section 5.6.5). Hence, implications for APs, TOs and 
Government officials have arisen. It must be noted that although the study did not 
seek to directly explore the perceptions of the TOs, the study’s findings also have 
implications for the TOs regarding their relationship management approach with the 
APs. These implications were derived from the research’s participants and the 
analysis that followed. The key implications for AP, TOs, and Government officials 
are discussed below. 
7.3.4.2.	 Key	Implications	for	APs		
This study has provided an in-depth explanation of the bargaining power 
relationship between the APs and the TOs during their negotiations, from the APs 
perspective. The findings can help APs achieve a better understanding of the 
interactions that occur and the factors that influence their bargaining power and 
negotiations with the TOs. This will enable them to take more informed decisions 
during their contractual and non-contractual negotiations with the TOs, which could 
lead them to a better negotiation outcome.  
More specifically, the analysis revealed the sources of power (resources) of 
the APs and TOs and how they could constrain or enable bargaining power during 
negotiations. This is of great importance for the APs since the majority operate in a 
relationship characterised by power asymmetry. With this knowledge APs could 
determine the resources (such as value for money and product quality) they must 
focus on in order to improve the attractiveness of their offering to the TOs. This may 
then increase the TOs dependence on the AP, which could increase the APs 
bargaining power in relation to the TOs.  
In addition, it was identified that emotional factors play a role in influencing 
the bargaining power of the parties in negotiations process and outcome (in terms of 
pricing and volume of sales). For instance, fear of losing the TO has been recognised 
as an important emotional constraint on the APs bargaining power in negotiations, 
whether contractual or not. If managers acknowledged, and did not minimise, the 
influence of emotions and they could use this knowledge to make more informed 
decisions during their negotiations. The role of emotions should also be considered 
in relation to their partners, such as the TOs. It has been revealed that the APs, as the 
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perceived weaker party, are already adopting actions to stimulate positive emotions 
in their relationship with the TOs, through personalised service. Hence, the role of 
emotions should be acknowledged and understood by managers in order to take 
more informed decisions and better manage their power asymmetric relationships.  
Moreover, the study has provided insights on the implications and impact 
that revenue management practices have on the relationship of tourism buyers and 
suppliers. Although revenue management is a common occurrence in the tourism 
and hospitality industry the findings indicated that pricing practices influence both 
the profitability of the APs and TOs and relational factors (such as trust and 
opportunistic behaviour) between the parties. For example constant overbookings 
may reduce the perception of the APs reliability as an exchange partner, create 
mistrust and could lead to the discontinuation of the relationship resulting in the loss 
of future profits. This is particularly pertinent in relationships with bargaining power 
asymmetry given that perceived stronger parties, such as TOs, may simply find 
alternative suppliers.  
Furthermore, the findings indicated that the majority of the APs focus on 
offering a low price to the TO in order to maintain their relationship. During 
contractual negotiations APs often offer a tactical price that is lower than intended in 
order to win the contract. This could create a precedent of low prices for the TO and 
could result in difficulties for the APs regarding future price increases, since the TOs 
have a low reference price.  This could then restrict their bargaining power to 
increase future prices. This is an important implication for the APs that should be 
considered in future pricing decisions.   
Structural constraints, culture and industry characteristics, have also been 
identified as influencing the bargaining power of the tourism buyers (TOs) and 
suppliers (APs). More specifically, the highly competitive relationship that exists 
between the APs poses a constraint on their bargaining power and ability to 
negotiate contractual and non-contractual agreements with the TOs. This is because 
the competitive relationship enables the TOs to play APs against each other leading 
to APs aggressively competing on price to win the contract reducing their 
profitability. This competition is intensified by their self-interest and short-term 
mentality seeking to achieve a contract. Extreme competition may lead APs to waste 
  
354 
resources (such as time and money) to gain a contract from the other APs and ignore 
the benefits from a more cooperative relationship. Therefore, it is important for 
tourism buyers and suppliers to be aware of how the external structure can restrict 
their bargaining power in negotiations in order to make more informed decisions.  
7.3.4.3.	 Key	implications	for	TOs		
Although this study did not seek to explore the perspectives of the large TOs, 
the findings indicate implications for the TOs in terms of their relationship 
management practices in relation to the APs, specifically in negotiations. The often 
aggressive style and coercive influence strategies adopted by the TOs in their 
contractual and non-contractual negotiations has had negative impacts on their 
relationship with the APs. For instance, the coercive strategies of the TOs have 
created a sense of fear of negative sanctions in the APs. As a result frequent use of 
coercive strategies could have damaging effects on the relationship creating conflict, 
reducing coordination, decreasing loyalty and commitment. As a result it could lead 
to a decrease in satisfaction of the parties in the relationship and reduce their 
performance.  
Further, this study identified that the price-focused strategies of large TOs 
have had a negative impact on the economic viability of the destination and the APs. 
Specifically, the APs are struggling in terms of operating a financially viable unit. 
Large TOs should consider how their pricing strategies influence the destinations 
and their partners. 
7.3.4.4.	 Key	implications	for	Government	officials		
The findings also have implications for the Government of the ROC and 
Government officials. The findings revealed that the ROC as a destination faces 
various challenges that constrain the ability of the majority of its tourism and 
hospitality suppliers, such as APs, to successfully operate their businesses. Policy-
makers should be aware of the number of challenges that the tourism and hospitality 
businesses face as well as their role in hindering the competitiveness of the 
destination. This study uncovered various government related factors that negatively 
influence the ability of the destination to enhance its destination attractiveness and 
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thus competitiveness in the international tourism arena. This in turn restricts the 
bargaining power of the APs in relation to the TOs, since it reduces the 
attractiveness of the tourism product that the APs offer to the TOs and tourists alike. 
For instance, many of the participants in this study noted, the rigidity of the 
Government, and insufficient governmental devolution, has been a major restrictive 
factor that has impeded new product development leading to the overreliance of the 
destination on a highly substitutable sun-and-sea tourism product. Other factors, 
such as clientelistic relationships and clashing of personal interests, have been 
identified as restricting the successful policy-making and strategies that could aid to 
improve the destination’s attractiveness, and in turn the bargaining power of the APs 
in relation to the TOs. This is because policy-making and strategies have focused on 
satisfying personal interests rather than the interests of the destination as a whole.  
Insufficient accountability of Government employees has also been 
identified by the participants in the study as hindering actions that could be taken to 
enhance the competitiveness of the destination, since employees are not held 
accountable or responsible for unsuccessful planning and implementation of 
policies, strategies or projects that could enhance tourism development. In addition, 
the short-term mentality and passive approach of tourism leaders regarding tourism 
development has led to tourism development focusing on short-term actions to fulfil 
political goals rather than addressing long-term challenges of the destination such as 
overreliance on the sun-and-sea product and seasonality. The findings have 
demonstrated that the participants consider that there is insufficient cooperation 
between the Government and the tourism sector and that has constrained effective 
policy making and implementation in tourism development. Consideration of the 
above factors could be considered by policy-makers in the ROC when deciding on 
how to improve tourism development on the island. In section 7.4 this study also 
offered recommendations for the Government officials in order to aid in improving 
the destinations attractiveness, and in turn destination competitiveness. This would 
be likely to improve the bargaining power of the APs towards the TOs, as well as 
aid in creating a more successful tourism destination as a whole.  
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7.4. RECOMMENDATIONS  
7.4.1. Introduction  
The study provides several insights for tourism practice, both at the 
destination and firm level, since the bargaining power of the APs is influenced by 
both structural and firm-specific factors. Accordingly, recommendations are offered 
below on issues that need to be considered to improve the bargaining position of 
APs in relation to the TOs. In order to fully understand and explain the bargaining 
power interactions in negotiations, participants with various roles in the ROC 
tourism and hospitality industry were interviewed (Chapter 5, section 5.6.5). As a 
result the study’s findings offer insights not only for the relationship of APs and TOs 
but also for the Government officials in the ROC and the tourism industry as a 
whole. These recommendations stemmed from the participants of the study as well 
as the study’s subsequent analysis. Therefore first, recommendations for APs are 
offered, second recommendations for the TOs are made, and third recommendations 
for Government officials are set out.  
7.4.2. Recommendations for APs 
7.4.2.1.	 Industry-specific	 and	 relationship-specific	 recommendations	 for	
APs		
Recommendations for APs are twofold, in terms of the industry and their 
relationship with the TOs. Hence, first recommendations for the APs are offered in 
terms of industry-specific issues and second, recommendations for APs operating 
with commitment and exclusivity contracts are provided, followed by 
recommendations for APs operating with allotment contract. This is because each 
type of contract has different characteristics that can influence negotiations. 
7.4.2.2.	 Recommendations	of	APs	in	terms	of	industry-specific	issues	
APs seeking to improve their bargaining position in their negotiations with 
the TOs should not merely focus on relationship-specific issues but also consider the 
influence of industry characteristics. The analysis has revealed that APs have a 
highly competitive relationship between each other that enables the TOs to play 
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them against each other. It is only natural that competition is evident in the 
relationship of the APs, rather than cooperation, since APs operate in a dynamic 
competitive environment. However, by APs developing a more cooperative 
relationship between them it could aid in enhancing trust and curbing short-term 
opportunistic behaviour. This could also help them to receive benefits from 
collective bargaining such as resource exchange or resource sharing that could 
improve their performance and bargaining power in relation to the TOs by 
improving their product offering. A more cooperative relationship could not only 
help the APs to increase their bargaining power in relation to the TOs but also aid 
them when lobbying for collective interests to the Government. One action that 
could contribute to the reduction of the antagonistic behaviour could be increasing 
the number of sources of supply for the destination. For instance, introducing new 
source markets for the ROC, thus, increasing the number of alternatives for the APs 
to gain the necessary tourism flow increasing their bargaining power. 
Moreover, due to the oversupply of accommodation units, it is important that 
APs actively seek ways to improve and differentiate their product and service. This 
does not necessarily mean offering a unique product targeted at one market (for 
instance couples only luxury unit), but differentiating the unit competing on quality 
and service, which are aspects of a product valued by all consumers, which in turn 
will be of value to the TOs. As a result increasing their bargaining power in relation 
to the TOs in contractual and non-contractual negotiations. Such action does not 
require a considerable amount of financial resources to achieve, but could safeguard 
the unit from strong price competition (Becerra et al. 2013).  
7.4.2.3.	 APs	operating	with	commitment	and	exclusivity	contract	
APs could continuously endeavour to increase the value proposition that they 
offer to the TOs. For instance, improving the quality of the product (physical and 
service) while also investing in their relationship to better serve their key TOs. By 
providing access to more desirable resources the TOs dependence on the APs may 
increase, thus the APs bargaining power in relation to the TOs could also improve in 
their negotiations. Large TOs have low loyalty to the destinations, and high 
mobility, allowing them to change suppliers based on their profit-margin. Therefore, 
APs could invest in increasing the value of their offer and thereby the switching 
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costs for the TOs. However, increasing value should not be exclusively focused on 
offering cost-reductions but also on creating a more relational exchange improving 
the service for the TOs and their customers. This could be achieved, for instance 
through enhancing the communication and coordination between the parties, 
promoting openness in the relationship, enhancing reliability and creating close 
emotional bonds to increase trust. Such actions could help to reduce opportunistic 
behaviour not due to fear of losing the contract but because there is trust and a long-
term view of the partnership engendering satisfaction.  
By improving the value of their service to the TO APs could have a higher 
bargaining power than those APs that focus on providing the lowest price to offer 
value. A lower price can be easily substituted by another similar unit but a more 
personalised service with high emotional bonds between the parties can increase the 
TOs switching costs. Hence, the TOs dependence on a specific AP could increase 
and enable the AP to negotiate more favourable contractual and non-contractual 
outcomes in terms of price and volume of sales. 
Moreover, AP pricing strategies that focus on retaining the relationship with 
the TOs in the long-term could be considered as beneficial since they engender 
relationship continuity and TOs satisfaction. However, APs should be cautious 
regarding constant price decreases in order to win the contract or increase the 
volume of sales, because it is difficult to alter the TOs reference price for future 
exchanges. Hence, price reductions should be considered carefully as this could 
restrict their bargaining power in contractual and non-contractual negotiations. 
Further, APs could consider the negative impact that revenue management practices 
can have on the relationship. For instance, not overbooking the clients of their key 
TOs, or asking for stop-sales, that could harm the operations of the TOs. A more 
efficient and effective application of revenue management practices could promote 
trust and increase the reliability of the AP, contributing to the relationship continuity 
and increasing the APs bargaining power in negotiations.  
It could be argued that the above recommendations would increase the 
dependence of the APs on the TOs. However, they could also improve the value of 
the relationship promoting risk-sharing and cooperation between the parties 
preserving a profitable relationship. Accordingly, the APs increasing the value of the 
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relationship, as perceived by the TOs, could also increase the dependence of the TOs 
on the APs thus enhancing the bargaining power of APs in relation to the TOs. 
However, APs should also carefully consider and evaluate the profitability of each 
TO that they cooperate with, and the pricing strategies they use with their key TO, to 
gain the highest economic value from their relationships. At the same time APs 
could actively seek ways to increase their sources of supply and not solely depend 
on one TO through very large agreements. This could create a level of flexibility in 
their operations, reducing their strong dependence on the TOs while offering a good 
service and value to the TO.  
7.4.2.4.	 APs	operating	with	allotment	contract	
Similar to APs operating with commitment and exclusivity contracts with the 
TOs APs with an allotment contract should continually focus their efforts on 
improving their product and service in order to offer a competitive product in the 
market. The lower dependence that APs with allotment contract have on the TOs 
allows them to have a better bargaining position and more control over their product 
and decisions such as price. The findings have indicated that this lower dependence 
often creates a more competitive relationship with the TOs, emphasising the short-
term nature of the transaction. However, this competitive and discreet exchange 
might lead to the APs losing out on benefits from a more cooperative relationship, 
which could be profitable for both parties. For instance, higher prices might decrease 
the ability of the unit to generate a higher occupancy rate, leading APs to offer lower 
prices to generate demand at the last minute hence restricting their expected 
profitability. Therefore, APs could consider adopting a more cooperative approach 
in their relationship and negotiations to avoid losing out on future benefits. A more 
cooperative relationship could create a more relational exchange engendering 
reciprocity, trust and personal relationships that could improve their bargaining 
power to negotiate contractual and non-contractual issues.  
APs could also consider the impact that their revenue management practices 
such as overbookings have on their relationship with the TOs, since mismanagement 
of such practices can have a negative effect (mistrust and reduced reliability as 
partners). Hence, APs should carefully consider the impact of opportunistic 
behaviour in the relationship and take actions to improve information transparency 
  
360 
with the TOs to achieve the highest benefits in the relationship. Finally, APs with 
allotment contract should also continuously endeavour to expand their sources of 
supply for tourism flow. This could be achieved through, for example, finding new 
niche TOs to promote their product, or operating with online intermediaries. This 
could further reduce their dependence on the large TOs for tourism flow and hence 
further increase their bargaining power in relation to the TOs. However, the APs 
should identify the right distribution channel for their targeted market while also 
assessing the profitability of each intermediary to achieve the highest benefits from 
the relationship.  
7.4.3. Recommendations for TOs 
Despite the fact the study did not directly aim to explore the perceptions of 
TOs and offer recommendations, the findings offer insights to the TOs in terms of 
better managing their relationship with the APs, particularly in contractual and non-
contractual negotiations. As a result it could contribute to the success of the 
relationship. The findings indicated that the TOs often adopt more aggressive styles 
and coercive influences in negotiations that create negative emotions (fear) for the 
APs, and could create conflict and decrease coordination. The TOs could consider 
adopting more non-coercive strategies to avoid negative impacts on the relationship. 
It must also be noted that due to the TOs higher bargaining power in relation to the 
APs, the majority of the APs interviewed focus on satisfying their demands 
irrespective of the use of coercive influence strategies. Consequently, non-coercive 
influence strategies could be even more effective, while avoiding the negative 
impacts deriving from coercion.  
Further, TOs could address the APs feelings of unfairness because such 
feelings could be harmful for the future of the relationship, since such perceptions 
could increase conflict, opportunistic behaviour and mistrust inhibiting relationship 
success. Accordingly, TOs could take actions to reduce information asymmetry 
regarding demand levels and expected bookings, which are factors the findings 
indicated to create mistrust and could lead to feelings of unfairness. A more efficient 
and effective communication structure with the APs, specifically in large contracts, 
could help to reduce mistrust and build a stronger cooperative relationship between 
the parties hampering opportunistic behaviour. This could also reduce the feeling of 
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bitterness that the APs feel promoting a positive emotional atmosphere and 
engendering its continuity.   
Finally, TOs could consider the impact that their price-focused strategies 
have on the destination and their partners, since the analysis suggested that it 
reduces the financial viability of the APs. Due to their strong power and large 
resources the TOs have the ability to take a more sustainable approach and help their 
suppliers in improving their market offering and become more competitive. In turn, 
they could aid the APs to improve their competitiveness not through price 
competition but through product differentiation.  
7.4.4. Recommendations for Government officials 
The recommendations for the Government officials discussed below 
stemmed from the fact that the Government and its tourism related activities can 
influence the APs and TOs business activities. These recommendations have arisen 
from both the study’s participants and from the analysis. Changes need to occur to 
the tourism governance model of the ROC in order to improve the attractiveness of 
the ROC as a whole, and as a result its competitiveness and the bargaining power of 
the APs in relation to the TOs.  
The centralised Government structure characterised by bureaucracy and 
rigidity is a key constraint for the destination’s competitiveness, and thus on the 
APs’ bargaining power. A more decentralised tourism model could facilitate tourism 
actors to be more responsive to tourism challenges as well as accelerate processes 
for tourism development. Further, the CTO, the Government body solely responsible 
for tourism, does not have the necessary authority and decision-making power to 
assist in tourism development. Hence, it could be beneficial for the Government to 
either appoint a new body or give the necessary authority and resource capacity to 
the CTO in order to enable the CTO take a more prominent role in the development 
and coordination of tourism in the ROC.  
The Government could consider implementing a more effective Government 
control system to improve the behaviour of Government officials in terms of their 
responsibilities as well as facilitate the process of tourism development. For 
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instance, such action could facilitate the process for new product development and 
the improvement of the current products. This could aid the destination to reduce the 
existing overreliance on the mass sun-and-sea model and tackle seasonality thus 
increasing the destination’s attractiveness. Indeed, for the APs interviewed, 
seasonality restricts their ability to be profitable during the winter (low) season, 
often leading them to accept a lower price in agreements with the TOs to recover 
financial loss from the winter season. Therefore, the Government could improve its 
governance model to facilitate actions to reduce the seasonality of the destination 
consequently also contributing to the financial viability of the APs. This could also 
improve the APs ability to enhance their product offering to the TOs, for example 
through renovations to improve their infrastructure. This in turn could increase their 
bargaining power in relation to the TOs in negotiations.  
A more effective and efficient governance model could also prompt a more 
successful allocation of funds that can enable the destination to achieve its 
objectives. Accordingly, this action could also respond to the calls of APs for 
government intervention in the form of financial aid to improve their infrastructure. 
This could improve first, the attractiveness of the APs product for the TOs thus 
increasing their bargaining power. Second, this could contribute to the ROC 
competitiveness in the international market. This is because, successful and 
competitive businesses create a successful and competitive destination and vice 
versa. However, Government officials could take a more long-term approach to 
tourism planning and policymaking, moving away from focusing on the short-term 
policies and strategies determined by political agendas. Actions could be taken to 
address long-standing issues of the tourism industry such as seasonality and 
overreliance on four key markets. 
It is critical to address the abuse of power, perceived by the participants, in 
the Government and clientelism that promotes goals that serve individual interests 
rather than the destination as a whole. This could increase the trust that the industry 
sector has in the Government. In turn, it could also encourage the engagement of 
industry actors in all tiers and not only economic elites thus improving the 
cooperation between the Government and the industry sector.  
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Moreover, Government officials could take strong steps to facilitate the 
process of diversifying the current source markets, moving away from being over 
dependent on a small number of TOs that control those markets. For years, the ROC 
has been reliant on the UK market, with Scandinavian countries, Germany and 
Russia to fill the gaps in tourist arrivals. Increasing the source markets could enable 
the destination, and in turn the APs, to diversify their sources for tourism flow since 
new TOs could enter the market. This can be done through enhancing flight 
connectivity to new markets and promoting visitation by independent travellers to 
move away from the overreliance on the packaged price sensitive tourist.  
Improving the tourism governance model could increase the competitiveness 
of the destination, by offering a more desirable product both for the tourists and the 
TOs. Increasing the attractiveness of the destination could also contribute in 
improving the value for money proposition that the ROC, and subsequently the APs, 
offer to the TOs, hence increasing the bargaining power of the APs.  
7.5. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Power is a relational concept, meaning that power is founded on the 
perception of one group (or actor) of the power of the other. Hence, future studies 
could also explore the TOs’ perception regarding the APs power sources. This 
exploration could not only focus on identifying the sources of bargaining power the 
TOs perceive important but also their views on the contractual and non-contractual 
negotiations with the APs. Accordingly, this would provide much needed insights in 
two ways. First, it would offer more information on the resources the APs need to 
focus on to increase their bargaining power from the TOs perspective. Second, it 
would provide insights on the large TOs negotiation and relationship management 
practices. Relationship management practices of buyers towards their suppliers 
within a B2B context is still an area that needs further investigation.  
Further, the role of emotions in B2B buyer-supplier relationships is still an 
area that needs further research. Anecdotal evidence obtained during the data 
collection suggests that emotions may be a stronger influencing factor on the 
behaviour of owner-managers during negotiations than is the case for managers 
employed to manage the unit. This is beyond the exploratory scope of this thesis and 
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the study did not account for this difference, therefore future research could 
investigate this issue further.  
Additionally, a substantive theory to explain and better understand the 
bargaining power relationship in negotiations of the APs and TOs in the ROC was 
developed. Future research could explore bargaining power and negotiations 
between the APs and TOs in other similar destinations to examine whether the 
findings are applicable and support the transferability of the findings to other 
tourism destinations (section 7.3.3.1).  
Lastly, the study’s findings are context-specific, tied to the tourism and 
hospitality industry. However, future research could explore whether similar 
findings can be found in other industries when exploring contractual and non-
contractual negotiations between B2B buyers-suppliers under asymmetric 
bargaining power. For example, as mentioned in section 7.3.3.1 the food grocery 
industry in the UK is dominated by a few large retail firms and operates in a highly 
power asymmetric relationship with their suppliers.  
7.6. FINAL REMARKS  
This study’s qualitative approach to research has uncovered contextual 
insights, in terms of the influence of the social setting and the human factor, that 
contribute to the explanation of the bargaining power relationship in negotiations 
between B2B buyers and suppliers in tourism and hospitality that are characterised 
by asymmetry. Specifically, the study developed a substantive theory that explains 
the implications of the bargaining power relationship of tourism buyers (large TOs) 
and suppliers (APs) within negotiations, taking into account both external structural 
influences, relational factors and firm-specific issues that influence these 
phenomena, within a service sector and particularly within a tourism and hospitality 
context. Furthermore, the consideration of both the contractual and non-contractual 
bargaining power interactions in negotiations, in this study, contributed to the 
understanding of how contracts are manifested and enforced between the buyers and 
suppliers within a tourism and hospitality context. This is particularly relevant 
within a dynamic tourism and hospitality industry, where environmental changes 
frequently occur and renegotiations between the parties are ever present.  
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7.7. PERSONAL REFLECTIONS ON THE RESEARCH 
EXPERIENCE 
My PhD journey has been an adventure which has taught me not only about 
‘doing research’ but also about my self as an individual. Similar to the ever-
changing business environment that the study’s participants deal with, my PhD 
experience has been an ever-changing process. It has been filled with highs and 
lows, moments of enthusiasm when inspiration struck and moments of 
contemplation and anxiety when difficulties were presented.  
Each step of this journey has been an amazing learning opportunity. My PhD 
journey gave me the opportunity to explore interesting philosophical and 
sociological writings on power relations that I found fascinating and intriguing. In 
addition, the research gave me the opportunity to examine literature on B2B 
relationships within the marketing, management, strategic management, psychology, 
tourism and hospitality field. Reading through the theoretical and applied literature 
was thought-provoking and led me to be a deeper thinker by broadening my 
understanding of how society and social relationships work at large. It also led me to 
question my assumptions about people and my interactions with them in everyday 
life. This is knowledge that I will value for life. 
I found the data collection and analysis stages fascinating but also the most 
challenging stages of the research process. The data collection stage gave me the 
opportunity to meet numerous individuals from the tourism and hospitality industry. 
I thoroughly enjoyed exploring each participant’s reality, through the interviews, 
hearing about their experiences and opinions. Furthermore, through my contact with 
the participants I felt the ‘buzz’ of the industry sector and that reminded me of why I 
find the tourism and hospitality industries fascinating and why I would like to 
continue to research to better understand these industries. However, as I adopted an 
interpretive epistemological Grounded Theory methodology I had, as a researcher, 
to be open to the data while also utilising my understanding of the phenomena 
(bargaining power in negotiations and tourism and hospitality industries) to make 
sense of the participant’s meanings and thereby bring out their voices. I found the 
task of understanding where the participant’s point of view was ending and where 
my own thoughts were beginning, very challenging. This task was aided by various 
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strategies to enhance the study’s credibility, for instance constant debriefing sessions 
with my supervisors, that allowed me to check my thoughts regarding the data, and 
helped me to bring out the voices of the participants. Further, I was constantly being 
reflective in the writing of memos regarding my thoughts and ideas concerning the 
data. Although challenging, the data collection and analysis stages were stimulating 
and eye-opening experiences that have helped me to improve my research skills. The 
data collection and analysis stages taught me to question my assumptions, to be 
more perceptive of people and to be a better listener by taking a step back and 
allowing individuals to express themselves and take time to reflect on new 
information. These are lessons that I will apply in my life. 
The data analysis process was difficult but it was also an intriguing process. 
Specifically, while it allowed me to explore new ideas, it also reminded me that in 
order to make sense of the data it was important to take time to contemplate and be 
patient. Patience, contemplation and various discussions with my supervisors about 
the data enabled me to generate the substantive theory which made me feel 
exhilarated when I achieved it.  Patience was a skill I had to develop and I am still 
developing in my personal and professional life.  
Another key challenge for me was achieving a balance between my work and 
my life. Achieving a work-life balance has been a catchphrase for many years, but I 
was only able to truly understand its meaning through the PhD journey. The PhD 
was a demanding process both in terms of time and mental effort that led me to 
forget the notion of work-life balance. However, the PhD journey has taught me the 
importance of accomplishing this in my life. I previously believed that working 
long-hours on a daily basis would be the most effective and efficient approach to 
academic success (PhD completion) and also success in life. However, I have 
realised that, while hard-work is important, giving myself time to rest, recharge and 
relax with family and friends increases my motivation, creativity and focus, helping 
me to perform better in my professional and personal life.  
As a last remark I can only note that this research process has been both 
about the destination and the journey. Specifically, knowing the destination, 
achieving my PhD, helped to keep me motivated and determined to reach it. 
However, I view my PhD research process as being a journey filled with highs and 
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lows that made me a stronger person, as well as teaching me that I have to appreciate 
the little things in life such as spending time with family and friends, while pursuing 
my goals. My PhD journey can be embodied by P.C. Cavafy’s poem, ‘Ithaca’ (1905-
1915), as translated by Sachperoglou (2007, p.35), of which an extract is presented 
below: 
 “[…] Always keep Ithaca in your mind. 
To arrive there is your final destination. 
But do not rush the voyage in the least. 
Better it last for many years; 
and once you're old, cast anchor on the isle, 
rich with all you've gained along the way, 
expecting not that Ithaca will give you wealth. 
 
Ithaca gave you the wondrous voyage: 
without her you'd never have set out. 
But she has nothing to give you any more. 
 
If then you find her poor, Ithaca has not deceived you. 
As wise as you've become, with such experience, by now 
you will have come to know what Ithacas really mean.” 
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APPENDICES  
APPENDIX 1: EXAMPLES OF MEMOS 
1. Memo during data collection 
Date: 10/07/2013 Number of Interviews 
Completed: 11 
Participant Code: HA:2 
Title:  Role of Personal relationships Stage: Data collection 
In the interview today the sales manager received  a call during the interview 
process. 
At the beginning the conversation focused on conversational formalities such as 
asking how he/she was and how is work going.   
The sales manager seemed very relaxed and talking to the TO on the line in a very 
informal manner. He was smiling, joking and laughing in a sort of flirty way… 
He finished the conversation and hung up the phone and turned to me saying “[T]his 
is how you need to do it otherwise you will never get anything done. I had to give 
her the free room in a sort of a favour but If I need something I can also ask her for 
it.” 
The interview then continued with the sales manager pointing out how important it 
is to have a good personal relationships with your partners. 
Therefore, the demeanour and attitude as well as personal relationship seems to be 
important in getting things done. Need to think about the role of personal 
relationships! 
 
2. Memo during the analysis stage  
Date: 14/11/2013 Number of Interviews 
Completed: 2 
Interview Code: AP:1 
Title: Coercion and Exploitation 
(concepts) 
Stage of Coding: Open coding  
After coding 2 interviews from hotel chains I am now coding an interview by a 
manager running an individual unit. When asked about his opinion of TOs he said 
straight away that they ‘take advantage’ “TOs take advantage of the situation and 
they push prices down.”  
 
This is interesting as it seems that individual hotels that work under different 
conditions seem to have a completely different feeling from people in Hotel chains. 
Exploitation was a concept that I felt was evident during the data collection but was 
not as obvious in the hotel chain interviews, although some reference was there.  
  
416 
For example, IG:1 said “[TOs] are now more demanding, more sensitive on price. If 
it were possible you have to go down in price as much as possible.” I added this as 
an attitude that they have when negotiating but maybe I need to rethink the phrase 
“have to” this is a strong word. And why do they HAVE TO? What will happen if 
they don’t? Is it coercion? Is coercion higher in individually owned hotels? 
One participant said “TOs ask for reductions in price because for them it’s if you are 
not in my best interest I will take you out [from the programme]”(IG:1)  
 
Maybe more coercion than exploitation... or does coercion lead to exploitation? 
What is the relationship between them and how it affects the relationship between 
TOs and AP? What level of coercion or exploitation do these participants feel as 
they work under different conditions? Have to rethink these two concepts?? 
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APPENDIX 2: CYPRIOT ACCOMMODATION INDUSTRY 
CAPACITY  
 
Source: CTO 2014a 
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APPENDIX 3: EXAMPLE OF CODES AND CONCEPTS 
INDUCED FROM DATA 
Selected codes are highlighted in italics. 
Concepts 
 
Examples of code 
 
Monopoly/Oligopoly 
“[…] it is a monopoly so you can understand that when someone 
has the monopoly of something he/she has the upper hand so the 
tour operators in Cyprus have the upper hand.” 
 
Dependency 
“[…] imagine if the tour operators do not succeed [surprised] 
and they leave Cyprus?! They are not the only ones losing out, 
we are losing as well, so for us it is very clear we do need the 
tour operators and without them we cannot do much.” 
Interdependency “[P]ersonally I think my company and the tour operators are 
interdepended […].” 
State of affairs “[…] the status quo and rules were set at the beginning [of 
tourism industry in Cyprus] and the hotel managers know them 
and play the game.” 
Win-win situation “[Y]ou always have to have a win-win policy, it suits me and it 
suits you, you have to find the balance, that equilibrium to 
create the sense that it is a win-win situation.” 
Stagnation “[I] believe that Cypriot tourism has reached its limits. If we 
don’t change something I think we are done for it.” 
Pressure “[D]on’t, don’t, don’t…down,down,down…decrease,decrease 
[the price] this will end up reducing the quality of the product, 
because we are also a business we also want to make a profit.” 
Cypriot mentality “[…] I don’t know where the problem lies exactly, we have the 
wrong mentality, or is it due to the lack of strategy, or maybe we 
just find it convenient.” 
Control “[S]o by controlling accommodation units it means they can 
dominate markets this way they assure their future basis.” 
Uncertainty “[…] uncertainty is always apparent in the tourism industry 
because it is a fragile industry.” 
Financial insecurity “[…] with the current prices it is extremely difficult to balance 
everything. […] to keep your costs low and to give a low price, 
it is extremely difficult to keep your head above the water.” 
Inflexibility […] there is control from the head office and inflexibility in 
negotiations […].” 
Flexibility “[…] sometimes the TO might be flexible sometimes they might 
say no way I do not accept it, if you do this I will not pay you.” 
Expensiveness “[…] the flights and the airports are expensive, everything is 
expensive.” 
Price sensitivity “[…] the tour operators are extremely price sensitive […].” 
Discounts “[…] if the tour operators are losing money they will come to 
you and tell you ‘I’m losing 25 Euro per package, since I am 
sending you bookings you have to help me reduce this loss’.” 
Soft Concessions “[…] instead of giving the tour operators an inland room I offer 
to give him sea view which is considered soft dollar concession 
because I keep the price I wanted and I give to the customer 
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something that he perceives to have monetary value but it does 
not cost me anything.” 
Threats “[S]ometimes the tour operators will have their arguments [in 
negotiations], sometimes they threaten you that they will stop 
the cooperation." 
Rationality “[I] believe that by having the right arguments you leave no 
choice to the other party to tell you anything different.” 
Profit “[E]verybody is working for profit, […] at the end of the day 
you are looking at numbers.” 
Deviance “[…] for example the tour operators might tell you that your unit 
is not selling in England but in fact the TO might not actually 
promote it because he might not have the desired profit from the 
agreement.” 
Oversupply “[I]n Cyprus supply is higher than demand, all the units […] 
have availability.” 
Size of unit “[S]mall units do not really have a say in anything, a large unit 
or a chain of hotels that has a lot of rooms to offer has a stronger 
position.” 
Flight connectivity “[…] we always have a problem with the flights and flights play 
an important role because we are an island and people need a 
plane to come to this island.” 
Fear “[…] the owners are weaker and they are afraid of losing out on 
the future business with the tour operator.” 
Incentives “[…] as a accommodation provider you offer incentives, you tell 
the travel agent that with 7 bookings through [a specific tour 
operator] you have a week free.”  
Differentiation “[W]e want to differentiate ourselves from the other products in 
the Cypriot market.” 
Direct sales “[I]n order to be independent from the tour operators the tourists 
must come directly to you.” 
Trust “[…] if [the tour operators] trust you they will usually respond 
to your requests.” 
Reciprocity “[T]his is because the tour operator wants you to feel that you 
owe him one, thus when he asks for something you remembered 
that he helped you so you owe him a favour.” 
Personal relations “[…] our relationship [with the tour operators] is exceptional 
both on a business level and a personal level, in this day and age 
it’s not what you know but who you know.” 
Cooperation “[A]s a unit we do not cooperate with small tour operators the 
tour operators that we cooperate with are the largest in market.” 
Liability “[S]ome tour operators might not ask a supplier for 
compensation for the guest if the guest is overbooked […] but 
we will still penalise the supplier.” 
Ownership “[T]our operators should exist in the market their clients spend 
more money than other tourists.” 
Short-termism “[I]n Cyprus we don’t have long term planning everything is 
about the profit you can make today, we have to learn to 
consider the future as well.” 
Bitterness “[…] deep down I personally believe there is always a feeling of 
bitterness between the parties; the bitterness goes from the 
weaker [party] towards the stronger [party].” 
Supply diversity “[…] in the last few years I have implemented a policy where 
we differentiated our sources of business.” 
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Seasonality “[T]he only problem is the winter tourism this year 2013, every 
winter we go from bad to worse.” 
Consistent tourism 
flow 
“[…] this particular tour operator might give me a lower price 
but he has a steady flow of business.” 
Visitor’s trends “[…] in Russia tourists mainly travel through the traditional 
tour operators.” 
Saleability “[…] to perform according to what the tour operators think they 
can sell.”/” […] if your hotel is really good and it sells, all tour 
operators want it.” 
Tourist arrivals “[I] am not sure if the demand for Cyprus is there because we 
are an expensive destination.” 
Information “[…] they are very knowledgeable. In the meetings we have you 
cannot fool them […] what you have to achieve is what I 
mentioned earlier for both parties to win.” 
Destination 
attractiveness 
“[…] it is an expensive destination but it sells security [it is a 
safe destination] and it has a certain tradition in tourism.” 
Infrastructure “[I]nvestment in hotels also did not increase, we do not have 
new hotels, new builds.” 
Destination 
characteristics 
“[S]elling ‘the sun’ that Cyprus has is not enough, there are a lot 
of countries that sell a sunny climate.” 
Obsolete and 
inadequate policy-
making and 
regulations 
“[…] where we have failed miserably is the factor that there are 
no rules or regulations or criteria on how the units should 
operate.” 
Governmental 
cronyism 
“[…] the board of directors of the CTO always consisted of 
architects, lawyers, high school teachers, people that have 
connections with political parties.” 
Inadequate 
government 
intervention 
“[…] so what the government should do is to upgrade the 
tourism product and give incentives to the hoteliers to upgrade 
their product.” 
Governmental 
ineffectiveness 
“[S]o if we judge according to the results of the CTO marketing 
wise, they have failed, they did not managed to open a single 
new market, they have not managed to increase the business 
from alternative countries.” 
Clashing of 
individual interests 
“[…[fulfilling individual interests plays an important role in 
Cyprus. In order for something to be implemented or solved in 
public sector there have to be individual interests involved.” 
Insufficient 
leadership 
“[…] nobody is leading [running] tourism in Cyprus.” 
Insufficient 
government/industry 
sector cooperation 
“[T]here are no collaborative efforts and cooperation [between 
the public and the private sector] to understand the problems 
that exist. The government does nothing.” 
Inadequate 
governmental 
knowledge 
“[B]ecause they [the CTO employees] do not care and they 
don’t know how to do anything. What is the strategy of the 
CTO? Nobody knows. When we ask them what is the strategy of 
the year they don’t know.” 
Government sector 
insufficient 
incentives 
“[government officials] have developed the mentality that since 
they have no incentives and no goals to achieve I don’t need to 
do anything.” 
Governmental 
accountability 
“[I]n order for things to improve in the CTO need to make a lot 
of changes, they need to take away the security of working in 
the public sector [job for life] they need to be assessed like in 
the private sector.” 
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Governmental 
centralisation 
“[T]he governing party […] simplify the procedures, as the CTO 
we are constantly asking for a simplification of the current 
procedures.” 
Promotional ability “[A]s a hotel we do not do any advertising, what we do is our 
contracts with the tour operators.” 
Reliability “[I] choose my associates based on […], how reliable they are 
[…] this is a critical factor” 
Product quality “[I] think [the tour operator’s] main concert is good quality 
products.” 
Repeat clientele “[…] we have a number of people that come every year this 
base of repeat clientele that gives us a good occupancy.” 
Reputation “[W]e have a good reputation with the tour operators, they know 
our product.” 
Location “[I]n Paphos 90-95% of tourism is leisure tourists.” 
Value for money “[…] to offer value for money.” 
Competition “[T]here is also a war going on between the large tour 
operators.” 
Allotment contract “[T]he tour operator has the right to ask for the 50 rooms an 
allotment contract and you must provide these rooms as per 
contract.” 
Commitment 
contract 
“[…] we might have agreed on a commitment contract the year 
before but the tour operator may not be able to honour that 
agreement when the season begins.” 
Exclusivity contract “[…] exclusivity contracts allow them [the tour operators] to 
have absolute control over a product.” 
Risk “[D]ue to competition and the risk they are taking, large tour 
operators are much more careful and assertive when it comes to 
their contractual negotiations.” 
Funding misuse “[N]ow due to the decrease of our [CTO] budget we must 
concentrate on making better choices , that would have return 
on investment, and be more sensible.” 
Inadequate 
governmental 
devolution 
“[T]he CTO as it is today does not even have the power and was 
never given the authority that it needed to be able to implement 
things.” 
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APPENDIX 4: MEMO: SUB-CATEGORIES INDUCED FROM 
THE DATA 
Date:	12/07/2014	 Memo	No:	4	
Title	Putting	the	concepts	into	categories	 Stage	of	Coding:	Open	coding	stage	2		
Looking	at	the	concepts	discovered	in	the	data	it	was	apparent	that	the	concepts	could	be	grouped	
together	under	10	sub-categories:	(1)	 industry	characteristics	(2)	tangible	resources	(3)	 intangible	
resources	 (4)	 type	 of	 contracts	 (5)	 pricing	 (6)	 Volume	of	 Sales	 (7)	 negotiation	 characteristics	 (8)	
relationship	constructs	(9)	emotions	(10)	Governmental	ineffectiveness		(11)	culture	
(1) Industry	characteristics:	 this	category	depicts	 the	current	state	of	 the	tourism	 industry	 in	
general	 and	 the	 Cypriot	 industry	 in	 particular.	 The	 concepts	 entail	 codes	 regarding	 the	
industrial	 (structural)	 factors	 that	 influence	 the	 bargaining	 ability	 of	 the	 accommodation	
providers,	their	dimensions	and	their	consequences.	These	factors	could	either	constrain	or	
enable	 the	accommodation	providers	 in	 their	negotiation	processes	 (whether	 contractual	
or	 not)	with	 the	 large	 TOs.	 Identifying	 the	 structural	 sources	 or	 constraints	 in	 bargaining	
ability	 of	 the	 accommodation	 providers	 provides	 information	 on	 the	 context	
(environmental)	 that	 surrounds	 this	 dyadic	 relationship.	 The	 concepts	 added	 in	 this	
category	 are:	Monopoly/oligopoly,	 dependency,	 interdependency,	 stagnation,	 oversupply,	
competition,	flight	connectivity,	control,	seasonality,	visitors’	trends	and	state	of	affairs.		
(2) Tangible	 resources:	 this	 category	depicts	 the	 tangible	 resources	 that	 the	accommodation	
providers	have	that	to	an	extent	determine	and	influence	their	bargaining	ability	with	the	
large	 TOs.	 Moreover	 it	 explain	 the	 most	 critical	 resources	 that	 the	 TOs	 need	 from	 the	
accommodation	providers	and	how	these	resources	influence	the	negotiation	process	and	
outcome.	The	category	has	both	 firm-controlled	 resources,	 in	other	words	 resources	 that	
are	possessed	by	 the	accommodation	providers	 as	well	 as	destination	 resources	 that	 are	
not	controlled	or	possessed	by	the	accommodation	providers	but	influence	their	bargaining	
ability;	since	they	provide	information	on	the	external	tangible	resources	(structure)	of	the	
relationship.	The	tangible	resources	of	a	party	partially	(along	with	the	intangible	resources)	
determine	its	position	within	the	industry	and	thus	bargaining	ability.	This	category	includes	
the	 concepts:	 infrastructure,	 product	 quality,	 location,	 size	 of	 unit,	 destination	
attractiveness,	and	destination	characteristics.		
(3) Intangible	 resources:	 this	 category	 explains	 the	 intangible	 resources	 that	 along	with	 the	
tangible	 resources	 determine	 and	 influence	 their	 bargaining	 ability.	 These	 intangible	
resources	 that	 are	 time	 consuming	and	difficult	 to	 achieve	 are	 critical	 resources	 that	 the	
accommodation	providers	can	possess	and	the	TOs	want	to	access	through	an	agreement.	
Furthermore,	 these	 resources	 can	 decrease	 the	 dependency	 of	 the	 accommodation	
providers	on	 the	TOs	 thus	 improve	 their	bargaining	ability.	These	 resources	 influence	 the	
outcome	of	 the	negotiations	with	 the	TOs.	The	concepts	 that	comprise	 this	 category	are:	
reliability,	differentiation,	repeat	clientele,	reputation,	value	for	money,	information.		
(4) Type	 of	 contracts:	 this	 category	 depicts	 the	 type	 of	 contracts	 that	 exist	 in	 the	 exchange	
relationship	between	the	TOs	and	the	accommodation	providers.	Specifically,	this	category	
explains,	 firstly	 the	 reasons	 behind	 the	 TOs	 choice	 of	 type	 of	 contract	 for	 each	
accommodation	unit.	Secondly	this	category	offers	information	on	the	influence	the	type	of	
contract	has	on	the	contractual	and	non-contractual	negotiation	process	between	the	two	
parties.	This	 is	because	the	characteristics	of	each	different	contract	that	the	parties	have	
provide	the	context	of	the	relationship,	the	data	indicate	that	the	type	of	contract	that	the	
parties	 have	 influences	 the	 negotiation	 process	 and	 outcomes.	 The	 concepts	 that	 are	
included	are:	commitment	contract,	exclusivity	contract	and	allotment	contract.	
(5) Pricing:	depicts	 the	critical	 importance	 that	pricing	has	 in	 the	 relationship	 the	pricing	can	
make	 or	 break	 the	 relationship.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 profit-making	 primary	 goal	 of	 both	
parties	 prompted	 the	 category	 pricing	 to	 be	 developed	 since	 it	 has	 been	 pointed	 out	 by	
almost	 all	 participants	 as	 a	 key	 issue	 whether	 it	 is	 a	 contractual	 or	 non-contractual	
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agreement.	 Therefore	 the	 category	 pricing	 depicts	 the	 negotiation	 processes	 (whether	
contractual	 or	 not),	 the	 antecedents	 and	 the	 conditions	 that	 influence	 the	 current	
outcomes	in	terms	of	pricing	between	the	two	parties.		This	category	includes	the	concepts:	
financial	insecurity,	expensiveness,	price	sensitivity,	soft	concessions,	discounts,	profit,	value	
for	money,	pressure,	saleability,	win-win	situation	and	risk.	
*however	 it	 is	 apparent	 that	 due	 to	 the	 bargaining	 power	 asymmetry	 that	 exists	 in	 the	
relationship	it	 is	extremely	difficult	for	the	accommodation	providers	to	negotiate	Pricing	with	
the	large	TO	(apart	from	a	couple	of	units	due	to	their	higher	bargaining	power	regarding	their	
competitors).	Therefore	the	data	indicated	that	accommodation	providers	seem	to	focus	on	the	
Volume	 of	 Sales	 that	 they	 can	 achieve	 in	 this	 relationship	 and	 focus	 on	 the	 total	 volume	 of	
tourists	 that	 they	 can	have	 in	 the	unit	 (occupancy)	during	 the	 season	essentially	 their	overall	
turnover.	Therefore,	the	second	category	Volume	of	Sales	that	emerged	from	the	data	depicts	
this.		
(6) Volume	 of	 Sales	 depicts	 the	 key	 benefit	 (or	 source)	 that	 the	 accommodation	 providers	
need	from	the	TOs,	Volume	of	Sales.	In	particular,	they	need	the	tourism	flow	that	the	TOs	
can	bring	 in	order	 to	operate.	 It	 is	 a	 critical	 issue	 that	directly	 influences	 the	negotiation	
process,	 whether	 contractual	 or	 not.	 The	 category	 includes	 concepts	 that	 explain	 the	
influencing	factors,	aspects	and	consequences	on	the	negotiation	processes	and	outcomes	
as	well	as	the	importance	of	volume	of	sales	on	the	relationship	as	a	whole.	This	category	
comprises	of	 the	concepts:	direct	sales,	saleability,	promotional	ability,	consistent	tourism	
flow,	 supply	 diversity,	 seasonality,	 tourist	 arrivals,	 flight	 connectivity	 and	 ownership	
(customer).		
(7) Negotiation	 Characteristics:	 this	 category	 explains	 the	 characteristics	 that	 influence	 the	
negotiation	process.	In	particularly	this	category	depicts	the	tactics	and	strategies	used	by	
both	parties	 to	 influence	negotiations	outcomes.	Moreover,	 it	depicts	 information	on	 the	
factors	that	influence	these	tactics	and	strategies	as	well	as	on	their	consequences,	in	other	
words	the	negotiation	outcomes	(contractual	or	not).	This	category	includes	the	concepts:	
inflexibility,	 flexibility,	 rationality,	 threats,	 uncertainty,	 pressure,	 deviance,	 control,	
information,	risk,	liability,	and	state	of	affairs.		
(8) Relationship	constructs:	this	category	depicts	 information	on	the	relational	elements	that	
influence	 the	 relationship	 in	 general	 and	 negotiations	 in	 particular	 between	 the	 two	
parties.	They	act	as	mitigating	factors	in	the	negotiations	between	the	two	parties	and	may	
indirectly	 influence	 the	 outcome	 of	 non-contractual	 negotiations.	Moreover,	 in	 terms	 of	
contractual	 negotiations	 they	 could	 affect	 negotiation	 tactics	 that	 the	 parties	might	 use.	
The	category	comprises	of	the	concepts:	trust,	reciprocity,	personal	relations,	cooperation,	
incentives	and	competition.		
(9) Emotions:	 this	 category	 depicts	 the	 emotions	 that	 the	 accommodation	 providers	 feel	 in	
their	 relationship	 with	 the	 TOs.	 These	 emotions	 are	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 power	
asymmetry	that	exists	in	the	relationship	between	the	two	parties	as	well	as	emotions	that	
derive	 from	 the	 current	 tourism	 environment	 in	 the	 ROC.	 In	 addition	 they	 depict	 the	
emotional	impact	the	negotiation	processes	have	on	the	accommodation	providers.	These	
emotions	 directly	 influence	 the	 negotiation	 processes	 and	 outcomes	 between	 the	 two	
parties,	 whether	 contractual	 or	 not,	 however	 they	 are	 implicit	 to	 the	 relationship.	 The	
concepts	 within	 this	 category	 are:	 fear,	 uncertainty,	 deviance,	 bitterness,	 pressure	 and	
control.		
(10) 	Governmental	 Ineffectiveness:	 this	category	portrays	 the	 influence	 that	 the	Government	
its	activities	and	characteristics	have	on	 the	 relationship	of	 the	accommodation	providers	
and	 the	 TOs.	 The	 Government,	 its	 activities	 and	 characteristics,	 give	 information	 on	 the	
(external)	 context	 that	 surrounds	 the	 relationship.	 This	 category	 provides	 information	 on	
how	the	Government	can	constrain	or	enable	the	bargaining	ability	of	the	accommodation	
providers	with	 the	TOs	and	 influence	the	negotiation	processes.	The	concepts	 included	 in	
this	category	are:	governmental	 ineffectiveness,	funding	misuse,	 inadequate	governmental	
evolution,	obsolete	and	 Inadequate	policy-making	and	regulations,	clientelism,	 inadequate	
government	Intervention,	clashing	of	individual	interests,	insufficient	leadership,	Insufficient	
public/private	 sector	 cooperation,	 inadequate	 governmental	 knowledge,	 public	 sector	
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insufficient	incentives,	accountability,	governmental	centralisation,	flight	connectivity.	
(11) 	Cultural:	this	category	depicts	the	influence	short-termism	and	Cypriot	mentality	have	on	
the	contractual	and	non-contractual	negotiations.	In	particular,	this	category	contributes	in	
better	 understanding	 the	 context	 of	 the	 relationship,	 in	 other	words	 how	 the	 culture	 of	
Cypriots	 influences	 their	 negotiations	processes.	 This	 sub-category	 includes	 the	 concepts:	
short-termism	and	Cypriot	mentality.		
	
*	Some	concepts	are	placed	under	more	than	one	sub-category	due	to	the	interconnections	of	the	
data	 some	concepts	are	placed	under	more	 than	one	category	 in	order	 to	 fully	aid	 to	explain	 the	
data.		
	
-The	 data	 also	 indicate	 some	 differences	 regarding	 the	 interactions	 in	 terms	 of	 whether	 the	
negotiations	are	contractual	or	not;	Specifically	 it	 is	apparent	 that	during	contractual	negotiations	
the	 stakes	are	higher	and	negotiations	more	 formal,	with	a	higher	 inflexibility	of	 the	TO,	whereas	
during	non-contractual	negotiations	that	have	a	more	informal	approach	there	is	more	flexibility	on	
the	part	of	the	TO.	Need	to	think	how	this	will	be	incorporated	in	the	analysis.		
-The	concepts	that	depict	the	type	of	contractual	agreements	that	occur	between	the	two	parties,	
allotment	contract,	commitment	contract	and	exclusivity	contract,	are	critical	since	the	provide	the	
context	of	the	relationship	(Seshadri	and	Mishra	2004)	therefore	in	order	to	have	a	more	in-depth	
and	 rich	understanding	of	 the	negotiation	process	 the	 concepts	 referring	 to	 the	 type	of	 contracts	
will	be	added	in	all	categories.		
-The	 fact	 that	 the	accommodation	providers	 see	 the	 tourists	as	 the	TOs	customers,	 contributes	 in	
creating	 a	 barrier	 between	 the	 customers	 and	 the	 accommodation	 providers	 that	 could	 also	
strengthen	their	dependency,	through	their	fear	that	they	cannot	have	any	customers	without	the	
TOs!	
*6/08/2014	
Looking	 at	 the	 categories	 identified	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 the	 sources	 of	 power	 and	 the	
external	environment	could	either	be	constraints	or	enabling	factors	to	the	bargaining	power	of	the	
APs	in	relation	to	the	TO;	this	depends	on	whether	these	sources	(or	resources)	are	able	to	decrease	
or	 increase	 the	 dependency	 of	 the	 APs	 on	 the	 TOs.	 Since	 following	 the	 power-dependency	
framework	the	level	of	dependency	that	one	party	has	on	the	other	determines	the	power	that	one	
party	has	on	the	other.	Following	Emerson	this	level	of	dependency	is	determined	by	the	value	that	
one	party	has	in	the	relationship	and	the	number	of	alternatives.		
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APPENDIX 5: EXAMPLE OF MEMO: REVISING PRICING   
CONCEPT 
 
Date: 28/04/2014  
Title: Revising- Pricing concept  Stage of Coding: Open coding  
Train	of	Thought:		
Initial	 ideas	 on	 the	 concept	 Pricing	 on	 Pg.28.	 As	 the	 researcher	 progressed	 it	 was	 apparent	 that	
pricing	is	a	critical	issue	between	the	TOs	and	the	accommodation	providers	that	can	make	of	break	
the	 relationship	 between	 them.	 Following	 the	 importance	 that	 was	 noticed	 I	 decided	 that	 the	
Pricing	concept	needed	be	 looked	at	more	detail.	 Since	 the	pricing	process	can	directly	affect	 the	
ability	of	the	accommodation	providers	in	investing	their	product	and	thus	increase	their	bargaining	
power	sources.	 	Thus	I	revisited	the	pricing	concept	 in	order	to	see	 in	more	detail	the	factors	that	
influence	 pricing	 and	 in	 turn	 the	 effect	 on	 the	 relationship	 and	 the	 bargaining	 ability	 of	 the	
accommodation	 providers.	 Four	 concepts	 were	 identified	 expensiveness,	 discounts,	 price	
sensitivity	and	soft	concessions.	The	result	of	revising	this	concept	led	to	pricing	being	promoted	to	
a	category	given	that	Pricing	was	identified	as	a	key	concern	by	the	interviews.		
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APPENDIX 6: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION LETTER 
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APPENDIX 7: FORM OF CONSENT 
  
Form%of%Consent%%%Title%of%project:%Exploring%the%relationship%between%Cypriot%accommodation%providers%and%large%European%tour%operators%Researcher:%% Savvina%Karyopouli,%PhD%candidate,%Bournemouth%University%%Contact%details:%skaryopouli@bournemouth.ac.uk%or%97873714.%%Supervisor:%% Dr.%Christina%Koutra%,%Senior%Lecturer%in%Corporate%Social%Responsibility%%Contact%details:%ckoutra@bournemouth.ac.uk%%or%+44%(0)1202%968716.%%%
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!!Place!initials!here!%I%confirm%that%I%have%read%and%understood%the%participant%information%sheet%for%the%above%research%project%and%have%had%the%opportunity%to%ask%questions.%
%
!
I%understand%that%my%participation%is%voluntary%and%that%I%am%free%to%withdraw%at%any%time,%without%giving%reason%and%without%there%being%any%negative%consequences.%In%addition,%should%I%not%wish%to%answer%any%particular%question(s)%I%am%free%to%decline.%%%
!
I%give%permission%for%members%of%the%research%team%to%have%access%to%my%anonymised%responses.%I%understand%that%my%name%will%not%be%linked%with%the%research%materials,%and%I%will%not%be%identified%or%identifiable%in%the%report%or%reports%that%result%from%the%research.%%%%
!
I%agree%to%take%part%in%the%above%research%project.%% !
!%____________________________%%%%%%_______________%%%%%%__________________________________%Name%of%Participant%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Date%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Signature%%____________________________%%%%%%_______________%%%%%%__________________________________%Name%of%Researcher%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Date%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Signature%
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